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Abstract
This thesis seeks to answer the principal question as to whether international criminal
justice systems can serve as adequate truth-ascertaining forums. In doing so, it
reviews the practice of three international criminal justice systems: the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the International Criminal Court (ICC). It is not the
purpose of this research to review the black letter law adopted and applied by these
international tribunals and court, but rather to review the implementation of the legal
principles in practice. It is a socio-legal research project which focuses on the practice
of the tribunals and court. It discusses socio-legal, institutional and political issues
relating to the ascertainment of the truth in international criminal justice.

In addition, it examines the gaps between the theory and practice of ascertaining the
truth in the ICTY, ICTR and ICC. It does so principally by exploring the roles of the
parties, participants and judges in ascertaining the truth. This includes the obstacles
they face in doing so and the responses given, if any, to accommodate these
difficulties. Challenges include the politicised climate of most post-conflict societies,
the remoteness of the crime base areas from the seat of the Court, the lack of
enforcement mechanisms and reliance on State cooperation, as well as the
unfamiliarities with the cultural and linguistic features of the affected communities.
This thesis reveals that these difficulties are not the principal cause of truth-searching
impediments. Indeed, it is asserted that the ascertainment of the truth can be fair and
effective notwithstanding these difficulties. It also demonstrates that truthascertaining impediments are mainly caused by failures to adequately investigate the
crimes and relevant evidence. At the ICTY, investigations have been carried out in the
most efficient and fair manner possible under the circumstances. By contrast, the
ICTR and ICC investigations are far from adequate and should be improved. The
Prosecution should make more efforts to obtain the best evidence available.

It further concludes that international justice systems have set their goals too highly.
Instead of seeking to meet objectives such as reconciliation, peace and security, they
should restrict their focus to the question as to whether the guilt of a particular
accused has been established in respect of the crimes charged.
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Introduction
Topic of this Research

This thesis on ‘The Ascertainment of the Truth in International Criminal Justice’
principally explores the following question:

Do international criminal courts and tribunals constitute effective truthsearching institutions?

This thesis has been inspired by two recent events:

A truth to be found or constructed?
First, on 30 March 2011 in The Hague, Michelle Parlevliet opened a debate on the
ascertainment of the truth in international criminal justice. This debate followed the
showing of the documentary ‘Telling Truths in Arusha’, 1 with the following question:
‘is there a truth to be found or a truth to be constructed’? None of the participants of
the debate which included two defence counsel who had practiced before a number of
international criminal tribunals and a judge from the SCSL2 had a clear answer to that
question. 3 This is not surprising since there is no fixed view on how truth is to be
defined in the context of international criminal justice. It is an important issue since it
is directly linked to the question of what interpretation should be given to the task of
ascertaining the truth in international criminal justice.

The same question was also central to the documentary itself, which was based on the
trial of a priest, Hormisdas Nsengimana, who was tried for genocide and crimes
against humanity before the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and
1

This documentary was shown in the filmhuis in The Hague as part of the Amnesty International Film
Festival ‘Movies that Matter’. It is a documentary made by a Norwegian filmmaker, Beate Arnestad in
2010 (SF Norge Produksjon AS). See:
<http://www.moviesthatmatterfestival.nl/english_index/programma_en/film_en/513>
2
One of the defence counsel for Nsengimana, Mr. David Hooper QC, was one of the participants of the
debate. The other participants were Judge Sebutinde, one of the judges in the pending SCSL case of
Charles Taylor, and Wayne Jordash, former counsel for Issa Sesay.
3
It appears, however, that Michelle Parlevliet who presided over the debate and asked this question
had already answered it in an academic writing entitled M. Parlevliet, Considering Truth. Dealing with
a Legacy of Gross Human Rights Violations, 16(2) Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 141
(1998). In this article, she held that the truth is not something that can be found but rather that needs to
be constructed (at 172).
7

acquitted on 17 November 2009. 4 Judge Møse, the presiding judge in this case and
former President of the ICTR, gave the following answer to the question of whether a
truth could be found in an international court of law: “That is a bit of a philosophical
quandary. The question we as judges seek to answer is whether the guilt of an accused
before us has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt”. In this case, Judge Møse and
two fellow judges considered that Nsengimana’s guilt had not been established
beyond reasonable doubt. Had the truth been found? That appeared to be a more
difficult question to answer. 5

Deficiencies in fact-finding in international criminal justice
Second, in June 2010, Nancy Combs published a book “Fact-finding Without Facts” 6
with shocking results. It places doubt whether establishing accurate facts in
international justice is possible. With ample examples of deficiencies in witness
testimonies in the ICTR, SCSL and East Timor Special Panel, Combs concludes that
there are insurmountable problems in establishing facts in conflict zones particularly
in Africa and other non-Western countries where documentary evidence is sparse.
The problems she addresses are, inter alia, (i) the problem of interpretation both in
the taking of statements and in court testimony; (ii) cultural differences resulting in
inaccurate answers; (iii) the inability particularly of uneducated witnesses to read
maps and measure distances; and, (iv) perjury. 7

Combs argues that some improvement can be made by increasing the budget for
translation, number of site visits, and prosecutions of perjurers, as well as increasing
investigation standards. She also suggests that improvement can be achieved by
allowing judges greater control over the questioning of witnesses. 8 She concludes,
however, that many of these problems cannot be resolved and clearly impede on the
ability to ascertain accurate facts in international justice. She believes that most of the
4

Prosecutor v. Nsengimana, T. Ch. I. Judgement, ICTR-01-69-T, 17 November 2009.
Judge Sebutinde did not seem to think so. She made the observation that, in reaching their conclusion,
the judges had focused too much on contradictions between the in-court testimony of the witnesses and
their prior statements, which were not taken under oath and should therefore, in her view, be given very
limited weight. David Hooper, on the other hand, responded by saying that the contradictions were so
significant that they could not be the result of mistakes but indicated that the witnesses did not tell the
truth.
6
N. Combs, Fact-Finding Without Facts, The Uncertain Evidentiary Foundations of International
Criminal Convictions (Cambridge University Press, 2010).
7
Ibid, in particular Chapters 1-5.
8
Ibid, 273-321.
5
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defendants are guilty but that their guilt cannot be established beyond reasonable
doubt in an international court of law. She argues that an unjustified acquittal in
international criminal justice is more costly than in domestic trials, while an
unjustified conviction is less costly than in domestic trials. Combs bases her argument
on the fact that international trials are extremely expensive and the financers are likely
to be less willing to pay the costs if a large number of the trials end in acquittals. She
also highlights that acquittals are regularly followed by public outrage, particularly of
the victims who suffered unspeakable atrocities. 9

In light of the foregoing, Combs offers two solutions in addition to improving factfinding accuracy: (1) to apply a flexible standard of proof permitting a lower level of
certainty, as appropriate in the circumstances; 10 and (2) to charge more frequently
under the joint criminal enterprise mode of liability. 11

Combs’ research is a valuable contribution to the literature because it is the first
socio-legal research that has been conducted in the area of fact-finding in
international justice. In reaching her conclusions, she read thousands of transcripts
and interviewed many defence and prosecution counsel and investigators in the field
of international justice.

However, her research and conclusions are highly controversial because they question
the very essence of international criminal tribunals, which is equivalent to domestic
criminal courts, namely the ability to establish accurate facts. Her research has been
embraced by some, and criticised by others. Some of the criticism is valid, other less,
as will be discussed in this thesis.

Defence counsel in international courts and tribunals generally support her views. In
one case before the ICTR, as well as in a Rwandan genocide case in the Netherlands,
the defence unsuccessfully sought to introduce her book as expert evidence. 12 On the
other hand, Justice Doherty, one of the SCSL judges in the case of Charles Taylor, is
9

Ibid, 352-360.
Ibid, 343-364.
11
Ibid, 321-333.
12
Such a request was made in the ICTR case of Prosecutor v. Nzabonimana, ICTR-98-44D-T; and in
the Dutch case of Yvonne Basebya.
10
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highly critical of Combs’ book. She suggests that the difficulties Combs describes are
not unique to fact-finding in international justice but also occur in domestic
jurisdictions where practical solutions have to be found constantly to practical
problems. Similarly, practical solutions must be found for practical problems in
international criminal tribunals. In her view, it cannot be argued that accurate factfinding in international justice is impossible per se. 13 Given that Combs did not
observe any of the proceedings personally but rather relied on transcripts, she was not
in a position to assess the demeanour of the witnesses. 14

Combs’ book also provoked ample academic debate on the limitations of fact-finding
in international justice and clearly warrants follow-up research. As Professor John
Jackson has pointed out, some valid criticism can be made against Combs’ research
and conclusions, but it should be acknowledged that she managed to do what many
others failed to do. She went out and conducted socio-legal research concerning the
practical realities of fact-finding in international justice. This is not an easy task.
Jackson encourages academics to continue the socio-legal work she started. 15

Aim of this Research
This thesis seeks to take Jackson’s advice and to continue the debate ignited by
Combs’ socio-legal research with a touch of Parlevliet’s philosophical approach to the
ascertainment of the truth. It examines the difficulties in ascertaining the truth in
international criminal tribunals. The central question of this thesis is whether
international criminal courts and tribunals constitute effective truth-searching
institutions. If not, what improvements can be made to achieve this goal, if, indeed it
is possible?

The aim of this research is not to review the black letter law adopted and applied by
international criminal tribunals, but rather to review the implementation of the legal
principles in practice. It is a socio-legal research project focusing on the practice of
the tribunals, discussing socio-legal, institutional and political issues relating to the
13

Observations of the Honourable Justice Teresa Doherty, key speaker at A Socio-Legal Approach to
Evidence in International Criminal Tribunals, Conference held at the University College of Dublin,
Dublin, Ireland, 19 November 2011 (“the Dublin Conference”).
14
Ibid.
15
Concluding remarks by Professor Jackson at the Dublin Conference.
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ascertainment of the truth in international criminal justice. It examines the gaps
between the theory and practice of ascertaining the truth in international tribunals. It
then explores what improvements can be made to fill these gaps.

Structure of this Research
This research consists of four parts.

Part I
Part I analyses theoretical concepts with the aim to define the theoretical framework
within which the practical issues will be discussed. It looks at the aspirations and
expectations of the ascertainment of the truth in international justice, as well as the
limitations of what can be achieved. It also discusses the extent to which the
ascertainment of the truth is an objective of international justice, and how this
objective relates to other objectives of international justice.

It explores what is actually meant by ascertaining the truth within the context of the
function and perceived mandate of international trials. In this regard, it analyses
whether the ascertainment of the truth corresponds with the reasonable doubt standard
or whether it is subsumed within the more general restorative aims. It further
examines the theoretical difficulties to achieve it as well as its scope. The principal
question of whether these international criminal justice systems are effective as truthascertaining institutions can only be meaningfully discussed after these factors are
addressed. In so doing, Part I analyses and compares the meaning and scope of the
ascertainment of the truth in civil law and common law criminal justice systems.

Part I then establishes minimum conditions international courts and tribunals should
meet to provide an adequate theoretical possibility of ascertaining the truth.

Part II
Part II examines the method chosen to ascertain the truth and whether it, at least in
theory, has all the ingredients to succeed in this endeavour. It assesses to what extent
these procedures comply with the minimum condition set out in Part I. It also
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identifies the procedural aspects which are potentially problematic in the
ascertainment of the truth.

Part II will provide a brief overview of two types of methodologies – civil law and
common law. Mainly these methodologies have influenced the procedure which is
now adopted and applied in international criminal courts and tribunals.

It then analyses whether the combining of these two types of procedures into the
emerging international methodology has led to a thoroughly adequate structure of
international truth ascertainment. It will address the concern frequently raised that
mixing bits and pieces of fundamentally different systems with their own distinct
legal philosophies may create a deformed system.

It further evaluates to what extent the emerging international truth-ascertaining
methodology, essentially based on Western criminal justice methodologies, can in
theory be implemented effectively in non-Western countries with potentially different
views on truth and justice.

Part III
In Part III, the efficiency of international criminal justice systems as truth-searching
forums is tested by considering whether the minimum conditions, as set out in Part I,
are met. This part determines how well the international tribunals and courts have
done so far in implementing the theoretical task of ascertaining the truth.

Part III examines the truth-searching practice in three international criminal tribunals
and court: the ICTR, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) and the International Criminal Court (ICC). It explores the roles of the parties,
participants and judges in ascertaining the truth, the obstacles they face in doing so
and the response which was given, if any, to accommodate these difficulties.
Particular attention is paid to the procedural aspects which have been identified in
Part II as potentially problematic in ascertaining the truth.

Part III discusses the following subjects:
•

Investigations;
12

•

Victims and Witnesses;

•

Admissibility and evaluation of the evidence.

Part IV
From the analysis in Parts I to III, conclusions are drawn regarding the adequacy in
practice of the ascertainment of the truth in the ICTR, ICTY and ICC. To the extent
necessary, suggestions for improvement are made.

Method and Scope of this Research
Part I
Part I discusses theory rather than practice. In exploring the theoretical concepts that
are later tested in practice, Part I principally relies on academic sources. It has
particularly been inspired by the aforementioned debate on the ascertainment of the
truth, as well as a number of scholarly works including Michelle Parlevliet’s
academic article on ‘Considering Truth: Dealing with a Legacy of Gross Human
Rights Violations’. 16 Other influential authors exploring the definition of the
ascertainment of the truth and conditions necessary to ascertain the truth efficiently
and fairly include Rorty, 17 Koskenniemi, 18 and David Becker. 19
The theories of Richard Ashby Wilson, 20 Hannah Arendt 21 and various other
observers 22 are referred to in discussing the extent to which courts should get
involved in establishing historical facts. To this effect, the views of practitioners in
international justice are also discussed.

16

Parlevliet, Considering Truth, supra note 3.
R. Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (Cambridge University Press, 1989), 48; R. Rorty,
Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I (Cambridge University Press, 1991),
21-45; Parlevliet, Considering Truth, supra note 3, 6.
18
M. Koskenniemi, Between Impunity and Show Trials, 6 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations
Law 1 (2002).
19
D. Becker, Confronting the truth of the Erinyes: The illusion of Harmony in the Healing of Trauma,
in T. Borer (Ed), Telling the Truths: Truth Telling and Peace Building in Post-Conflict Societies,
(University of Notre Dame Press, 2006) 231; at 232 he refers to ‘belief rather than scientific proof’,
and 242-243.
20
R. Wilson, Judging History: The Historical Record of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia, 27 Human Rights Quarterly 908 (2005), 908-942.
21
H. Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem, A Report on the Banality of Evil (Penguin Books, 1994) (first
published in the US by the Viking Press 1963).
22
See further below, section ‘Scope of the ascertainment of the truth in international justice’.
17
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Part I further gives due consideration to the manner in which Truth and Reconciliation
Commissions (TRCs) have interpreted their mandate to establish the truth and how
they deal with difficulties in meeting this mandate. This is considered essential
because TRCs and international criminal courts and tribunals are established in
similar circumstances with similar objectives albeit with different types of truthascertaining methodologies.

The scope of the analysis of TRCs is limited. The analysis does not discuss practical
examples – save for a number of limited references – but focuses on theory. The
discussion is primarily aimed at explaining the common objectives of TRCs and
international criminal justice. It points out the limits of any mechanism in meeting
those objectives and emphasises the difficulties of meeting them all at once in the
same procedure. The TRC experience demonstrates that the achievement of these
objectives can be frustrated by seeking to over-achieve as, in particular situations,
these objectives may be in conflict with each other.

Part I also discusses opinions expressed at conferences or in personal interviews by
various participants from NGOs or international criminal courts and tribunals.
Inclusion of such opinions is necessary to analyse the general perceptions of what the
functions of international criminal courts and tribunals are, or should be.

Part II
Part II provides a comparative analysis of common law and civil law criminal justice
systems. The discussion of civil law jurisdictions is based mainly on the Dutch,
French and German criminal justice systems with occasional references to the Italian,
Russian and Belgian systems. Whilst this clearly does not give the overall picture of
all civil law systems, it offers a global picture of the common features among these
various systems. The discussion of common law jurisdictions is based mainly on the
criminal justice system of the United Kingdom (UK), the birth country of common
law. It does not discuss other common law jurisdictions in great detail.

A classification of domestic systems as common law or civil law systems requires
significant generalisations, omissions of important details and oversimplification of
legal complexities. This is all the more so in light of the fact that the analysis is
14

limited to a number of jurisdictions only. Each jurisdiction has features unique to its
own and could form the subject of an entire thesis. In addition, there are debates on
whether the legal systems can and should still be classified as common law or civil
law systems.

Domestic systems continue to evolve. Given the massive expansion of international
relations over the last fifty years, the evolution of domestic systems is a process that is
heavily influenced by cross-border developments. The European Court of Human
Rights, the European Union and international treaties have had significant influence
on European criminal justice systems and led to convergence between the UK
common law and continental civil law criminal justice systems. 23 Simultaneously,
such European developments influencing the UK system may widen the gaps between
the UK and non-European common law criminal justice systems. In light of such
developments, Richard Frase argues that “the value of global models may become
increasingly limited; the growing complexity and hybridisation of modern criminal
justice systems tend to undercut the simplicity needed for models to serve their
descriptive, explanatory, predictive and normative functions.” 24

The impact of international developments on domestic jurisdictions and whether they
should be re-classified as a result, or not classified at all, is a thesis on its own. This
is, however, beyond the scope of this research. A more in depth analysis of the
comparative framework of common law versus civil law and the extent to which it is
still applicable is given by distinct comparative criminal law scholars like Professor
Hans Nijboer, Professor Mireille Delmas-Marty, and Professor Mirjan Damaška.
Their deep and challenging thinking has greatly inspired this thesis.

23

M. Delmas-Marty, The ‘Hybridisation’ of Criminal Procedure, in J. Jackson, M. Langer & P. Tillers
(Eds.), Crime, Procedure and Evidence and International Context, Essays in honour of Professor
Mirjan Damaška, (Hart Publishing, 2008) 251, at 253; M. Delmas-Marty, Procédure Pénale d’Europe
(Dalloz, 1995); C. Brants & S. Field, Convergence in European Criminal Justice, in E. Hondius, De
meerwaarde van de rechtsvergelijking. Opstellen aangeboden aan prof. mr H.U. Jessurun d’Oliveira,
Nederlandse Vereniging voor Rechtsvergelijking, (Deventer: Kluwer, 1999), 179-180; B. Swart & J.
Young, The European Convention on Human Rights and Criminal Justice in the Netherlands and the
UK, in P Fennell, C Harding, N Jorg & B Swart (Eds.) Criminal Justice in Europe: A Comparative
Study (Clarendon Press, 1995).
24
R. Frase, Sentencing and Comparative Law Theory, in Jackson, Crime, Procedure and Evidence,
supra note 23, 351, at 369.
15

The following question comes to mind: why does this thesis rely on a comparative
framework whose usefulness is disputed?

Most scholars still use this comparative framework, particularly in discussing
elements of international criminal justice. 25 Even if such a classification is no longer
justified, it is still used in international criminal justice. The scope and word limit of
this thesis do not permit inclusion of an analysis of Chinese, Sharia or other law
which has little in common with either common law or civil law. The influence of any
such laws on international criminal justice is extremely limited, even if debatably they
should have more impact.

Comparative research can only be done properly within a well-defined framework.
Being fully cognisant of the disparities among individual criminal justice systems
labelled as the same ‘ideal type’ criminal justice system, Damaška has nonetheless
stressed the importance of ‘comparative modelling’. The complex legal world cannot
be understood “without constructing analytical models through which to organise and
interpret the empirical data which bombard our senses.” 26

While Paul Roberts defends the continuing relevance and importance of conceptual
analysis and modelling in comparative law, he highlights that “constructing idealtypical models should be a starting point, rather than the ultimate destination, of
comparative legal analysis.” 27 Indeed, domestic jurisdictions are not “blueprints of
procedural ideas”. 28
With that in mind, Part II of this thesis will explore what influence, if any, the two ideal type
methodologies have had on international criminal courts and tribunals. Where necessary, a number of

25

See, for instance, P. Murphy & L. Baddour, International Criminal Law and Common Law Rules of
Evidence and V. Tochilovsky, The Nature and Evolution of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, in
Khan, Principles of Evidence, in K. Khan, C. Buisman & C. Gosnell (Eds.), Principles of Evidence in
International Criminal Justice (Oxford University Press, 2010). See also P. De Hert, Legal Procedures
at the International Criminal Court in R. Haveman, O. Kavran & J. Nicholls (Eds.), Supranational
Criminal Law: a System Sui Generis (Intersentia, 2003) 79, 93–94.
26
P. Roberts, Faces of Justice Adrift? Damaška’s Comparative Method and the Future of Common
Law Evidence, in Jackson, Crime, Procedure and Evidence, supra note 23, at 300, citing Damaška’s
reference to Weber.
27
Ibid, 325.
28
J. Jackson & M. Langer, Introduction: Damaška and Comparative Law, in Jackson, Crime,
Procedure and Evidence, supra note 23, at 7-8; M. Damaška, The Faces of Justice and State Authority:
A Comparative Approach to the Legal Process (Yale University Press, 1986).
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superficial descriptions, in particular of civil law criminal justice systems, will be corrected.
International criminal justice systems frequently refer to ‘common law’ or ‘civil law’ without being
more specific. They have relied over the years on generalised assumptions about common law or civil
law to justify legal interpretations and modifications. 29 These will be addressed.

Common law jurisdictions are also referred to as ‘Anglo-American’, ‘adversarial’,
‘adversary’ and ‘accusatorial’ systems; and civil law jurisdictions as ‘continental
European’, ‘inquisitorial’ or ‘non-adversary’ systems. 30 This thesis refers to common
law and civil law criminal justice systems only. This is done for simplicity reasons,
but also because the terms ‘common law’ and ‘civil law’ are most value-neutral. To
refer to these two legal families as ‘Anglo-American’ and ‘continental European’
would not do justice to the many other jurisdictions falling under the common law
and civil law nominators. To refer to them as ‘inquisitorial’ and ‘accusatorial’ or
‘adversarial’ would not describe the systems accurately as both ideal types are
accusatorial in the sense of the prosecutor charging the defendant. Also, both have
adversarial proceedings. Civil law criminal proceedings have their roots in
inquisitorial proceedings, but have over the years incorporated many adversarial
features.

Accordingly, Damaška considers it unfair to continue to brand these systems as
‘inquisitorial’. 31 He argues that the traditional classification of criminal legal systems
in ‘inquisitorial’ versus ‘accusatorial’ or ‘adversarial’ “does not afford a suitable
conceptual framework within which to study the contrasts between modern
continental and Anglo-American criminal processes”. 32 Instead, Damaška proposes to
use the terms ‘adversary’ for common law systems versus ‘non-adversary’ for civil
law systems. 33 However, even these terms no longer adequately reflect the ideal-type

29

See, for instance Prosecutor v. Tadić, T. Ch. II. Decision on defence motion on hearsay, IT-94-1-T,
August 1996, para. 13.
30
Damaška has qualified the two different families as adversary versus non-adversary systems. See M.
Damaška, Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of Criminal Procedure: A Comparative
Study, 121 U Penn L Rev 506 (1972–73), 562.
31
Ibid, 560-562.
32
Ibid, 555.
33
In earlier days, Damaška distinguished three types of criminal procedures: adversarial, inquisitorial,
and reformed inquisitorial criminal procedures. As inquisitorial type procedures are now all
increasingly adversarial, at least in parts, the differences between inquisitorial and reformed
inquisitorial type criminal proceedings have diminished. See Damaška, Evidentiary Barriers, supra
note 30, 562.
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systems. As will be discussed in this thesis, the ‘non-adversary’ systems have become
more ‘adversary’.

Part III
Part III is in part a follow-up of Nancy Combs’ research on international fact-finding
realities and discusses her findings and conclusions. Having carefully scrutinised
Combs’ book on fact-finding without facts, it has become clear to me that there is still
ample room for further research in this area. Indeed, as Combs herself recognises in
her book, her research “is preliminary and […] much more needs to be done both to
quantify [her] findings and to understand their impact”. 34

This thesis is complementary to Combs’ research since it focuses primarily on the
ICC, a court Combs has not discussed in her book. The ICC could not have been part
of her research as it had barely begun. Even today, there are no verdicts yet. However,
a number of confirmation decisions have been rendered. These may reveal whether
the ICC judges apply a rigorous standard of proof or simply accept the prosecution’s
allegations on face value without thoroughly scrutinising the supporting evidence.
Even without verdicts, a number of conclusions can already be drawn on the basis of
the ongoing proceedings, the investigations that have been conducted thus far and the
procedural decisions issued by different Pre-Trial and Trial Chambers. In addition,
while ICTY and ICTR will soon close down, the ICC represents the future. The ICC
will continue to ascertain the truth, likely facing fact-finding difficulties resembling
those experienced by the ICTY and ICTR. This is precisely why this research
principally examines the ICC proceedings.

In so doing, it analyses the truth-ascertaining obstacles that have occurred in the
ICTY and ICTR. Combs does not include the ICTY in her analysis. The ICTY is
ascertaining facts relating to a European rather than a non-Western conflict and deals
with Western witnesses. Combs therefore assumes that the ICTY is not faced with the
same number of fact-finding impediments as she has identified in the ICTR, SCSL
and East Timor Special Panels. In addition, until now, the ICC is dealing exclusively
with African situations. Accordingly, Combs asserts that it is likely that the ICC will

34

Combs, Fact-Finding Without Facts, supra note 6, 366.
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face similar fact-finding problems to those experienced by the ICTR, SCSL and East
Timor Panels, even if the ICTY is not as problematic. These are her reasons for
leaving the ICTY out of her research. 35 She has been criticised for failing to include
the ICTY, which according to Professor Paul Roberts renders her research flawed. 36

This thesis reviews the assumption that the ICTY is not affected by fact-finding
impediments in the same fashion as the ICTR, SCSL and East Timor Special Panels.
Accordingly, it compares the fact-finding practice of the ICTR with that of the ICTY
and determines whether they differ greatly. It is to be expected that the ICC will not
continue to deal exclusively with African conflicts but may at some point deal with a
conflict zone in a Western sector. Accordingly, the realities of ascertaining the truth in
the ICTY and ICTR are both relevant to the ongoing ascertainment of the truth in the
ICC.

Combs has already extensively discussed the practice of the ICTR. However, it is still
worthwhile discussing this practice as part of this thesis because significant judgments
(Government I and II, Bagosora & Nsengiyumva Appeal Judgment, Military II) have
been passed since she wrote her book. These may alter her conclusions. This project
includes an analysis of these recent judgments with the aim to determine whether
there has been any change of approach to ascertaining the truth over the course of
time.

Contrary to Combs’ book, this research does not refer to fact-finding, but rather to the
ascertainment of, or search for the truth. Conceptually, ascertaining the truth differs
from ascertaining the facts as becomes clear in Part I. In addition, this research
refrains from using the terms ‘fact-finding’ or ‘truth-finding’ notwithstanding that
these are commonly accepted terms used frequently by scholars. 37 Former judge in
the United States and critical legal philosopher, Jerome Frank, points out that “finding
facts” is a misleading term. In his view, facts “found” in the court are not ready-made
“data” waiting somewhere to be found by the court. Frank argues that it is more
35

Ibid, 5.
Observations of Professor Paul Roberts, one of the speakers at the Dublin Conference, supra note 13.
37
For instance H. Friman, The International Criminal Court and Participation of Victims: A Third
Party to the Proceedings?, 22 Leiden Journal of International Law 485 (2009) 485-500; W.
Schomburg, Truth-Finding in the International Courtroom: The ad-hoc Tribunals for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR), Lecture Outline, Utrecht 29 March 2008.
36
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appropriate to say that the court creates the facts on the basis of its subjective
perceptions of the witnesses’ stories. 38 The same reasoning applies to the truth. As is
discussed in Part I, it queries whether the truth can be found or whether it must be
constructed. Accordingly, the terms ‘truth-finding’ and ‘fact-finding’ are avoided in
this thesis.

In discussing the obstacles to ascertaining the truth in international criminal justice, I
rely on my extensive (over a decade) personal experience and observation in
conducting investigations in war-affected areas as well as employment at various
international criminal courts and tribunals. Having interned for the ICTY Office of the
Prosecutor and participated in the defence of several accused before the ICTR, ICTY,
SCSL and ICC, I observed on a daily basis in the courtroom as well as the field,
everyone’s struggle to ascertain the factual allegations accurately and efficiently. I
conducted investigations in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Sierra Leone,
Rwanda, Kenya and Kosovo with the aim to collect evidence and interview potential
witnesses.

While being there, I also conducted interviews with members of the local
communities concerning their expectations of international justice and their
perspectives on the truth regarding the conflict through which they had lived.

In and outside Rwanda, I have spoken to at least 200 Rwandan male and female
adults of both ethnic groups (although more Hutu than Tutsi) about their perceptions
on ICTR justice. In the DRC, I have had similar discussions on ICC justice with at
least 100 Congolese of various ethnic groups including Hema, Ngiti and Nande. The
interviewees were predominantly men in their twenties or older. I also spoke to about
15 prisoners in DRC and Rwanda.

In Kosovo, I have spoken to approximately 25 male Kosovar Albanians about ICTY
justice. Women were less forward in DRC and Kosovo. In addition, I have spoken to
ICTY colleagues from the former Yugoslavia mainly of Serb ethnicity. These
discussions were mostly informal conducted in French, Swahili or English. In
38

J. Frank, Courts on Trial, Myth and Reality in American Justice (Princeton University Press, 1973)
23-24.
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Kosovo, I relied on a translator. The people I interviewed were aware of my role in
defence, which may have affected their answers. It is possible that their answers
would have been different had I worked for the Prosecution, or had no affiliation with
international justice. This is, of course, a problem that any socio-legal researcher, or
investigator is facing.

Part III is therefore largely based on primary sources and inspired by my personal
experiences in the field and in international courtrooms. My discussions are also
based on the experience of other practitioners in international criminal justice.

In addition, I have reviewed all ICTY and ICTR Appeals and Trial Judgments
through to the end of 2011. I have also reviewed all ICC Confirmation Decisions until
23 January 2012. Where necessary, I have studied the transcripts to review the
testimonies of witnesses or legal debates. I have also examined many motions, briefs
and decisions. In doing so, I have drawn a number of conclusions concerning the
accuracy and efficiency of the ascertainment of the facts. The review of the case law
was particularly important for writing the chapter on the evaluation of the evidence.

Any socio-legal researcher seeking to assess the credibility of witnesses or the
reliability of their testimonies by reading the transcripts is faced with significant
limitations. Unless a researcher has witnessed the testimony of a witness in court, it is
difficult to make an assessment of the weight it should be given. A researcher
attempting to do so essentially wears the hat of a judge without having had the
opportunity of observing the witnesses. 39

Combs has, however, demonstrated that significant inferences can be drawn from the
transcripts and detailed judgments rendered by the Trial and Appeals Chambers. For
instance, the coherence and consistency in approach can be assessed. In cases where
previous written witness statements are accessible to the public, it is possible to
compare these statements with the witnesses’ viva voce testimonies and consider
whether they contradict each other. Regrettably, large parts of the transcripts and
39

At the Dublin Conference, supra note 13, Justice Doherty expressed criticism of Nancy Combs for
drawing conclusions on the basis of the transcripts without having observed the live testimonies on
which the conclusions were based.
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witness statements are confidential and thus not accessible to the public.

In conducting this research, I have faced such limitations, save in the ICTR case of
Bagosora et al and the ICTY cases of Kupreskic et al, Limaj et al and Haraqija where
I was a direct observer. I was, however, a party to the proceedings, and may thus be
perceived as partial. In addition, I cannot make use of confidential material to which I
have been privy.

This research, therefore, limits itself to making observations on how the judges go
about evaluating the evidence without drawing conclusions on whether it was fair to
convict or acquit an accused in a particular case. This research is confined to
analysing the quality of the evidence produced by the parties, the Chambers’ approach
to certain categories of witnesses, whether defence and prosecution witnesses are
treated in the same fashion, whether Chambers have been consistent, and whether
there has been a change in approach over time.

As a complement to the research of primary sources and jurisprudence, this thesis is
based on academic literature and addresses the scholarly debate that has arisen in
relation to the practical realities of the ascertainment of the truth in international
courts and tribunals.

PART IV
Part IV draws conclusions on the basis of the research in previous parts.

As Clark rightly observed, in conducting empirical research relating to international
criminal justice, “self-reflection and recognition that our own “aspirations are often
taken for empirical facts” are (…) important components of impact assessment.40
Therefore, I am not offering conclusive answers, but rather material to ponder.
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International Criminal Law Review 241 (2011).
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PART I
MEANING AND SCOPE OF
ASCERTAINMENT OF THE TRUTH

23

Identified Objectives of International Criminal Courts and Tribunals
International criminal justice systems are set up in post conflict situations, or
sometimes even during an ongoing conflict. They are often established in respect to
States in transition where domestic criminal justice may be inadequate due to a
variety of factors: massive scale of atrocities committed in the course of the conflict,
the collapse of the domestic legal infrastructure, and/or its inability to conduct trials in
a neutral and fair fashion. When a conflict is still fresh, the applicable domestic legal
system is often unwilling or unable to address past atrocities. 41

Indeed, the climate in a post-conflict society is often politicized with many unhealed
wounds. A domestic judicial system in this context may not be suited to deliver
impartial justice. 42 Post-conflict societies have a plethora of problems and require a
significant transitional period to rebuild. This rebuilding is not limited to physical
infrastructure but also includes psychological rebuilding necessary to deal with
communal trauma. It is during this period that international criminal justice systems
step in to offer a helping hand and deliver ‘transitional justice’. 43 Whilst the ICTY
and ICTR can enter in even in situations where the domestic State itself is willing to
deal with criminal investigations and prosecutions, the ICC only has jurisdiction
where a domestic State is unable or unwilling to initiate genuine criminal
investigations. 44
41

J. Llewellyn, Restorative Justice in Transitions and Beyond, The Justice Potential of Truth-Telling
Mechanisms for Post-Peace Accord Societies, in Borer, Telling the Truths, supra note 40, 90. See also
M. Latimer, Enforcing Human Rights Through International Criminal Law, in M. Lattimer & P. Sands,
Justice for Crimes Against Humanity (Hart Publishing, 2003) 387, 394-400, describing the difficulties
and challenges faced by post-conflict societies.
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Wilson, Judging History, supra note 20, 919: According to Wilson, post-conflict governments often
“selectively filter the past to invent a new official history and to construct a new vision of the nation.
These regimes manufacture legitimacy internally to defuse and delegitimate political opponents, and
externally to assert the government’s human rights credentials to the international community. They
attempt to create a new shared ‘collective memory’.”; Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem, supra note 21,
270-272. See also S. Cohen, State Crimes of Previous Regimes: Knowledge, Accountability, and the
Policing of the Past, 20(1) Law and Social Inquiry 7 (1995), 18, 14-15. See also Burying Myths,
Uncovering Truth, The Economist, 12 March 2010, available at <http://www.othernews.info/2010/03/burying-myths-uncovering-truth/#more-3311>, last accessed December 2011.
43
Transitional justice has been described as “the task of doing justice in the time period following the
end of a conflict or repressive rule, during which a new peaceful, stable and democratic society is being
established.” (see: Jennifer J. Llewellyn, supra note 41, in Borer, Telling the Truths, supra note 40, 83)
Transitional justice can be rendered by international or domestic criminal courts, commissions of
inquiry, referred to as Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (“TRCs”), or other mechanisms allowing
redress for victims. See further Koskenniemi, Between Impunity and Show Trials, supra note 18, 9-12.
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1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2187 UNTS 3, Art. 17(1)(a). The question as
to whether the ability to conduct trials requires the ability to do so fairly must still be answered in light
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International criminal courts are set up principally with the purpose of prosecuting
and, if found guilty, punishing those responsible for the commission of serious
violations of international humanitarian law. 45 This is considered necessary to pay
tribute to the victims and to end impunity for such crimes with the aim to deter
potential future perpetrators from doing the same. Bassiouni pointed out that these
crimes are so serious that they affect mankind as a whole and the only way to work
towards prevention of their recurrence is to send out a clear message to future
dictators that they will have to answer for their deeds. 46

The ICC has explicitly acknowledged the right to justice for victims, which was
defined as follows: “victims’ interests in the identification, prosecution and
punishment of those who have victimized them by preventing their impunity. When
the right to justice is to be satisfied through criminal proceedings, victims have a
central interest in the outcome of such proceedings leading to the identification,
prosecution and punishment of those who have victimised them. Accordingly, victims
have a personal and core interest in the determination of guilt or innocence of the
persons charged.” 47

of the Prosecutor’s invitation to the Libyan highest authorities to challenge the admissibility of the case
of Saif Gaddafi before the ICC. See: Situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in the Case of the
Prosecutor v. Saif Al Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah al Senussi, Public Prosecution’s Submissions on the
Prosecutor’s recent trip to Libya, ICC-01/11-01/11-31, 25 November 2011.
45
UN Doc. S/RES/808, 22 February 1993 (Resolution establishing the ICTY); UN Doc. S/RES/955, 8
November 1994 (Resolution establishing the ICTR); Preamble of the Rome Statute, supra note 44.
46
M. Cherif Bassiouni, Searching for Peace and Achieving Justice: The Need for Accountability, 59(4)
Law and Contemporary Problems 9 (1996), 9-28; M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Crimes: Jus
Cogens and Obligatio Erga Omnes, 59(4) Law & Contemp. Probs. 63 (1996), 63-74. See also Karl
Jaspers who suggested this already in 1963, in ‘Lebensfragen der deutschen Politik’, referred to by
Arendt in Eichmann in Jerusalem, supra note 21, 269-270. See further M. Drumbl, Atrocity,
Punishment and International Law, (Cambridge University Press, 2007), 60-63; On identifying
retribution and deterrence as the main purposes of international criminal justice, see R. Amoussouga,
ICTR Spokesperson, Strong Message to Africa’s Leaders and Warlords, ICTR Newsletter, March
2008, available at <http://69.94.11.53/English/newsletter/mar08/mar08.pdf>, last accessed 2008.
47
Prosecutor v. Katanga & Ngudjolo, P. T. Ch. Public Urgent Decision on the Set of Procedural Rights
Attached to Procedural Status of Victim at the Pre-Trial Stage of the Case, ICC-01/04-01/07-474, 13
May 2008, paras. 39-42, footnote 102; Prosecutor v. Katanga & Ngudjolo, Confirmation of Charges
Hearing - Open Session, Opening Statement by Mr. Gilissen, ICC-01/04-01/07-T-38-ENG ET, page
45, lines 8-13 (“With the Court and the participants, we contribute – and I believe this firmly – we
represent hope, the hope for justice, the hope in justice. You can believe me, on the ground there is a
burning thirst for justice. They need justice, which is necessary, because the justice that they wish for is
one of the conditions for the return to real peace on the ground”). See also the opening statement of
Ms. Bapita, another victim representative, at page 52 lines 1-7: “The victims want you to know that
they are thirsting for justice. This is the first time that they can speak out. Five years later, can you
imagine what they have had to deal with over the last five years, how they crave for justice? And to
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The prosecution of the perpetrators of serious violations of international humanitarian
law is further believed to be necessary to restore and maintain international peace and
security. In respect of the ICTR and ICTY, the Security Council used its powers
under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, to adopt military and nonmilitary measures deemed appropriate to maintain or restore international peace and
security. 48

These objectives correspond with the ICTY’s First Annual Report, which notes that
the mandate of the Tribunal is “to do justice, to deter further crimes and to contribute
to the restoration and the maintenance of peace”. 49 Similarly, the Humanitarian Law
Centre and other human rights organisations in the former Yugoslavia embraced the
establishment of the ICTY because it constituted an effort to resist the culture of
impunity in the former Yugoslavia, as well as stop the violence by fighting this
impunity. 50

The ICTR Resolution refers to an additional objective, namely, its contribution to the
process of national reconciliation. 51 The ICTY Resolution, on the other hand, does not

that end, they hope that at the wake of this hearing the charges against these suspects will be
confirmed. They also that they will not be victimised anew, be it by individuals or by institutions.”
48
It can do so by virtue of Art. 39 of Chapter VII of the 1945 Charter of the United Nations, 892 UNTS
119, which provides that:
“The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to peace, breach of peace, or act of
aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance
with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.”
49
M. Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes against humanity in International Criminal Law, ed. Kluwer Law
International (The Hague/London/Boston, 1999 2nd ed), page 236. This corresponds with the view
expressed by Mr. Joinet in the ICTY contempt case against Florence Hartmann, holding that one of the
purposes of international criminal justice is to set an example in order to prevent persons in the future
from committing massive human rights violations. See Prosecutor v. Hartmann, IT-02-54-R77.5-T, T.
16 June 2009, page 288.
50
Prosecutor v. Hartmann, IT-02-54-R77.5-T, T. 17 June 2009, pages 383-384 (per Ms Kandic). See
also Michael Mansfield who cited Martin Luther King’s famous phrase “There can be no peace without
Justice” in the context of the bloody Sunday inquiry. See: Expensive, but justice must be done, Article
published in The Independent, 13 June 2010.
51
UN Doc. S/RES/955, 8 November 1994. Concerns have been expressed about these objectives. They
make no reference to principles of due process, which, according to Howard Morisson, former defence
attorney at the ICTY and ICTR, suggests that the political agenda at the time of drafting did not
prioritise defence issues. See H. Morrison, International Criminal Tribunals, Counsel, June 2001, 1417, at 14. See also, L. Hammond, Professor, University of Texas, statement before the United States
House of Representatives International Relations Committee, 28 February 2002, expressing concern
about the objective to restore peace: “From the beginning ... the ICTY was established to carry out a
specific political purpose: to restore peace. ... There may be nothing wrong with this purpose, but it is
not one that should guide a court that exists to assure just trials. There is no hint of any presumption of
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explicitly refer to reconciliation as an objective, 52 but a number of judgments have
nonetheless referred to such an objective. For instance, in Deronjic, the Chamber held
that “[t]ruth and justice should also foster a sense of reconciliation between different
ethnic groups within the countries … of the former Yugoslavia”. 53 In Erdemovic, the
Trial Chamber stated that efforts to end impunity ‘would contribute to appeasement
and give the chance to the people who were solely afflicted to mourn those among
them who had been unjustly killed.’ 54

Similar objectives are set out in the Preamble of the Rome Statute, stating that,
“during this century millions of children, women and men have been victims of
unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of humanity”. Such grave
crimes “threaten the peace, security and well-being of the world” and concern the
international community as a whole “and must not go unpunished”. Their “effective
prosecution must be ensured … to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these
crimes and thus to contribute to the prevention of such crimes”. 55

There is no explicit reference to reconciliation. However, it is regularly suggested that
“peace, security and well-being of the world” can only be achieved if former
opponents are reconciled in a new stable order. 56

The ICC recognises an additional objective of international criminal justice, that is, to
give a voice to victims through participation in the proceedings and offer them a

innocence, or of the possibility that persons brought before the Tribunal might not be “responsible for
serious violations” of law.... [T]here exists an always present pressure to gain convictions.”
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30 November 1999, 8 May 2000, 17 January 2001 and 16 January 2002. The Statute entered into force
on 1 July 2002. See also R. Goldstone & N. Fritz, In the Interests of Justice” and Independent
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J. Bolton, The Global Prosecutors: Hunting War Criminals in the name of Utopia, 78 Foreign
Affairs 157 (1999), 657-658. See also S. de Gurmendi, The Role of the International Prosecutor, in R.
Lee (Ed.), The International Criminal Court: Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence
(Transnational Publishers Inc., 2001) 175, at 181.
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forum of redress for their losses. 57 This function does not exist in the ICTY and ICTR
where victims have a voice only if they testify. However, each of these international
tribunals and court intend to offer victims a forum where they can tell their truth in an
officially sanctioned forum. 58 This “truth-telling” function of international courtrooms
aims to “break their silence” and so instil in them “a sense of empowerment and
control”. 59 Whilst the international tribunals and court were not established to serve as
therapeutic centres for victims, Doak argues that, to the extent possible, they should
“maximize their healing potential and minimise their harming potential”. 60 Safferling,
on the other hand, is of the viewpoint that any healing objective would overstrain the
system and should, therefore, be dealt with by TRCs. 61
In summary, the acknowledged primary purpose of international criminal justice is
the punishment of alleged perpetrators of international humanitarian law with the
additional aims to
(1) put an end to impunity;
(2) do justice to the victims and give them a voice, as well as a forum;
(3) deter any potential future perpetrators from doing the same;
(4) restore and maintain the international peace and security;
(5) reconcile former enemy fighters.

Achievability of the Identified Objectives

These objectives are both retributive and restorative in nature. They resemble the
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objectives of Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (“TRCs”), which similar to
international courts seek to reconstruct facts. 62 However, international criminal
procedures differ from TRC procedures in that the latter do not involve criminal
prosecutions. In addition, they often grant amnesty to some or all of the identified
perpetrators. 63 TRCs focus on producing a report containing an official version of
events. By contrast, the focus of international criminal justice is on the fair and
efficient identification and accountability of the perpetrators of massive human rights
violations. Its primary purpose is therefore retributive. 64

It is, however, often assumed that the identified restorative objectives in international
tribunals will be met by holding individuals accountable for their deeds. 65 Indeed,
there is great optimism as to how much international tribunals and courts can
achieve. 66 As Klabbers phrases it, “we have all fallen under the spell of international
criminal law and the beauty of bringing an end to the culture of impunity.” 67
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Empirical research is, however, lacking to conclude whether this is indeed the case.
Such assertions are frequently based on mere speculations. 68 Wishful thinking is often
equated with empirical evidence. Amongst other scholars, Debra L. DeLaet holds that
such assumptions are based on “idealistic aspiration rather than a concrete reflection
on the actual records of trials and truth commissions as truth-telling mechanisms”. 69
In reality, the impact of truth-telling mechanisms on any of these concepts may be
exaggerated. 70 Drumbl suggests that such exaggeration stems from a blind faith in
international tribunals and courts without giving due weight to the complexity of the
situations in which they operate. 71 As Doak puts it, “transitional justice is not magic
bullet”. 72 It has even been argued that the impact of international justice is counterproductive. 73 In any event, the impact is far less understood than the mechanics of
truth-telling processes. 74 This lack of understanding is increased by the fact that
concepts such as peace, justice and reconciliation are abstract, ambiguous and
disputed. 75
It is impossible to verify whether the goals are achievable and have been achieved
68
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until adequate empirical research is conducted into the impact of international justice
on its goals. Until then, as ICTY Prosecutor Blewitt puts it, “[t]he simplified
dichotomy between reconciliation and justice serves academic discourse more than it
accurately describes reality”. 76

If expectations are too high or unrealistic, they may have an adverse effect on the
ultimate achievement of international justice. They could actually lead to great
disillusion with international justice itself. 77 Rather, expectations must be “informed
and pragmatic”, 78 and limited to “what can reasonably be accomplished”. 79 The
potential of international tribunals in achieving the identified objectives should be
recognised but not romanticised. 80 Only then may international justice make a modest
contribution to the above objectives. 81

Some practitioners and observers take it a step further and take the view that
international trials should focus on trying alleged perpetrators only and not get sidetracked by peripheral issues such as reconciliation. If trials effect reconciliation, then
that may be an asset, but it should not be the focus. Other institutions, such as TRCs,
have been set up with the particular objective of seeking to reconcile former enemies.
International tribunals should not be overly ambitious in trying to achieve the same.82
The validity of this point will be examined in Part IV.

The Ascertainment of the Truth as an Objective of International Justice
For international tribunals to have the potential to impact positively on any of the
above objectives, their judgments must be perceived as truthful. It is often claimed
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that there can be no justice, deterrence, lasting peace or reconciliation without truth.83
The ascertainment of the truth is therefore the principal objective of TRCs. Truth is
considered a necessary instrument to achieve reconciliation. 84

Similarly, NGOs, civil society groups, academic scholars and other observers of
international justice consider the ascertainment of the truth to be one of the core
objectives of international justice. Only if the truth is established in international
justice will the unspeakable crimes be uncovered and spoken about: “truth now peace
forever”. 85

In Borer’s view, the purpose of trials and tribunals, arguably, “is the discovery of
facts about past actions and the assignment of blame for these actions. Not only do
trials contribute to justice and the rule of law – important qualities of positive and
83
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sustainable peace – they can also forge a sense of collective memory, thus serving as
a tool of nation building, another quality necessary for fostering sustainable peace”. 86

The Resolutions establishing the ICTY and ICTR do not list the ascertainment of the
truth as one of the objectives of these tribunals. Their Statutes also make no reference
to the ascertainment of the truth as an objective of international criminal justice. The
Rules of Procedure and Evidence initially adopted were equally silent on the
ascertainment of the truth as a function of the tribunals.

Notwithstanding this absence of any explicit reference to the ascertainment of the
truth, it has, from the beginning, been clearly and explicitly acknowledged as one of
the objectives of the ICTY and ICTR and has gained importance over time.

During the inter-State debates that preceded the adoption of the Security Council
Resolution to establish the ICTY, Ms. Albright, who represented the United States of
America, stated: 87

The lesson that we are all accountable to international law may have finally taken hold in our
collective memory. This will be no victor’s tribunal. The only victor that will prevail in this
endeavour is the truth.

In a follow-up meeting, she repeated her submission on the importance of the
establishment of the truth and added: 88

Truth is the cornerstone of the rule of law, and it will point towards individuals, not peoples, as
perpetrators of war crimes. And it is only the truth that can cleanse the ethnic and religious
hatreds and begin the healing process.
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Thus, according to Ms. Albright and other State representatives, 89 the ascertainment
of the truth was one of the core objectives of the ICTY and the ICTR, established
subsequently.

Many NGOs, academics, international criminal judges, prosecutors and other persons
concerned place similar emphasis on the ascertainment of the truth. For instance, Mr.
Joinet, a retired French judge who has fulfilled a number of human rights positions in
the Council of Europe and United Nations, was called as an expert in the ICTY
contempt case of former ICTY prosecutor Ms Hartmann. 90 In the course of his
testimony, he held that the ultimate purpose of international criminal justice is
obviously to establish the truth. 91

The Presiding Judge in the ICTY case against Prlic et al stated:

I am a bit like Digenious ^ , who was walking in Athens with a lantern in daylight and he was
asked what he was doing, and he answered, "I'm looking for a human, a human being," I myself
am looking for the truth. I'm the judicial counterpart of this famous person, and I'm looking for
the truth.” 92
89
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In the ICTY case against Dronjic, the Chamber recognized that the tribunal is
mandated “to search for and record, as far as possible, the truth of what happened in
the former Yugoslavia”. 93 Also, the first ICTR judgement in Akayesu refers to the
ICTR objective “to establish the truth in its judgment”. 94 In many other cases before
the ICTY or ICTR, the mandate of ascertaining the truth is relied on in resolving
procedural issues. 95
Meanwhile, by amendment of 1 July 1999, 96 which two years later was also
incorporated into the ICTY Rules, 97 a reference to truth-ascertainment has been
included in the ICTR Rules of Evidence of Procedure. Rule 90(F)(i) of the ICTY and
ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence provides that “[t]he Trial Chamber shall
exercise control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting
evidence so as to … [m]ake the interrogation and presentation effective for the
ascertainment of the truth”.

The ICC goes a step further than the ad hoc international criminal tribunals in
explicitly recognising a truth-ascertaining function in its Statute. In contrast to the
ICTY and ICTR Statutes, the ICC Statute embodies an explicit duty on the Prosecutor
and Chambers to establish the truth. Pursuant to Article 54(1)(a) of the Rome Statute,
the Prosecutor shall “[i]n order to establish the truth, extend the investigation to cover
all facts and evidence relevant to an assessment of whether there is criminal
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responsibility under this Statute, and, in doing so, investigate incriminating and
exonerating circumstances equally”.

Article 69(3) of the Rome Statute further states that “[t]he Court shall have the
authority to request the submission of all evidence that it considers necessary for the
determination of the truth”. In addition, a similar provision as ICTY/ICTR Rule
90(F)(i) has been incorporated in the ICC Rules. According to ICC Rule 43(a), the
Presiding Judge, in consultation with the other members of the Chamber, “shall
determine the mode and order of questioning witnesses and presenting evidence so as
to: (a) Make the questioning of witnesses and the presentation of evidence fair and
effective for the determination of the truth”.

The ICC Chambers also ruled that their task is to establish the truth. They make a
distinction between Pre-Trial Chambers and Trial Chambers. Pre-Trial Chambers
consider whether there are substantial grounds to believe that a suspect is guilty as
charged pursuant to Article 61(7) of the ICC Statute. Trial Chambers consider
whether there is no reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty as charged. Given the
difference in standards, it has been held that the Pre-Trial Chamber is not a truthfinder, whilst the Trial Chamber is. 98 The truth in relation to the guilt of the defendant
is not yet determined during the confirmation of the charges proceedings, but only
during the trial itself. 99

The ICC judges and the parties refer to establishing the truth almost on a daily basis.
ICC judges have stated on numerous occasions that the Chamber’s mission is to
manifest the truth. 100 The truth provides the basis for questions from the bench to
witnesses. In addition, the truth determines whether victim participants can ask a
particular question to a witness, 101 or whether evidence of which the defence had
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received no advance notice or documentary evidence can be admitted. 102 Guidelines
have also been adopted to ensure that the cross-examination contributes to the
ascertainment of the truth. 103

Right of Victims to the Truth
The single judge of a Pre-Trial Chamber at the ICC has interpreted the personal
interests of victims to include the “well-established” right to the truth. 104 She defined
this as the right to “the determination of the facts, the identification of the responsible
persons and the declaration of their responsibility”. 105 This right can be satisfied
through means other than international criminal proceedings, 106 but when criminal
proceedings are used as a tool to grant victims their right to the truth, such
proceedings should: “(i) bring clarity about what indeed happened; and (ii) close
possible gaps between the factual findings resulting from the criminal proceedings
and the actual truth.” 107

Accordingly, the issue of the guilt or innocence of persons prosecuted before the ICC
is not only considered to be relevant, but also to affect “the very core interests of
those granted the procedural status of victim in any case before the Court insofar as
this issue is inherently linked to the satisfaction of their right to the truth”. 108 In this
regard, it was held that the victims' central interest in the search for the truth can only
be satisfied if “(i) those responsible for perpetrating the crimes for which they
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suffered harm are declared guilty; and (ii) those not responsible for such crimes are
acquitted, so that the search for those who are criminally liable can continue”. 109

Whilst ICTY and ICTR Chambers have recognized their mandate to search for the
truth and “bring justice to both victims and their relatives and to perpetrators” 110, they
have not explicitly granted a right to victims to the truth and justice.

However, in the view of an increasing number of scholars, the right to know the truth
for victims of massive human rights violations is an emerging norm of customary
international law as well as a general principle of law. 111 According to some
observers, this right would then naturally extend to victims before the international
criminal tribunals. 112

Joinet expressed the view that victims have the right to the truth in international
criminal justice. 113 He defined this as the right to access to information. 114 He
emphasized the importance of the right of victims to uncover the ‘whole’ truth and
referred to it as symbolic or moral reparation, as opposed to material reparation
through damages granted to victims before the ICC and numerous domestic criminal
justice systems. 115

Joinet acknowledged that such access to information may not be given to victims
immediately, given that international criminal justice is understandably slow, and
there may be good grounds not to disclose information to the public while the
criminal investigations are carrying on, but sooner or later, massive human rights
violations should not remain hidden. Accordingly, Mr. Joinet held that, for
international criminal tribunals to play their full role in uncovering the truth, they
109
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must be transparent and, as soon as possible, inform the victims of the evidence which
is available about the crimes committed against them. 116

Reservations about the Ascertainment of the Truth as an Objective
In conclusion, the legal instruments of the ICC and their interpretation by the ICC
judges leave no room for disputing that the ascertainment of the truth is a core
objective of the court. It is also part of the evolving international vocabulary. The
same can be said in respect of the ICTY and ICTR, notwithstanding the silence on the
ascertainment of the truth in their Statutes and Resolutions.

However, similar to peace, justice and reconciliation, the notion of truth is ambiguous
and disputed. 117 Parlevliet refers to it as an “elusive concept”. 118 Its relationship and
compatibility with the other objectives is also unclear and ill defined. 119 In order to
test the efficiency of the ascertainment of the truth, it is important to be clear on the
term.

There are voices raising concern in regard to the recognition of the ascertainment of
the truth as a core objective of international justice. Common law practitioners in the
international field are not as familiar with such vocabulary as their colleagues with a
civil law background. They, therefore, take a critical view on the ascertainment of the
truth as an objective of international justice. Common law practitioners often take the
stance that international trials should focus strictly on whether the prosecution has
proved the allegations against the defendants beyond a reasonable doubt, nothing
more, and nothing less. They are concerned that a focus on ascertaining the truth
would distract the triers of fact from the essence of the criminal trial. They regard a
trial as a forum to determine the guilt of the defendant, rather than the truth of what
happened. A TRC, on the other hand, can focus on establishing the truth. In their
view, the two issues should not be conflated. 120
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These practitioners are not alone in their view. Observers, most importantly Hannah
Arendt in her book ‘Eichmann in Jerusalem’, held that the exclusive focus of a
criminal court should be on the weighing of the charges brought against the accused,
rendering judgment and meting out due punishment. 121

However, the search for the truth in international justice does not need to be
incompatible with the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. Yet, the existence
of such concerns demonstrates that there are different views on what the
ascertainment of the truth as an objective signifies. Thus, an in-depth discussion on
the meaning of the ascertainment of the truth, both in the context of legal and
sociological political debates, appears necessary and will follow.

Meaning of the Ascertainment of the Truth
Meaning in domestic criminal justice systems
In order to determine the meaning of the ascertainment of the truth in international
criminal justice, it is helpful to examine what interpretation domestic criminal
jurisdictions have given to this term.

Truth has a particular legal meaning in domestic criminal justice. Criminal justice
throughout the world and history seeks to identify perpetrators of crimes committed
within a society. The method of doing so changes over time and differs from society
to society. Any criminal justice system, at least in theory, seeks to punish only those
who are guilty of committing the crimes charged and liberate anyone who is wrongly
accused. In some jurisdictions, the process in which the guilt of an alleged perpetrator
of a crime is tested is referred to as ascertaining the truth about the guilt or innocence
of the accused. Other jurisdictions do not use such terminology, as frequently or
explicitly.
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9 December 2010 in The Hague, one Prosecutor, one member of Chambers and one member of a
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A distinction is often made between trials conducted in a civil law and a common law
criminal justice system. Whilst both types of trials inquire into, and reconstruct past
events, it is generally assumed that the former emphasises the importance of
establishing the truth to a much greater extent than the latter. The questionable
validity of this assumption will be addressed in the following discussion on common
law and civil law interpretations of ascertaining the truth.

Civil Law Justice Systems: Meaning of Ascertainment of the Truth

In many civil law systems, the mandate of ascertaining the truth is perceived as the
main goal of criminal proceedings. It is considered to be ‘a precondition to a just
decision’ and in that sense the ‘true ultimate aim’ of the criminal justice process. 122
Countries, such as France, Belgium and Germany, have explicitly recognized the
ascertainment of the truth as an objective of criminal justice in their criminal codes of
procedure. 123

The aim of ascertaining the truth in civil law criminal justice systems has been
described as the goal, to the extent humanly possible, to reach a factually accurate
verdict. 124 The truth that is assessed in a civil law criminal trial is referred to as an
122
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objective, material, substantive or ontological truth. 125 This truth goes beyond the
truth of the parties. Jointly with all parties and participants, a neutral and impartial
judge searches for correct answers on the theoretical assumption that “an objective
reconstruction of reality is attainable”. 126

The objective truth should, however, not be confused with absolute truth or scientific
truth, whose existence has been denied by many sceptics. 127 Even if absolute truth
exists, it would be impossible for human beings to establish with certainty what the
absolute truth is. 128 In epistemology, a distinction is made between truth (‘reality’ or
‘proposition’) and the criteria on which a specific notion of the truth is accepted
through consensus in different situations, without being certain that the truth has in
fact been discovered. This distinction leaves room to use terms such as ‘ascertaining
the truth’ without having the illusion that human beings can achieve more than
establishing with a high level of certainty what has occurred in their framework of
experience. 129

In this interpretation of the truth, a verdict whose accuracy is not absolutely certain
can still be consistent with the objective truth. On the basis of the evidence available,
the objective truth is then the most reliable outcome that can be achieved in a
courtroom run by human beings. Provided that all efforts are made to ascertain the
truth, the truth-searching mandate has been successfully completed notwithstanding
the absence of a guarantee of the accuracy of the outcome. The efforts referred to here
include everyone involved in the criminal process, including the triers of fact and law
(professional judges, sometimes assisted by lay assessors), the parties (prosecution
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and defence) and participants (civil parties). The defendant has no obligation to
participate in this process, but it is generally in his interest that he does. 130

Elisabetta Grande has qualified this all-inclusive truth enquiry as a ‘rumba’ dance,
which is “performed by a variable number of dancers occasionally alone and
occasionally in groups with many shifts and continuous substitutions of dancers and
roles. It is a genuinely communal performance in the collective search of an objective
truth”. 131 A similar observation – albeit not in the dancing metaphor – was made by a
French judge at the ICC who has pursued his entire career in the French legal system
prior to his arrival at the ICC. While addressing the defence, prosecution and victim
participants, he stated: “We are jointly seeking to establish the truth, and each party,
each participant, has a role to play”. 132

This process is intended to lead to the objective truth, which is fully justified in a reasoned written
decision.

133

The objective truth is therefore verifiable, transparent and subject to public scrutiny and

appeal to a higher court. It is also predictable as a consistent methodology is applied. The outcome is,
therefore, not coincidental but upholds the certainty of the law. 134

Common Law Justice Systems: Meaning of Ascertainment of the Truth
In common law systems, the extent to which the ascertainment of truth is a core
objective of criminal justice is questionable. The term ‘ascertainment of the truth’ is
part of the legal vocabulary used in civil law systems but not, or at least not as firmly,
as that used in common law systems.

A common law adversarial trial is structured along the line of burdens on the parties
and regulations as to how and what kind of evidence can be presented to the triers of
fact, rather than along the line of searching for an objective truth. Practitioners and
observers take the view that dispute resolution in a fair and equal manner is the prime
130
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objective of criminal justice. It is considered more important than the accuracy of the
outcome. 135 This dispute is between two equal parties. On the one hand, there is the
prosecution, and on the other hand, there is the defendant. The court must settle the
dispute in a fair manner, because only then can it bring about just results. 136 The
pivotal issues are equality of arms between the two parties and giving a voice to the
defendant.
Amongst others, his Honour Judge Peter Murphy defines the objective of common
law trials as follows: 137

Trials are adversarial contests engaged in by parties who have much to lose and gain,
and the goal of a party to a case is not to explore objective truth, but to persuade the
trier of fact that his own version of the facts is the correct one.

Some scholars, however, opine that the central question of any criminal trial lies in
‘discovering the truth of an accusation’. 138 Goodpaster observes that the high regard
for fairness intends to contribute to this goal. Truth and justice are intertwined, and
the fairness of the procedure determines the accuracy of the results. 139
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Twining, one of the leading scholars on evidence and proof, refers to rectitude of
decision as an important social value. He defines this term as “the correct application
of valid substantive laws to facts established as true”. 140 He nonetheless concedes that
this important social value must be balanced against other factors, such as the security
of the state, the fairness of the proceedings and public expenditure. In light of such
other objectives, “[t]he pursuit of truth as a means to justice under the law commands
a high, but not necessarily overriding priority as a social value”. 141

The rulings of the English Courts have been ambiguous as to whether the
ascertainment of the truth is a primary aim of adversarial proceedings. It can hardly be
read to support one view over the other. In one case, the Court of Appeal defined the
judge’s mandate as: “above all … to find the truth, and to do justice according to
law”, and as being “at the end to make up his mind where the truth lies”. 142 In a later
case, the Court of Appeal, however, said that “[t]he due administration of justice does
not always depend on eliciting the truth. It often depends on the burden of proof.” 143

Thus, common law trials are more focused on procedural fairness than the search for
an objective truth. Unlike civil law jurisdictions, barely any thought has been given to
the concept of truth-ascertainment in common law procedures. No doctrine or
definition of the term has been adopted. Yet, no trial can be entirely divorced from
truth ascertaining, as it equals an attempt to reconstruct accurate past facts. This
exercise can only be conducted if there is an assumption that the reconstruction of
facts that occurred in the past is in principle possible. The method to reconstruct past
events is, however, different.

In common law jurisdictions, there is little faith in the neutrality of any fact finder,
given that human beings always assimilate information selectively. Such cognitive
limitations, it is said, prevent fact finders from ascertaining the objective truth through
a neutral inquiry. 144
140
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Twining affirms that determinations concerning the truth about allegations are
generally made under uncertain conditions. Present knowledge about past events is
typically based on incomplete evidence. Therefore, “establishing the truth about
alleged past events is typically a matter of probabilities or likelihoods falling short of
complete certainty”. 145
Similarly, Frank held: 146
The axiom or assumption that, in all or most trials, the truth will out, ignores, then, the
several elements of subjectivity and chance. It ignores perjury and bias; ignores the
false impression made on the judge or jury by the honest witness who seems untruthful
because he is frightened in the court-room or because he is irascible or over-scrupulous
or given to exaggeration. It ignores the mistaken witness who honestly and
convincingly testifies that he remembers acts or conversations that happened quite
differently than as he narrates them in court. It neglects, also, the dead or missing
witness without whose testimony a crucial fact cannot be brought out, or an important
opposing witness cannot be successfully contradicted. Finally it neglects the missing or
destroyed letter, or receipt, or cancelled check.

Therefore, the aim is not to ascertain an objective truth, but rather to establish a
procedural truth. This then is the outcome of a battle between two parties who each
present their truth to a passive arbiter. In civil law doctrinal terminology, such a truth
is referred to as a formal truth. This is defined as a relative truth primarily based on
the evidence produced by the parties in a civil suit. 147 The conclusion of the triers of
fact drawn from the evidence presented in court reflects the formal truth. This
conclusion is not presumed factually accurate. It merely reflects whether the party
who had the burden of proving his claim failed or succeeded in doing so.

This is similar to the truth that is established in a common law criminal trial. After
hearing all the evidence, a jury will consider whether the prosecution has proved its
case against a defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. An acquittal does not mean that
the defendant is not guilty; it only means that the prosecution failed to establish the
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defendant’s guilt. Whilst it is certainly the aim to convict the guilty and acquit the
innocent, there is clear appreciation that the same set of facts may lead to different
truths in different court settings with different prosecutors, defence counsel and jury
members. In that sense, truth is considered to be relative as it is dependent on the
human beings who participate in the trial. 148 The outcome that is established at the
end of the battle between two parties is a courtroom truth. It is less consistent and
verifiable than the truth established in a civil law courtroom, which is set out in full
detail in a written judgement. 149 By contrast, a verdict issued by a jury in a common
law courtroom consists of one or two words: “guilty” or “not guilty”. The manner in
which the jury’s verdict is reached is unknown to the public. 150
Elisabetta Grande refers to the truth that comes out of this process as an ‘interpretive truth’, a secondbest truth which common law practitioners view as the only realistically discoverable truth.
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She

compares the two-party system with a ‘tango’ justice. As it takes two to go to tango, it also takes two
“to produce a reconstruction of reality that can be equated to truth”.
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The Objective and Procedural Truths Compared
It appears that the difference between ‘material’, ‘objective’ or ‘ontological’ truth,
and ‘formal’, ‘interpretative’, ‘relative’ or ‘procedural’ truth is that the former
presupposes a true version of events that is out there to be discovered. By contrast, the
latter is a truth that is established on the basis of the information that is presented post
facto in the courtroom.

Conceptually, there is a very clear distinction between these two types of truths. In
practice, however, the difference between them is not as significant. This is
particularly true, given that both civil law and common law jurists most often accept
that there will always be some doubt about the final outcome of the inquiry. Indeed,
common law and civil law scholars and practitioners alike have acknowledged that it
148
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is impossible for any human assessor to acquire absolute certainty of any fact
including those to which they were a witness themselves. 153

The objective truth has been described as the most reliable outcome that can be
achieved in a courtroom run by human beings on the basis of the evidence available.
If the objective truth is viewed in this way, there is little difference from the
procedural truth because they are both determined by the procedure. Thus, the focus
in any truth-searching exercise is on the procedure more than the result. If the truthsearching procedure is fair then the outcome is accepted as truthful until and unless
proven wrong in appeal or review proceedings. In such a situation, the outcome will
be overturned in either system. Yet, both types of criminal justice systems have
adopted a procedure which is believed to produce the safest, most accurate results.
Some scholars would therefore argue that both methods of criminal proceedings seek
to establish the truth. 154

The main distinction between the material and procedural truth is the methodology
applied to obtain the truth. Different notions of truth go combined with different
procedural arrangements. 155 In establishing the procedural truth, the persuasion of the
argument prevails. The search for the objective truth, on the other hand, is a quest for
right answers. 156

The most essential difference between the two types of methodologies is that the
common law criminal justice system constitutes a regulated two-party battle. The civil
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law criminal justice system is an all-inclusive judge-led inquiry. The party-driven
systems have stricter regulations and more prescribed burdens than judge-led systems
in regard to the presentation and admissibility of the evidence. 157 A judge-led system
is more flexible allowing more room for a case-to-case evaluation based on fairness
and truth.

The Scope of the Search for the Truth
The truth-ascertaining methodology applied in common law and civil law
jurisdictions will be explored below in Part II. Here, suffice it to say that the
difference between the two methodologies should not be overestimated. The essence
of a criminal trial in every system is the same, that is, to inquire into the guilt or
innocence of the accused. In both types of systems, the trial is focused on whether the
accused should be found guilty as charged and punished appropriately. The scope of
the inquiry is defined by the charges brought by the prosecutor or in some
jurisdictions by the investigative judge. Trial judges or juries cannot lay charges and
can only render judgment if a case is brought before them. This is referred to as the
principle of procedural passivity. 158

Moreover, the scope of any courtroom inquiry is limited to the question of guilt or
innocence of the specific crimes charged. The indictment sets the parameters of any
such inquiry, which is referred to by some scholars as the tyranny of the indictment.
Given its limiting effect, this principle is said to frustrate the ascertainment of the
truth. 159

Both methods further include safeguards to the defendant, and apply a standard
equalling that of proof beyond reasonable doubt. 160 Indeed, as absolute certainty is
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unachievable, reasonable certainty is the highest certainty that can be reached which
is still acceptable to the human conscience. 161 If at the end of the case, there is a
reasonable doubt remaining about the guilt of the accused, he must be acquitted. This
is in line with the common law standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt as well as
the civil law principle of in dubio pro reo, pursuant to which doubt must be
interpreted in favour of the accused. 162 This also correlates with the presumption of
innocence which, at least in theory, is an internationally widespread presumption. 163
The “reasonable doubt” standard has been defined as follows: 164

.... in dealing with matters of importance in your own business affairs, your own
business or personal affairs, you do not allow slight, whimsical doubts to deter you
from going along; you brush them aside and go ahead. But surely, there comes a time
when, in dealing with matters of your own affairs, you stop to think, and by reason of
that doubt you decide what you are to do in your business of importance. Well, this is
the quality and kind of doubt of which the law speaks when it speaks of “reasonable
doubt”.

This is ultimately a subjective standard which is difficult to define, or to assess
objectively. The evaluation process is an internal subjective and psychological
process of the triers of fact, seeking to reach a level of reasonable certainty about
theguilt or innocence of the accused. 165 Redmaye described this standard is “an
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inscrutable, subjective standard which exists largely within the mind of the fact-finder
in a particular case. All we can do is to describe the sort of reasoning process which
we feel the fact-finder should adopt in eliminating doubt.” 166

Scope of the ascertainment of the truth in international justice
Desired Scope of the Ascertainment of the Truth
International criminal justice does not significantly differ from domestic justice in
terms of methodology in ascertaining the facts. The prosecutor investigates crimes
within the jurisdiction of the international tribunal or court. He then charges particular
individuals who he will seek to bring before the court. If he succeeds, the suspect is
entitled to select counsel to represent him and a trial will take place in front of a bench
of three judges. At the end of the trial, the judges must determine whether the charges
against the defendant have been established beyond reasonable doubt. If there is a
reasonable doubt, the judges must acquit. Thus, also in international justice, the
ascertainment of the truth is done in accordance with the standard of proof beyond
reasonable doubt. The search for the truth is limited to the cases selected and brought
by the prosecutor. 167

Some scholars, human rights activists and other observers go a step further. They
consider that it is part of the mandate of international tribunals and courts to provide a
historical analysis of the context in which the crimes charged were committed. In
their view, this follows from the mandate to ascertain the truth. For instance, Piragoff
states that the function of the ICC goes beyond that of an ordinary criminal court in
that, to the extent possible, the parties and the Chamber have the additional obligation
to clarify the historical facts underlying the crimes charged. 168
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Such a suggested mandate aligns with the other mandates, particularly of
reconciliation, peace and security, and the right of victims to the truth. According to
Waters, the mandate of the ICTY is to generate a definitive and authoritative account
of the course and origins of a conflict. This account is to the exclusion of alternative
historical narratives and is an attempt to combat denial and prevent attempts at
revisionism. An accurate historical record is said to “promote reconciliation between
conflicting communities” 169, and help educate people, often long subject to
propaganda, about what really happened, and “help ensure that such horrific acts are
not repeated in the future”. 170

Judges have expressed similar views. For instance, Judge Meron, one of the appeals
judges of the ICTR and ICTY, has confirmed that the task of the judges at the
international criminal tribunals extends the ordinary function of determining the guilt
of alleged perpetrators: “we are judging cases in these tribunals but we also have a
mandate to write history and are collecting massive information for future historians
who can formulate and reformulate (write and rewrite) the history of a country”. 171
Another ICTY judge, Judge Bonomy, has similarly stated that compiling a complete
historical record of the war is one of the objectives of international criminal justice. 172

These views correspond with the Fifth ICTY Annual Report determining that,
“through its judicial proceedings the Tribunal establishes a historical record which
provides the basis for the long-term reconciliation and reconstruction of the
region”. 173 Also at the ICTR, in the Military II case, the Chamber emphasised “its
obligation to discover the truth about the events that happened in Rwanda in 1994.” 174
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In these views, the notion of ascertaining the truth in international criminal justice
must go beyond the ascertainment of the truth in ordinary domestic criminal trials.
There is an aspiration for international trials to establish not only the facts directly
implicating the accused on trial, but also depict a more general picture of what
happened at the time and in the region relevant to the indictment and those
responsible.

This is, however, very complicated in practice. The judges have a difficult task giving
correct interpretations to historic events. The correct interpretation of such events is
often in dispute. Judges are regularly faced with evidence of more than one
reasonable version of the facts. 175 Yet, they have to choose one version as the
authoritative version of the facts.

Cultural Context
Difficult as it is to come to one view on facts within the same cultural context, this is
much more challenging when dealing with many different cultural contexts, each with
their own way of looking at the world, moral values and views on what is acceptable
behaviour. Turner asserts that culturally distinct groups often have different
understandings of the same events stemming from their distinct cultural frameworks.
He defines culture as “‘the knowledge people use to generate and interpret social
behaviour’. Such knowledge is learned and, to a degree, shared. Cultural knowledge
is coded in complex systems of symbols. People growing up in a society are taught ‘a
tacit theory of the world’. This theory is then used to organize their behaviour, to
anticipate the behaviour of others, and to make sense of the world in which they
live.” 176

When an assessor must evaluate facts in a situation unfamiliar to him, even with the
best of efforts, he can hardly avoid interpreting these facts in accordance with the
norms that he has been taught within his own society. According to Rorty, it is
impossible to climb out of one’s own mind, which is coloured by these societal
175
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norms. 177 Similarly, in Becker’s view, there is only subjective reality. Neutral and
objective opinions do not exist.178

Rorty’s and Becker’s points are solid and shared by this author, as well as numerous
others. 179 As aforementioned, any judgement on facts involves subjective, coloured
judgements. The ascertainment of the truth is not an objective undertaking as often
assumed. It is rather a subjective exercise of qualifying events in accordance with the
assessor’s understanding of the facts. Facts cannot be fully separated from opinion
because they only exist after being qualified as facts. They are not incontestable,
colourless objects but are determined by subjective interpretations and perspectives,
which are influenced by the personal circumstances of the assessor. 180 Rorty calls
facts ‘products of time and change’. 181

An additional problem is that the society where atrocities occurred is typically divided
in different, often opposing perceptions of what happened during the conflict. This is
all the more so when the conflict involved different ethnic groups. The perception of
truth concerning these conflicts can vary significantly across different ethnic
groups. 182 Perceptions of truth are largely related to identity, which is often defined
by ethnicity. 183 The same person may be perceived as a liberator by one side and as a
war criminal by the other side. 184 There is a risk that “trials become a battlefield over
the official history and future identity of a country”. 185
177

Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, supra note 17, 48; Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and
Truth, supra note 17, 21-45; cited by: Parlevliet, Considering Truth, supra note 3, 6. See also T. Franck
& H. Fairley, Procedural Due Process in Human Rights Fact-Finding by International Agencies, 74(2)
American Journal of International Law, 308 (1980), 309; J. Leurdijk, Fact-Finding: Its place in
International Law and International Politics, 14 Netherlands International Law Review 141 (1967),
141.
178
Becker, Confronting the Truth of the Erinyes, supra note 19, 245-250, particularly 250.
179
See, for instance, Damaška, Evidence Law Adrift, supra note 122, page 95; Grande, Dances of
Criminal Justice, supra note 122, at 147, 152.
180
F. Cornford, The Republic of Plato: Translation and Commentary (58th Ed.) (Oxford University
Press, 1976), 227-235; I. Murdoch, Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals (Chatto & Windus, 1992), 1112. Parlevliet, Considering Truth, supra note 3, 5-7. Frank, Courts on Trial, supra note 38, 23-24.
181
Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, supra note 17, 22; also cited in: Parlevliet, Considering
Truth, supra note 3.
182
Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness, supra note 59, 63.
183
Parlevliet, Considering Truth, supra note 3, 19.
184
For example, the acquittal of the former Prime Minister of Kosovo, Mr. Ramush Haradinaj, who
was prosecuted and tried by the ICTY (although currently being re-tried), was perceived as a just result
by many Kosovar Albanians, and as a ‘mockery of justice and a mockery of the innocent victims who
suffered at the hands of Haradinaj’ (statement made by Kostunica) by many Serbs. For many Kosovar
Albanians, Mr. Haradinaj was one of the heroes who had liberated them from Serb suppression; for
54

One or Multiple Versions of the Truth?
Only if one of those perceptions exclusively corresponds with the accurate description
of events, can one speak of an objective or ontological truth. Indeed, as defined by
Parlevliet, the uncovering of the objective truth means “[r]evealing reality as it truly
is, without interference of subjective perceptions nor personal or ideological frames of
reference”. 186 She thereby refers to Carr’s definition of truth, that is, “the objective
matter per excellence. What is true is true for everyone […] independently of what
anyone believes.” 187

The truth described here leaves little room for conflicting versions of the past because
only one of them is considered accurate. If more than one perception corresponds
with the accurate description of events, then they merely qualify as subjective
perceptions of truth. For these reasons, it is not always evident that there is only one
correct version of events. Like there is not one way to look at world politics, there is
arguably not one way to look at the causes of a conflict and who is responsible and
who are the victims. These are complex questions rarely with straightforward
answers. As Parlevliet rightly points out, “[w]hat one considers to be true, may not
seem true to others. Even if there is one truth, which goes beyond particular views and
is true for all, it is hardly conceivable how one may know this truth, as it requires that
one could disentangle it entirely from one’s perceptions and ideas.” 188

If there is more than one correct version of events, the acceptance of only one
authoritative version can be dangerous and manipulative, particularly because the
engagement of a court with “truth” and “memory” tends to be an engagement with
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political antagonism. Thus, according to Koskenniemi, “no truth can remain sacred
within it.” 189 As Paciocci puts it, history is “too imbued with complexity, nuance and
perspective to yield official versions”; historical events also “have to be understood in
their appropriate larger context”. 190

Accordingly, Becker is a clear supporter of acknowledging the existence of multiple
versions of reality. Such acknowledgement does not mean that right and wrong no
longer matter or that everything is relative. It is an acknowledgment, however, of the
complexity of the reality and that there is no easy, comfortable truth, accepted by the
society at large. In Becker’s view, truth is often contradictory and can be constructive
only if it reflects this complexity by including multiple perspectives. The reality is,
according to Becker, “that people really believe their truths and that they are not
merely victims of propaganda”. 191

If a court has a mandate to establish accurate historical facts, it cannot adopt two or
more versions of events. It has to acknowledge one as the authoritative version. In
general, the outcome of the court examination must be yes or no, guilty or not
guilty. 192 In cases of uncertainty, the court can adopt less specific facts. For instance,
where the number of victims is unknown, a court can make an estimate. A court
cannot, however, leave open the identification of the victims and perpetrators, if not
by name then at least by ethnicity or other group to which they belong. If a court has
insufficient information to make such or other findings relevant to the charges, then in
most cases it must acquit the accused due to a failure to establish his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. 193

By contrast, historians, social scientists, human rights activists, journalists or others
who seek to analyse past events, can acknowledge more than one version of what
happened. They do not need to reach one solid conclusion and have no burden of
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proof. An academically sound historical analysis tends to be pluralistic allowing for
more than one interpretation of the facts. 194

TRCs can similarly establish various versions of past facts. The TRC established in
South Africa to address the apartheid regime, has in fact done so. There were clear
conflicting theories about what happened during the apartheid regime. Particularly
contrasting were the views of the African National Congress (ANC), considered to be
the primary liberation group, on the one hand, and the former regime and those
Afrikaners who had supported the apartheid, on the other. They both largely blamed
each other for everything. To accommodate both sides, two final reports were issued.
One was supported by the majority and the other by the minority. 195 The majority
report was highly critical of the former apartheid regime without excusing the crimes
committed by the ANC. The minority report issued by an Afrikaner commissioner
was much milder in its criticism of the former regime. It emphasised that apartheid
was not on trial and that the ANC was responsible for committing massive atrocities.
Neither was entirely happy with the result as nobody escaped significant criticism. 196

It has been debated whether “a plurality of truths” can and should be accommodated
in a reconciliation process, or whether “one shared ‘Truth’” much be reached. 197 It
may not be ideal to acknowledge more than one truth because that undermines the
idea that there is one authoritative truth, which can have an adverse impact on
reconciliation. However, this may be the best option for the purpose of reconciliation
when it is impossible to reach a consensus between radically different, irreconcilable
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views. The alternative is to adopt one official truth, which is denounced by one or
more parties to a conflict. In such a situation, the TRC process may have more
negative than positive consequences for ‘fostering national unity’ and reconciliation
purposes. 198 At least the TRC has the option to acknowledge various truths, whilst a
court does not.

Additional Constraints in Establishing Historical Facts in the Courtroom
There are other constraints in determining historical facts in an international
courtroom, which are not shared by other analysts of past events.

Although varying from system to system and depending on the methodology applied,
courtroom proceedings include strict regulations on the type of material that can be
relied on as evidence in reaching a final conclusion. Such evidence must at least be
reliable and relevant. In common law jury trials, unreliable or irrelevant evidence may
not even be shown to the triers of fact. Rules of evidence purposefully restrict the
nature and range of material that can be produced. This is done not only out of
fairness to the accused, but also in an effort to reduce the material adduced and
consequently the time taken to consider it. The findings are limited to the evidential
material adduced before the court. A failure to adduce sufficient convincing and
credible evidence results in an acquittal. 199 The outcome of a trial may then “not only
be inadequate in their historical approach, but positively distorting. »200

Time limits and procedural constraints also limit the scope of the court enquiry.
Criminal proceedings cannot continue endlessly. The accused is entitled to a fair and
speedy trial. Compared to historians who are entitled to take years to analyse the story
of a conflict, criminal proceedings must be completed within a reasonable time.201
Historians may travel to the conflict area they are analysing, conduct on-sight
investigations or even live there for some time and get a feeling for the place.
International courts, on the other hand, mostly operate from geographically remote
locations and, in creating a historical record, mainly rely on the testimony of
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historians, human rights activists or social scientists who are more familiar with the
conflict area, as expert witnesses.

In addition, first and foremost, the triers of fact must determine the guilt or innocence
of a specific individual or individuals on trial and cannot assess facts that are wholly
irrelevant to the charges in the indictment. By looking at individual criminal liability
only, central elements of the story are sometimes overlooked. 202 Trials are focused on
individuals in order to avoid the demonization of an entire community. However, the
counter-effect is that individuals may become the scapegoat for the crimes committed
by everyone else. Indeed, the focus on individual leaders may “serve as an alibi for
the population at large to relieve itself from responsibility.” 203

In reality, crimes committed by State entities on a large scale are rarely the work of a
few individuals. Rather, “the meaning of historical events often exceeds the intentions
or actions of particular individuals and can be grasped only by attention to structural
causes, such as economic or functional necessities, or a broad institutional logic
through which the actions by individuals create social effects. This is why
individualisation is not neutral in its effects.” 204 Therefore, according to
Koskenniemi, the truth may not be served by a narrow focus on the guilt of
individuals. 205

Further, when crimes are committed on a large scale, courts cannot judge all crimes
but must select the most important crimes. In this selection process, crucial aspects of
the story surrounding the conflict may be ignored. For instance, the Nuremberg trials
were clearly focused on the Germans as the aggressors invading the whole of Europe,
more than on their crimes against the Jews. Genocide, undefined until the Genocide
202
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convention of 1948, was not charged. 206 Extermination was charged but the focus was
on the German invasion of Europe. According to many commentators, this focus was
wrong. 207

Also, the plot often gets lost in endless debates between the parties on procedural
issues. Such debates are important in order to respect principles of due process but are
tedious with regard to the overall picture of the conflict. 208

Expressed Reservations on Establishing Historical Facts
Given these limitations, necessary to guarantee the fairness of the proceedings, courts
are often perceived as “too selective and limited in scope to reveal the “whole
story”. 209 Indeed, numerous scholars, including Arendt, Todorov and Paciocco, have
argued that it is impossible to establish accurate historical facts without undermining
the fairness of the proceedings. Each in their own way affirm that “[h]istory and
justice cannot be written at the same time, with the same pen, without distorting
both.” 210 In their view, any engagement of the court in writing history would distract
the attention and focus from where it should be, namely on the rendering of justice
and determining the charges, nothing else, not even “the noblest of ulterior purposes”
including the creation of a record “which would withstand the test of history”. 211 If
the court attempts to answer the broader question as to why a conflict occurred and
who is responsible for what, why and where, or if the court passes judgment on
competing interpretations of historical explanations of the conflict, a court defeats
itself and undermines the fairness of the proceedings. 212
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The greater the perceived responsibility of a person, the more difficult it is to produce
a historical record simultaneously with a verdict on the person’s guilt or innocence.
The media and human rights activists will already largely have written the historical
record and analysed who are the most responsible. They may have branded such a
person as “guilty” long in advance of his trial. In such a situation, the judges are in a
difficult position should they be asked to consider evidence which challenges the
‘received’ history about the conflict, including the responsibility of the accused on
trial. Consequently, the trial process risks becoming an instrument for confirming a
preordained result rather than an objective investigation based on the evidence that is
available. 213

Professors Michael Scharf and William Schabas acknowledged that there was
massive “adverse pretrial publicity” against Milosevic, a widespread belief that he
was guilty and a public denouncement of him by prominent political leaders before he
was even brought to The Hague. 214 Professional judges are generally expected to rise
above such adverse pre-trial publicity, 215 but this may be difficult in reality.

Many of the above-cited observers are therefore strongly opposed to a criminal court
engaging in creating a historical record of the facts underlying the conflict. 216 Their
reservations are shared by a number of judges in international criminal tribunals.
Judge Denis Byron, former President of the ICTR, asserted that the mandate of the
ICTR to ascertain the truth is not tantamount to writing the history of Rwanda’s
conflict. Instead, similar to judges in domestic courts, international judges have to ask
and answer the simple question whether the charges are proven or not. 217 Similarly,
Golsan (Ed.), Memory, The Holocaust and French Justice: The Bousquet and Touvier Affairs (1996)
114, 115 at 120; L. Douglas, The Memory of Judgment: Making Law and History in the Trials of the
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(2000); R. Golsan, History and the “Duty to Memory” in Postwar France: The Pitfalls of an Ethics of
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Justice Doherty, one of the SCSL judges involved in the case of Charles Taylor,
described the mandate of the courts as establishing fairly a truth concerning the
charges beyond a reasonable doubt. 218

Also, the ICTY Chamber in Krstic has stated that it would refrain from analyzing the
“deap-seated” causes of the Balkan conflict, which was viewed as the work of
historians and sociologists, and refrain from expressing emotions on the crimes
committed in Srebenica, with which the accused was charged. 219 The Chamber saw
its own task as a more modest one, that is, to establish, “from the evidence presented
during the trial, what happened during that period of about nine days and, ultimately,
whether the defendant in this case, General Krstic, was criminally responsible, under
the tenets of international law. … This defendant, like all others, deserves
individualized consideration and can be convicted only if the evidence presented in
court shows, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he is guilty of acts that constitute crimes
covered by the Statute of the Tribunal”. 220

These observers and judges rightfully express reservations in respect to a mandate to
create a historical record. It is important to be realistic as to what can be achieved in
an international courtroom. 221 The judges have a difficult enough task in assessing the
charges, as will be further explored in Part III of this thesis. Accordingly, it is
suggested that the task of ascertaining the truth in international criminal justice, like
in domestic criminal justice, must be interpreted in accordance with the standard of
proof beyond reasonable doubt. It should be viewed as an aspiration, rather than an
objective, to get as close to the truth about the charges as humanly possible.

Wider Scope of Truth-Ascertainment in International Justice
Even limiting the truth-ascertaining task to the charges, it remains a challenge to carry
out this task adequately in international justice. Unlike domestic criminal courts,
international criminal courts and tribunals only have jurisdiction over what are
considered the most serious crimes so much so that intervention in what is usually a
domestic matter is warranted. The criminal nature of acts falling within the
218
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jurisdiction of the international courts and tribunals is considered to be acknowledged
worldwide and, thus, their prohibition qualifies as an international custom supported
by State practice. 222 Even if not all States agree to criminalise such acts, their nature is
considered to be so serious that their prohibition has attained a jus cogens status,
binding all States irrespective of their viewpoint or conventional obligations. 223
Criminal acts can only qualify as such if they shock mankind as a whole due to the
large scale on which they were committed. An international court or tribunal cannot
judge an isolated cruel act. A number of stringent threshold criteria must be met first
before an international court or tribunal can exercise jurisdiction in respect to alleged
criminal acts. Such acts only fall within the jurisdiction of an international court or
tribunal if they qualify as war crimes, crimes against humanity, or crimes of genocide.

The threshold criteria that must be met for each of these categories of punishable
international crimes are not fixed or precise. Neither the codified law nor the
222
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underlying customary law is specific on the details but leave ample room for
interpretation by the judges. Definitions have changed over time and vary from
tribunal to tribunal. 224 However, as a minimum, the crimes charged must have been
committed in the context of an armed conflict (war crimes), on a widespread scale
and/or systematically (crimes against humanity), or with the specific intent to destroy
an ethnic group in part or in whole (genocide). 225

Accordingly, before the judges can assess the guilt of a particular accused for the
crimes with which he is charged, they must make assessments about the context in
which the accused allegedly committed these crimes. The determination of whether
there was an armed conflict is probably the most straightforward one, although the
distinction between serious riots, terrorism or other rebellious movements within a
country and an armed conflict is not always easy to ascertain. A distinction is further
made between national and international armed conflicts. In determining the latter,
judges must assess the extent to which one of the armed groups was supported by
another country, which is not always clear-cut. Unless a third State is a clear party to
the war, any indirect involvement through the support of a local armed group is
mostly denied and hidden, which makes it difficult to prove it to a standard of proof
beyond reasonable doubt. 226

When assessing crimes charged as crimes against humanity, the judges must
determine whether the acts charged were part of a widespread or systematic attack
against a civilian population. To determine whether the crimes charged were
widespread, assessments about the scale of the crimes charged, as well as crimes not
charged, and the overall number of victims must be made. 227 Only if the crimes
charged are part of a large-scale action carried out collectively with considerable
224
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seriousness and directed against a multiplicity of victims, or amount to singular acts
of extraordinary magnitude, can they be qualified as ‘widespread’. 228 This is a caseby-case determination treated differently in each court or tribunal. 229 At the ICC, the
term ‘widespread’ still has to be defined by Trial Chamber or Appeals Chamber, but
the Pre-Trial Chamber has given a similar definition to it as the ICTY and ICTR. 230

The systematic nature of a crime depends on the level of organisation. In the ICTY,
the crimes charged must have been committed as part of a deliberate pattern, rather
than randomly. 231 Initially, it was necessary to demonstrate the existence of a plan or
policy, but the Appeals Chamber both for the ICTY and ICTR got rid of this
requirement. 232 At the ICC, on the other hand, the elements of crimes against
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humanity listed in the Statute itself require of an attack that it be carried our pursuant
to, or in furtherance of, a State or organisational policy to commit such an attack. 233
The extent to which ‘organisational policy’ includes policies of non-State entities is
currently subject to litigation. 234 Scholars disagree on this issue. 235

If genocide is charged, it must be established that the accused possessed the "specific
intent" or dolus specialis to destroy a targeted protected human group in whole or in
part. 236 Genocidal intent may be inferred from, amongst others: 237
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“(a) the general context of the perpetration of other culpable acts
systematically directed against that same group, whether these acts
were committed by the same offender or by others, (b) the scale of
atrocities committed, (c) their general nature, (d) their execution in a
region or a country, (e) the fact that the victims were deliberately
and systematically chosen on account of their membership of a
particular group, (f) the exclusion, in this regard, of members of
other groups, (g) the political doctrine which gave rise to the acts
referred to, (h) the repetition of destructive and discriminatory acts
and (i) the perpetration of acts which violate the very foundation of
the group or considered as such by their perpetrators”.
Failing to establish any of the above and the other ‘chapeau’ elements necessarily
results in an acquittal, or, if raised before the commencement of trial, the dismissal of
the case for lack of jurisdiction. These elements do not relate to the actus reus or mens
rea of the accused himself, but are rather described as the contextual elements of the
crimes. Thus, although the focus of any trial should be on the ultimate issue of guilt or
innocence of the accused in respect to the charges, there is no escape from making
findings on events on a broader scale than those charged.

This means that, in order to render judgment in an international case, judges must
establish facts of historic importance to a much wider audience than those directly
implicated by the criminal trial that triggers the judges to makes such findings. To
give an example, a finding that genocide was committed against an identifiable group
not only has a significant historic and moral importance to the direct victims, but also
for the history writing of the region in question. The identification of the various
players directly or indirectly involved in a conflict and the role they played, may be
necessary to establish that the conflict was of an international nature. This is also of
paramount importance in understanding the nature, cause and background of the
conflict.

The establishment of the direct mens rea and actus reus of the accused is itself of
historic significance, particularly where the accused in question had a leading political
or military position in the region under examination. They are usually not the ones
who pulled the trigger but rather those who committed through or with others,
ordered, instigated, planned or aided and abetted the crimes charged. The prosecution
has a difficult task in establishing a nexus between the accused and the crimes
charged particularly when the accused was remote from the crime scene when the
67

crimes were committed, or there is no obvious link between him and the direct
perpetrators. 238

Thus, unlike in ordinary domestic trials where the question is usually a simple one,
‘does the evidence show that he did, or did not commit a certain act?’, in international
trials the question of guilt is more complex. In order to establish responsibility of
those behind the scene, many questions have to be answered about the crimes of
others and the relationship between the direct and indirect perpetrator. It is therefore
usually much harder to prove a case of such complexity than it is to prove a typical
murder case in a domestic court.

It must further be established, for instance, whether an act constituted a war crime or a
legitimate self-defence, collateral damage or deliberate targeting of civilians. Such
determinations require choices of a historical interpretation of the conflict in terms of
who were the main aggressors and who were principally targeted. 239

It is therefore clear that the charges against an accused before an international court or
tribunal are interwoven with historical events. The judges must interpret these events
in their ultimate determination of whether a particular accused is guilty as charged. 240
However, in light of the difficulties discussed above, it is suggested that the judges
should not be overly ambitious and seek to write the entire history of the conflict. In
each case, judges should limit themselves to evaluating the evidence relating to the
charges against the accused. Any step further to writing history may lead to distortion
of that history.

The totality of the judgements rendered by international criminal courts and tribunals
may, however, contribute to the overall history writing carried out by historians,
sociologists, human rights advocates, the affected communities and others interested
in the conflict. The volume of this contribution depends on the extent to which the
findings of the tribunals are acknowledged as accurate and legitimate. History writing
is a time-consuming process. In this regard, historians and other observers have an
238
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advantage because they are not restrained by the deadlines imposed on the courts. As
historian and Rwanda expert Guichaoua said at a conference on Rwanda and the
ICTR, he and other experts on Rwanda will continue to write and review their history
of Rwanda’s conflict and genocide well after the closure of the ICTR. He showed
optimism that the truth on Rwanda would eventually come out. 241

The meaning of ‘the ascertainment of the truth’ in international justice
Relativism versus Radicalism
The frequent use of expressions such as ‘revealing the truth’, ‘uncovering the truth’ or
‘truth prevails’ in the context of past serious atrocities, suggests that there is a clear
assumption that there is one indisputable, objective truth out there that can be found if
one has sufficient tools to conduct an adequate search for the truth. It suggests that the
truth that one seeks to establish is more than a procedural truth, which is constructed
in the course of criminal proceedings.

The difficulties of establishing a non-contested ontological truth, if at all possible,
have been set out above. These difficulties are particularly evident in international
justice by comparison to domestic justice. Many different reasonable views exist
rather than one authoritative correct version. 242

Particularly in the context of serious human rights violations, it can be dangerous to
take relativism concerning the existence of one objective truth too far. If there are
only subjective perceptions none of which carries more moral weight than any other,
then any extremist negationist view would have to be considered in an equal manner
as any more moderate view.

Such extreme relativism should be avoided because it would undermine the moral
foundation of any fact-finding exercise, given that the outcome would simply be
another point of view. 243 Domestic systems would be equally affected by adopting
such a radical relativist position, as any criminal justice system is based on the
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assumption that it is in principle possible to reconstruct facts. Convicts are sent to
prison on the basis of this assumption.

The acknowledgement that the truth has more than one reasonable version is
consistent with the common law notion of procedural truth, and not inconsistent with
the civil law notion of objective truth. The objective truth in a civil law judicial
context has a legal, more than a moral meaning with reference to a particular method.
As previously stated, an objective truth in civil law systems should not be confused
with absolute truth, but is rather the safest result humanly possible of criminal
proceedings. 244

By contrast, when truth is used in the context of human rights violations, it has “very
strong moral, political and social dimensions”. 245 It does not only relate to uncovering
facts, it also has a strong normative value as well as an imposing tone. Truth is
contrasted with the lies of an authoritarian regime or other group having committed
atrocious crimes. People can no longer tolerate the concealment of their past atrocities
and demand to know the truth about these atrocities, in order to expose their lies and
prevent the spreading of false information about what happened in the conflict
itself. 246 The uncovering of the truth is seen as a solution to break with the past and
prevent the use of propaganda to brainwash people into committing further atrocities.
Truth also serves to identify those who did wrong and those who suffered this wrong.
Truth is thus associated with morality and righteousness and aligns with the morally
correct. 247

It is also believed that, when faced with the ‘truth’, those who are clinging onto their
inaccurate version of events will have to accept that they were in error. Truth is thus
seen as a tool to bring different ethnic groups together and work towards a more
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truthful and open society. 248 The truth, therefore, not only has a backward function in
determining who was responsible for atrocities committed in the past, but also a
forward function in working towards a better future society where such atrocities will
not be repeated. 249

Where a domestic country is too unstable or politically divided to render fair justice,
the entire hope of the victims of serious atrocities is vested in international tribunals
and courts. In a conflict zone, there usually is a greater faith in international criminal
tribunals than domestic courts to establish the truth impartially. 250 However, to
achieve all the objectives international justice has set out to achieve, if at all possible,
it is not sufficient to establish the truth about past events. This truth must also be
accepted, acknowledged and internalised by the international community as well as
the affected communities. 251 It then stands a better chance of beating negationism,
manipulation and cover-ups. 252 It would thus be unfortunate if the truth established by
international tribunals and courts were challengeable.

Accordingly, an overemphasis on relativism in relation to the objective nature of truth
would significantly undermine the importance that people, including those who
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suffered tremendously, attach to the determination of the truth and negate some of
their hopes for a better future.

Some level of relativism and acknowledgement that there is more than one reasonable
perspective is, however, healthy as well as necessary. For an international court to
have legitimacy and reach its objectives, it must at least consider all competing
narratives of different parties to the conflict.

This is an extremely difficult task after a conflict covered by blood and suffering on
all sides. On the one hand, one must be alert not to give too many credentials to
radical theories which seek to justify the behaviour of the principal aggressors in a
conflict and thereby underestimate their responsibilities. 253 This could undermine any
possibility for reconciliation since it would not do justice to the side of the principal
victims and may anger and frustrate them. It could potentially feed extremists and
would not encourage national and communal healing.

This is confirmed by Clark’s empirical research in different regions in Bosnia, where
she spoke to 120 ordinary people from the three ethnic groups, each massively
denying their own crimes and blaming all on the others. According to Clark, denial is
the cause of resentment, anger and frustration on all sides and undermines
reconciliation. 254

Reconciliation would equally be undermined if the extremist voices are not listened to
at all, no matter how unappealing they are to the assessors. They, themselves, would
feel undermined and not accept the outcome of the process. 255 More importantly, no
safe and solid truth can be established by listening to the side only of the identified
victims. This can only establish a partial, one-sided truth, while limiting any
understanding as to the causes of the violence. 256
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This is particularly true where the facts are not clear and different ethnic groups have
played a role. There are usually perpetrators and victims from all sides even if one
group has committed atrocities on a much larger scale. Also, victims are not always
blameless. Sometimes, one person may be a perpetrator and victim at the same
time. 257
Accordingly, no one possesses “a monopoly on correct interpretation”. 258 Conflict
stories are seldom black and white and as simplistic as they may initially appear.
Facts may be manipulated for political ends. The recorders of the facts may be easily
misled by the overwhelming information of gruesome crimes being committed and
the high number of persons being victimised. 259 Led by the horrific stories during
ethnic wars, everyone can become subject to manipulation. Yet, the story may deserve
at least some nuance. Nuance brings complexity and ambiguity and may result in
more acquittals or mitigated sentences. The end result is, however, closer to reality. 260

Therefore, it is important that an international tribunal identifies the wrongs suffered
and perpetrated by all sides. Only then can the truth stand the test of challenge. Its
credibility must not be allowed to be undermined by the identified wrongdoers or
their associates. Simultaneously, this very credibility must be acceptable to all sides
of the conflict. 261
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Construction of a Collective Truth
The only possible truth that would have legitimacy and be acknowledged as accurate
is one that is produced with the involvement of all parties. The end result would then
reflect a “collective truth”, somewhere in between black and white. 262

The process to obtain such a result must be transparent and allow for all voices to be
heard in an equal manner, even if what they say is ultimately rejected. Having
carefully balanced the different perspectives, the triers of fact must choose the most
reasonable and plausible interpretation of facts. 263 This does, however, not go without
difficulty or criticism. No matter how fair the triers of fact seek to be to all parties to
the conflict in addressing the wrongs and sufferings from all sides, it appears difficult,
if not impossible, to satisfy them all. There will always be people or groups unhappy
with the result.264 The important matter is that most reasonable people can live with
the end result, and that the blatant lies are filtered out in the course of the process. 265

Accordingly, as in domestic criminal justice, the truth is determined by the procedure.
As Ignatieff puts it, “the past has none of the fixed and stable identity of a
document.” 266 It cannot be found, but must be constructed by a fair and democratic
procedure in which the most persuasive argument wins. It is the fairness of the
procedure rather than the certainty of the outcome, which determines the legitimacy
and authoritative nature of the truth. 267 Accordingly, truth “is more a notion of
humanity than of science”. 268
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Rorty has pointed out that it is difficult to define truth, but it is possible to identify
certain “conditions in which a search for the truth will most likely be successful”. 269
He and others refer to “undistorted communication”, “reciprocity and mutual
recognition” and “free and open encounter” as such conditions. 270 Instead of an
objective truth, the truth that is established in such an environment is an intersubjective truth, as it is defined by communication between human beings, rather than
the relationship between a human being and the external, objective reality. 271

Conditions for the Effective Ascertainment of the Truth in International Trials
Listening to all sides in the context of international trials includes the prosecutor,
defence and victims. It is particularly important and challenging for the triers of fact
to listen to the side of the accused in full equality without a preconceived idea of his
guilt. 272 This is not always easy, given the extensive pre-trial media attention given to
the more notorious accused persons before international criminal tribunals. 273 In any
event, this author shares the view of the above-cited scholars Rorty and Becker, that
neutrality is a myth. 274 This does not, however, prevent triers of fact from ascertaining
the truth accurately to the extent humanly possible. Arguably, rather than seeking to
be neutral, triers of fact should seek to keep a distance from the information and
information providers with whom they are confronted, while engaging genuinely with
the information. In engaging with the information, triers of fact should not choose one
side over the other, but they do not need to abstain from choosing any side. Instead,
they should engage with all sides. 275
269
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Such engagement with all sides at a distance is essential for the establishment of a full
truth rather than a partial truth based on one side only. It may be part of a legitimate
defence to present the court with an alternative narrative of what occurred during the
conflict and with whom lies the responsibility. 276 The downside is that the accused
may turn the trial into a propaganda show. For instance, the accused, or counsel on his
behalf, can use the trial as a forum for politics, or to point to the guilt of people not on
trial. 277

The context in which crimes were committed cannot be ignored and may offer a
better understanding as to why the crimes were committed. Particular political,
historic, social and economic circumstances are needed for crimes against humanity,
war crimes or genocide to be perpetrated. However, contextualisation is not always
easy to distinguish from justification or exoneration of these crimes. Going too far in
this could potentially conflict with the purpose of doing justice to the victims by
acknowledging the harm done to them. The accused should thus not be allowed to use
the context to excuse his criminal conduct. At most, it would mitigate his criminal
conduct. 278

Yet, he must be able to express unpopular views as part of his defence. The accused
has a special status. He is the one facing a long prison sentence, and is protected by
due process principles. In a specific case, granting due process to the accused may be
in conflict with the mandate of ascertaining the truth. 279 In particular, the fairness of
the procedure may limit the access of the triers of fact to relevant information. For
instance, what if relevant and reliable information is produced late and the accused
had no advance notice thereof and could thus not prepare a defence to address the new
information? Or what if it was obtained unfairly? In such situations, seemingly a
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choice has to be made between respecting the fair trial rights of the defendant and the
search for the truth.
Also rights, such as the right to silence, the right not to incriminate one-self, the right to counsel and
the right to privacy are frequently considered to frustrate the ascertainment of the truth because the
individual cannot be taken by surprise or lured into speaking. 280

In the commentaries and literature, the terms ‘ascertainment of the truth’ and
‘effective prosecutions’ are often used inter-changeably – although they clearly do not
mean the same thing 281 – and are contrasted with fair trial guarantees. 282 Damaška, for
instance, opines that it is often naively denied that, usually, what is gained on the
front of individual rights is lost on the front of fact-finding precision, and vice versa.
Indeed, “in the criminal process, concern for individual rights will often set limits to
the pursuit of truth and conflict with the desire to establish the facts of the case. This
potential “zero-sum” effect is denied mostly by those who claim that they have
established an ideal social order. Actual failure to realize the ideal leads them to
idealize the real.” 283

Arguably, however, and contrary to Damaška’s assertion, fact-finding precision and
protection of due process principles can go hand in hand without undermining either
or both. A vigorous protection of the rights of the accused does not need to hinder a
thorough search for the truth. Whilst effective prosecutions with the fewest possible
barriers caused by principles of due process may lead to more convictions, they may
not necessarily lead to more accurate results. There is a compelling argument that
respecting individual rights contributes to ascertaining the truth. 284 For instance,
putting pressure on someone to answer questions often results in inaccurate answers
280
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and may distort the truth. 285 Further, if obtaining evidence irregularly carries no
consequences, there is no encouragement to stop using irregular methods to obtain
such evidence, which would adversely affect the overall quality of the proceedings
and thus the end product.

Fair trial rights were introduced to prevent miscarriages of justice and determine the
boundaries of the search for the truth. Arguably, the most adequate truth-searching
model reflects a fair balance between the rights of the defendant on the one hand, and
the need for effective prosecutions on the other. Professor ‘t Hart, former Dutch
prosecutor and legal scholar, is of the firm view that these objectives are not in
conflict with each other but must be considered as two sides of the same coin of
justice. 286 Only if the rights and obligations of the prosecution and defence are
equally balanced in the truth-searching process can the end result be accurate. 287

In conclusion, there is a constant struggle to find the right balance between protecting
the interests of the accused as well as the interests of the victims. There are various
types of methods that could be put in place to achieve the ‘happy middle way’,
provided they comply with a number of minimum conditions. These minimum
conditions are:
•

greatest access to relevant and reliable information from all sides;

•

engagement at a distance by the triers of fact;

•

transparency;

•

democratic, open and fair procedure to accused and victims.
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Part II will consider to what extent the international criminal justice model complies
with these minimum conditions and identify the procedural elements which are
potentially problematic in ascertaining the truth. Bearing the above definition of truth
and the conditions to achieve it in mind, Part III will review how adequately
international criminal tribunals ascertain the truth in the practical reality of their daily
operation. More specifically, it will examine the selection of cases, the investigations,
presentation and evaluation of the evidence in the ICTY, ICTR and ICC. In so doing,
it will evaluate to what the extent the potentially problematic procedural elements
identified in Part II are problematic in reality.

In carrying out this socio-legal research, it should be borne in mind, as Becker stated,
that truth “cannot and should not be developed with the idea of a master plan or with
fantasies about a clear-cut tool kit that is applicable in any context of conflict in the
world. So our first and most important set of recommendations to any actor in this
field is about humility in reference to the enormity of the task, public honesty as to the
limited goals we are able to achieve, and a capacity to respect and reflect the special
characteristics of a given local context.” 288
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PART II
METHODOLOGIES

80

Origins of the Legal Principles of the ICTY and ICTR

When the Yugoslavia and Rwanda Tribunals were set up in 1993 and 1994
respectively, the only precedents available were the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals,
which had been established fifty years earlier. 289 Similar to these earlier tribunals, the
drafting of the Statute and Rules of Procedure and Evidence finished very rapidly.
Time was of the essence, given that both tribunals responded to ongoing wars and
threats of renewed and increasing violence. 290

Both the ICTY and ICTR, which were initially almost identical in their structure,
operation and legislative framework, were established on the basis of a Security
Council resolution. 291 Resolution 808, pursuant to which the ICTY was established,
assigned the Secretary-General the task of submitting a report containing a draft
Statute for the anticipated tribunal. Since the UN has no legislative branch, the
Secretary-General assigned the task of drafting the Statute of the ICTY to the Office
of Legal Affairs (‘ALO’) in New York. The procedure was fast. Within three months
the Statute was drafted and adopted. Since government positions communicated to the
ALO remained secret there are no records of the drafting process. 292

According to M. Cherif Bassiouni, who was part of the drafting process, many States
made proposals during this process. To avoid lengthy debates on issues where no
consensus existed between various States, the Security Council did not allow any

289

London Agreement, 8 August 1945; Tokyo Charter, 26 April 1946; Y. Beigbeder, Judging War
Criminals, The Politics of International Justice (St. Martin’s Press Inc, 1999), 54-56.
290
In Rwanda the war shifted to a neighbouring country, the nation formerly known as Zaire, now
called the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).
291
The ICTY was established pursuant to Resolution 808, adopted on 22 February 2003: UN Doc.
S/RES/808. The ICTR was established pursuant to Resolution 955, adopted on 8 November 1994: UN
Doc. S/RES/955. In each of these cases the Security Council used its powers under Article 39 of
Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, allowing it to adopt military and non-military
measures it deems appropriate to maintain or restore international peace and security. This Article
provides: “The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to peace, breach of peace,
or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in
accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.”
292
See M. Cherif Bassiouni & P. Manikas, The Law of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia (Transnational Publishers Inc, 1996), 219-221; S. Johnson, On the Road to
Disaster: The Rights of the Accused and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, 10(1) International Legal Perspectives 111 (1998), 113-115.
81

amendments once it received the draft Statute. 293 Pursuant to Security Council (‘SC’)
Resolution 827, the draft Statute was adopted without change. 294 Save for the
provisions stipulating the crimes, the ICTR Statute was copied word for word from
the ICTY Statute and attached to the SC Resolution establishing the ICTR. 295

Given the lack of a clear precedent, the drafters of the Statute had a difficult task in
drafting a legal framework in a legal vacuum. The predominantly American drafters
mainly referred back to a system they knew best: ‘common law’ as applied in
American courtrooms. 296 Bassiouni confirms that the tribunal that had been created
“is more akin to court systems found in common law jurisdictions, particularly that of
the US.” 297 This is particularly with regard to the manner in which its functions were
separated.

Unlike the Nuremberg Charter, which had already incorporated the main evidentiary
principles, 298 the ICTY and ICTR Statutes did not include any evidentiary guideline.
293
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In adopting the rules of procedure and evidence, the Statutes left the task of designing
evidentiary principles exclusively to the judges.

By virtue of Art 15 of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) Statute and Art 14 of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)
Statute the Rules of Procedure and Evidence were adopted on 11 February 1994 and
29 June 1995 respectively. The ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence served as a
model for the ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence. Accordingly, as initially
adopted, the ICTY and ICTR Rules were almost identical except for minor
differences. 299

The principal drafters of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICTY were the
judges of the Trial and Appeal Chambers, in co-operation with States and
organisations from all over the world.
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The purpose of this inclusionary approach

was to ensure that different domestic legal systems would be considered and
incorporated.

301

However, representatives of common law systems, particularly the

US, played the most influential role in the drafting process of the ICTY Rules. 302 In
particular, the role of the American Bar Association (‘ABA’) was significant. 303
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Many of the participating judges also came from common law countries.304
Consequently, similar to the Statutes, the Rules of Procedure and Evidence are
predominantly common law rooted. This is particularly the case with regard to the
procedure, which is based on the adversarial approach of common law.

However, from the outset, there have been important departures from common law,
rooted in civil law. Over the years, through interpretation, re-interpretation and
amendments of the rules of procedure and evidence, as well as the adoption of new
rules, these points of departure from common law have been strengthened. 305 Civil
law has become increasingly influential.

Origins of the Legal Principles of the ICC
The ICC Statute and Rules of Procedure and Evidence have a much longer drafting
history. The need to set up a permanent international criminal court had been
recognised after the ad hoc and post facto Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals had been
established. During the Cold War, however, any debates on the establishment of such
a court had been discontinued. Negotiations were resumed in 1989 and a draft Statute
was prepared by the International Law Commission (ILC). This Statute was then
discussed by an Ad Hoc Committee and Preparatory Committee. It appeared that
there were wide disparities in views among States both in respect of procedural
technicalities and the political desirability of such a court. Therefore, it was a difficult
and lengthy process to finalise a Statute. 306

The establishment of the ad hoc tribunals gave an extra impetus to continue the
negotiations for the ICC. After several years of negotiations between representatives
from many jurisdictions, common law and civil law alike, as well as many NGOs, the
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Procedure and Evidence, 14(2) LJIL 367 (2001); K. Ambos, International Criminal Procedure:
“Adversarial”, “Inquisitorial” or Mixed?, 3 International Criminal Law Review 1 (2003), 1-37; A.
Orie, Accusatorial v. Inquisitorial Approach in International Criminal Proceedings prior to the
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See, among others, Philippe Kirsch QC, Introduction, XXIII – XXVIII; and: Morten Bergsmo / Otto
Triffterer: Preamble; and Otto Triffterer: Part I. Establishment of the Court, in: Triffterer, Commentary
on the Rome Statute, supra note 168.
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Rome Statute was adopted on 17 July 1998. The reason that it took so long was that
many different views, notably those from common law and civil law jurists, had to be
reconciled. 307 In 2002 the ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence were adopted.
Similar to the negotiation process that preceded the adoption of the Rome Statute,
debates on the rules by a preparatory committee consisting of representatives of States
Parties to the Rome Statute together with NGOs lasted for a number of years. The
Assembly of States Parties subsequently approved and adopted the Rules created in
this process. 308

In drafting the ICC Statute and Rules, the drafters had an advantage over the drafters
of the ICTY and ICTR Statute and Rules, in that the ICTY and ICTR Statute and
Rules provided a modern and fresh example for the ICC. The drafters carefully
examined the legal provisions adopted by the ICTY and ICTR, in particular with
regard to the Rules. 309 In essence and nature, the ICC Rules are similar to the ICTY
and ICTR Rules and are clearly influenced by them. 310 Some of the rules were copied
almost word for word from the ICTY and ICTR Rules.

Despite the instructive example the ICTY and ICTR Rules provided, the formulation
of rules at the ICC also diverged. Unlike in the drafting process of the ICTY and
ICTR Statutes and Rules, there was a powerful lobby from civil law jurisdictions, in
particular France, seeking to assert their influence over the drafting of the ICC Statute
and Rules. They succeeded. The ICC Statute and Rules are, from the outset, a true
hybrid of civil law and common law principles.

Accordingly, the ICTY, ICTR and ICC are all rooted in a combination of civil law
and common law principles. It is debatable whether such a mixed system can serve as
an appropriate truth-ascertaining model. The two systems differ significantly, both in
structure and in legal philosophy. They cannot be separated from the cultural and
307
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political norms of the societies in which they have evolved. They are not the product
of a cursory configuration of rules, but have developed over the course of time.

A number of scholars and practitioners have suggested that it is not advisable to
combine procedural aspects rooted in culturally different systems into a new criminal
procedure. 311 Taking parts from a system without the corresponding parts may
deprive the new system of the protection mechanisms that were built into the original
system. Mixing can particularly go wrong if the foundation of a legal principle or its
underlying philosophy is misunderstood. This may result in an erroneous
interpretation of it in a different legal context.

For instance, Haveman pointed out that it is difficult to merge different legal doctrines
from inherently different and often incompatible systems, and take them out of their
context without fully comprehending the origins and rationale behind those
principles. 312 Nijboer warned against copying elements from one system into another
without carefully examining whether they could work in the other system. 313 Indeed,
as suggested by Hongju Koh, evidentiary principles “are so rooted in their historical
and cultural context that they cannot be transplanted piecemeal from common law to
civil law jurisdictions”. 314

The difficulties of transplanting legal concepts from one domestic criminal procedure
into another are increased when this other procedure is an international procedure
emerging from scratch. Judge Cassese understood the difficulties of transplanting
domestic legal concepts into international criminal proceedings. He rightly pointed
out that domestic legal principles cannot be “mechanically imported into international
criminal proceedings.” 315
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It is particularly difficult to determine the ideology or legal thinking that would suit a
melting pot of two fundamentally different systems. Ideologies are intertwined with
the legal structure and societies in which those systems emerged over time. It is
unclear whether the different ideologies underlying different domestic legal systems
are even compatible and how they can merge successfully, if at all. The difficulties
that come with the process of merging fundamentally different legal systems into a
new one can potentially lead to a schizophrenic system.

Jackson argued that the international criminal procedure has evolved in a pragmatic
rather than a principled manner. In his observation, it has mixed common law and
civil law procedures with scant regard to Damaška’s warning “that a mixing of
procedures can produce a far less satisfactory fact-finding result in practice than under
either Continental or Anglo-American evidentiary arrangements in their unadulterated
form.” 316

In order to test the validity of these observations, a comparative analysis of these two
types of criminal justice is provided. They are defined in terms of their compatibility
with the conditions identified in Part I: (i) greatest access to relevant and reliable
information from all sides; (ii) engagement with the information at a distance; (iii)
transparency; and, (iv) democratic, open and fair procedure.

Next, it is considered whether the international criminal justice model, combining
parts of civil law principles with parts of common law principles, meets these
conditions, and can accordingly serve as an efficient theoretical truth-ascertaining
framework.

Comparison of civil law and common law methodologies
Access to Relevant and Reliable Information
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Civil Law Jurisdictions
Part I has established that the ascertainment of the truth is a core objective of civil law criminal
proceedings. This requires a methodology that facilitates the collection, presentation and assessment of
the largest possible quantity of quality information relevant to the case. Accordingly, prosecutors and
investigators must make all efforts to present to the triers of fact the most complete and unbiased
material truth as possible. The triers of fact include professional judges who also adjudicate on legal
issues that arise in the course of the proceedings.

The prosecution represents the State,

318

317

but is not viewed as a mere party to the proceedings

representing the interests of the State exclusively. Serving the public interest is the primary duty of the
prosecutor,
judges.

320

319

who in many jurisdictions has attended the same judicial training as professional

In most civil law jurisdictions, the prosecutor is in charge of searching for incriminating and

exonerating evidence equally.
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German Criminal Procedure, supra note 123. See further C. Buisman, Civil Law (‘Fact Finders’), in
Khan, Principles of Evidence, supra note 25.
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Many civil law jurisdictions also rely on an investigative judge for investigations,
although a number of civil law jurisdictions including Germany and Italy have
abolished the investigative judge. 322 In jurisdictions where an investigative judge is
still involved in criminal investigations, he is viewed as independent of the parties. He
plays a double role of overseeing the fairness of the investigations as well as
collecting incriminating and exonerating evidence independent of the police and
prosecutor. The collection of evidence includes the hearing of witnesses, usually in
the presence of the parties. 323

The exact role and scope of the duties of an investigative judge vary from country to
country. In some countries, such as France and Spain, the investigative judge is very
active in collecting evidence, and is in charge of issuing indictments. 324 In other
countries, the prosecutor rather than the investigative judge is dominis litis of the
322

Germany has abolished the investigative judge in 1975. There is an ‘Ermittlungsrichter’ who is
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an interview with a witness if there is fear of the witness disappearing or retracting his or her
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See, for instance, Art. 81 of the French CPP which states that an investigative judge may undertake
any investigative step he deems useful for the discovery of the truth and which is in accordance with
the law. The decision of an investigative judge to issue an indictment is rendered after hearing the
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investigations. This means that he is in charge of the investigations and has the
responsibility of charging identified suspects. 325

The extent to which the defence has an independent role in conducting investigations
on behalf of the defendant also varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. In Germany,
Italy, Russia and the Netherlands, the defence is allowed to conduct its own
investigations. However, the funds available for such investigations can be limited in
cases where the State, rather than the defendant, pays for the defence. 326 In France, on
the other hand, the defence cannot conduct its own independent investigations. Since
1993, the defence is instead in a position to ask the investigative judge to conduct
certain investigative tasks. These include the ordering of a medical examination, the
organizing of a confrontation, a site visit, or a hearing. 327
Once the investigation has been finalised, the prosecutor, or in some countries, the
investigative judge, produces a dossier detailing every investigative step taken during
the investigations. 328 The dossier includes exonerating and incriminating evidence
produced by all parties, including the defence. 329

Prior to the commencement of the trial, the judges receive full disclosure of the
dossier and are thereby made aware of the whole case and all the evidence available.
If, in the view of the judges, the dossier is incomplete, they may order the prosecutor
or investigative judge to conduct further investigations, provide additional materials,
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and/or schedule additional witnesses. 330 They can do so up to the deliberation stage.
In addition, they may unlimitedly conduct their own independent examination in court
and are not restricted by what the parties present. 331

Accordingly, the judges are not solely dependent on the prosecutor to produce sufficient convincing
evidence to sustain a conviction. 332 The prosecutor must produce sufficient evidence to demonstrate the
existence of a prima facie case. Otherwise, a case will be dismissed prior to trial.

333

However, once the

dossier has been finalised, the judges are in a position to complement or supplement the evidence
presented by the parties, both in favour and against the accused. The parties call most of the witnesses,
but the judges can call additional witnesses if necessary to complete the picture. 334

In addition, judges rather than the parties are in control of the examination of
witnesses. The parties can ask questions of their own witnesses as well as the
witnesses called by the other party. The defendant himself can as well, even if
assisted by counsel. 335 The concept of cross-examination is unknown to civil law
jurisdictions. 336 The parties cannot be overly confrontational with the witnesses in
challenging their evidence and must treat them with due respect. As Sybille Bedord
puts it: “The sporting spirit, the notion of the law as a game of skill with handicaps to
give each side a chance, is entirely absent on the Continent.” 337
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The judges may elicit information from the witnesses beyond what has been elicited
by the parties. When examining a witness, judges have access to all prior statements
made by such a witness and may ask a witness to clarify any answers given
previously. In addition, they can confront witnesses with the statements of other
witnesses and ask them to explain any contradictions. 338

In many civil law jurisdictions, civil parties representing the victims of the alleged crimes are allowed
to participate in criminal proceedings. Victims may only participate if they have established that their
harm is personal, exists at the time of the application, and is directly linked to the offence. 339 The
modalities of victim participation vary from country to country. Where victim participation is allowed,
the participatory rights of victims are limited to their direct interest, which is a claim to financial
compensation for the alleged harm suffered. In some jurisdictions such as France, civil parties are
treated as parties with full participatory rights equal to the prosecutor and defence. Civil parties can
question witnesses at trial or call their own witnesses in a similar manner as the prosecutor and
defence. 340 Civil parties cannot be heard as sworn witnesses, but the judges may decide to hear them
without requiring the taking of an oath. 341

Judges receive all evidence and then decide whether to exclude parts of it or accredit
it less weight. 342 Technical rules governing the admissibility, presentation and
evaluation of the evidence are generally not engaged unless the evidence was
obtained irregularly or is privileged. 343 For instance, hearsay evidence is admissible.
338
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This, however, does not suggest that Courts can always rely on a written statement
instead of oral testimony. It can usually do so only if the statement was taken by an
investigative judge or other judicial officer in the presence of the parties. 344 A finding
of guilt can further not be based solely on written statements. 345 Most civil law
jurisdictions apply a rule of immediacy, pursuant to which witnesses have to be heard
directly by the triers of fact in the presence of the accused. They should also testify
exclusively to what they have personally observed. 346

registered partners, violation of which normally leads to exclusion. See for instance the German case:
BGH St 11, 216. Also, communications between counsel and client, or doctor or psychiatrist and
patient, are usually privileged, and can, therefore, not be used as evidence if seized. See for instance the
German case: BGH St 18, 229. In The Netherlands, testimonial privileges for close family are set out in
Arts. 217 and 219 of the Dutch Code of Criminal Procedure; and the professional privilege in Art. 218
of the Code. The grounds to exclude illegally obtained evidence have been expanded, particularly in
Germany when it concerns violations of the fundamental rights of the accused. The German Supreme
Court (‘‘Bundesgerichtshof’’ (BGH)) has developed a theory based on the defendant’s ‘‘sphere of
rights’’ (‘‘Rechtskreistheorie’’). According to this approach the admissibility of the illegally obtained
evidence depends on whether the violation in obtaining the evidence substantially aﬀects the
defendant’s sphere of rights or if it is only of subordinate or
ﬁ cance
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to him. See:
Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofs in Strafsachen (BGH St) 11, 213. See further C. Roxin,
Strafverfahrensrecht (25th edn, 1988) 182; Weigend, Rechtsvergleichende Bemerkungen, supra note
123, 754.
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November 1989, 1989 ECHR (Ser. A.) 166; Delta v. France, Judgment of 19 December 1990, 1991
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A former US judge and distinguished legal scholar, Jerome Frank describes the
‘investigatory’ or ‘truth’ method of trying cases as conducting “an intelligent inquiry
into all the practically available evidence, in order to ascertain, as near as may be, the
truth about the facts of that suit.” 347 The criminal investigation must be unbiased,
impartial and non-prejudicial. 348

At the end of the trial, judges withdraw to deliberate in private and write their
judgment. If they are convinced that the accused is guilty, they will enter a conviction
and simultaneously determine the appropriate sentence. If they are not so convinced,
they must acquit. 349 Dissenting opinions, if any, are not published. Only the majority
opinion is reflected in the judgment. 350

Irrespective of the verdict (guilty or not guilty), both parties may lodge an appeal
against it before the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal examines all findings de
novo, which means that the parties may produce additional evidence, introduce a new
line of defence or prosecution and/or adopt a new strategy. The appeals judges are
active and may recall witnesses heard at trial or heard by an investigative judge prior
to trial. They may also conduct their own investigations, possibly with the assistance
of an investigative judge. The Court of Appeal routinely overturns verdicts. In such
situations, the Court of Appeal may refer the matter back to the court of first instance,
order a re-trial by another court of first instance or determine the matter itself. 351

After the Appeals Chamber renders its judgment, an appeal is still open before the
Supreme Court or Court of Cassation as it is called in Belgium and France. Cassation
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is allowed against both convictions and acquittals. 352 This is not a trial de novo; the
Supreme Court will marginally examine whether the defendant has received a fair
trial and whether the issues have been properly adjudicated. The test applied by the
Supreme Court is whether the judges in the first instance or on appeal could have
reached their verdict on the basis of the evidence available; not whether they should
have reached this verdict. 353

Thus, the determination of guilt or innocence does not become final until it has been
tested on three levels, two of which include a full test of the facts. This in
combination with the thorough investigation preceding the trial is in agreement with
the truth-ascertaining objective.
In summary, the ascertainment of the truth does not only indicate that the criminal
process is aimed at a factually accurate result, but it also refers to a particular
methodology in obtaining that result. The methodology exists in many different
versions, but is generally aimed at acquiring the greatest quantity of attainable and
available relevant information to enable active triers of fact and law to assess and
reconstruct the fullest possible picture.

Common Law Systems

The English system and other common law systems modelled on the English system
can be described as a battlefield. To quote Frank: “I want, therefore, to stress the fact
that litigation in our courts is still a fight. The fighting, to be sure, occurs in a courtroom, and is supervised by a government officer known as a judge. Yet, for the most
part, a law-suit remains a sort of sublimated, regulated brawl, a private battle
conducted in a court-house”. 354
The parties can argue their dispute with any means they wish to use within the limits
of the law. They are autonomous. The parties are responsible for gathering the
352
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evidence they wish to rely on at trial. At trial the prosecution presents its case first,
followed by the defence. If the prosecution fails to establish a prima facie case, the
defence has no case to answer. An acquittal will then be entered without the need to
hear from the defence. 355

The parties call their witnesses one by one and examine them after they have taken
the oath to tell the truth. Leading questions, unless they concern matters not in
dispute, are prohibited. The opposite party subsequently has an opportunity to crossexamine the witnesses. The cross-examining party is entitled to ask leading questions
of the witness. 356 The examining party will then be able to ask some final questions in
re-examination, but only on matters raised in cross-examination. 357 Nobody can ask
any questions of the defendant unless he decides to testify under oath during the
defence case. In that instance, the defendant would be examined like any other
witness. 358

The parties, themselves, decide what information to elicit from the witnesses. The
triers of fact simply listen, but cannot themselves ask questions to the witness. In
examining and cross-examining the witnesses, parties intentionally attempt to put the
best portrayal of their version of the truth. Being an efficient party to the criminal
proceedings requires the discrediting of adverse witnesses. It also requires the
presentation of the party’s own witnesses in the best possible light while concealing
the weaknesses in their testimony and boosting up their credibility. Consequently, if
the parties are successful in doing so, there is a risk that “the trial court is denied the
benefit of observing the witness’s actual normal demeanour, and thus prevented from
accurately evaluating the witness.” 359 Nonetheless, a vigorous cross-examination is
considered the most efficient tool to test the credibility of the witnesses and to
unmask dishonesty and uncertainty. It therefore seeks to ensure that the triers of fact
are aware of the weaknesses in the evidence.
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In presenting their cases and cross-examining the witnesses of the opposition, both
parties are bound by ethical obligations. They cannot, for instance, deliberately
mislead the court or produce evidence with the knowledge that it is false. However,
particularly for defence counsel, defending the interests of their clients is more
important than helping to establish the truth about their guilt or innocence, unless
their clients are truly innocent or have pleaded guilty. This is true in any system, civil
law and common law systems alike. In civil law systems, however, there is more
judicial control in the manner in which evidence is being collected and the witnesses
are being questioned. 360

There is a clear separation between the triers of law and the triers of fact. The trial is
presided over by a judge, who is the trier of law. A jury, also present at trial, is the
trier of fact. 361 The jury and judge are passive in the process and allow the parties to
proceed in the manner they choose, provided they abide by the rules. The jury is silent
throughout the trial and the judge will only intervene where necessary to ensure the
fairness and integrity of the proceedings, 362 which may include some supplementary
questioning to clarify issues that arise. Such an intervention is, however, the exception
rather than the rule, unless triggered by an objection from one of the parties. The
judge must always rule on objections made by either side, but rarely intervenes if no
objection is made. 363

As the overseer of the fairness and integrity of the proceedings, the judge must protect
the accused from unfair prejudice. In doing so, he may exercise his discretionary
powers in an attempt to ensure that the form in which the case is presented to the
jurors will lead them to decide on it fairly. 364 The judge should, for instance, prevent
360
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evidence that is irrelevant, unreliable or unfairly prejudicial, from being presented to
the jury. The reason for excluding such evidence from the jury is to avoid that a
conviction is based on it. 365 As John Henry Wigmore stated, the purpose of rules of
evidence is “to guard the tribunal (particularly the jury) against erroneous
persuasion”. 366 The jury may, however, erroneously believe that any evidence they
review is relevant and reliable because otherwise, it is assumed, it would have been
excluded. 367

The judge will rarely exclude evidence on his own initiative. Usually, one of the
parties will invite the judge to use his discretion. 368 If he decides to exclude the
evidence, the jury is not even aware that the excluded evidence exists. In some cases,
the jury therefore renders its verdict on incomplete evidence.
In acquittal cases, the verdict of the jury is final, 369 unless highly compelling new
evidence comes to light or the verdict can be shown to have been “tainted” by
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interference with the jury. 370 In case of a conviction, the verdict can be appealed
before a Court of Appeal, consisting of judges only. 371 There is no jury. Factual issues
can only be the subject of an appeal where the verdict is unsafe, or where there is said
to be fresh evidence. Leave to appeal must first be granted by a single judge on the
papers alone. 372

On allowing an appeal the Court may direct either that the defendant stand acquitted,
or that there should be a fresh trial at first instance. 373 The evidence is tested only
marginally and witnesses are called only in exceptional circumstances. When the
Court of Appeal is presented with new evidence on appeal which could not have been
introduced earlier with due diligence, it will hear the new evidence directly. On the
basis of such a hearing, the Court of Appeal must consider whether the new evidence
caused it to entertain a reasonable doubt about the conviction. 374

The Court of Appeal does not lightly overturn errors. Where a party fails to exploit all
procedural tools available to it, it cannot complain to the Court of Appeal on the
grounds that a miscarriage of justice has occurred. 375 There is particular reluctance to
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reverse the jury’s decision on the facts, provided that the case has been fully and
fairly laid before it. The reasoning is that the Court of Appeal is not given an
opportunity to see or hear the witnesses and can, therefore, not form a first-hand
impression of the witnesses’ demeanour. 376 This reluctance has been criticized as it
effectively deprives a convicted person of a remedy against miscarriages of justice
involving no error of law or irregularity of procedure. 377 It is clearly in contrast with
the civil law approach where the filing of an appeal by either party is an automatic
right both against a conviction and an acquittal.

In summary, the parties run the proceedings and the jury decides by whom they are
convinced, bearing in mind the burden and standard of proof. The extensive
participation of the parties and their autonomy is often perceived as the most
significant feature of the common law trial and reflect its adversarial nature. Fuller,
for example, expressed the view that “[t]he essence of the adversary system is that
each side is accorded a participation in the decision that is reached, a participation that
takes the form of presenting proofs and arguments.” 378 The jury is also an important
element of this system. 379

To conclude on the issue of access to information, civil law and common law
jurisdictions both have their own distinct way to channel information which
ultimately forms the foundation for the findings of fact. The triers of fact in civil law
jurisdictions receive all relevant available information, including from the victims. By
contrast, the common law triers of fact only receive relevant information which is
presented by the parties and considered reliable enough as a basis for a conviction.
Whilst this reduces the chances of wrongful convictions, it does not automatically
strengthen the ascertainment of the truth. The latter does not only seek to ensure that
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innocent defendants are acquitted, but also that guilty defendants are convicted. 380 For
that reason, the civil law method of presenting all relevant information to the triers of
fact may be more efficient. The downside of this is that the triers of fact may be
influenced by relevant, but unreliable information. 381 They may for instance have
formed an opinion on the papers concerning the guilt of the accused before the trial
has even begun. 382 In addition, witnesses in civil law jurisdictions are not subjected to
a cross-examination. Witnesses are thus more protected from unpleasant questioning,
but their credibility is not tested in a similarly vigorous manner.

Thus, of the two, the civil law method guarantees the greatest access of the triers of
fact to relevant information from all sides. However, this includes unreliable
evidence, which should be excluded in the ultimate determination of the facts.
Whether this is done depends on the ability of the triers of fact to engage, yet keep a
distance from the information and sources subject to their evaluation. In common law,
the unreliable information has been filtered out before the triers of fact get to see the
information. Accordingly, there is less risk that a finding is made on unreliable
evidence. All in all, both methods have advantages and disadvantages.
Engagement at a Distance
Common law jurisdictions rely mainly on laypersons to determine the facts. Civil law
jurisdictions rely on professional judges. Professional judges are the more obvious
choice to ascertain the truth. This is because the determination of the guilt of a
defendant includes the legal qualification of facts, which may be too complex a task
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for a layperson. Judges are also more academically trained in civil law jurisdictions
than judges in common law jurisdictions. 383

In searching for the truth, professional judges are seeking to get to the essence of the
testimony by engaging in dialogue with the witnesses and the defendant.
Simultaneously to determining whether the defendant has done as alleged, judges
seek to comprehend his motive for doing so. The defendant’s state of mind is
important to determine his culpability and what sentence, if any, would be
appropriate. Accordingly, judges assess both the credibility and the personality of the
defendant and witnesses and thus engage with the information. Yet, they have been
trained to be impartial and evaluate the facts in a dispassionate manner. Professional
judges are therefore assumed to be less susceptible to improper influence from
irrelevant or prejudicial information than jurors. In reality, the ability to remain
impartial in the process varies from judge to judge. 384

A trial by jury is more random. A defendant can be lucky or unlucky with the
personalities and independent minds of the jurors. They are randomly selected from
society. 385 The defendant can ask that individual jury members be disqualified if they
can demonstrate bias on their part. 386 In other situations, the defendant’s fate is in the
hands of twelve unknown citizens who may, or may not be fair and open minded with
regard to his innocence.
In the eyes of many civil law practitioners and some common law practitioners, 387 it
is curious that the common law system entrusts jurors, who have no legal
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qualification or forensic expertise, with the ultimate decision on guilt or innocence of
the accused no matter how notorious or legally complex the case may be. 388 Often,
the determination of the ultimate issue requires an understanding of the law because it
involves a determination as to whether the facts qualify as a crime and whether it was
committed with the requisite mens rea. It is difficult to imagine that, in just a few
days, the jurors without any legal background could grasp the often complex legal
matters. Where legal definitions are fluid, the jurors would even operate as legislators,
and there is no way of verifying whether the jury has understood the judge’s
instructions. 389

It is particularly striking that, on the one hand, enough faith is placed in jurors to
render a verdict while, on the other hand, they are not sufficiently trusted with
evidence which prejudices the accused unfairly because it may render them biased
against the accused. 390

Lacking expertise and full information, it is questionable whether jury members can
engage with the information. It is further contested that jury members can evaluate the
information in a dispassionate manner. Research has demonstrated that jury members
are regularly manipulated by the media or other prejudicial information that may
place the accused in a bad light. 391

Yet, in the common law tradition, professional judges are viewed with suspicion.
They usually come from a different class than the persons on trial. They are,
therefore, not viewed as the peers of the defendants. 392
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This explains why greater faith is placed in lay members of society than on
professional judges to determine the guilt or innocence of an accused. 393 Trial by jury
is considered pivotal to criminal justice and “the final check against suppression of
liberty by the state.” 394 It has been described as “the lamp that shows that freedom
lives” 395 and has enormous popular support. According to Lord Bingham, Lord Chief
Justice, this support for trials by jury is shared by judges who are uncomfortable
making decisions on facts, given that no authority or rational rules can assist them.
The trier of fact is merely dependent on ‘his own unaided judgment’. 396

An additional safeguard is offered by the fact that the judge is mandated to sum up the
case to the jury and explain coherently the principles of law applicable in the case. He
must be more careful in presenting the facts. He cannot be seen to attempt to
influence the jury one way or the other. He should caution the jury in respect to
certain categories of dubious evidence, such as evidence from a co-perpetrator. The
judge must also clearly indicate that it is for the jury, not him, to decide on what
evidence to rely and whether guilt has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. He
must further emphasize that the jury cannot convict the accused unless all of the
jurors are convinced beyond reasonable doubt that he is guilty as charged, or, after a
long period of deliberation and a further judicial direction, by a majority of not less
than 10-2. 397 By contrast, judges render verdicts solely or in a bench of three, two of
whom must agree with the verdict. 398
393
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Railroad, ibid, 241; Frank, Courts on Trial, supra note 38, 108.
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397
The unanimity rule is set out in the UK Criminal Justice Act 1967, § 13. Prior to 1967, unanimity
was required for a conviction. Likewise, in the US, until 1972, there was a unanimity requirement for
conviction. In Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) and Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972)
104

The impression commonly held by supporters of trial by jury is that lay triers of fact
are more lenient, and require more evidence in support of a conviction. Lay triers of
fact do not routinely determine whether an accused is guilty as charged. It has been
suggested that they, therefore, often feel a greater responsibility for the fate of the
defendant, who could end up serving a long prison sentence as a result of their
finding. 399 Professional judges, on the other hand, become depersonalized with the
consequence that convicting becomes less of a “unique human drama” and thus less
of a “big deal”. Also, they are more inclined to use a mathematical test, based on prior
experience: e.g. if factor x is present then result y will follow. 400

If at all true, this in itself does not guarantee more accuracy in ascertaining the facts,
given that an acquittal is not necessarily more reliable than a conviction. Accuracy
and even fairness cannot be tested by the number of acquittals, but rather by the
procedure as a whole leading to the outcome. The assessment of jurors which leads
them to doubt may be inaccurate. Their doubt may have been based on sympathy for
the defendant rather than on the actual evidence. 401 According to Honourable Judge
Murphy, jurors “are extremely susceptible to being affected, either positively or
negatively, by a combination of dialectic and rhetoric”. 402

In conclusion, it is difficult to determine which type of trier of fact is best suited to
engage with the information while simultaneously keeping a distance. It depends on
the personality of individual judges and jury members. Both open minded and biased
judges and jurors exist. However, truth-ascertainment is more consistent when done
by a constant pool of professional judges than a continuously changing selection of
jurors.

the US Supreme Court held that jury unanimity was not constitutionally mandated. See Damaška,
Evidentiary Barriers, supra note 30, 536-537. For summing up by the judges, see Juries Act 1974 (UK)
s. 17; Richardson, Archbold, supra note 355, paras. 4-404i–4-404r (general summing up directives
concerning caution in respect of dubious evidence); paras. 13–68; 4-410–415 (warning in relation to
bad character evidence admitted to show propensity to commit offences or to be untruthful and general
summing up directions); paras. 14-12–14-24 (Turnbull warning concerning identification evidence).
398
However, as stated above, many civil law courts include jurors as triers of fact. See supra note 317.
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402
Murphy, Evidence, Proof, and Facts, supra note 137, 9.
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Transparency
On most issues, civil law proceedings are conducted in a much more transparent
manner than common law proceedings. All information that is collected during the
investigation is compiled in a dossier that is accessible to all. The defence has a right
to inspect and challenge the dossier for incompleteness. 403 The defence can do that
before the prosecutor, investigative judge or the court. The defence can also ask that
missing materials be added to the dossier, which can in principle not be denied.
Information can only be withheld from the defendant where a concrete interest of the
investigation so requires. 404

The transparency of the proceedings is, however, undermined where necessary to
protect witnesses. Many civil law jurisdictions allow the use of witnesses whose
identities are not disclosed to the defence. 405 The European Court of Human Rights
(“ECHR”) has accepted that, under circumstances, granting anonymity may be
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In France and Belgium, the right of the defence to inspect the dossier during the investigative stage
has been introduced by laws of 4 January and 24 August 1993 under influence of the European Court
of Human Rights (Lamy v. Belgium, Judgment of 30 March 1989, 1989 ECHR). In addition, Article
281 of the French Code Procédure Pénale establishes a compulsory disclosure for all parties ‘as early
as possible’ and in any case at least 24 hours before the start of trial.
404
See, for instance, the Dutch case: Dutch Supreme Court: Hoge Raad (HR), 26 May 1987,
Nederlandse Jurisprudentie (NJ) 1988, 177, stating the principle of full disclosure of all materials in
and outside the dossier upon request of the defence. Art. 30(1) sets out the materials to which the
defendant must have access. Art. 30(2) of the Dutch CCP sets out the exception of a concrete
investigative interest. Such interest may include the protection of prosecution sources. See Beijer,
Bewijs, supra note 130, 34.1.5 Composition of the ‘Dossier’. For France, see Arts. 2bis and 114 of the
French CPP (le secret de l’enquête et de l’instruction) defence counsel has a right to have access to all
confidential materials but he must respect the secrecy of the criminal investigations. Counsel may
make photocopies of the files for the accused unless the investigative judge considers that such
disclosure would create a risk that pressure be put on victims, persons being examined or their counsel,
witnesses, investigators, experts or other persons connected with the criminal proceedings. In those
circumstances, access of the accused to confidential material can be denied, provided that the
investigative judge gives explicit written reasons for such denial within five days. This denial is subject
to appeal with the president of the Chamber of investigations. (Art. 114 CCP;
<http://archives.cnb.avocat.fr/VieDuConseil/VDC_dossierspublications_rin.php>).
405
See for instance, the Netherlands, Arts. 226(a)-(d) and 344a(2) CCP. See further Cleiren & Nijboer,
Strafvordering, supra note 165, Boek II, Titel III, Afd 4A, Arts 226a-f (Van der Meij) 865-881;
Nijboer, Strafrechtelijk Bewijsrecht, supra note 160, 178-182; A. van Hoorn & E. De Wet
getuigenbescherming – een uitzonderlijke regeling (1996); Beijer, Bewijs, supra note 130, 34.2.10:
Anonymous Declarations. See further Russia, where anonymous statements may be admitted, provided
that the specific procedural rules concerning the admission of such statements are met, requiring
documentation and authentication. See further Butler, Russian Law, supra note 125, 272. The
European Court of Human Rights has allowed this practice provided that a finding of guilt is not solely
or primarily based on the testimony of anonymous witnesses.
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necessary to protect the safety of a witness. 406 However, this is permissible only if the
defence is offered full counterweight to offset the prejudice caused by such use. A
finding of guilt cannot be based solely on anonymous witnesses. 407 The triers of facts
are always aware of the identities of the witnesses.

In common law jurisdictions, the defence is entitled to full pre-trial disclosure of any
incriminating evidence the prosecutor intends to use at trial. Only in exceptional
circumstances can information be withheld from the defence. In the United Kingdom
non-disclosure to the defence is increasingly acceptable. Since 2008, the use of
anonymous witnesses is even permitted in exceptional circumstances. 408 The defence
is further in possession of its own evidence, as well as the exonerating evidence
collected and disclosed by the prosecution. 409 The triers of fact, on the other hand, are
not in possession of any evidence, unless one of the parties adduces it in court.

The judges’ reasoning in reaching their factual findings is transparent. Each step in
the evaluation process is described and justified in a written public verdict. This
ensures that judges rely on reliable and relevant evidence only in their ultimate
findings of fact. A reasoned verdict also creates precedent. By contrast, jurors
deliberate freely and reach a conclusion in full independence of rules or precedent
without disclosure of their thought process. 410 Apart from giving the jury an
appropriate warning as to the reliability of the evidence that was admitted, the judge
406
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Kostovski v. The Netherlands, Judgment of 20 November 1989, 1989 ECHR (Ser. A.) 166; Van
Mechelen & Ors v. The Netherlands, Judgment of 23 April 1997, 1997 ECHR; Visser v. The
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which witness anonymity is allowed subject to certain conditions. See also:
http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/directors_guidance/witness_anonymity.html. The UK is said to
have gone even further than the European Court of Human Rights permits in accepting criminal
liability solely on the basis of anonymous witnesses. For further commentaries, see:
http://ukscblog.com/reflections-on-horncastle.
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410
Frank, Courts on Trial, supra note 38, 123: “To my mind a better instrument than the usual jury trial
could scarcely be imagined for achieving uncertainty, capriciousness, lack of uniformity, disregard of
the R’s, and unpredictability of decisions.” Frank further states: “Yet little, practically, is done to
ensure that these officials, jurymen, “act upon principles and not according to arbitrary will,” or to put
effective restraints upon their worst prejudices. Indeed, through the general verdict, coupled with the
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has no say in the adjudication of the facts. 411 This is to ensure that the triers of fact
make findings based solely on what they consider to be accurate in light of the
evidence presented in the case. However, it gives the jury an uncontrollable and
incorrigible power. 412

Thus, civil law proceedings are clearly more transparent to the triers of fact, but are
generally less transparent to the accused and the public if required to protect the
identity of witnesses.

Democratic, open and fair procedure
Common Law Systems

It is often assumed that the common law adversarial procedure is more democratic,
open and fair to the accused. Part I already established that common law criminal
justice systems focus more on fairness and equality between the two parties than on
the ascertainment of the truth. Trial by the defendant’s peers is also perceived as more
democratic than trial by professional judges. 413

However, in terms of equality of arms, the prosecution has a clear advantage over the
defendant because it has the massive resources of the state to rely on for
investigations. The defendant has only his counsel and such resources as can be
bargained for from limited legal aid funds. Unlike in continental Europe, there is no
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(Cambridge, 1987), 16-17. See also J. van den Berg, Th. L. Bellekom, H.M. Th. D. ten Napel, E. M.
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judicial officer involved in the criminal investigations to whom the defendant may
address himself for assistance. 414

Judges do not participate in the investigations or in the adversarial contest between
the parties at trial. They cannot intervene to correct errors or technical choices of a
party, even if they clearly damage the position of that party. If, for instance, defence
counsel fails to produce a credible and available alibi witness, there is nothing a judge
can do to assist the defendant. A judge may, in the absence of the jury, question the
parties’ advocates (particularly the prosecution) as to why particular witnesses are, or
are not being called. If, however, they were to enter into the arena and effectively
steer the case in one direction or another by the introduction of evidential material
against the wishes of the parties an appeal on grounds of partiality would be
inevitable, and its success likely. 415 Thus, the defendant’s fate is largely dependent on
the competence of his counsel.

The parties however, have different roles. The prosecution brings a case against the
defendant. If he so wishes and considers it necessary, the defendant may challenge the
case against him by calling witnesses and presenting evidence of his own. He may
simply suggest that the prosecution evidence is insufficient. To win its case, the price
of which would be the conviction of the defendant, the prosecution must convince the
triers of fact beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty. The defendant on
the other hand bears no burden of proof at all, unless otherwise stated in the law or he
presents an alibi or other positive defence. In such cases, the defendant would be
required to produce some evidence in support of his assertion. 416 In every other way,
his active participation in the process of presenting evidence is optional and he is
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416
A burden can be placed on the defendant by virtue of common law or statutory law. Where the
Defence raises the defence of insanity or diminished responsibility, it has the burden to persuade the
jury that it is more likely than not that the defendant’s contention is true. This is referred to as the
standard of proof on the balance of probability. Regarding this standard, Lord Denning held in Miller
v. Ministry of Pensions [1947] 2 All ER 372: “It must carry a reasonable degree of probability….If the
evidence is such that the tribunal can say: “we think it more probable than not”, the burden is
discharged, but if the probabilities are equal, it is not.” It has been suggested that such burdens on the
defence violate the presumption of innocence as set out in R v. Lambert [2002] 2 AC 545. See further:
Kiralfy, The Burden of Proof, supra note 164; P. Murphy, Murphy on Evidence (10th Ed.) (Oxford
University Press, 2007), 74-100.
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presumed innocent until proven guilty. This is a fundamental element of a fair trial. 417
If there is anything less than a perfectly convincing performance by the prosecution,
the defendant wins. 418

Civil Law Systems

Civil law criminal justice systems are often described as hierarchical and bureaucratic
in light of their professional judiciary and centralised investigations. 419 It is also
sometimes suggested that civil law jurisdictions prioritise the ascertainment of the
truth at the expense of the fairness of the proceedings. 420

However, the important role played by professional judges in civil law criminal
proceedings is frequently associated too strongly and negatively with excessive
bureaucracy, and inquisitorial proceedings. 421 Whilst historically, this may have been
true, it no longer is. In medieval times, criminal investigations were entirely secretive
and conducted proprio motu by an investigator without any involvement of the
identified suspect. Upon completion of the investigations, the investigator would
submit an official dossier (acta inquisitionis) to a court. The court would then
examine the contents of the dossier. It would determine, solely or primarily on the
basis of this dossier, whether the accused was guilty or not. This would occur with or
without having communicated with him or counsel acting on his behalf. 422 Torture
was used routinely in cases where an accused refused to confess and there was
insufficient other evidence available. 423
417
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In the beginning of the nineteenth century, following the French revolution, this socalled ‘inquisitorial’ mode of proceeding, which was applied in most of continental
Europe, was abolished. 424 Since that time, significant amendments have been
introduced into the civil law criminal justice systems which set clear boundaries to the
unlimited and secretive criminal proceedings previously in place. Particularly Italy
and Germany have departed rigorously from their inquisitorial past. 425 Everywhere in
continental Europe, whilst the investigation still has somewhat of an inquisitorial
character, the trial itself has become rather adversarial. 426 In addition, principles of
fairness to the accused have increasingly become of paramount importance in
criminal justice. Such principles are codified in domestic constitutions as well as
was overwhelming evidence because: (1) corporal punishment or the death penalty could only be
imposed if the accused made a confession; (2) in the event that the accused confessed, he lost his right
to appeal. As Van de Vrugt observed, torture as a tool of truth-finding is dubious at best and
demonstrates a complete negation of the suspect as an equal subject of the law. There was criticism
against the use of torture but most courts continued to allow it for a long time because no alternative
was available to them to discover the truth. There was a firm belief that torturing an accused in order to
obtain a confession was an effective means of truth-finding and when this was abolished, there was
nothing to replace it. One had little faith in witness testimony. Thus, it was a difficult practice to
abolish this custom. See M. Van de Vrugt, De Criminele Ordonnantiën van 1570: enkele
beschouwingen over de eerste strafrechtcodificatie in de Nederlanden (De Walburg Pers, Zutphen,
1978), 141-148; J. van den Berg, Th. L. Bellekom, H.M. Th. D. ten Napel, E. M. Peeters, Inleiding
Staatkunde (Deventer: Kluwer, 1995), 70-71, 77-78; Bemmelen, Strafvordering, supra note 317, 70–
71, 78–80; A. J. van Weel (Nijmegen), ‘De Nasleep van de Afschaffing van de Pijnbank, in Verslagen
en mededeelingen van de Vereeniging tot uitgaaf der bronnen van het oud-vaderlansche recht’, 14, 2
(1975) 355–367.
424
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of asserting pressure on someone to speak or cooperate were banned. In most continental European
systems, torture was already banned prior to the introduction of the Code d’Instruction Criminelle. In
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425
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Sheppard, American Law in a Global Context (Oxford University Press, 2005), 532; Wang, Criminal
Justice System in Germany, supra note 322. Italy, on the other hand, has really departed from the
inquisitorial method. See further M. Costi: ‘Italy’, 80-92, in Buisman, Civil Law, in Khan, Principles of
Evidence, supra note 25.
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and Counsel); Cleiren & Nijboer, Strafvordering, supra note 165, De verdachte, Boek I, Titel II, Art.
29 (Spronken) 65.
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applicable human rights treaties, most importantly, the European Convention on
Human Rights (“ECHR”). 427

The right to be tried without undue delay and the right not to incriminate oneself limit
the scope of criminal proceedings. A defendant is further entitled to be informed of
the charges against him, review and challenge the prosecution’s evidence and present
his own evidence. Most civil law jurisdictions have sought to balance the different
interests at stake to ensure that “truth-finding is not only lawful and effective, but that
the process is fair and the exercise of state power legitimate”. 428 Only if proceedings
are fair can the truth be safely ascertained. 429 In this regard, a German court held that
the decision whether to exclude evidence is partly based on the consideration ‘‘that
the truth cannot be ascertained at all costs.’’ 430

The prosecutor does not have a strict burden of proof as in common law jurisdictions.
The judges can fill in the gaps. 431 However, the defence has no burden to produce
evidence favourable to the defendant or even to raise objections where the interests of
the defence are at stake. 432 Where it fails to do either, judges may intervene to protect
the rights of the defendant and order, proprio motu, additional investigations in order
to complement the evidence favourable to the defendant. 433

To safeguard the fairness of the proceedings, the defendant, assisted by counsel, is
given a voice, which he can use at any time he wishes and this voice is heard. 434 The
defendant can make unsworn statements, but he cannot give evidence or perjure
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himself. Judges can ask him direct questions without him taking the oath. The
defendant has the choice to answer or not to answer such questions. 435

The trial itself is fully transparent and open. It is based on the adversarial principle,
pursuant to which triers of fact and law must hear both parties before arriving at a
decision. They are also required to give reasons in support of their decision, “and they
must do so solely on the basis of legal and factual arguments free of personal bias so
that the judgment will appear impartial.” 436

Everyone involved in the truth inquiry is bound by the law. In gathering evidence, the
police and prosecutors cannot exceed their powers explicitly granted by the law. They
are bound by principles of legal certainty and legality. Judges are similarly bound by
such principles, which prevents them from creating new legal norms. This ensures
that the parties to the criminal trial have advance notice of the criteria guiding the
decisions. 437
Accordingly, in both types of criminal justice, fairness is of paramount importance,
the trial is open and adversarial, and the defendant is given a voice.

Conclusion
In conclusion, both the common law and civil law methods meet the minimum
conditions of an effective truth-ascertaining system as identified in Part I. It appears
that the civil law method includes more features required to reconstruct a full and
transparent picture of events painted with the assistance of everyone concerned
including the victims. Thus, in theory, this method offers greater opportunities to
work towards the restorative objectives of international justice.

435
Ibid. In some jurisdictions, such as the Netherlands, a choice to remain silent or tell an obvious lie
may in certain circumstances be used against the defendant. See, for instance, Art. 286(4) of the Dutch
CCP, and the Supreme Court’s decisions: HR 15 June 2004, NJ 2004, 464; HR 24 March 1987, NJ
1987, 893; HR 8 June 1993, DD 93.469; HR 28 May 1996, DD 96.317. See further: Beijer, Bewijs,
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manipulatie (Kempe bundle, Utrecht/Antwerpen 1976), 20; G.J.M. Corstens, Het Nederlands
Strafprocesrecht, (Deventer Kluwer 2008, 6th edition) 667-668.
436
Guarnieri & Pederzoli, Power of Judges, supra note 158, 10–11.
437
Ibid. However, in interpreting the law, some judicial creativity is not only allowed but also desired
(5).

113

Both types of procedure, however, have their strengths and weaknesses in seeking to
achieve accurate results. Civil law jurisdictions allow the triers of fact to review all
evidence, including unreliable evidence that should not be relied on for any of the
findings. Yet, their triers of fact are judicially trained and are, therefore, at least in
theory able to separate reliable from unreliable information. As a safeguard against
erroneous factual findings, they must offer an explanation of their findings, which is
appealable. Common law systems do not require the triers of fact to explain their
findings. However, they seek to ensure that the triers of fact can only base their
findings on relevant and reliable evidence.

It is therefore apparent that the salient factors of the two types of procedure are
interrelated and interdependent. The totality of these ingredients works as a system. It
remains to be seen whether these same ingredients still work as a system if they are
torn apart and mixed with other ingredients in a new procedure. 438

The ultimate accuracy of the outcome in individual cases depends on the people
involved in the process, as well as the political climate in a country. In civil law
jurisdictions, a defendant is particularly dependent on the openness of the judge. In
common law jurisdictions, a defendant predominantly depends on the diligence and
vigilance of his counsel. 439 The overall quality of justice depends on all parties,
participants and triers of fact and law involved. Their freedom to act in accordance
with legal principles depends strongly on their political independence. For instance, a
judge may be less inclined to acquit if that would ruin his career. 440

Even in democratic countries, things go wrong in both types of criminal justice.
Miscarriages of justice have been brought to light in both common law and civil law
438
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procedures. 441 It is impossible to determine which method is safer in obtaining
accurate results, as it is unknown how often miscarriages of justice have gone
unnoticed. In addition, when miscarriages of justice are referred to, they tend not to
include wrongful acquittals. 442

The reality of criminal justice is not necessarily in accordance with its theory. Each
criminal justice system is fallible. In individual cases, fair trial principles are not
always duly respected, and the triers of fact may be biased. Research has
demonstrated that miscarriages of justice increase where the cases are higher
profile. 443 When crimes stir up a public outrage and condemnation, mistakes are made
more regularly. This increases where crimes are hard to prove because they are
committed by the mafia, a terrorist organisation or other organised crime group.
Placed under pressure to collect sufficient quality evidence for a conviction,
overzealous police officers or prosecutors are more inclined to use unlawful methods
to obtain evidence and secure convictions. 444 Ambitious investigators may also be too
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See, for instance, the Dutch case Schiedammer parkmoord, which concerned a miscarriage of justice
caused by the confession of innocent suspects. See further P. J. van Koppen, De Schiedammer
parkmoord; een rechtspsychologische reconstructive (Nijmegen: Ars Aequi Libri, 2003; Evaluation
report of the Commission Posthumus in the Schiedammer park-moord, 13 September 2005, 172). As
for France, examples of miscarriages of justice are given in: Bouazdi, ‘France’, in Buisman, Civil Law,
in Khan, Principles of Evidence, supra note 25. In the UK, the most well-known miscarriages of justice
concerned trials involving Northern Irish terrorist suspects. See, for instance, the Birmingham Six,
Maguire Seven, and Guildford Four, which led to public outrage. See further: Armytage, Educating
Judges, supra note 313, (Sir Dorabji Tata Memorial Lecture, delivered under auspices of Sir Dorabji
Tata Trust in New Delhi, 5 January 1999 and in Mumbai on 6 January 1999), 274-275.
442
See, for instance, C. Walker & K. Starmer (Eds.), Miscarriages of Justice (Oxford University Press,
1999), Chapter 2. See also Armytage, Educating Judges, supra note 313, 259: “I suppose a purist
might argue that a miscarriage of justice occurs as much when a guilty man is acquitted as when an
innocent man is convicted. It is not, however, the acquittal of the guilty which on the whole gives rise
to public disquiet, and the occasional acquittal of guilty defendants is, I think, generally accepted as the
price which has to be paid for observance of the beneficial principle that the defendant shall enjoy the
benefit of any doubt.”
443
See supra note 441. In respect of the Irish terrorist cases, most notably the Birmingham Six,
Guildford Four, and Maguire Seven, it was held that “[t]here is a widespread reaction of public
outrage. The situation is fraught with difficulty, because the responsible police forces come under the
strongest pressure to bring the perpetrators of such atrocities to justice and jurors would be less than
human if, despite the strongest judicial warnings, they were not tempted to reflect the sense of outrage
felt by the community as a whole” (Armytage, Educating Judges, Ch VII ‘The English Criminal Trial:
The Credits and the Debits’, 252, at 262. See also Pompe, Bewijs in Strafzaken, supra note 153, 49-50.
444
For instance Malone v. United Kingdom, Judgment of 2 August 1984, 1984 ECHR (Ser. A.) 82;
Schenk v. Switzerland, Judgment of 12 July 1988, 1988 ECHR (Ser. A.) 140; Unterpertinger v. Austria,
Judgment of 24 November 1986, 1986 ECHR (Ser. A.) 110; Barbera, Messegué & Jabardo v. Spain,
Judgment of 6 December 1988, 1988 ECHR (Ser. A.) 146; Kostovski v. The Netherlands, Judgment of
20 November 1989, 1989 ECHR (Ser. A.) 166; Delta v. France, Judgment of 19 December 1990, 1991
ECHR (Ser. A.) 191, para. 35; Lüdi v. Switzerland, Judgment of 15 June 1992, 1992 ECHR (Ser. A.)
238; Saïdi v. France, Judgment of 20 September 1993, 1993 ECHR (Ser. A.) 261.
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fixated on guilt and, therefore, turn a blind eye to evidentiary leads suggesting
otherwise. 445

The media closely follows high profile cases and often condemns the alleged
perpetrator before he has had a chance to defend himself in a court of law. Adverse
pre-trial media may influence triers of fact. One only has to think of the extreme
public reactions provoked by cases involving paedophilia or rape, as was recently
demonstrated in the case of Dominique Strauss-Kahn. The American media
thoroughly condemned him for raping a hotel employee in New York. The
prosecution then withdrew the case against him, as it had lost faith in its only
witness. 446 Others were less lucky. In the United Kingdom, a number of Northern
Irish “terrorists” were erroneously convicted. 447 Many “terrorists” have been held by
the US for years on vague or non-existing charges in an extrajudicial detention camp
at Guantánamo Bay. 448

These are a few examples to demonstrate that the quality of justice is often
determined by extra-judicial factors, rather than the criminal justice model which is in
place. When a miscarriage of justice is identified in a democratic society, usually a
strong public reaction follows resulting in amendments to the law. In other words, a
system has a tendency to rectify itself over time and address deficiencies that come to
light. 449

445

In the Netherlands, a blind focus on the guilt of the accused at the exclusion of alternative options
has been referred to as a tunnel vision (‘koker visie’). The prosecution has frequently been accused of
applying a tunnel vision which has led to serious errors. See Wagenaar, Vincent plast op de grond,
supra note 129, 15-17, 30-49, 62-72, 223-225.
446
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/whatsnew/pdf/dsk_motion_to_dismiss.pdf;
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/08/22/nyregion/dsk-recommendation-to-dismiss-case.html
447
See supra note 441.
448
See, for instance, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guantanamo_Bay_detention_camp
449
For instance, in the UK, a Court of Appeal was established in 1907 as a reaction to public concerns
expressed in respect of the criminal justice system following the case of Mr. Adolf Beck who had been
wrongfully identified by fifteen honest witnesses. In 1985, a Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) was
established as a response to criticism with regard to police misconduct, which had resulted in
miscarriages of justice. See Uglow, Criminal Justice, supra note 138, 177, 180-181, 191; Armytage,
Educating Judges, supra note 313, 259. In France, reforms were proposed following the Outreau case
scandal. A Parlimentary Commission investigated the case and drafted a report with recommendation
to amend the French criminal procedure in order to avoid any repetition at: <http://www.assembleenationale.fr/12/
dossiers/outreau_aﬀ aire_dysfonctionnements_justice.asp>.
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Thus, the civil and common law domestic jurisdictions experienced a progression
steeped in tradition and fashioned over centuries through trial and error. Procedural
changes that have occurred in this process corresponded with the contemporaneous
political climate. Legal structures cannot be separated from societal norms, structures
and culture as developed over time. 450

The more recently formed international criminal court and tribunals did not undergo
the same historical development. The crimes under the jurisdiction of international
criminal courts and tribunals are of the worst kind and attract wide public attention.
Part I has described the ambitious goals international courts and tribunals have set for
themselves, and the urge felt to do justice to the victims. Many of the accused before
international tribunals are extremely high profile and have been condemned in the
media long time before they are brought to justice. 451

In such circumstances, a strong judicial system is needed to withstand the political
pressure and manipulation from all sides. It is therefore all the more important that the
international criminal justice model meets the conditions, which have been identified
in Part I. It has already been pointed out that, at least in theory, the civil law and
common law criminal procedures both meet the minimum conditions set out in Part I.
Now, it will be considered whether the combination of the two into the ICTY, ICTR
and ICC criminal proceedings still meets these conditions.

Combination of civil law and common law methodologies
From the start, the union of civil and common law legal principles had deep tensions
within it. The international criminal justice systems mix a powerful judiciary
controlling the conduct of the proceedings with autonomous, independent parties. 452

450

Jackson & Langer, Introduction: Damaška and Comparative Law, supra note 28, 1, at 3-6.
See above, section ‘Expressed Reservations on Establishing Historical Facts’.
452
For an analysis of the main features of the two systems and their interaction in international
jurisdictions, see Vladimir Tochilovsky, Rules of Procedure for the International Criminal Court:
Problems to Address in Light of the Experience of the ad hoc Tribunals (1999) 46 Netherlands
International Law Review 343; and V. Tochilovsky, ‘Legal Systems and Cultures in the International
Criminal Court: The Experience from the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’
in Horst Fischer Horst Fischer, Claus Kress and Sascha Rolf Lüder (eds), International and National
Prosecution of Crimes Under International Law (Berlin Verlag Arno Spitz, 2001) 627.
451
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Investigations and Charging Suspects
The roles of the parties as described in the Statute and the Rules are based on
common law. The parties may choose their own strategy and conduct their own
independent

investigations.

The

Prosecutor

is

responsible

for

conducting

investigations, identifying suspects of crimes falling within the jurisdiction of the
tribunal and bringing charges against them. 453 The defence is responsible for
gathering evidence in support of the defendant’s case. If the defence faces difficulties,
for instance because it has been refused access to material essential for the preparation
of a defence, and it has done all within its means to obtain this material, it may call
upon the Chamber for assistance. 454

There is no investigative judge or any similar body, and in the ICTY and ICTR, the
judiciary is not ascribed any investigative role. The ICC, on the other hand, has a PreTrial Chamber, consisting of three judges. 455 The Pre-Trial Chamber has multiple
tasks and is actively involved in the management of the pre-confirmation and
confirmation phases. It has the task to oversee the fairness of the pre-trial proceedings
and ensure that there is compliance with the pre-confirmation disclosure obligations.
However, its role is not comparable to the role of an investigative judge. The PreTrial Chamber has no investigative powers, except in situations where a unique
investigative opportunity arises. In such a situation, pursuant to Article 56(1)(b) of the
ICC Statute, the Pre-Trial Chamber may, “upon request of the Prosecutor, take such
measures as may be necessary to ensure the efficiency and integrity of the
proceedings and, in particular, to protect the rights of the defence.” 456
453

Art 16(1) ICTY Statute; Art 15(1) ICTR Statute.
ICTY/ICTR Rule 54; Part IX of the ICC Statute. In certain circumstances, a Chamber may order the
prosecution to obtain certain documents for the defence pursuant to Rule 89 even if the Defence made
no efforts to obtain such documents. However, in general, a Chamber would only make such an order
where the Defence has made its own independent efforts “to secure evidence it wishes to use at trial
other than exculpatory material in the possession of the Prosecution.” (Prosecutor v. Simba, Decision
on Defence Motion to Obtain Judicial Records Pursuant to Rule 68, ICTR-2001-76-T, 4 October 2004,
para. 11).
455
Rome Statute, supra note 44, Art. 56.
456
In accordance with Article 56(2), such measures may include “(a) Making recommendations or
orders regarding procedures to be followed; (b) Directing that a record be made of the proceedings; (c)
Appointing an expert to assist; (d) Authorizing counsel for a person who has been arrested, or appeared
before the Court in response to a summons, to participate, or where there has not yet been such an
arrest or appearance or counsel has not been designated, appointing another counsel to attend and
represent the interests of the defence; (e) Naming one of its members or, if necessary, another available
judge of the Pre-Trial or Trial Division to observe and make recommendations or orders regarding the
collection and preservation of evidence and the questioning of persons; (f) Taking such other action as
may be necessary to collect or preserve evidence.”
454
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Where the Prosecutor fails to take such measures without good reason and after
consultation with him, the Pre-Trial Chamber may take such measures proprio motu if
necessary to preserve evidence (Article 56(3) ICC Statute). However, this power can
be exercised in exceptional situations only and, thus, constitutes a limited
investigative power.

In the ICTY and ICTR, a judge is charged with confirming charging documents and
issuing arrest warrants provided it is satisfied that the Prosecutor has established a
prima facie case against an identified suspect of crimes under the jurisdiction of the
tribunal. 457 The defence does not participate in this process. In the ICC, on the other
hand, a confirmation hearing takes place before the Pre-Trial Chamber. This is after
the Pre-Trial Chamber has determined ex parte that there is a reasonable ground to
believe that the defendant is guilty as charged and issued a warrant of arrest or a
summons to appear. 458 The defence is entitled to participate actively in the
confirmation hearing and challenge the charges. Both parties are entitled to submit
evidence and call live witnesses in this process. 459 Counsel representing victims are
also allowed to participate and make oral and legal submissions.460

On the basis of all evidence presented, the Pre-Trial Chamber determines whether
there are substantial grounds to believe that the suspect committed the crimes
charged. If so satisfied, the Pre-Trial Chamber issues a decision confirming the
charges. If not so satisfied, it dismisses the charges. 461 It can also modify them or the
mode of liability, in which case it may order a new confirmation hearing. 462
457

Art 18(4), Art 19(1) and Art 19(2) ICTY Statute; Art 17(4), Art 18(1) and Art 18(2) ICTR Statute.
At the request of the Prosecutor, the judge may “issue such orders and warrants for the arrest,
detention, surrender or transfer of persons, and any other orders as may be required for the conduct of
the trial” (19(2) ICTY Statute; 18(2) ICTR Statute. A duty or reviewing judge is designated for this
matter pursuant to Rule 28 ICTY/ICTR.
458
In the case of Katanga, the Prosecutor had initially sought his arrest on the basis of ordering the
crimes charged as the mode of liability. The Single Judge confirmed the warrant of arrest but added
common plan as an alternative mode of liability. Eventually, the charges against Mr. Katanga and his
co-accused Mr. Ngudjolo were confirmed only under the common plan mode of liability. See
Prosecutor v. Katanga, Decision on the evidence and information provided by the Prosecution for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest for Germain Katanga, 6 July, 2007, ICC-01/04-01/07-4; Prosecutor v.
Katanga & Ngudjolo, Decision on the confirmation of charges, 30 September 2008, ICC-01/04-01/07717.
459
Rome Statute, supra note 44, Art. 61; ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 121.
460
See further below, section ‘victim participation’.
461
See, for instance, Bahar Idriss Abu Garda whose case was not confirmed due to insufficient
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Disclosure Obligations
Since June 2006, through amendment of ICTY Rule 73bis the Chamber in the ICTY
has the power to invite the Prosecutor in advance of the trial to reduce the number of
counts charged in the indictment (73bis(D)), or direct him to select those on which to
proceed (73bis(E)). This amendment was in line with a Report produced earlier by the
Expert Group which made recommendations to transform the party-based proceedings
into proceedings controlled more tightly by the judges. 463 This amendment was not
adopted by the ICTR, where the Prosecutor is still exclusively responsible for
charging defendants without judicial intervention, other than the confirmation of the
indictment.

Judicial control particularly at the ICTY has also significantly increased in the areas
of prior disclosure of material to the bench. Initially, disclosure obligations existed
only vis-à-vis the opposite party, not the Chamber. In line with common law, the
Chamber was not intended to have information, other than the indictment, prior to the
start of the trial. The Defence had no disclosure obligation at all other than to give a
notification of an alibi or other special defence. 464 The disclosure regime has changed
drastically over the years, although it is still a point of dispute between common law
and civil law jurists. 465

As a result of the adoption of new rules 65ter, 73bis and 73ter in July 1998 for the
ICTY, and 73bis and 73ter in June 1998 for the ICTR and subsequent amendments,
the parties are now required to submit to the Court and opposing party a pre-trial
brief. It addresses the factual and legal issues and is accompanied by a list of
evidence to meet the ‘substantial grounds to believe’ standard: Prosecutor v. Bahar Idriss Abu Garda,
Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 8 February 2010, ICC-02/05-02/09-243-Red.
462
This occurred in the Bemba trial: Prosecutor v. Bemba, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and
(b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ICC01/05-01/08-424, 15-06-2009.
463
‘Statement by Tribunal President Judge Fausto Pocar to the Security Council 7 June 2006’.
Published in: Tochilovsky, Nature and Evolution of the Rules in: Khan, Principles of Evidence, supra
note 25, 173-174.
464
Rules 67(A)(ii)(a) & (b) obligates the defence to notify the prosecution of its intent to offer the
defence of alibi or any special defence, including that of diminished or lack of mental responsibility; in
which case the notification shall specify the names and addresses of witnesses and any other evidence
upon which the accused intends to rely to establish the alibi or special defence.
465
This was still in dispute during the ICC negotiations. See Tochilovsky, Nature and Evolution of the
Rules in Khan, Principles of Evidence, supra note 25, 167-169.
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witnesses and their particulars, summaries and length of their anticipated testimony,
as well as a list of exhibits upon which the parties intend to rely. 466 At the ICTY, the
pre-trial judge is designated who is in charge of pre-trial proceedings to ensure to
ensure that the parties meet their disclosure obligations in a timely manner. 467 A
failure for either party to meet any of the deadlines set for disclosure may lead the
Chamber to impose sanctions such as the exclusion of testimonial or documentary
evidence. 468 The ICTR did not follow this example.

In advance of the trial, the Prosecutor is obliged to disclose all this information, as
well as all supporting material which accompanied the indictment, in advance of the
trial. 469 If disclosure has an adverse impact on the safety of the witness or on the
ongoing investigations, such disclosure may be delayed until such moment that the
Trial Chamber considers disclosure thereof to the defence necessary to allow adequate
time for preparation of the defence. The public may never be informed of the
identities of witnesses whose safety is at risk and be excluded from large portions of
their testimonies. 470

The Prosecutor must further allow the defence, if so requested, to inspect any
documents which are material to the preparation of the defence, intended for use by
the Prosecutor as evidence at trial, or which have been obtained from, or belonged to
the accused. 471 At the ICC, and since March 2008 at the ICTY as well, the defence is
likewise required to permit the Prosecution to inspect all materials on which it intends
to rely. This is, however, only the case in the event that the defence decides to present
a case after the close of the Prosecutor’s case. 472 The ICTR did not adopt a similar
obligation. 473

466

ICTY Rule 65ter(E) and (G); ICTR Rule 73bis(D) and 73ter(D), adopted in Fifth Plenary Session,
1-8 June 1998.
467
ICTY Rule 65ter.
468
ICTY Rule 65ter(N).
469
ICTY/ICTR Rules 66(A)(i), 66(A)(ii), 67(A)(i).
470
ICTY/ICTR Rule 69; 75; Article 67(1)(b) ICC Statute; Rules 81(2) & (4) ICC Rules.
471
ICTY/ICTR Rule 66(B).
472
Rule 67(A) of the ICTY Rules now provides: “(A) Within the time-limit prescribed by the Trial
Chamber, at a time not prior to a ruling under Rule 98bis, but not less than one week prior to the
commencement of the Defence case, the Defence shall: (i) permit the Prosecutor to inspect and copy
any books, documents, photographs, and tangible objects in the Defence’s custody or control, which
are intended for use by the Defence as evidence at trial…” Rule 78 of the ICC Rules requires the
defence to permit inspection of materials intended for use by the defence as evidence at either the
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The Prosecution further has an obligation to provide to the Chamber the written
statements of each witness he intends to call to testify. 474 Initially, he only had an
obligation to disclose those statements to the defence. The ICTR Akayesu case was
the first case where the Prosecutor was ordered to disclose, not only to the defence but
also to the Chamber, the statements of the witnesses to be called. 475 It soon became
routine in both tribunals and a legal obligation upon the Prosecutor in 1998. 476 In
some cases, in order to acquire complete knowledge of the facts, judges of a civil law
background would even ask for disclosure of the exculpatory material that had been
disclosed to the defence. 477

Closer to the commencement of the trial, the defence at the ICTY is obliged to file a
statement of admitted facts and law and a pre-trial brief addressing factual and legal
issues, including the nature of the accused’s defence, the contested issues and the
grounds on which these issues are contested. 478 The defence has a similar obligation
at the ICC. 479 In the ICTR, the defence may be ordered to produce a pre-trial brief, 480
but is in reality rarely ordered to do so.

Unless it relies on an alibi or special defence, the defence does not need to give details
about witnesses it intends to rely on, or disclose their statements until after the close
of the Prosecutor’s case. Initially, the defence had no obligation to provide the
Prosecutor and/or Chamber with statements of witnesses it intended to rely on.

confirmation hearing or trial, and which does not require the trigger of a defence request for inspection
of prosecution materials.
473
It should, however, be noted that the ICTR Rule 67(C) still provides for reciprocal disclosure,
requiring the defence to allow the prosecution to inspect defence material but only if the defence has
made a request for disclosure under rule 66(B). The notion of reciprocal disclosure was removed from
the ICTY rules in December 2003 (29th Plenary Session (12 December 2003) (IT/32/Rev.29).
474
ICTY/ICTR Rules 66(A)(i), 66(A)(ii), 67(A)(i).
475
Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Decision by the tribunal on its request to the prosecutor to submit the written
witness statements, 28 January 1997, ICTR-96-04-T.
476
Rule 73bis(B), adopted by the ICTY on 10 July 1998, IT/32/Rev. 13; and by the ICTR in the 5th
Plenary Session on 8 June 1998.
477
Prosecutor v. Stakić (Transcript), 25 November 2002, IT-97-24-PT, 9437.
478
ICTY Rule 65ter(F). Amended during 21st Session, 15 – 17 November 1999, IT/32/Rev. 17,
incorporated on 7 December 1999.
479
Regulations of the Court, Reg. 54. See also Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Decision on Defence disclosure
by the Defence, 20 March 2008, ICC-01/04-01/06-1235, para. 41; Prosecutor v. Katanga & Ngudjolo,
Decision on the prosecution’s application concerning disclosure by the defence pursuant to Rules 78
and 79(4), 14 September 2010, ICC-01/04-01/07-2388.
480
ICTR Rule 73bis(F).
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However, since June 2000, the ICTR Chambers have the power to order the defence
to provide it with copies of such statements, 481 and has routinely used this power. 482
Since March 2008, the defence at the ICTY similarly has an obligation to provide
statements of defence witnesses, but to the Prosecutor only, not the Chamber. 483 At
the ICC, no defence team has yet been ordered to disclose statements of the witnesses
it intends to call. 484

Such pre-trial disclosure to the Chamber as well as the opposite party has increased
the Chamber’s prior knowledge of the dossier. This was considered necessary to
enable the Chamber to control the proceedings more efficiently and ensure more
expeditious trials.485 However, this disclosure is not tantamount to the disclosure of a
dossier in civil law systems because none of the items constitute evidence. Its purpose
is simply to manage the trial—statements or summaries contained in the pre-trial brief
have no evidentiary value. Only if a witness testifies and his statement is used in
whole or in part, may such a statement be introduced into evidence.
The Prosecutor also has an ongoing obligation to disclose to the defence “any
material, which in the actual knowledge of the Prosecutor may suggest the innocence,
mitigate the guilt of the accused or affect the credibility of the Prosecution
evidence”. 486 Only in highly exceptional circumstances and with leave of the
Chamber may exonerating information be withheld from the defence if, for instance,
its disclosure may affect State security interests, 487 or where information was given to
481

ICTR Rules, Rule 73ter(B), adopted during Eighth Plenary Session: 26 June 2000.
Prosecutor v. Rwamakuba, T. Ch. III. Decision on prosecution motion for disclosure of witness list
and witness statements, 4 October 2005, ICTR-98-44C; Prosecutor v. Bagosora, Decision on alleged
deficiencies in the Kabiligi pre-defence brief, 30 October 2006, ICTR-98-41-T), para. 5.
483
Rule 67 of the ICTY Rules, as amended 3 March 2008 by IT/256.
484
In the Lubanga and Katanga trials, the Defence was not ordered to disclose statements. See
Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Decision on Defence disclosure by the Defence, 20 March 2008, ICC-01/0401/06-1235, para. 41; Prosecutor v. Katanga & Ngudjolo, Decision on the prosecution’s application
concerning disclosure by the defence pursuant to Rules 78 and 79(4), 14 September 2010, ICC-01/0401/07-2388. Regulations of the Court, Reg. 54, however, allows Chambers to order the Defence to
provide the witness statements. This regulation provides: ‘At a status conference, the Trial Chamber
may, in accordance with the Statute and the Rules, issue any order in the interests of justice for the
purposes of the proceedings on, inter alia… f) The production and disclosure of the statements of the
witnesses on which participants propose to rely…’
485
See Tochilovsky, Nature and Evolution of the Rules, in Khan, Principles of Evidence, supra note
25, 164-174.
486
ICTY/ICTR Rule 68(A).
487
ICTY/ICTR Rule 66(C). The Prosecutor may apply to the Trial Chamber sitting in camera to be
relieved from the obligation to disclose exculpatory materials if the disclosure thereof to the Defence
may prejudice further or ongoing investigations, be contrary to the public interest or affect the security
482
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the Prosecutor on a confidential basis. 488

This duty does not include an obligation on the part of the Prosecutor to search
actively for exonerating material. It simply obliges the Prosecutor to disclose such
materials if he is aware of their existence. At the ICC, on the other hand, the
Prosecutor not only has a statutory obligation to disclose exonerating evidence, but
also to search for incriminating and exonerating evidence equally. 489 Only in
exceptional cases and with leave of the Pre-Trial Chamber may the Prosecutor be
exempted from his disclosure obligations. This occurs when disclosure may affect the
Prosecutor’s ongoing investigations, put victims and witnesses at risk, or is obtained
on the basis of an agreement of confidentiality with an NGO. 490
Trial Proceedings
In the course of the trial, while presenting their cases, the Prosecutor proceeds first,
followed by the defence, if at all. The parties are entirely free to make strategic
choices as to what evidence to use and what not to use, provided the disclosure
obligations have been followed.

The parties call their own witnesses and examine them. The parties are not allowed to
use leading questions except during cross-examination or if a witness is declared
hostile. 491 The parties are entitled and expected to cross-examine the witnesses of the
opposite party. A failure to cross-examine a witness on all aspects of its case may be
interpreted “as a tacit acceptance of the truth of the witness’s evidence on that
interests of any State (Rule 68(D)). In determining whether the prosecutor is exempt from his
disclosure duty to the Defence, the Chamber must carefully balance the rights of the accused and the
interests at stake. See, for instance, Prosecutor v. Karemera, Decision on the prosecutor’s motion for
special protective measures for witnesses G and T and to extend the decision on protective measures
for the prosecutor’s witnesses in the Nzirorera and Rwamakuba cases to co-accused Ngirumpatse and
Karemera and defence’s motion for immediate disclosure, 20 October 2003, ICTR-98-44-T, para. 18.
488
See ICTY/ICTR Rule 70. Rule 70(A) exempts from disclosure the internal working documents of a
party, while Rule 70(B) to (G) protects sources of certain information given on a confidential basis. See
Prosecutor v. Brđanin, Public version of the confidential decision on the alleged illegality of rule 70,
IT-99-36-T, 6 May 2002, para. 18; Prosecutor v. Milutinović, A. Ch. Decision on request of United
States of America for review, IT-05-87-AR108bis 2, 12 May 2006, para. 38.
489
Rome Statute, supra note 44, Art. 54(1)(a).
490
See, for instance: Prosecutor v. Katanga & Ngudjolo, Decision on Article 54(3)(e) documents
identified as potentially exculpatory or otherwise material to the defence's preparation for the
confirmation hearing, ICC-01/04-01/07-621, 20 June 2008. See below section ‘Protective Measures’.
491
Prosecutor v. Limaj et al, T. 2104 – T. 3164; Prosecutor v. Katanga & Ngudjolo, T. 8 Feb 2010, 6468. See also K. Khan & R. Dixon, Archbold International Criminal Courts Practice: Procedure &
Evidence (3rd Ed.) (Sweet & Maxwell, 2009), para. 9-125.
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matter”. 492 The parties are allowed to cross-examine on all issues raised in
examination-in-chief or affecting the witness’s credibility. With leave of the
Chamber, the cross-examining party can also enquire into additional matters, or put
its case to a witness and ask him to comment on it, or explain an apparent
contradiction. 493

After cross-examination, the party whose witness is on the stand may conduct reexamination. 494 At the ICC, the terms “examination-in-chief”, “cross-examination”,
and “re-examination” have been left out of the Statute and Rules of Procedure and
Evidence. This was done deliberately so as not to give preference to the common law
over the civil law style of the procedure. However, until now, the parties have been
allowed to cross-examine in a manner similar to common law trials.

With the purpose of ensuring effective truth-ascertainment and avoiding needless
consumption of time, the judges exercise control over the manner and order in which
the parties examine the witnesses and present their evidence. 495 Accordingly, they can
intervene to ensure that the questions posed to the witness are relevant, not leading
unless in cross-examination, and respectful to the witness. They can also limit their
time for cross-examination. 496 In addition, they can order the parties to shorten the
examination-in-chief of their witnesses, 497 or to reduce the total number of witnesses
scheduled to be called. 498 While the ICTR rules refer to a request from the Chamber
that the parties reduce witnesses or length of testimony, the ICTY rules use more
forceful language indicating that it is the Chamber which shall determine the number
492

Rutaganda v. Prosecutor, A. Ch. Judgment, ICTR-97-3-A, 26 May 2003, para. 310.
Amendments to Rule 90(H) ICTY Rules and Rule 90(G) ICTR Rules (by amendment of 17
November 1999 at ICTY and 27 May 2003 at ICTR).
494
ICTY/ICTR Rule 85(B).
495
Rule 43 ICC Rules; ICTY/ICTR Rule 90(F)(i), as amended in the ICTR on 1 July 1999:
http://69.94.11.53/ENGLISH/rules/010799/6.htm. The ICTY Rule was amended on 12 April 2001,
which came into effect on 4 May 2001 (IT/32/Rev. 20), at:
http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Rules_procedure_evidence/IT032_rev20_en.pdf
496
Often, a certain percentage of the time given to the party-in-chief is given to the cross-examining
party. See, for instance, Prosecutor v. Prlić et al, A. Ch. Decision on prosecution appeal concerning the
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of witnesses to be called by the parties and the time available to present the evidence.
In a similar manner, the ICC judges can exercise control over the presentation of the
evidence by the parties. 499

In the ICTY, ICTR and ICC, the Chamber is not dependent only on the parties asking
relevant questions for the establishment of the truth. It can also ask questions of a
witness. For instance, where important and relevant evidence is not elicited from a
witness by the parties, the Chamber may seek to elicit this information. 500 The
Chamber’s questions are aimed at clarifying matters raised by the parties and
participants. 501 They “can be closed, they can be open, they can be leading while they
are -- they are done with a view to finding the truth. … The Chamber has a possibility
to ask questions which will make it possible to continue together in the search of the
truth”. 502

New to the proceedings of the ICC is, the victims may participate in criminal
proceedings and bring matters to the attention of the Court. 503 Article 69(3) gives the
Court a general right to request the presentation of all evidence necessary for the
determination of the truth. Victims may assist in the determination of the truth and
may, for that purpose, be permitted to tender and examine evidence. They may also
put appropriate questions pursuant to Rule 91(3) of the ICC Rules of Procedure and
Evidence, not only in respect of reparation issues but whenever their personal
interests are engaged by the evidence under consideration. 504
499
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In 1998, the ICTY and ICTR introduced a new Rule 98bis pursuant to which, at the
end of the Prosecutor’s case, the defence can make ‘half time’ submissions
challenging the sufficiency of the prosecution evidence to sustain the offences on the
indictment. 505 Only if the judge then considers that the Prosecutor has established a
prima facie case is there a case to answer for the defence. This is a common law
practice. 506 The ICC has not adopted such a provision, given that the charges have
already been confirmed on the higher standard of ‘substantial ground to believe’. 507

If new significant issues have arisen during the defence case, which could not
reasonably have been anticipated, the judges at the ICTY and ICTR may allow the
Prosecutor to bring evidence in rebuttal. 508 If new significant issues arise directly out
of rebuttal evidence, and the defence "could not be expected to have been addressed
during the Defence case", the defence can subsequently present evidence in
rejoinder. 509 At the ICC, rebuttal evidence is not permissible. 510

In highly exceptional circumstances, the Prosecutor can apply to re-open his case after
the close of his case but before the judgment is rendered. This right is not provided in
the Statute or Rules but has been created by jurisprudence. The Prosecutor can invoke
this right if he is in possession of fresh evidence, which could not have been found
with the exercise of reasonable diligence before the close of the case, and its probative
Rights Attached to Procedural Status of Victim at the Pre-Trial Stage of the Case, ICC-01/04-01/07474, 13 May 2008; Katanga & Ngudjolo, Decision on limitations of set of procedural rights for nonanonymous victims, ICC-01/04-01/07-537, 30 May 2008; Katanga & Ngudjolo, T. Ch. Decision on the
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value is of such significance that it outweighs the prejudice against the accused
caused by its late admission. 511

After the presentation of all the evidence, the parties may present closing arguments,
including rebuttal and rejoinder arguments. 512 At the end of the closing arguments,
the presiding judge declares the hearing closed and the Chamber withdraws to
deliberate in private. The Chamber has to consider whether the Prosecutor has
established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Only if the majority is
so satisfied will the Chamber reach a finding of guilt and simultaneously impose an
appropriate sentence. 513 It will be announced in public and accompanied by a
reasoned written judgement with separate or dissenting opinions, if any, attached to
it. 514

Thus, the criminal proceedings resemble common law proceedings in terms of their
structure and the roles of the parties. There is no dossier, but rather two cases: one
presented by the prosecution and the other by the defence. The main departure from
the common law model is that there is no jury. The judges are responsible for all legal
and factual determinations throughout the case and must give reasons for any such
determination. Their power in controlling the conduct of the parties has increased
over the years, and was strong from the outset at the ICC. Thus, the ICTY, ICTR and
ICC judges have a very different role from the passive judge in a common law
jurisdiction. Yet, their role is more limited than it would be in civil law jurisdictions.

Rules of Evidence
The absence of a jury has given rise to important departures from the common law
rules of evidence.
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When the ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence were adopted, Antonio Cassese J,
President of the ICTY at the time, stated:
Based on the limited precedent of the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, and in order for us,
as judges, to remain as impartial as possible, we have adopted a largely adversarial
approach to our procedures, rather than the inquisitorial approach found in continental
Europe and elsewhere …
…there are two important adaptations to that general adversarial system. The first is
that, as at Nuremberg and Tokyo, we have not laid down technical rules for the
admissibility of evidence… [T]his Tribunal does not need to shackle itself to restrictive
rules which have developed out of the ancient trial by jury system. All relevant evidence
may be admitted to this Tribunal unless its probative value is substantially outweighed
by the need to ensure a fair and expeditious trial. An example of this would be where
the evidence was obtained by a serious violation of human rights. Secondly, the
Tribunal may order the production of additional or new evidence proprio motu. This
will enable us to ensure that we are fully satisfied with the evidence on which we base
our final decisions and to ensure that the charge has been proved beyond reasonable
doubt. It will also minimise the possibility of a charge being dismissed on technical
grounds for lack of evidence. We feel that, in the international sphere, the interests of
justice are best served by such a provision and that the diminution, if any, of the
accused’s rights is minimal by comparison.515

The first exception to the adversarial model is reflected in Rule 89(C) of the ICTY
and ICTR Rules, stating that a Chamber ‘may admit any relevant evidence which it
deems to have probative value’. The ICC has adopted a similar provision. 516
Similar to civil law criminal proceedings, the drafters of the legal provisions of the
international criminal tribunals sought to guarantee the greatest access to available
and attainable information by the adjudicators. Given that the adjudicators of law and
fact are professional judges, the drafters did not introduce technical barriers to the
admissibility of evidence, except when it is irregularly obtained. 517 As held by the
Trial Chamber in the first ICTY case of Tadic, “the trials are conducted by Judges
515
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who are able, by virtue of their training and experience, to hear the evidence in the
context in which it was obtained and accord it appropriate weight. Thereafter, they
may make a determination as to the relevancy and the probative value of the
evidence.” 518

This had led to the adoption of a new rule in the ICTY and ICTR which permits the
admission of testimonial evidence in the form of a written statement. This possibility
was initially introduced only in respect to statements which did not intend to prove
the acts and conduct of the accused, 519 and only if certain conditions were met. 520 If
the statement concerned was pivotal to the Prosecution’s case, cross-examination
could be ordered. 521 In the ICTY, this possibility was later extended to statements
which go to proof of the acts and conduct of the accused, provided that the makers of
the statements are available for cross-examination. 522 Such a statement can be
admitted without cross-examination if the witness is dead, untraceable or unable to
testify. 523 Since 2009, such a statement can also be admitted if the witness was
scheduled to testify but failed to attend as a result of improper interference as a result
of threats, intimidation, injury, bribes or coercion. 524
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These new rules, which were not adopted by the ICTR, have clearly undermined the
principle that witnesses be heard orally in court. 525 Directly incriminating statements
can now be introduced without the judges having had an opportunity to assess the
demeanour of the witness and without the defence having had an opportunity to ask
questions to the witness. These new provisions were adopted to accelerate the
proceedings in light of the completion strategy. The ICTY has been under great
pressure to complete the cases and close the tribunal. With that purpose in mind, it
introduced these measures and increased judicial control. 526 The ICTR has a similar
completion strategy but did not consider it necessary to incorporate these changes. It
is, therefore, questionable whether these curtailments of the principle of orality were
truly necessary and whether they have even assisted in accelerating the proceedings.
Neither tribunal has yet closed its doors.
Ironically, these rules were said to have been inspired by civil law principles. 527
However, in civil law jurisdictions written testimonial evidence is usually only
admitted if the examination of the witness was conducted by a judicial officer in the
presence of the parties. This is also more in accordance with the adversarial principle
as part of fair proceedings enshrined in the human rights conventions, as well as the
ICTY, ICTR and ICC Statutes. 528 Thus, this is an illustration of an adoption of a legal
principle in international justice based on an erroneous interpretation of domestic
legal principles.

No similar rules exist in the ICC Statute or Rules. The only rule regulating the
admissibility of recorded testimonial evidence is Rule 68, which allows such
admission only when the parties have an opportunity to examine the witness during
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the proceedings, or had such an opportunity during the recording. This reflects the
civil law practice better than the ICTY position. Until now, it has only been used as
background evidence not central to the core issues of the case. 529 Whether this rule
can be circumvented and written testimonial evidence can be admitted under the
general power to admit any relevant and reliable evidence whose prejudice is
outweighed by its probative value is still a pending issue. It is also still unclear
whether the transcripts of Prosecutor’s interviews with dead or untraceable witnesses
can be admitted into evidence if the conditions of Rule 68(a) were not met. 530

The second exception to the adversarial model cited by Judge Cassese is enshrined in
Rule 98 of the ICTY and ICTR Rules, allowing judges, proprio motu, to order either
party to produce additional evidence or to summon witnesses and order their
attendance. 531 At the ICC, if one or both of the parties would like additional witnesses
to be called, they can request the Chamber to call them as Chamber witnesses.
Pursuant to Articles 64(6) and 69(3) ICC Statute, and Rule 84, the Chamber can also
decide on its own initiative that additional witnesses be called or documentary
evidence produced.

Appellate Proceedings
Any oral or written ruling from the Chamber is subject to interlocutory appeal if
certified by the Trial Chamber. Certification may be granted where the decision
involves an issue that would significantly affect the fair and expeditious conduct of
the proceedings or the outcome of the trial, and for which, in the opinion of the Trial
Chamber, an immediate resolution by the Appeals Chamber may materially advance
the proceedings. 532 There is also appeal, as of right, against a final verdict, whether an
529
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acquittal or a conviction. 533 Appeal is, however, not an opportunity for the parties to
remedy any error of judgment or oversight made at trial. 534 The appellate proceedings
are not equivalent to a trial ‘de novo’, as in civil law systems.

The ICC Statute has codified more elaborate grounds of appeal. Both parties can
appeal the decision on the basis of a procedural error, an error of fact or law. 535 The
convicted person can further appeal the decision on any ground affecting the fairness
or reliability of the proceedings. 536 The ICC Statute does not impose conditions on
bringing new evidence. Pursuant to Article 83(1), the Appeals Chamber has all the
same powers of the Trial Chamber. If it finds that an unfairness to the defendant has
affected the reliability of the decision, or a procedural error or error of fact or law has
materially affected the decision, the Appeals Chamber may call evidence to determine
the issue itself. 537 In light of those powers, the appellate proceedings could develop
into more substantial proceedings than those at the ICTY and ICTR. Whether they
will remains to be seen.

Does the international criminal justice model meet the conditions in Part I?
Having adopted ample civil law influenced amendments, the ICTY system in its
current shape represents a modified versions of an adversarial system. It moved closer
to the ICC which from the outset has been inspired by civil law. The ICTR system has
not incorporated civil law features to the same extent as the ICTY. However, similarly
to the ICTY and ICC it represents a modified version of an adversarial system. As the
ICTR Trial Chamber in Bagosora held, the rules “are broader than either the common
or civil law systems and they reflect an international amalgamated system without
necessarily adopting a single national system of evidence”. 538

The efficiency of this international criminal procedure as a truth-ascertaining
methodology will be tested in Part III. However, some observations can be made with
533
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regard to the compliance of the theoretical framework with the conditions in Part I.
Seemingly, the combination of the two systems is the cause of a number of
weaknesses in the international truth-ascertaining procedure.

Access to Relevant and Reliable Information

The access to all available relevant and reliable information is more limited than in
civil law procedures. There is no dossier and no investigative judge. Instead, the
Chamber relies on the Prosecutor to select the suspects, and on both parties to conduct
investigations. The Trial Chamber is not presented with the available exculpatory
material unless one of the parties introduces it at trial. There may also be
incriminating, or partly incriminating and partly exonerating, material that the
Chamber has never seen because neither party, for strategic or other reasons,
introduces it at trial. Such evidence then is not considered in the ultimate decision on
guilt or innocence of the accused. The Chamber has increasingly great powers to
exercise control over the manner in which the parties conduct themselves. They have
a wide discretion to admit evidence and call additional witnesses. Both the parties and
the judges are entitled to examine the witnesses.

The international criminal justice model truly combines the strengths of the judges
and the parties in acquiring the greatest access to relevant and reliable information.
This is potentially frustrating both for the parties and for the judges, as the strength of
their position is weakened by the strength of the position of the other. The manner of
questioning the witnesses illustrates this clearly. Judges are not in a position to take
the lead in questioning the witnesses, as they would be in civil law jurisdictions. For
the main part of the questioning, they have to restrain themselves from intervening in
the performance of the parties, even if in their view the examination could be
conducted more efficiently for the ascertainment of the truth.

The parties on their part are considerably more limited in cross-examining witnesses
than they would be in a common law jurisdiction. They have to be more careful in
their approach to witnesses and are under significant time constraints. The extent to
which their cross-examination is ultimately compromised depends on the judges
before whom they appear. It also depends on the judges whether their compromised
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position is remedied by the greater powers granted to the judges in questioning the
witnesses at the end of their examination. These powers are, however, not unlimited
as judges should not be seen as partial or leading the witnesses to their answers.
Potentially, the parties and judges can strengthen each other. If a party fails to ask a
crucial question or produce an important document or witness, the judges can still do
it.

The roles of the Chamber and parties in collecting the evidence is an aspect that will
be looked at in more detail in Part III. Another aspect that will be discussed is whether
the flexibility of the rules of evidence, in particular with regard to admissibility, has
undermined or strengthened the ascertainment of the truth.

In addition to the parties and the judges, victim participants at the ICC can also
adduce evidence and examine witnesses. Given that they are allowed to bring
additional matters to the attention of the court, their participation potentially
contributes to the ascertainment of the truth. However, a number of observers and
practitioners consider that the participation of victims in the ICC proceedings is
troublesome and undermines the ascertainment of the truth. 539 Their arguments will
be further discussed in Part III. Overall, the structure itself offers sufficient access to
reliable information.
Engagement at a Distance

In principle, it must be assumed that the international judges can engage with the
information and information providers while keeping a distance. They are selected
from a pool of diverse candidates from all over the world. They must be “of high
moral character, impartiality and integrity”, and “possess the qualifications required
in their respective countries for appointment to the highest judicial offices.” 540 In
addition, the ICC requires judges to have an excellent knowledge in at least one of the
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working languages of the court. They must also have established competence in
“criminal law and procedure, and the necessary relevant experience, whether as judge,
prosecutor, advocate or in other similar capacity, in criminal proceedings”; or
“relevant areas of international law such as international humanitarian law and the
law of human rights, and extensive experience in a professional legal capacity which
is of relevance to the judicial work of the Court”. 541

Their nomination is, however, political which potentially compromises their position.
In the ICTY and ICTR, judges are appointed by the UN General Assembly upon
initial nomination by UN Member-States and subsequent pre-selection by the Security
Council. 542 They are elected for a renewable four-year term. It has been argued that
this undermines their independence. If the UN is not satisfied with the performance of
the judges, it can be assumed that their contract will not be renewed. 543 In the view of
numerous practitioners, the independence of the judges can only be ensured if they
are appointed for life. 544 At the ICC, judges are elected for nine years. Their
nomination must be approved by a secret vote of two thirds of the members of the
Assembly of State Parties. 545

A political nomination in itself does not suggest that the judges cannot be impartial
and independent of political considerations. 546 A judge whose impartiality might
reasonably be doubted may be disqualified from sitting in a particular case. 547 Thus,
541
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(2007) 325, at 355-361.
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Arguments, raised at a Conference, entitled The Position of the Defence at the ICC, and Role of The
Netherlands as Host-State, held in The Hague on 3-4 of November 2000, published in M. Hallers et al
(Eds), The Position of the Defence at the ICC, and Role of The Netherlands as Host-State, (Rozenberg,
2002). See also M. Cherif Bassiouni & Peter Manikas: The Law of the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia (New York: Transnational Publishers Inc, 1996), at 806, stating that the
eligibility for re-election “could mitigate against the principle of judicial independence”.
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Rome Statute, supra note 44, Art. 36.
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In the US, the nomination of judges is also political. In the US federal system judges are appointed
by the President and have to be confirmed by the US Senate. A judge is approved based on his judicial
qualifications.
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See, for instance, the US case Caperton v. AT Massey Coal Co. 129 S Ct 2252 (2009) at:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Caperton_v._A.T._Massey_Coal_Co. See further:
http://templelaw.tenintenclients.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/McManus_Degnan.pdf
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in theory the appointed international judges should be able to engage in ascertaining
the truth impartially and independently.

Transparency and Fairness

The ICTY, ICTR and ICC Statutes guarantee the transparent and fair nature of the
proceedings. The judges must ensure that a trial is fair and expeditious and in
accordance with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, “with full respect for the rights
of the accused and due regard for the protection of victims and witnesses”. 548 The
trials are public. The Chamber may, however, order that proceedings be held in closed
session to protect victims and witnesses, or confidential information. 549 The
judgement is public and detailed. The defence is a full and autonomous party to the
proceedings. The defendant can testify under oath or give an unsworn statement. 550

Throughout the proceedings, the principle of equality of arms must at all times be
respected. The right to equality of arms has been recognized as one of the most
fundamental elements of a fair trial enshrined in the ICTY, ICTR and ICC Statutes.551
With regard to the defence, the ICTY and ICTR Statutes and Rules were silent about
the responsibilities of the Registry. The ICC Rules, on the other hand, include a
number of provisions, which impose duties on the Registry to arrange defence
issues. 552

548

Article 20(1) ICTY Statute; Article 19(1) ICTR Statute; Rome Statute, supra note 44, Arts. 64(2) &
64(8)(b). The rights of the accused are enshrined in Article 21 ICTY Statute; 20 ICTR Statute and
Rome Statute Art. 64.
549
Rome Statute, supra note 44, Art. 64(7).
550
Rome Statute, supra note 44, Art. 67(1)(h) (the right to make an unsworn oral or written statement
in his or her defence); Rule 84bis(A) ICTY Rules (“After the opening statements of the parties or, if
the defence elects to defer its opening statement pursuant to Rule 84, after the opening statement of the
Prosecutor, if any, the accused may, if he or she so wishes, and the Trial Chamber so decides, make a
statement under the control of the Trial Chamber. The accused shall not be compelled to make a
solemn declaration and shall not be examined about the content of the statement”). The ICTR did not
incorporate this Rule. However, the judges still have the discretionary power to allow the defendant to
give an unsworn statement, as the judges did in the case of Bagosora.
551
Article 21(2) ICTY Statute; Article 20(2) ICTR Statute; Rome Statute, supra note 44, Art. 64;
Neumeister v. Austria, ECtHR Judgement of 27 June 1968, A-37 [4] [hereinafter ‘Neumeister’];
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case N° IT-94-A, Appeals Chamber, Judgement, 15 July 1999, para 52;
Prosecutor v. Clément Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana, Case N° ICTR-95-1-A, Appeals Chamber,
Appeals Judgement, 1 June 2001.
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See in particular Rule 20 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. See further C Buisman, ‘Defence
and Fair Trial’ Ch VI in: Haveman, Supranational Criminal Law, supra note 27, 231-237.
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The equality of arms principle must be read in light of the different burdens and roles
of the different parties. The Prosecutor has the burden to prove the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt. The defence has no burden except to provide some
evidence in support of an alibi or special defence. 553 If the defence establishes that the
alibi or special defence is plausible, it is then the Prosecutor’s responsibility to
establish beyond reasonable a doubt that the accused is guilty as charged
notwithstanding this alibi or special defence. 554

Given these different burdens and roles, the parties also have different types of rights,
powers and obligations. The defence enjoys more rights in order to compensate for
the greater powers which the Prosecutor possesses. For instance, the accused is
entitled to full and timely disclosure, and is protected by the presumption of
innocence and the right not to incriminate himself. 555

Accordingly, the international proceedings appear to be transparent and fair. Whether
this is true in reality will be addressed in Part III. In particular, it will be considered
whether the proceedings are indeed transparent, and if not, whether that has an
adverse impact on the ascertainment of the truth. In addition, the treatment of the
defence in reality, and its consequences for the ascertainment of the truth, if any, will
be analysed.

Conclusion

Thus, in theory the system can serve as an adequate truth-ascertaining system. It has
incorporated most of the minimum safeguards inherent to domestic systems. Because
it is a judge-led system, the main safeguards of producing reasoned written verdicts
and a full new hearing on appeal have been incorporated.
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ICTY/ICTR Rule 87(A); Rome Statute, supra note 44, Art. 31 ICC Statute.
Khan & Dixon, Archbold International Criminal Court, supra note 486, paras. 17-57 – 17-59. For
ICC, see Rome Statute, supra note 44, Article 66(2), and Rule 79 of the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence (relating to the obligation upon the defence to dislose its alibi).
555
Article 21(3) ICTY Statute; Article 20(3) ICTR Statute; Rome Statute, supra note 44, Article 64(3).
See also Judge Robinson: ‘[w]hat the Prosecutor did in terms of information to the Accused is not
necessarily a correct basis for determining the Accused’s responsibilities, because the Prosecution has
obligations under the Rules which the Defence does not have. Conversely, the Defence has rights
which do not apply to the Prosecution…’Prosecutor v. Milošević, T 17 June 2004, IT-02-54-TC,
P32086.
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In reality, this has however been a struggle. The hindrances to an effective
ascertainment of the truth that have occurred so far in the ICTY, ICTR and ICC are
numerous and will be analysed in Part III. Most of them are unrelated to the
methodology, but have rather to do with the implementation. Yet, some observers and
practitioners continue to criticise the methodology itself. An often-heard legitimate
criticism is against the ease with which testimonial evidence can be admitted in the
form of a written statement. 556 Unlike in civil law jurisdictions, such a statement is
not taken by an investigative judge in the presence of the parties. The extent to which
this, as well as other problematic practices have adversely affected the ascertainment
of the truth is addressed in Part III.

The main reason for continued criticism is that practitioners and observers continue to
think in terms of common law or civil law. They often support the system they are
most familiar with and criticise the features that have their roots in unfamiliar
systems. 557

People employed by the international criminal justice systems come from different
domestic systems. When they arrive at the international forum, they come armed with
their own legal philosophy and language which they cannot remove completely from
their minds. They are trained in their domestic jurisdiction and are familiar with the
terminology and philosophy applied in their own system. 558 These different legal
vocabularies and philosophies must be merged into a uniform legal vocabulary
inherent and unique to international criminal justice. 559
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See Jackson, Transnational Faces of Justice in Jackson, Crime, Procedure and Evidence, supra note
23, 221, at 238-241; M. Fairlie, The Marriage of Common Law and Continental Law at the ICTY and
its Progeny: Due Process Model 4 International Criminal Law Review Journal 243 (2004).
557
Bohlander, Radbruch Redux, supra note 123, 410.
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According to Pakes, this has led to considerable differential treatment of case-management issues in
the ICTY. See: F. Pakes, Styles of Trial Procedure at the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia, 17 Perspectives in Law and Psychology 309 (2003). See also Sliedregt,
Introduction: Common Civility, supra note 433.
559
See also M. Delmas-Marty who refers to such vocabulary as a ‘common grammar’: “I would stress
that a system of justice conceived by hybridisation will necessarily be distinguishable from its national
‘parents’ and will progressively become autonomous. In other words, hybridisation goes hand in hand
with autonomisation. Therefore the system’s coherence cannot be pre-established and cannot simply be
borrowed from a preexisting one, but must be built. True hybridisation, as distinct from simple
transplantation, makes it easier to do so by using not only common technical rules, but also a common
‘grammar’, that is, the guiding, or meta principles that structure the system around general international
law principles, human rights instruments and a comparison of the main national criminal justice
systems. This ‘grammar’ then guides the interpretation of the questions of first impression that will
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Indeed, international criminal justice systems “combine and fuse, in a fairly felicitous
manner, the adversarial or accusatorial system (chiefly adopted in common-law
countries) with a number of significant features of the inquisitorial approach (mostly
taken from States of continental Europe and in other countries of civil-law tradition).
This combination or amalgamation is unique and begets a legal logic that is
qualitatively different from that of each of the two national criminal systems: the
philosophy behind international trials is markedly at variance with that underpinning
each of those national systems”. 560 This philosophy is further influenced by factors
unique to international criminal justice and unrelated to domestic criminal justice.
This confuses domestic legal concepts, language and philosophy even more.

Practitioners and observers must familiarise themselves with this emerging
international vocabulary and philosophy. Only then can the systems melt
efficiently. 561 This appears to be difficult for many of them, which increases the
‘hybridisation’ problems.
Unique Context of International Justice
In order to discuss thoroughly any of these issues and to evaluate whether the
international criminal justice systems can in reality be an adequate truth-ascertaining
systems, it is necessary to place these systems in their proper context. International
criminal justice systems are more than mere hybrids between common law and civil
law criminal justice systems. They operate in circumstances which are very different
from the circumstances in which domestic criminal justice systems operate and,
therefore, include elements that are unique to international criminal justice. 562 The
inevitably arise and makes it possible, when suitable, to integrate in a unified, pluralist manner.”: The
Hybridisation of Criminal Procedure, supra note 23, 251 at 258-259.
560
Prosecutor v. Erdemović, A. Ch. Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cassese to Judgment of
Appeals Chamber, IT-96-22-A, para. 3. See also para. 6: Once transposed onto the international level,
legal concepts may have acquired “a new lease of life, absolutely independent of their original
meaning”, or they may have been adjusted to the characteristic features of international proceedings.
See also Tuinstra’s observation that international criminal justice systems “lack a clear philosophy”:
Tuinstra, Defence Counsel, supra note 54, 103.
561
See also Justice Doherty’s observation expressed at the Dublin Conference, supra note 13, that we
should stop thinking in common law and civil law.
562
Prosecutor v. Erdemović, A. Ch. Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cassese to Judgment of
Appeals Chamber, IT-96-22-A, para. 5. See also para. 3:
“One might wonder why international courts show such great caution in drawing upon national law
when establishing the meaning of national law concepts and terms. Indeed, such caution might be
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international criminal justice systems are sui generis rather than hybrid courts. 563
Indeed, as the ICTY Trial Chamber held in Tadic:

In interpreting the provisions which are applicable to the International Tribunal and
determining where the balance lies between the accused’s right to a fair and public trial
and the protection of victims and witnesses, the judges of the International Tribunal
must do so within the context of its own unique legal framework. (emphasis added) 564

Some of the unique circumstances have been discussed in Part I. International
criminal courts and tribunals have set themselves very ambitious objectives. They
aspire to achieve many goals in addition to the accurate assessment of the guilt or
innocence of a particular defendant. These goals are: end impunity, justice to the
victims, deterrence, restoration or maintenance of the peace and security,
reconciliation, and the ascertainment of the truth.

The legal and factual determinations to be made in international justice are extremely
complex. Particularly in ethnically divided societies, there are different versions of
events. It is a challenge to collect sufficient reliable evidence in support of allegations
against a person who did not participate directly in any crimes. This is particularly
challenging in a war-torn society where many interested parties may either seek to
manipulate the collectors of information or destroy evidence.

The task of ascertaining the truth in international justice is therefore considerably
more challenging than in domestic justice. The tools available to international
criminal justice systems are more limited both in terms of its structure and capacity.
regarded as inconsistent with the fact that the whole body of international law owes so much to
national or municipal rules: as is well known, over the years international norms have greatly borrowed
from the internal law of sovereign States, particularly from national private law. However, this
historical spilling over from one set of legal systems into the law of nations does not detract from these
legal systems (those of States on the one side, and international law, on the other) being radically
different: their structure is different, their subjects are different, as are their sources and enforcement
mechanisms. It follows that normally it would prove incongruous and inappropriate to apply in an
inter-State legal setting a national law concept as such, that is, with its original scope and purport. The
body of law into which one may be inclined to transplant the national law notion cannot but reject the
transplant, for the notion is felt as extraneous to the whole set of legal ideas, constructs and
mechanisms prevailing in the international context. Consequently, the normal attitude of international
courts is to try to assimilate or transform the national law notion so as to adjust it to the exigencies and
basic principles of international law.”
563
Haveman, Supranational Criminal Law, supra note 27, 3-5, where Haveman argues that the ICTY
and ICTR Systems are more appropriately referred to as Systems Sui Generis than hybrid systems.
564
Prosecutor v. Tadić, T. Ch. II. Decision on prosecutor’s motion requesting protective measures for
victims and witnesses, IT-94-1-T, 10 August 1995, para. 27.
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Structural and Capacity Limitations
International criminal justice systems suffer from structural limitations since they
have not been established by an existing State to try perpetrators among its population
for crimes committed on its territory. Instead, they have been established on an interState level and exercise their function within territories under the authority of
sovereign States. International criminal courts and tribunals have no autonomous
power to carry out any act within the territory of a sovereign State without its
permission and assistance. Investigators of both parties must be given permission to
enter into the country to conduct on-site investigations and search for potential
witnesses as well as documentary and forensic evidence. Investigations can only be
effective if the investigators are able to do their work freely and independently
without the intervention of local de jure or de facto authorities or other powerful
groups.

The assistance of the local authorities is required for any investigative act that
requires a judicial authorisation, for instance a house search or an interview with a
prisoner. International courts and tribunals do not have their own independent police
force with any power of arrest or other powers police officers have in domestic
jurisdictions. Accordingly, in conducting investigations and securing arrests and
transfers of suspects, international criminal tribunals and courts are entirely dependent
on State cooperation. 565

The ICTY and ICTR have more means than the ICC to enforce cooperation on
unwilling States. The ICTY and ICTR have been established by the Security Council
using chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. Therefore, they have primary
jurisdiction in respect to crimes described in their Statutes committed in the former
Yugoslavia or Rwanda. 566 All States are under a statutory duty to cooperate fully with
the ICTY and ICTR. 567 These tribunals can report any refusal of States to cooperate
fully to the Security Council, which can then take measures against these
565

It is noteworthy that, today, there are nine outstanding arrest warrants issued by the ICC which have
not been executed. See further S. Maupas, Cour pénale internationale: nouvelle victoire américaine,
Le Monde, 28 July 2010.
566
Art 7(2) ICTY Statute; 8(2) ICTR Statute and ICTY/ICTR Rules 8, 11, 56-58. See further Cryer,
Prosecuting International Crimes, supra note 223, 127-142.
567
Art. 29 ICTY Statute; Art. 28 ICTR Statute.
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uncooperative States. 568 Whether this option has had the desired impact is
questionable and will be analysed further in Part III. At least there is some level of
political pressure the tribunals can assert on unwilling States.

The ICC, on the other hand, has concurrent jurisdiction and was established on the
basis of a treaty. In signing the Rome Statute, States-parties have committed
themselves to cooperate fully with the Court. 569 Failure to do so can be reported to the
Assembly of States Parties. The ICC has, however, no effective power to take
compulsory measures against States that fail to abide by their obligations. Unlike the
ICTY and ICTR, the ICC has no power over non-States-parties. 570

These are fundamental structural differences with domestic criminal courts and have
had significant consequences. As Judge Cassese put it:
To lose sight of this fundamental condition, and thus simply transplant into international
law notions originating in national legal systems, might be a source of great confusion
and misapprehension. The philosophy behind all national criminal proceedings, whether
they take a common-law or a civil-law approach, is unique to those proceedings and
stems from the fact that national courts operate in a context where the three fundamental
functions (law-making, adjudication and law enforcement) are discharged by central
organs partaking of the State’s direct authority over individuals. That logic cannot be
simply transposed onto the international level: there, a different logic imposed by the
different position and role of courts must perforce inspire and govern international
criminal proceedings. 571

Cassese is right. For instance, the international tribunals and court must be watchful
so as not to compromise their political independence. Part III will assess whether they
have dealt with the issue of State cooperation in a responsible manner. It will also
consider to what extent there is a difference in reality between the ICC and the
tribunals in terms of their enforcement mechanisms.
568

Where State authorities fail to comply with an obligation under any of the Rules in conjunction
with Article 29 ICTY Statute or Article 28 ICTR Statute, the President may report the matter to the
Security Council if satisfied that this is indeed the case (ICTY/ICTR Rule 7bis, Rule 11, Rule 59(B)).
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Rome Statute, supra note 44, Part IX. See also Jugde Kirsch: http://wwwold.icccpi.int/library/about/newsletter/16/en_01.html.
570
This is a problem, for instance, in Sudan, which is not a State-party to the Rome Statute. It has
closed all borders for investigations carried out by anyone from the ICC. This has meant that the parties
in the Sudan cases against Bahar Idriss Abu Garda, Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain and Saleh
Mohammed Jerbo Jamus are unable to conduct investigations in the field. This makes investigations
impossible. See further Cryer, Prosecuting International Crimes, supra note 223, 142-159; Blewitt,
The International Criminal Tribunals, supra note 76, 145, 150-152; Chuter, War Crimes, supra note
75, 139-149; May & Hoskins, International Criminal Law, supra note 57, 211, 216.
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Prosecutor v. Erdemović, A. Ch. Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cassese to Judgment of
Appeals Chamber, IT-96-22-A, para. 5.
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International courts and tribunals also have insufficient capacity to deal with all the
crimes committed in a conflict. There is a limited budget, number of investigators,
cell capacity and courtrooms. Accordingly, international courts and tribunals cannot
deal with proceedings against more than a handful of alleged perpetrators. This forces
the collectors of information to conduct selective investigations and focus only on a
small percentage of the totality of the crimes committed within a particular
geographical area and time zone. Given the dependence on State cooperation, this
potentially leads to selective justice based on political rather than legal criteria. It also
limits the capacity to ascertain the truth, since many aspects of the overall picture of
the war will never be addressed by the court or tribunal. 572

Cultural Diversity
The enforcement of international justice is further complicated by the fact that the
courts and tribunals are geographically, culturally and temporally far removed from
the crime scene. The geographical distance between the seat of the ICTY, ICTR and
ICC from the localities whose crimes and perpetrators they are judging makes the
operation very costly and difficult. Unless the court or tribunal organises site visits,
only the investigators will usually have visited the crime scene. In most situations, the
crimes will not be investigated and assessed until years later. Evidence may get lost or
destroyed in that time period and the memories of witnesses fade. Culturally and
linguistically, the tribunals and courts are also separated from the local territories and
their local people. Combs has highlighted the difficulties caused by this cultural and
linguistic gap in assessing the credibility of the witnesses and interpreting their
stories. Combs also pointed out that it may be more acceptable to lie in some cultures
than in others. 573

It is questionable whether the international truth-ascertainment methodology can
adequately accommodate these unique circumstances. Significantly, only common
law and civil law principles have ever been properly relied on in international
criminal justice systems. Raimondo pointed out that ‘multiculturalism’ within
572
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Combs, Fact-Finding Without Facts, supra note 6, 131-135. See further C. Murphy, Political
Reconciliation and International Criminal Trials, 224-225, pointing out that such difficulties can also
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international justice systems has been reduced to ‘biculturalism’ consisting of two
legal families: common law and civil law. To the dismay of some observers, 574 other
legal traditions are removed from most legal discussions. 575

Common law and civil law systems have their differences and different historical
roots, and reaching compromises between them can be challenging. They are
nonetheless both Western-types of criminal methodologies and at least share their
legal foundation. The differences between them are minimal compared to the
differences with non-Western-types of criminal methodologies. A high number of
non-Western criminal procedures have been influenced heavily by civil law or
common law procedures as a result of their imposition during Colonialism. This is not
to say that such procedures are regarded as legitimate by the local communities even
if approved by their Government. 576

There are ample countries that have adopted a different style of criminal proceedings.
Islamic countries, for instance, apply Sharia: a set of legal rules, often misunderstood
in the Western world. 577 In addition, there are various types of local criminal justice
that have little in common with either common law or civil law. For instance, both
Rwanda and Northern Uganda have a local justice system in place.

Two examples of local justice
In June 2002, Rwanda introduced Gacaca Courts, mixing local traditional conflictresolution with a modern retributive legal procedure to deal with genocide cases.
They have been operational from 2005 until today. Rwanda’s President Kagame
referred to this initiative as an “African solution to African problems”. 578
574
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International Criminal Law, 11 International Criminal Law Review 299 (2011), 307; also B. Jia,
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Community-Based Gacaca Courts, May 2011, available at <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/
reports/rwanda0511webwcover.pdf> , last accessed January 2012, 1.
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The term ‘gacaca’ means grass in Kinyarwanda and stems from the local custom to
sit on the grass to resolve disputes. In the modern types of Gacaca Courts, people
indeed sit on the grass in front of the local administration office. Seven judges from
the local community, with little to no education and limited judicial training, 579 decide
on the fate of the defendants who face allegations of genocide. Initially, the Gacaca
Courts dealt with all but the most serious category of genocide cases, involving
planners, leaders, organisers, instigators, well-known killers and rapists. As of 2007,
Gacaca Courts also had jurisdiction to deal with these most serious cases. 580

Between June 2002 and the end of 2004, adult community members met weekly in a
general assembly to gather information about what happened during the genocide and
to identify the victims, perpetrators and lost property. As of 15 January 2005, the
Government took over and assigned local authorities to collect information. 581 These
local authorities collect their information with the assistance of local villagers and
then present the accusations to the entire community in a verification hearing.

Once all information is gathered and verified, the trials begin. All villagers and other
interested parties can attend and participate in the trials. 582 A defendant is not assisted
by counsel, but can bring family members, friends and witnesses to support him. The
victims can do the same. There is no prosecution. A defendant may confess which
usually decreases his sentence. If he does not confess, there will be a direct
confrontation between the defendant and the victims, their supporters, the judges and
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In 2002, magistrates and law students offered a six-day compulsory training to Gacaca judges,
which is arguably inadequate to deal with genocide cases. See further Amnesty International, Gacaca:
A Question of Justice, December 2002, available at <http://www.amnesty.org/fr/library/>, last accessed
January 2012.
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Gacaca Courts, Truth-Justice-Reconciliation, Kigali, November 2004, in: “Monitoring and Research
Report on the Gacaca Information-Gathering during the National Phase” June 2006 at:
http://www.penalreform.org/files/rep-ga8-2006-info-gathering-en_o.pdf.
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enforce their appearance. In 2004, participation was made compulsory through Article 29 of the
Gacaca Law. See further HRW, Justice Compromised, supra note 573, 83-93.
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everyone else who was a witness to the events. Each of them is expected to say
publicly what they know about the defendant’s conduct during the course of the
genocide. If the confrontation gets out of hand, the judges may warn any person
stirring up emotional heat or even charge him with contempt and order his
imprisonment up to several months. If found guilty, the defendant may face
community service or a prison sentence with or without special provisions. If he is
found guilty of property crimes only, the sentence imposed could be compensation.583
If the defendant has disappeared the judges may contemplate charging a member of
his family instead. 584
Leaving its deficiencies aside, 585 the gacaca type of justice appears to be much more
community-based and involve everyone concerned. 586

In Northern Uganda, the Acholi community has its own traditional justice system,
which is more ceremonial than punitive in nature. Mato oput (bitter root or justice) is
the common nominator in the Acholi justice for healing rituals and blessings
performed by rwodi moo (anointed chiefs). These ceremonies blend various
traditional ceremonies. The most well-known traditional ceremonies are the mato oput
(bitter root or juice), and the gomo tong (bending of spears). Traditionally, if someone
had been killed, Acholi traditional chiefs led a mato oput ceremony between the
wrongdoer and a representative of the harmed family. The wrongdoer had to confess
583
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to his wrongdoing, ask for forgiveness and accept to pay compensation. Then, to
reconcile social divisions, both the wrongdoer and the family representative were to
drink the blood of a sacrificed sheep mixed with mato oput. The gomo tong was
performed to seal the conflict resolution between clans. Nowadays, these ceremonies
are used to reintegrate former members of the Lord Resistance Army (“LRA”) into
society by offering them forgiveness. 587

Such criminal justice methods differ substantially from the international method.
These local justice systems can reach out to the direct victims of a conflict in a much
more engaging and impacting manner than an international court. They may also be
more efficient in ascertaining the truth. It is often stated that within the local
community everyone knows exactly what happened and who did what. The truth
could potentially come out less shaped in a community-based justice model. 588

This corresponds with the initial reaction to the introduction of the Gacaca Courts
from many Rwandan prisoners. The majority of them had been waiting for justice for
many years. They were initially very positive about the idea of Gacaca and thought
that the truth had a better chance of getting out during such trials. They also thought it
would have a positive effect on reconciliation. They, however, rapidly lost their
faith. 589 Years before the Gacaca Courts were operational, the prisoners had
introduced their own unofficial Gacaca system in prison under charge of a committee
of prisoners who presided over, and recorded the Gacaca meetings. The prisoners had
much greater faith in their own Gacaca system. 590

587

T. Allen, Trial Justice: The International Criminal Court and the Lord’s Resistance Army, (Zed
Books, 2006) 128-168; D. Pain, The Bending of the Spears: Producing Consensus for Peace &
Development in Northern Uganda, (London International Alert and Kacoke Madit, 1997), published at:
www.km-net.org/publications/spear.doc.
588
Truth and reconciliation were among the core objectives of the Gacaca Courts in trying genocide
cases. See Speech of the Vice-President and Minister of Defence on the Occasion of the Opening of the
Seminar on Gacaca Tribunals, Kigali, 18 June 2002, reproduced by Penal Reform International in PRI
Research on Gacaca Report: Rapport III, April – June 2002, available at
<http://www.penalreform.org/publications/gacaca-research-report-no3-jurisdictions-pilot-phase-o>,
last accessed January 2012.
589
See Tertsakian, Le Château, supra note 580, 376-377.
590
Ibid, 364-366.
148

Impact of Local Justice on International Justice
These systems, as well as any other system with different rationales and modalities of
punishment have largely been ignored in drafting, interpreting and implementing the
legal provisions of any of the international courts or tribunals. This is particularly
striking because it is mainly these countries that are subject to the jurisdiction of
international courts and tribunals. 591

Drumbl is of the firm view that indigenous approaches are not sufficiently
incorporated into the international criminal justice methodology. Too little attention is
paid to local views on justice and what the communities who suffered the most want
from international justice. Drumbl proposes that horizontal and vertical approaches be
included. He defines horizontal approaches as the inclusion of extralegal interventions
in addition to meting out punishment. Vertical approaches refer to the inclusion of
bottom-up influence of local communities and societal institutions.592
Almqvist also emphasised the importance of cultural proximity. 593 It is imperative
that local cultural norms and perceptions are considered. Failure to do so may
undermine the legitimacy of international tribunals which essentially depends on their
acceptance by the affected communities, as well as the international community.
Local communities are less likely to acknowledge international tribunals as legitimate
if they cannot identify with them at all. 594 A lack of consideration for local cultures
can also affect the ability to ascertain the truth. It would create a gap between the
assessors and those who are being assessed. 595

According to Doak, international justice focuses predominantly on retribution, while
it addresses restorative elements inadequately. 596 Clark suggests that further studies
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are required on “how to bridge the gap between transitional justice processes and
local communities”. 597

International courts seek to be culturally sensitive. They recruit people from all over
the world. This can lead to difficulties. Lawyers do not all share the same education,
experience, language and legal qualifications. It is then hard to compare the profiles
of potential candidates. In addition, many among them, particular those who have no
background in common law or civil law, may have great difficulties in familiarising
themselves with the international procedural rules. 598

The new ICC chief Prosecutor is an African woman. Her candidacy was supported by
the African Union. 599 She appears to have been selected in part on the basis of her
African origin and gender. The ICC thereby hopes to tackle the criticism that it is an
anti-African court, as it has so far only addressed situations in Africa. 600 It remains to
be seen whether her appointment will strengthen the legitimacy of the court in the
eyes of African nations.

Judges are selected on the basis of their geographical representation as well as of the
principal legal systems of the world. 601 Yet, it is questionable whether the recruitment
of judges worldwide, including those from countries that are subject to the jurisdiction
of the court, helps to bring the tribunal closer to the affected areas. Judges are
recruited from the educated elite and may have little familiarity with the villagers
even from their own country.
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The ICC, more than the ICTY and ICTR, must consider local justice systems, as it
can intervene only if such systems are perceived as inadequate or unwilling to deal
with a case. 602 Further, the Prosecutor has an explicit statutory obligation to take into
account the “interests of victims” and the “interests of justice”. 603

The Prosecutor also issued a policy paper in September 2003, encouraging States and
civil society “to take ownership of the Court”, and promising to consider “the need to
respect the diversity of legal systems, traditions and cultures”. 604

Thus, the ICC attempts to be cognisant of cultural diversity. Whilst it is important to
create cultural awareness within international systems, it should not be overlooked
that cultural differences can also be exaggerated. This is evident from the abovedescribed local justice systems in Rwanda and Northern Uganda.

Exaggeration of Cultural Differences
The Gacaca Courts were no longer in use in Rwanda. The traditional version came
into existence in the pre-colonial period and remained in use until 1962. The Gacaca
Courts were previously never used for serious crimes before. Rather, they were used
to settle property, monetary and personal injury disputes. Community elders were the
mediators between the families involved in the dispute. The emphasis was on social
harmony rather than punishment and compensation. As a means of reconciliation, the
losing family could be ordered to offer beer to the community. They were reintroduced for the purpose of trying the many thousands of suspects of genocide,
imprisoned for years in the overcrowded prisons in Rwanda. However, apart from the
name, the modern Gacaca justice system dealing with genocide has little in common
with the traditional Gacaca justice system. In particular, they differ in the modern
Gacaca system being retributive more than restorative. 605
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The modern Gacaca Courts are criticised for being heavily Government-controlled as
well as corrupt and unfair. 606 NGOs which have monitored the Gacaca trials cite
ample examples of defendants being pressured to pay witnesses or judges; Gacaca
trials being used to settle old scores; and the Rwandan authorities being involved
directly or indirectly in influencing the outcome. Monitoring Reports state that judges
and witnesses are frequently bribed, harassed, intimidated or simply pressured to
conduct themselves in a manner securing convictions. 607 At times, this pressure
appears to come from the community, and at times from the authorities. It is,
therefore, not infrequent that the Government rather than the community determines
the fate of the defendants in the name of community justice.

Similarly, the mato oput and gomo tong were no longer in use for twenty years or
more when they were reintroduced in 1999. The Acholi elders insist that the mato
oput ceremony of forgiveness is more suitable to the Acholi culture than retributive
justice. They want to use the same ceremony in relation to the leaders of the LRA
against whom the ICC has issued a warrant of arrest. 608 Many observers support their
views and consider that the ICC should not intervene in the local attempts at
reintegration and reconciliation. 609

Tim Allen, a cultural anthropologist who spent over four years in Northern Uganda,
expresses a different view. He describes the traditional justice system as “deeply
flawed” because it does not offer a national solution. 610 Allen and his team of
researchers have conducted many interviews with members of the Acholi community.
These interviews depict a different reality and suggest that more Acholi people than
assumed disagree that the mato oput ceremony offers a solid alternative to retributive
justice. A large number of the interviewed members of the Acholi community, who
606
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are the most affected by the LRA crimes, prefer punishment over forgiveness. 611 The
empirical research conducted by the International Center for Transitional Justice and
Human Rights Center has reached a similar conclusion. 612

Cultural differences can, therefore, be used in a manipulative manner to justify an
outdated or inhuman local practice. 613 It can also occur that cultural diversity is used
as a cover-up for an outright lie, or exaggerated for other negative purposes. It is not
entirely clear what the affected communities want from justice. Opinions also differ
among individuals within the affected communities. 614 The question is then which
view is authoritative and represents the view of the entire local community most
accurately. 615

Most likely, individual victims from all over the world have their own views on
justice and forgiveness. Some of them prefer justice over peace and reconciliation;
others prefer peace and reconciliation over justice. At least, there does not appear to
be a striking difference between what victims want in Northern Uganda and Rwanda
versus in the West. Similar to Western-type justice systems, the Gacaca Courts are
focused on retributive rather than restorative justice. Many of the Acholi people have
also stated a preference for retributive over restorative justice. Allen suggests that the
Acholi people do not constitute ‘a race apart’, but resemble people elsewhere. 616
Thus, the differences between “them” and “us” are perhaps overstated.

An additional difficulty for the ICC is that it deals with a variety of regions each with
their own unique cultural framework. The ICC should, therefore, not adopt a “one611
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size-fits-all” approach. 617 The success of a specific methodology in one post-conflict
region does not guarantee its success in another post-conflict region. 618

Thus, it is difficult to create a methodology that would encompass all different
cultural elements. Each specific situation demands its own individual approach.619
The international procedure should, therefore, be applied with a level of flexibility so
it can be adjusted to each situation with its own cultural specifics. In Clark’s view,
international justice “needs to be contextually and culturally sensitive”. 620

A final issue to be considered is how far international justice should go in
accommodating local justice practices that are not in accordance with its standards of
fairness. ICTY Appeals Judge Meron firmly stated that “there can be no cutting
corners” in upholding due process principles. 621 However, not everyone shares this
view. Drumbl, for instance, has observed that the notion of due process is a typically
Western concept, which is transplanted to conflict areas where it may not be respected
in the same manner. While not suggesting due process is irrelevant, he states that
“justice is not a recipe and due process is not a magic ingredient”. 622

Part III will address the question of whether the international methodology is capable
of dealing adequately with the cultural challenges, as well as other challenges it is
faced with in the unique context of international justice.
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PART III
PRACTICE OF ASCERTAINING THE TRUTH AT THE
ICTY, ICTR AND ICC
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Investigations

General Observations

As previously held, a minimum condition for a successful truth inquiry is that the
collectors of the evidence have access to sufficient probative and reliable information
that is sufficiently relevant to the subject of the inquiry. Thus, the efficiency of
investigations is of the utmost importance. 623

In addition, it is important that the inquiry is conducted in an unbiased fashion and
produces information reflecting all views equally and fairly. The goal is to present to
the adjudicators the fullest picture of the events in question. To the extent possible,
this picture should be based on all attainable and available relevant, probative and
reliable incriminating and exonerating evidence.

This is always difficult, given that one seeks to reconstruct facts that have already
occurred in the past. Evidence may be lost. Documents may have been destroyed and
witnesses may have died or disappeared. It has already been noted that it is impossible
to reconstruct the facts fully and to obtain all relevant evidence. One should
nonetheless seek to get close to this goal. For this, it is important that the inquiry is
complete and conducted with the utmost care and scrutiny and that all potential leaks
have been explored. The gathering of evidence is the most essential part of the inquiry
because without adequate information, the fact finders are in no position to make any
findings.

Various methods can be applied to achieve this. As aforementioned, international
criminal justice systems apply the adversarial investigative method. They rely
exclusively on the parties to collect and produce the evidence. Each is responsible to
present their side of the story. To produce the fullest picture in such a setting, it is
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essential that both parties have an equal and adequate opportunity to conduct effective
investigations. For this, both parties must be given adequate time and facilities. 624

Equality of Arms in Practice
Thus, the principle of equality of arms must be upheld throughout the investigations.
In theory, this principle is applied fully at all stages of the proceedings. In reality,
however, the parties are never equal, whether on a domestic or international level. On
a domestic level, the prosecution represents the State and has a police force to rely on
to conduct the investigations. On an international level, there is no State, but the
Prosecutor’s office is one of the organs of the tribunal or court. Defence counsel, on
the other hand, is a visitor. At the ICTY, there is one office to share with all defence
teams, as well as a limited number of additional offices in another building. The ICTR
has defence offices for defence teams on trial. It however does not offer paper and
other work material to the defence. The ICC offers better facilities to the defence
including offices and office equipment.

In the two ad hoc tribunals, a defence structure has been established to represent the
defence – in the ICTR by defence counsel themselves and in the ICTY by the
Registry. Initially, these structures had little significance, but over the years, their role
and influence has increased to the extent that they are even consulted directly for
proposed amendments to the rules. The defence is, however, not recognised as an
official organ of the court, which, according to some commentators, amounts to an
‘architectural defect’. 625

In the ICC, the Office of Public Counsel for the Defence (“OPCD”), an official
registry organ, assists the defence and represents its views in any negotiations with
other sections. The OPCD can also propose rules amendments or object to
propositions. The OPCD typically asks individual defence teams for their views on
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any issue which touches on the defence. This partly rectifies the imbalance between
the two parties. It provides the defence with an institutional voice and significant
assistance in conducting legal research.

Thus, a change in mentality has occurred over the years. Whilst initially the defence
was merely regarded as an outside and disruptive body to the system, there is
presently much more comprehension for the position of the defence and it is listened
to more frequently than in the past. 626

The parties nonetheless remain unequal in conducting investigations. The accused has
one, possibly two, defence counsel, as well as a handful of supporting staff members.
The Prosecutor’s office is regarded as one organ. It has, therefore, many more people
available to work on one case than the defence and a greater budget to spend on
investigations. Thus, the Prosecutor has an institutional advantage over the defence
and has significantly more resources available to him. 627
For years, investigators for the prosecution have continually investigated the alleged
crimes. Unless he is being interrogated or imprisoned, a suspect may not even be
aware of the investigation against him. In most cases, an accused has not done any
defence preparations before he is in the custody of the tribunals or court and has
recruited a defence team. Still later, he receives all incriminating material necessary
with which to prepare a defence. 628
Once the accused is within the custody of the tribunals or court, his means to prepare
personally a defence are limited, given that the tribunals or court are located in areas
remote from the crime scene. In addition, the contacts of the accused with the outside
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world are restricted and subject to monitoring. He, therefore, relies mostly on his
defence team to conduct investigations and prepare his defence.

In such circumstances, it is not realistic to offer equal means to the defence, nor is it
necessary in light of their different roles and burdens. The tribunals confirmed that
equality of arms is not tantamount to equality of means and resources. 629 In the view
of Goldstone, who was the first chief Prosecutor of the ICTY and ICTR, one should
do away with the notion of equality of arms because it is a promise that cannot be
fulfilled. Instead, the test should be whether the defence has sufficient resources. 630

The question then is what amounts to sufficient resources. If there is reason for doubt
concerning the guilt of an accused, it is not to be expected that such doubt will be
raised by the prosecution. Therefore, it is essential that the defence has sufficient
means to investigate.
The sufficiency of means must be determined against the background of each specific
case. Investigations in remote areas are expensive and time-consuming for both
parties. It includes airfare and possibly expensive hotel fees. If the crime base area is
wide, it requires additional travel time and expenses. For instance, potential ICTR
witnesses are spread throughout the world, but mostly in Europe and Africa.
Particularly many defence witnesses have fled Rwanda in 1994 and now live
elsewhere. This requires a larger budget for the defence than in a situation where all
witnesses live in one place. In the DRC, the parties have had to divide their limited
resources to investigate and meet potential witnesses in places separated by
considerable distance. Travel and communication in these areas is difficult and time
consuming. Possible contacts have often moved to different and distant Provinces.
Others are to be found in remote, country villages or rural areas. Possession of mobile
phones, the only available telephone, is limited. Security issues have occasionally
prevented investigations, or limited the opportunity to conduct them. 631
629

The Prosecutor v. Clément Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana, Case N° ICTR-95-1-A, Appeals
Chamber, Appeals Judgement, 1 June 2001, [63], [69].
630
Conference of the International Bar Association, held in The Hague, Netherlands, 9 June 2009; also
see IBA Equality of Arms Review - Issue 3, July 2009.
631
The Prosecution supervisor of investigations in the DRC case of Katanga & Ngudjolo testified
about such general obstacles in conducting investigations. See ICC-01/04-01/07-T-81-Red-ENG WT
25-11-2009 6/79 NB T, page 10. Similar arguments have been raised by the Katanga defence in: ICC159

Given their more limited budget, such circumstances affect the defence to a much
greater extent than the Prosecution. For instance, the Prosecution often chooses to
meet and interview its witnesses, or potential witnesses, in surroundings conducive to
an interview. Some Prosecution witnesses in the Katanga & Ngudjolo case were met
on ‘safe’ territory, such as at The Hague, or in Uganda, or elsewhere, where in
addition the facilities are better. The defence does not have the means to do so, and
has no office space available to it in the country where it must conduct investigations.
Accordingly, it has to meet its witnesses in their mud huts or houses, or public places
such as bars, restaurants or hotel lobbies often without electricity. In addition, the
defence only has its investigator to rely on for translations. 632

Such circumstances should be taken into account when determining the defence
investigative budget. The international criminal justice systems are attempting to offer
the defence the necessary means. In the view of defence counsel, however, the budget
attributed to the defence is far from adequate. 633 The defence must constantly
negotiate its investigative budget with the registry. The registry generally seeks to be
reasonable, and over the years, the defence budget has become more realistic.
Nonetheless, whenever the tribunal or court is faced with budgetary problems, the
defence budget is generally the first to be downgraded. There are currently pending
negotiations at the ICC regarding the defence budget for 2012 and after. The ICC
State Parties have refused to increase the total ICC budget. Therefore, the registry
intends to reduce the defence expenditure by 15 percent and has proposed drastic cuts
in their salaries and investigation budget. 634 Thus, in general, defence counsel
legitimately consider their resources insufficient.
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The Prosecution’s means may not be sufficient either. If done properly, investigations
are very expensive for both parties, and the prosecution’s budget is not unlimited,
albeit significantly larger than the budget for the defence. 635 In addition, both parties
suffer from hindrances inherent to international justice, as already touched upon in
Part II. These hindrances will now be considered in light of the practice of the ICTY,
ICTR and ICC.

Prohibition of Contact with the Parties
At the ICTY and ICTR, before the parties are put on the stand, the parties are entitled
to be in contact with their witnesses and prepare them for testimony upon their arrival
at the seat of the court. This has led to many legal disputes, as new allegations are
often made during such meetings. These new allegations are then disclosed to the
defence in the form of an unsigned "supplementary information sheet" (ICTY) or a
"will-say statement" (ICTR). Sometimes, they include references to criminal conduct
of the accused that the witness has never raised before. 636 This seriously hampers the
defence in preparing an effective cross-examination in respect to the new issues. An
effective cross-examination requires an adequate investigation into the allegations.
This includes their verification by speaking to other people in the field who have
knowledge of them. This is a time-consuming exercise. 637

Being routinely confronted with new evidence on the eve of the witnesses’
testimonies, the defence in the ICTY case of Limaj et al requested that the meetings
between the Prosecutor and the witness be videotaped or otherwise transcribed and
disclosed as a signed statement to the defence. This request was rejected, as the
“practice of proofing, by both the Prosecution and Defence, has been in place and
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accepted since the inception of the Tribunal”. 638 The Chamber considered that
alternative measures could be taken to remedy the late notice to the defence,
depending on the circumstances of each individual situation. 639 In most cases,
Chambers permit the Prosecutor to lead the new evidence in examining the witnesses
at trial, but postpone the cross-examination to allow the defence adequate time to
prepare. 640 The Appeals Chamber has accepted that it is within the Trial Chambers’
discretion to allow witness proofing notwithstanding the silence on this issue in the
Statutes or Rules. 641

The ICC put an end to this widely endorsed, but highly contentious practice. On
request of the defence, 642 the Trial Chamber in Lubanga held that neither party is
entitled to proof their witnesses from the moment that they are within the control of
the Victims and Witnesses Unit (“VWU”) whose task it is to familiarise the witness
with Court practice and testimony. 643 In the case of Katanga & Ngudjolo, the defence
stated its agreement with the prohibition of “substantive preparation of a witness for
their in court testimony,” or “a preparation session directly before giving
testimony”. 644 Indeed, it strongly objected to such a practice, which strongly implies
“rehearsing” or “training” a witness, and is thus “capable of abuse”. 645

However, the defence expressed concern that the manner in which the matter had
been resolved in the Lubanga case may create unfairness, in particular for the
Defence. Rather than prohibiting all contact, the defence requested that the parties
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could meet their witnesses in The Hague prior to the commencement of the
familiarisation process. The Defence submitted the following arguments: 646

What is of concern to the Defence is if a defence witness were to travel, for
example, to the Hague, fell immediately into the welcoming hands of the VWU, and
the Defence were thereafter unable to communicate with their witness, nor, if need
be, to take a further and more extensive statement from the witness. This is a
particular concern for the Defence as circumstances often do not permit sufficient
time and contact with potential witnesses to enable a full and satisfactory review of
their potential contribution to the case. The Defence lack the financial and logistical
support available to the Prosecution. It is to be noted that the Prosecution’s
interviews with their witnesses often run into several days, with a team of
professional investigators supervising and conducting the interviews, all of which
are recorded. The Defence do not have that capacity. From experience, many
defence witness interviews take place in imperfect, and sometimes difficult,
circumstances. The opportunity to meet with and conduct further fact finding
interviews with witnesses is an important factor for the Defence in its preparation of
a complex case and the witnesses presence at the Hague is a further and economical
opportunity to do that. Such an exercise is to be distinguished from the prohibited
exercise of ‘rehearsing’ or ‘witness proofing’ as characterized by the Prosecution in
the Lubanga case and the object of judicial disapproval.

The Trial Chamber did not explicitly rule on these submissions, but simply adopted a
similar “Protocol on the practices used to prepare and familiarise witnesses for giving
testimony at trial" to that in Lubanga. 647

In Bemba, the defence requested the Chamber leave to contact witnesses immediately
prior to trial in order to conduct a limited form of substantial preparation. It raised
similar arguments of fairness and judicial economy. 648 In its Decision on the Unified
Protocol on the practices used to prepare and familiarise witnesses for giving
testimony at trial, the majority of Trial Chamber III rejected the Bemba defence
request on the ground that it saw “no compelling reasons to depart from the
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uncontroversial jurisprudence of the Court and maintains the view that no proofing or
preparation of witnesses for trial by the parties shall be allowed.” 649

One of the judges, however, issued a partly dissenting opinion in which he stated that
the parties should be allowed to meet with their witnesses before trial. 650 He stated as
follows:
For the purposes of the present Opinion, witness proofing refers to a meeting
between a witness and the party calling the witness for the purpose of substantive
preparation of the witness's testimony. It effectively consists of confirming with the
witness as to whether his/her statement is accurate and complete, presuming that the
witness already has been given the opportunity to review his/her statement during
the familiarisation process, and going through the evidence and relevant exhibits. It
may also include a question and answer session, but should not be a rehearsal of the
questioning that is to take place during the in-court session. "Rehearsing",
"practicing", "coaching" or any intentional or unintentional contamination of the
evidence is therefore not included in the definition. 651

The judge considered that such a practice is justified on the basis of the ICC rules
dealing with the presentation of evidence. These rules are more akin to the common
law than to the civil law system, 652 where “the manner in which the evidence is
presented through the testimony of witnesses is of the utmost importance”. 653 He also
justified it in light of the scale, complexity, geographical and temporal scope of the
case, and of the cultural and linguistic remoteness from the Court:
In tackling a case of such magnitude and complexity, I do not believe it is practical
and reasonable to prohibit any pre-trial meeting between the parties and their
witnesses. Indeed, under these circumstances, witness proofing could be considered
as a "genuine attempt to clarify a witness' evidence", and to ensure the smooth
conduct of the proceedings by enabling a more accurate, complete, methodical and
efficient presentation of the evidence.654
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Arguably, these are valid points. Time and budgetary limits do not always permit
adequate preparation time with a witness at his location. The parties must travel a
considerable distance to conduct onsite investigations and meet with potential
witnesses. Witnesses are not always easily accessible and traceable. There is no
guarantee that a party will be able to discuss with witnesses during each, or most of
their investigation missions. Sometimes months or even years pass by without contact
between a witness and a party. The stories of the witnesses can change drastically
over time. 655 Thus, it is important for a party to meet its witnesses shortly before their
testimony to assess the consistency of their testimonies and the witnesses’ credibility.
This assessment is to be made with a view to finally determine whether they should
be called in light of the Court’s mandate to ascertain the truth. In addition, such a
meeting is important to ensure that the witnesses are adequately prepared and
understand what is expected from them.

On such grounds, the defence in Katanga & Ngudjolo requested the Chamber to be
allowed on an exceptional basis to meet four defence witnesses in The Hague prior to
their familiarisation program. 656 This request was based on the fact that, despite its
very best efforts, the defence had had insufficient time and budget to meet with these
witnesses in adequate circumstances. It highlighted general obstacles it had faced in
seeking to conduct effective investigations in geographically remote areas within the
time limit set and budgetary restraints. 657 In particular, it had been difficult to spend
sufficient time with the witnesses in question. They were detained in the Prison
Centrale de Makala in Kinshasa, some 2500 kilometers from Ituri, the core
investigation area. Visiting the prison was, therefore, a serious drain on the defence
investigation budget. The DRC authorities had obstructed the defence in meeting with
the detained witnesses on a number of missions. 658 Accordingly, the defence had not
been able to spend a sufficient amount of time with these witnesses, particularly
compared to the time spent by the Prosecution in meeting their witnesses. 659
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In addition, the defence highlighted the difficulties in obtaining high-quality
interviews in an overcrowded noisy prison without any private interview room. It took
hours for the authorities to make available a work space somewhere in the prison, to
locate the prisoners sought and to produce them for an interview. Some of the
detained witnesses had health problems and were, therefore, not always available. The
defence pointed out that, when the Prosecution interviewed one of them for three
days, this interview took place outside the prison. Accordingly, the defence argued
that the effective application of the principle of equality of arms required that the
defence be given an opportunity to speak with the detained witnesses one last time
outside the prison. 660
The Prosecution and victim representatives objected to the defence request. 661 The
Chamber acknowledged the difficulties the defence had faced in meeting with the
detained witnesses. It nonetheless dismissed the request but instead allowed the
defence to return to the DRC to interview them in the prison before their departure to
The Hague. It ordered the Registry to contact the DRC authorities to ensure that a
private office in the prison be made available to the defence and that access to the
prison be granted immediately upon arrival. 662 Thus, the Chamber was prepared to
accommodate the defence but chose the more expensive and inconvenient option of
sending two members of the defence back to the DRC over the option of granting an
exception to the prohibition of contact rule. Consequently, the defence had to conduct
the interviews in less than ideal circumstances which included excessive noise and
waiting time. No private and quiet offices are available in Kinshasa central prison. 663
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Contact between the parties and their witnesses in The Hague has been allowed on an
exceptional basis. For instance, in Lubanga such contact was allowed when new
evidence was disclosed. 664 In addition, the Chamber authorised the defence to be in
contact with its witness in The Hague on two occasions when the witness had brought
new material. The Chamber reasoned that this contact would save time which would
otherwise have to be spent in the courtroom to discover its content and eventual
relevance. 665

In Katanga & Ngudjolo, contact was allowed between the Prosecution and a witness
after completion of his testimony but before the end of the presentation of all
evidence. The VWU had terminated the witness’s participation in the witness
protection program. The Prosecution was granted an opportunity to discuss alternative
protective measures with the witness if so required. 666 In addition, contact was
allowed in the presence of a jurist from the Registry when an interview given by a
defence witness was published on the internet while the witness was already in The
Hague. In this interview, which was entirely new to the defence, the witness
incriminated the accused in whose favour he was about to give evidence. The defence
was granted an opportunity to ask the witness about this interview and consider
whether it should still call him in light of the new incriminating information. 667

Thus, on a case-to-case evaluation, Chambers may authorise contact in the presence
of the Registry, but in most circumstances, contact is prohibited. This has generally
been perceived as an improvement to the ICTY and ICTR practice. Prohibition of
contact is considered to be fairer to the defendant who has a right to know the
664
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allegations against him in advance of the trial. Such prohibition of contact has,
however, not prevented the witnesses from raising new allegations. Instead of raising
them to the prosecution before trial, they now raise them in court directly. 668

Thus, the defence is caught by surprise even more than when such allegations are
disclosed to it a few days before commencement of the testimony. Prohibition of
contact also hampers significantly the investigations of both parties, as indicated
above. The defence is more affected by it because they have more budgetary
limitations to travel back and forth to the location of the witnesses. Thus, the
prohibition of contact further undermines the equality of arms between the parties and
should ideally be reconsidered.

Academics and practitioners have similarly argued in favor of the adoption of witness
proofing at the ICC. In their view, witness proofing will encourage both the fairness
and the expeditiousness of trial proceedings at the ICC. 669 They have also underlined
its “capacity to adduce more evidence for consideration at trial,” and the eventual
“detrimental effects to the truth-seeking process of prohibiting proofing: probative
evidence lost or distorted by the surprise – to both parties – inherent in sudden witness
box revelations.” Witness proofing, it has been argued,
[...] as it has been developed, practised, and endorsed at the
international criminal tribunals – appears to be a better modality for
enhancing the efficiency, integrity, and legitimacy of the truth-seeking
process than does the prohibition of proofing. 670

Lack of State Cooperation
In order to establish a record of the crimes committed and the causes of the conflict,
international criminal courts depend on expert and factual witnesses as well as
668
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documentation from governments, the UN and NGOs operational within the territory
under investigation. To establish that the accused was involved directly or indirectly
in the crimes charged, international criminal courts and tribunals tend to rely heavily
on factual witnesses. To establish the context of a conflict and the crime base, they
tend to rely on expert evidence and reports from governments, the UN and NGOs.

It has already been noted that the international tribunals and court are dependent on
the cooperation of the authorities of the crime-base State for conducting any onsite
operations. 671 The lack of State apparatus and enforcement mechanisms significantly
affect the efficiency of the investigations conducted by the parties, as well as the
ability of the judges to verify the reliability of the information.

The ad hoc tribunals have faced significant difficulties despite their primary
jurisdiction and their chapter VII mandate with the result that they have some powers
to put pressure on States to cooperate. The ICC has no such powers but is fully
dependent on voluntary state cooperation resulting in very limited powers to
pressurise States to provide cooperation. 672

The parties require the assistance of the government for various matters. First of all,
the State must allow the parties into the country. Rwanda has often threatened to close
its borders. 673 This is a problem in Sudan for both parties, neither of which has been
granted access to Sudan despite ongoing post confirmation proceedings against
Abdallah Banda and Saleh Jerbo, two opposition rebels. 674 This has led the defence
for these accused to request for a stay of the proceedings. It argued that it is
impossible to prepare an effective defence for the accused due to the ongoing
insecurity in Darfur and the inability of both the defence and the Prosecution to enter
671
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the country despite the defence’s best efforts to visit Sudan. In addition, the defence
stated it was severely restricted in obtaining evidence because a Government authority
announced a public death threat against anyone who would cooperate with the ICC. 675
This has resulted in severe restrictions on the ability of the defence to secure
evidence, access documents and ensure the safety of witnesses even when they are
contacted by phone. Accordingly, the defence considered that the Chamber should
order a stay since guarantees of a fair trial cannot be met in these circumstances. 676
This is a valid argument, not merely because a minimum condition for having
international trials is that the crimes can be adequately investigated. The outcome of
this request is still pending.

Once in the country, the parties depend on the government for the collection of
documents in the hands of the State. They also need the government’s authorisation to
meet and interview potential witnesses in an official function, prisoners or other
potential witnesses under government control. The parties also rely on the cooperation
of local authorities for the calling of witnesses. In this regard, the prosecution has a
clear advantage over the defence. As an organ of the court, it has more means to
enforce cooperation on the government and often enters into a cooperation agreement
with the government.
Yet, this can be problematic because, the more the powers of the Prosecutor are
restrained, the greater the dangers that « selective justice » may occur. 677 Indeed, the
Prosecutor’s dependency on State cooperation makes it very difficult to investigate
the conduct of persons with links to the government. In the event that the Prosecution
shows a suspicion towards any such persons, the government may try to manipulate
the investigations, refuse cooperation or otherwise frustrate the work of the
Prosecution. 678 Prosecutors have admitted that these limitations have forced them to
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compromise their investigative focus. 679 As one Prosecutor put it, it is an illusion to
think that international courts and tribunals can be independent from domestic or
international political authorities. 680

Politically motivated Investigations

ICTR

Political factors have clearly come into play in determining the Prosecutor’s
investigative focus in Rwanda. The crimes committed by the RPF guerrillas, who now
constitute the Government of Rwanda, have barely been investigated, and nobody
from the RPF side has been prosecuted. As a result, all of the approximately 100
individuals who have been arrested and indicted at the ICTR are of Hutu ethnicity. All
are associated with the old regime. While there is little doubt that the large majority of
killers during the events of April to July 1994 were Hutus, and that a large number of
the victims were Tutsi, it is near universally acknowledged that the RPF also
committed atrocities and were responsible for unlawful killings on a large scale. 681
The UN Commissioner for Refugees estimates that the RPF killed between 25,000
and 45,000 civilians in 1994. 682
Prosecutors in the ICTR have admitted that political considerations have played a role
in selecting alleged perpetrators to be brought before the tribunal. Carla Del Ponte,
former chief prosecutor at the ICTY and ICTR, who lost her position at the ICTR
when she opened investigations against the RPF, has acknowledged that politics
controls international justice. 683 The frequent difficulties with the Rwandan
679
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Government whenever there is a discussion on indicting members of the RPF has led
the Prosecutor’s Office to decide against issuing such indictments. 684

Many commentators equate this one-sided justice with victor’s justice because those
who won the war have escaped prosecution and dictate who is prosecuted and who is
not before the ICTR. In their view, as long as only one side is being targeted for
prosecution, any efforts to reconcile the different ethnic groups have been frustrated.
This has also given credibility to the revisionist and negationist theories, which have
further decreased any chance of reconciliation. Whilst one cannot escape certain
political pressure, giving in too much to such pressure may undermine all of the
objectives international courts and tribunals have set out to achieve. 685

ICTY

In the ICTY, however, the Prosecution adopted a very different strategy. It took a
tough approach to uncooperative governments. It did not bend to pressure from the
Yugoslav authorities, but rather pressured them into cooperation with significant
political and financial bargains. 686 Initially, the ICTY investigators had a rough time
in acquiring access to certain crime-base areas and crucial witnesses, particularly in

Conference, supra note 173. After she was replaced by Justice Hassan B. Jallow, the current ICTR
Prosecutor, the investigations discontinued. At the same conference, Muna, one of the ICTR
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the Republika Srpska within Bosnia and Herzegovina. 687 However, with time and
persistence, they eventually managed to investigate the bulk of the most significant
crimes committed by all sides, including Serbs, Croats and Muslim throughout the
former Yugoslavia. 688 More specifically, the Prosecution investigators conducted
their main investigations in Croatia between 1991 and 1995; in Bosnia and
Herzegovina between 1992 and 1995; in Kosovo between 1998 and 1999; and in
Macedonia between May and August 2001. 689 Accordingly, it appears that the ICTY
Prosecutor’s approach worked well. Human Rights Watch observes that the fact that
the ICTY has investigated crimes committed by all sides in the Yugoslav conflict
“stands as a record against claims that it was biased against one particular group”. 690

There is still criticism. The ICTY Prosecutor has for instance been criticised for
seeking to prosecute all sides at all costs and irrespective of the evidence. 691 The fact
that many of the prosecutions of members of the Muslim community have led to
acquittals may prove that there is some value in this criticism. 692 Prosecutions should
be based on the evidence available, not on any pre-determination to prosecute all
sides.

The ICTY Prosecutor was also criticised for failing to prosecute anyone from NATO
for war crimes committed in the course of the bombing of Kosovo and Serbia in 1999.
It has been alleged that this decision was based on political, rather than legal
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reasons. 693 However, as one ICTY Prosecutor, Blewitt, rightly noted, NATO could
not have been prosecuted before the ICTY, because it only deals with crimes
committed by individuals. No specific war crimes committed by individuals had been
identified. If NATO can be blamed for launching an illegitimate war, that in itself
does not lead to criminal liability under the ICTY Statute, as it is not one of the
recognised crimes under the jurisdiction of the ICTY. 694

Criticism is unavoidable in any situation where a Prosecutor can only investigate a
handful of the totality of the crimes. Selectivity is a necessary ingredient of
international justice. On the whole, however, the ICTY Prosecutor’s selection policy
has been balanced and fair to victims and perpetrators of all ethnic groups.

ICC

At the ICC, politics also appear to have influenced Prosecutorial choices. 695 This has
led to similar scenarios as in Rwanda, namely that the crimes committed by one side
of the conflict are investigated, whilst the crimes committed by the other side are
not. 696 According to Human Rights Watch, this one-sided justice can be perceived as
“victor’s justice”, undermining the perceptions of independence and impartiality. 697
As was suggested in Part I, for a successful truth-ascertaining exercise with a
potentially positive impact on reconciliation, it is important to look into the
sufferings, and crimes committed by all sides. 698 This should be done even if
“politically inconvenient or otherwise difficult”. 699 If not, the ICC may loose
legitimacy in the eyes of the affected communities who are all too aware of violations
committed by various parties. Therefore, Human Rights Watch has a point when it
states that it is “essential for the credibility of the ICC in its delivery of meaningful
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justice that it act impartially and be seen to be doing so.”700

The Prosecutor can initiate investigations proprio motu on the basis on information received from
individuals or organizations. He can also initiate investigations on the basis of a referral from any State Party
or from the United Nations Security Council.701 Until today, 14 cases in 7 situations have been brought
before the ICC. Three of the situations are self-referrals by the territorial States (Uganda, the Democratic
Republic of Congo (“DRC”) and the Central African Republic (“CAR”). Two situations have been referred
to the ICC by the Security Council (Darfur and Libya).702 Two situations have been opened by the
Prosecutor proprio motu after having been authorized by the Pre-Trial Chamber to do so (Kenya on 31
March 2010 and Côte d’Ivoire on 3 October 2011).703

DRC
In the first ICC situation, the Democratic Republic of Congo (“DRC”), opened on 23
June 2004, it appears that no investigations have been conducted in respect of crimes
allegedly committed by persons on the side of the DRC government. This choice has
been made notwithstanding the numerous allegations made in respect of its
involvement in the war in Ituri, the eastern part of DRC. 704 This conflict zone is
subject to the Prosecution’s investigation in other DRC cases (Lubanga and Katanga
& Ngudjolo). In the Katanga & Ngudjolo case, even specific individuals in the current
DRC Government and army have been identified as having played a role in the crimes
charged against Katanga and Ngudjolo. 705
700
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There are also suspicions that the ICC Prosecution protects the Rwandan regime
rendering it immune from prosecution for any crimes in the Kivu provinces of the
DRC allegedly committed by Rwandan armed groups or Congolese armed groups in
collaboration with Rwanda. The ICC Prosecution maintains close contacts with the
Rwandan Government. For instance, the deputy Prosecutor attended President
Kagame’s inauguration as President on 5 September 2011. 706

Having just returned from Kigali, in the Katanga & Ngudjolo case, the Prosecutor
opened the case with the 1994 Rwandan genocide: 707 “At the root of the Congo wars
is the genocide in Rwanda” he said while inflating the number of people who were
exterminated in Rwanda within three months to one million fifty thousand. 708 It is
unclear where he derived this number from because it is significantly higher than the
number of victims acknowledged by the ICTR or any Rwandan expert. 709 He then
went on to explain that some of the génocidaires from Rwanda had escaped to
neighboring Congo. Their regrouping in DRC had been a crucial factor in triggering
the two Congo wars. According to the Prosecutor, “[t]he Bogoro attack is the
consequence of the national and international failures to prevent and control such
massive crimes”. 710

The Rwandan genocide has, however, no relevance in respect to the Katanga &
Ngudjolo case. Those Rwandans who regrouped operated from a different area. Thus,
this opening created the impression that the Prosecution was putting on a show to
please the Rwandan Government. It also gave the impression that the Prosecutor has
Ngabu (ICC-01/04-01/07-T-242-Red-ENG WT 30-03-2011, pages 55-59; ICC-01/04-01/07-T-244ENG CT WT 06-04-2011, pages 55-57) directly implicating Mbusa Nyamwisi, currently Minister of
Sport in the DRC government, Bovic Bolanga, former commissioner for the interior in Mbusa’s
government, the RCD-K/ML, Colonel Aguru, the RCD-KML and Kinshasa in training and providing
weapons and other logistics to the militia with the specific purpose of attacking Bogoro and Bunia. See
also HRW, Unfinished Business, supra note 682, 12-16.
706
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adopted a biased view on historical events which led to the Congo wars. The causes
of the Congo wars are not established historical facts, but are in dispute. 711

The Prosecutor made no mention of the fact that, according to the UN draft report, the
APR together with the Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du
Congo (‘AFDL’) and the Forces Armées Burundaises (‘FAB’) committed serious
violations of human rights and international humanitarian law against Hutu refugees
in DRC between March 1993 and June 2003.712 Given the targeted, indiscriminate
and systematic nature of the massacres of the Hutu ethnic group, whose victims
included women, children, elderly and sick people, and given the systematic use of
barriers to facilitate the elimination of the Hutu population, the report asserts that, if
they were proven beyond reasonable doubt before a competent court, “they could be
classified as crimes of genocide”. 713

Most of these allegations relate to a period which falls neither under the jurisdiction
of the ICTR, nor of the ICC. However, if the Prosecutor chooses to give a historical
narrative, it is unfortunate if he addresses one side of the story only. Even in the
period under the jurisdiction of the ICC, allegations have been made against the
711
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Rwandan government for financing, training and otherwise supporting armed militia
groups in the Kivu provinces, which were allegedly implicated in committing war
crimes and crimes against humanity. 714 However, the Prosecution’s investigations
appear to focus merely on crimes committed by the Forces Démocratiques pour la
Liberation du Rwanda ("FDLR"), the main current opposing army to the Rwandan
regime. It is a splinter group of Armée de Libération du Rwanda ("ALIR"), which
succeeded the earlier armed group called Rassemblement pour le retour des Réfugiés
Rwandais. The initial group was established in 1995 to re-conquer Rwanda and
overthrow the Rwandan regime. It mainly consists of Rwandan soldiers from the
former Rwandan army (Force Armée Rwandaise (“FAR”) and interahamwe who fled
from Rwanda to North and South Kivu in 1994 after losing the war against the
Rwandan Patriotic Front (“RPF”) led by Paul Kagame, the current President of
Rwanda. 715
The FDLR is alleged to be responsible for multiple atrocities in DRC. The
Prosecution alleges that, in January 2009, the FDLR launched a campaign “aimed at
attacking the civilian population and creating a “humanitarian catastrophe” in the
Kivu provinces of DRC, in order to draw the world’s attention to the FDLR’s political
demands”. 716 The extent to which this allegation is accurate has not yet been
established. Witnesses typically identified FDLR soldiers by the fact that they spoke
Kinyarwanda. However, in light of the fact that many other Kinyarwanda-speaking
armed groups were operational in the same area, the alleged crimes or part thereof
could have been carried out by other armed groups. 717

More surprising, however, is that the Prosecution charged Mbarushimana for these
714
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crimes, although he was in Paris, far remote from the crime base, during the entire
period covering the charges. The Prosecution describes his role in the alleged FDLR
crimes as follows: “On the one hand, whilst having full knowledge of the attacks
perpetrated by the FDLR against the civilian population, he issued several press
releases on behalf of the organisation in the aftermath of operations, systematically
denying any responsibility of the group. On the other hand, he engaged in
international peace talks and negotiations, shrewdly portraying the FDLR as an actor
seeking peace and stability in the Kivu area”. 718

In the main, Mbarushimana’s post facto press releases deny the involvement of the
FDLR in alleged crimes and demand international investigations into these crimes. At
no time is Mbarushimana alleged to have ordered, incited or instigated the crimes.
Nor is it suggested that he had power to exercise authority over FDLR soldiers.719
Thus, in fact, all he can be blamed for is being the Executive Secretary of the FDLR.
However, even if the FDLR can legitimately be described as a criminal organisation,
membership therein is insufficient to trigger liability under the ICC Statute. No
wonder, therefore, that the Pre-Trial Chamber by majority held that Mbarushimana
“did not provide any contribution to the commission of such crimes, even less a
"significant" one”.” 720

Instead, the Prosecution could have charged one of the FDLR commanders present in
the DRC. Therefore, one cannot help to wonder whether, in charging Mbarushimana,
an outspoken enemy of the current Rwandan regime, the Prosecution was led by
political more than legal motives. Alternatively, it is a sign of inefficient and
inadequate investigations.

Further prosecution investigations are being carried out in the Kivu provinces. It
appears that these investigations continue to be focused exclusively on the FDLR, and
not on any Rwandan or Congolese armed group linked to the current Rwandan
regime. 721
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Uganda
The second situation was opened in Uganda on 29 July 2004. In January 2004, the
Ugandan government had already referred its country to the ICC Prosecutor. On 29
January 2004, Uganda’s President Museveni and the ICC Prosecutor held a press
conference together in London to announce publicly that the ICC Prosecutor would
look into the situation in Northern Uganda. 722 These ICC investigations eventually led
to the arrest warrants of 5 members of the Lord Resistance Army (“LRA”), one of
whom is confirmed dead. 723 From the beginning, the Prosecutor indicated that he
would also investigate allegations against the Ugandan People’s Defence Force
(“UPDF”), the Government army which had been involved in an armed struggle with
the LRA in Northern Uganda. However, today, eight years later, there is no sign that
the Prosecutor ever scrutinized the conduct of UPDF soldiers. Failing to assess the
criminal liability, if any, of the Government’s side in the conflict has undermined the
credibility of the ICC in the eyes of the affected communities in Northern Uganda. 724

Central African Republic
Bemba’s case is similarly surprising. At the time of his arrest by the ICC, Bemba was
a powerful political figurehead in DRC and came second in the presidential elections
in DRC held in 2006. He is the most feared enemy of the current President in the
DRC, President Kabila, whose popularity and power have significantly weakened
over the last few years. NGOs have made many allegations against Mr. Bemba and
his group. Yet, Mr. Bemba has been charged with one attack only, which was
launched not in DRC but in CAR. This has raised suspicion as to whether the choice
of charges, as well as the choice of the suspect was not politically motivated. Those in
support of Bemba were of the view that President Kabila was behind his arrest, as he
constituted a political threat against him. 725 Others have raised a question mark as to
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why Bemba has not been charged for crimes allegedly committed by his armed group
in the DRC conflict. 726

In addition, he is clearly not the only one responsible for crimes committed in CAR.
Yet, the Prosecutor has not initiated any investigations into crimes other than those
allegedly committed by Bemba’s armed group, the Mouvement de Libération du
Congo (“MLC”). Initially, the Prosecutor alleged that Bemba had sent the MLC to
CAR on the request of Ange-Félix Patassé, President of the CAR to resist a ‘coup
d’État’ led by General François Bozizé. The MLC soldiers allegedly raped, pillaged
and murdered anyone opposing them in the period between October 2002 and March
2003. Bemba was initially charged under the common plan liability with President
Patassé as his co-perpetrator. 727 The latter, however, was never charged; nor was his
role in the common plan sufficiently investigated. When asked why Bemba was the
only person prosecuted in the dossier on CAR, the Prosecutor said that he was
considered the main person responsible for the alleged crimes. The Prosecutor added
that, at the beginning, the Prosecution Office thought that Bemba and Patassé were
jointly responsible, but that the evidence has since demonstrated that the soldiers who
committed the crimes were those under Bemba’s responsibility. 728 In a second
confirmation hearing, Bemba’s charges were confirmed under the criminal liability
mode of command responsibility rather than common plan. 729
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Kenya
In the Kenya I case, high-up politicians, most notably Ruto, Kenyatta and Muthaura
have been charged. The Prosecutor has targeted both sides that are held responsible
for the post-election violence in Kenya at the end of 2007 until January 2008.
However, the President and Prime Minister are spared. This separation is surprising,
particularly in the case of Ruto, who was of the same party as Prime Minister Odinga
(Orange Democratic Movement “ODM”). At the time of the events under the ICC’s
jurisdiction, they were working closely together and often seen together in videos and
political rallies. 730 Prosecution witnesses made allegations against Odinga. 731 Yet, the
Prosecution claims not to have evidence against him. 732 The result is that two
potential candidates for presidency (Ruto and Kenyatta) cannot participate in Kenya’s
2012 elections. 733

It remains to be seen how the Libyan and Côte d’Ivoire situations will evolve. For
now, only the losing sides to the conflicts in Libya and Côte d’Ivoire are facing ICC
charges.

Causes and Consequences of Selective Prosecutions
In light of the above examples, there is at least a valid perception that the ICC
Prosecutor does not act fully independently, or impartially in his investigations. This
goes against the Prosecutor’s statutory obligations of independence and impartiality,
as well as its own stated policy. Pursuant to article 42(1) of the Rome Statute, the
Prosecution “shall not seek or act on instructions from any external source.” In
accordance with the Prosecutor’s policy, the duty of independence “goes beyond
simply not seeking or acting on instructions. It also means that the selection process is
not influenced by the presumed wishes of any external source, nor the importance
of cooperation of any particular party, nor the quality of cooperation provided. The
730
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selection process is independent of the cooperation-seeking process.” 734

Some have alleged that this has been the result of allowing States to refer a situation
to the ICC, as was done by Uganda, DRC and CAR. 735 Schabas, for instance, firmly
believes that self-referrals increase the potential for political manipulation.736
However, as Robinson points out, political manipulation is not determined by the
trigger mechanism, but is an inherent problem of international criminal justice.737
Provided the Prosecutor makes the final decision as to whether a situation should be
opened in a self-referral State based on the admissibility and complementarity criteria
set out in the Statute, it makes little difference which State has referred the situation to
him. Irrespective of who has referred the situation to the ICC, Government members
targeted for prosecution are likely not inclined to cooperate. 738

The consequences of such selective prosecutions can be quite significant, particularly
for the secondary objectives of the ICC. As May and Hoskins state: 739
“How and which cases are selected for prosecution will affect the image of
impartiality of the international community. First, especially in deeply divided
societies where atrocities were committed by members of both sides of a conflict,
solely singling out representatives of one community for prosecution is likely to
erode perception of impartiality among the targeted community. Second, local law
enforcement officials will only serve to entrench, and potentially legitimate, the
practices too often found within transitional contexts.”
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(2005), at 386-397.
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Whilst acknowledging that the Prosecutor needs to work efficiently with governments
in order to broker any success, it is suggested that he should retain his independence
in selecting suspects. Otherwise, the ICC cannot achieve the goals it has set out to
achieve. As John Bolton stated, a « politically motivated prosecutor targeting, unfairly
or in bad faith, highly sensitive political situations » may destabilise the society and
undermine regional peace and reconciliation efforts. 740 If unwelcome prosecutions
result in the closing of borders, as it has in Sudan, then that is the unfortunate price to
pay for independent justice. Through political and economic pressure, as was used by
the ICTY Prosecutor, that may not be a lasting situation. Time will tell. The ICTY
practice demonstrates that patience and persistence can bring results.

Securing Arrests
The next difficulty is to have the identified and charged suspects arrested. This has
been reasonably easy at the ICTR. Most of the suspects had fled Rwanda in 1994 to
neighbouring countries most of which were prepared to arrest the suspects and
transfer them to the ICTR. The only suspect at large remaining is Kabuga who is
alleged to have financed the genocide. 741

This has been much more challenging in the ICTY. For many years, the Yugoslav
authorities were unwilling to cooperate and arrest the ICTY indictees especially the
high-level ones. A significant number of arrest warrants were not implemented until a
new rule 59bis was introduced, explicitly allowing peacekeeping forces deployed in
Bosnia-Herzegovina to arrest ICTY indictees. As of 1996, many lower-level indictees
were arrested by NATO forces. However, local NATO commanders were reluctant to
order the arrest of higher-level indictees like Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic.
Consequently, in 2001, the ICTY set up a specialised team to track the whereabouts
of indictees. Its purpose was to provide timely intelligence to governments and
organisations with the power of arrest. The intelligence gathered by this tracking team
has been essential in identifying the hiding places of high-level indictees in Bosnia740

John Bolton : The Global Prosecutors : Hunting War Criminals in the name of Utopia, 78 Foreign
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Herzegovina and Serbia. Yet, the ICTY still depended on States to act upon this
information and secure their arrests. 742

The Prosecution thus developed a new strategy to lure governments into cooperation
by creating strong incentives for doing so. To implement this strategy, the Prosecution
was dependent on the assistance of the international community. The international
community demonstrated preparedness to condition aid programs and admission to
international organizations upon the cooperation of the State concerned with the
ICTY. For instance, the arrest and surrender to the ICTY of former President
Milosevic on 28 June 2001 was the direct result of a US threat to boycott a key
donor’s conference. Croatia communicated Ante Gotovina’s whereabouts, which led
to his arrest and transfer several months later, only after the European Union (“EU”)
suspended accession talks with Croatia in March 2005. Serbia arrested a significant
number of indictees in order to begin the negotiation process to enter the EU. The
negotiation process was suspended in 2006. The arrest of Karadzic was still not
sufficient for the EU to re-enter into negotiations with Serbia. Particularly the Dutch
government insisted that Serbia should not be allowed access to the EU until Mladic
was arrested. This persistence eventually led to the recent arrests of Mladic and
Hadzic. There are currently no indictees at large. Thus, the strategy and significant
efforts of the ICTY Prosecutors has ultimately been very effective. 743

The success of the ICC in arresting suspects has been a mixed bag. The Prosecutor
has managed to secure the arrests of low and high level indictees including a former
President and a former President candidate. He has also secured the cooperation of six
Kenyan suspects, four of whom are now accused, without the need to arrest them.
Similarly, two Sudanese accused have not been arrested but are, until now, fully
cooperative. Trials for the Kenyans and Sudanese accused are due to be scheduled.
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It is, however, striking that ten outstanding arrest warrants have not been executed.744
As long as President El Bashir stays in his own country or travels to countries that are
unwilling to arrest him, the Prosecutor is unable to effect his arrest or that of those at
his side. It is similarly practically impossible to arrest Koni, who currently appears to
reside in a border area of Sudan and DRC. His arrest warrant can only be effected if
the DRC army, ideally with the assistance of other armies, is prepared to launch a
risky offensive on the LRA base. It is more surprising, however, that the arrest
warrant against Bosco Ntaganda has still not been executed. Instead of arresting him,
the DRC authorities promoted him in the army. It is nonetheless the official position
of the Prosecution that the DRC government cooperates “sans limites”. 745

Lack of Cooperation with the Defence
Governments also frequently frustrate the work of the defence. This is particularly the
case if it concerns a case against an enemy of the government. In addition, the
government regularly seeks to obstruct any attempt on the part of the defence to
incriminate the government as part of its defence. Many international defence counsel
confirm that this is a real not a mere theoretical problem. 746

The defence has particularly endured difficulties in conducting investigations in
Rwanda. Most of the Rwandan investigators are not allowed, or do not dare to enter
744
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Rwanda. A handful of defence investigators live in Rwanda. However, one of them
fled and sought asylum in The Netherlands. Another one was accused and convicted
for contempt of court. 747 A defence counsel was arrested as a revisionist. 748 Even
though he was not in Rwanda on an official mission of the ICTR, his arrest had a
significant intimidating effect on other defence counsel. Anyone who brings nuance
to the Rwandan official story about the genocide risks being charged as a revisionist
and held liable to minimum ten years imprisonment in Rwanda. 749

Regularly, defence counsel have difficulties obtaining documents from governments.
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It is not uncommon for defence teams to submit various requests for documents to a
government without receiving any response. Most States whose authorities are not
subject to prosecution investigations are much more willing to cooperate with the
Prosecution than with the defence. This is so because the Prosecution is typically
regarded as the representative of the court or tribunal. It also has more powers to
enforce cooperation through political channels. Some countries including the
Netherlands and Belgium have adopted an explicit policy to treat any request from the
Prosecutor’s office as a request from the tribunal, which is then routinely
implemented. A request submitted by the defence, on the other hand, is automatically
refused unless there is a court order to grant it. 750

If the defence has taken all steps available to it without success, it can address itself to
the Chamber for assistance. 751 If the Chamber is satisfied that the defence cannot
obtain the information in any other way, and the information is relevant for the
ascertainment of the facts, or the preparation of the defence, it can order the State to
provide the documents. 752
750

Author’s personal experience in the Netherlands in relation to a request for documentary evidence
relevant to one of the witnesses called in the case of Bagosora et al, ICTR-98-41-T. In Belgium,
cooperation with the defence absent a Court’s order is prohibited by law. This is sufficient for the
defence to approach the Chamber for assistance without demonstrating further efforts to obtain the
documents itself. See: Prosecutor v Bagosora et al, No. ICTR-98-41-T, Decision on Request to the
Kingdom of Belgium for Assistance Pursuant to Article 28 of the Statute (21 April 2006) at para. 4;
Prosecutor v Bizimungu et al, No. ICTR-99-50-T, Decision on Mr. Bicamumpaka’s Request for Order
for Cooperation of the Kingdom of Belgium (12 September 2007); Prosecutor v Ndindylimana et al,
No. ICTR-00-56-T, Decision on Ndindliyimana’s Request for the Cooperation of the Kingdom of
Belgium for the Appearance of Witnesses CBP3 and CBP4 (14 December 2007); Prosecutor v
Bizimungu et al, No. ICTR-99-50-T, Decision onUrgent Second Motion of Defendant Bicamumpaka
Regarding Cooperation of the Kingdom of Belgium (27 February 2008) at para. 10.
751
Prosecutor v Simba, No. ICTR-2001-76-T, Decision on the Defence Request for the Cooperation of
the Rwandan Government Pursuant to Article 28 (28 October 2004); Prosecutor v Karemera et al, No.
ICTR-98-44-T, Decision on Defence Motion for Exclusion of Witness GK’s Testimony or for Request
for Cooperation of the Government of Rwanda (27 Nov 2006) at paras.14-15; Prosecutor v Bizimungu
et al, No. ICTR-99-50-T, Decision on Prosper Mugiraneza’s Motion Pursuant to Rule 68 for
Exculpatory Evidence, or in the Alternative, Motion for Subpoena to the Government of the United
States of America (8 December 2004). It is, however, not required that a party exhaust all possible
mechanisms before requesting the Chamber’s assistance. See: Prosecutor v Bizimungu et al, No. ICTR99-50-T, Decision on Prosper Mugiraneza’s Motion Regarding Cooperation with the Government of
Burundi (30 October 2008) at para. 14. It is sufficient for the defence to demonstrate that it submitted
requests to the relevant authorities even if they remain unanswered: Prosecutor v Karemera et al, No.
ICTR-98-44-T, Decision on Joseph Nzirorera’s Motion for Request for Cooperation of Government of
Rwanda: Statements of Witness BDW (25 July 2007) at para. 7; Prosecutor v Bizimungu et al, No.
ICTR-99-50-T, Decision on Prosper Mugiraneza’s Motion Regarding Cooperation with the
Government of Burundi (30 October 2008) at para. 14; Prosecutor v Milutinovic et al, No. IT-05-87-T,
Decision on Sreten Lukic’s Amended Rule 54 bis Application (29 September 2006) at para. 7.
752
Prosecutor v Halilovic, No. IT-01-48-T, Decision on Addendum to Further Defence Report re
Access to Foss Material and Additional Motions re Criminal Record of Prosecution Witnesses Filed on
188

Such an order is, however, not always executed. The defence in the Katanga &
Ngudjolo case is still waiting for the DRC government to comply with a court order to
provide it with non-contentious documents such as lists of combatants who
participated in the demobilisation program, as well as the ranks of those who
integrated into the Congolese army. 753 The international courts and tribunals do not
have the power to take enforcement measures against a State. 754 If a State refuses to
implement its order, the Chamber can order the Prosecution to obtain the requested
documents. It has done so in the ICTR on a number of occasions, using its power
under Rule 98 to request additional evidence. 755

The Prosecution can also make an application to the Chamber for an order for
cooperation of a State, but this is far less common. Generally, the Prosecution is able
to resolve cooperation issues without the need for the Chamber’s assistance.
Nonetheless, in the ICTY case of Gotovina et al, the Chamber ordered the
government of Croatia to intensify its search for documents requested by the
Prosecution. It also ordered Croatia to provide detailed reports of its efforts where its
claim that it could not find the requested documents was not conclusive. 756

Assistance from UN and NGOs

5 January 2005 and 11 February 2005 (18 March 2005); Prosecutor v Milutinovic et al, No. IT-05-87PT, Decision on Second Application of Dragoljub Ojdanic for Binding Orders Pursuant to Rule 54 bis
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The Prosecution tends to rely heavily on the support of the UN, NATO, Interpol, local
and international NGOs and civil society groups, and other governments. Such
support may be necessary to compensate for the lack of cooperation from the regional
State. Such organisations tend to be much more reluctant to cooperate with the
defence. 757

Often, before international tribunals and courts have opened their investigations, such
bodies have been operational in the post-conflict-zone under investigation of an
international court. Such bodies are therefore usually more familiar with the territory
than ICC investigators. Their assistance can be useful in providing details of potential
witnesses as well as documentary or other evidence. They may orientate the
investigators in their investigative work and bring to their attention the most serious
crimes committed in a particular region. They may even suggest the names of alleged
perpetrators.

For instance, MONUC, the UN mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(DRC), has been charged with documenting the massive violations of human rights in
the eastern part of the DRC. 758 It has transmitted a large quantity of their collected
material to the prosecution of the ICC on the condition that it not be disclosed to the
defence. 759

Another example of a fact-finding entity which has the explicit mandate to assist the
investigations carried out by the prosecution of an international criminal tribunal is
the Humanitarian Law Documentation Project in Kosovo. This is a project of the
International Crisis Group established in 1999. Its aims are to identify violations of
international humanitarian law as well as record evidence of such violations in order
757
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to provide information about witnesses and reported crimes to the ICTY. 760 In seven
months, 4700 records were created from victims and witnesses and, together with an
extensive list of potential witnesses, were handed over to the ICTY Prosecutor. In
doing so, this project complemented the work of the ICTY prosecution investigators,
but not of the defence investigators.

UN and NGO human rights investigations have, however, a number of deficiencies.
There is, for instance, no standard procedure for fact-finding missions conducted by
the UN or NGOs. 761 This lack of standardized methods precludes any way to test the
validity of the research and conclusions. UN Missions rely heavily on NGOs,
government reports, and the media. Reports on human rights violations, for instance,
in South Africa, Iran, Iraq and Israel have been made by people who have never set
foot in the country. 762

According to M. Cherif Bassiouni, given this close link between the UN and other
bodies, including governments and NGOs, UN reports are often “designed to please
the influential Geneva-based non-governmental organization (NGO) community and
certain governments, particularly the three Western permanent members and a
number of Western European countries that champion human rights.” 763

Bassiouni further points out that the UN is not a politically independent body. Rather,
it was established “as a political organization, and, as such, it is largely governed by
political considerations [...] the Security Council is unbridled in its determination of
peace and security issues. These considerations are elevated above judicial or other
forms of review, although always subject to self-review whenever considerations of
power and interest require it.” 764 He also considers it problematic that accountability
of those involved in fact-finding missions “has yet to be clearly established as one of
760
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the goals of fact-finding missions. Indeed, to date the UN has not promulgated
guidelines for accountability.” 765

UN and NGO fact-finding missions also frequently rely on second hand hearsay or
other dubious sources whose identities are often not disclosed. 766 Reports produced

by NGOs or the UN are, therefore, generally viewed with scepticism. 767 For instance,
in ICC case of Bemba, the Chamber decided with regard to the admissibility of NGO
reports or portions thereof, that their provenance and reliability is entirely
uninvestigated and untested. Therefore, these materials carry little, if any, evidential
weight. 768 Similarly, the Chamber in Katanga & Ngudjolo treated UN and NGO
reports with caution. 769 On a case-by-case basis, it determined whether such a report
was relevant to a live issue in the case. If so, the Chamber then determined whether it
had sufficient reliability and significance, and whether its admission would cause
unfair prejudice to the opposing party. 770 On the basis of these criteria, the Chamber
excluded a large part of the proposed UN and NGO reports. It particularly declined to
admit reports whose methodology was unknown, and/or which were largely based on
anonymous sources or hearsay information. 771

In the Special Court for Sierra Leone, Justice Robertson Q.C. said the following,
which is rightly on point:
Courts must guard against allowing prosecutions to present evidence which amounts
to no more than hearsay demonisation of defendants by human rights groups and the
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media. The right of sources to protection is not a charter for lazy prosecutors to make
a case based on second-hand media reports and human rights publications.772

Even at the confirmation stage, anonymous hearsay can only be used for the purpose
of corroborating other evidence. In Mbarushimana, the Pre-Trial Chamber
highlighted that anonymous hearsay contained in human rights reports must be given
a low probative value “in view of the inherent difficulties in ascertaining the
truthfulness and authenticity of such information”. 773
The ability to cross-examine the person who compiled the report does not necessarily
cure the fact that the defence is deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine the
persons whom the investigator interviewed whilst compiling the report. 774 This will
principally depend on the reliability of the methodology applied. 775

In addition, the impartiality from members of international organizations cannot be
verified. Also, their knowledge of events is often limited and sometimes contradictory
in nature. They frequently rely on information from representatives of warring
factions. Since they are denied access to the relevant headquarters or camps, they are
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not able to observe personally the warring parties’ combat operations at close
proximity. 776

Accordingly, the heavy reliance of investigators of international criminal courts and
tribunals on UN or NGO investigations may diminish the quality of the investigations.
In addition, their moral and political independence may be compromised. 777

Practice at the international tribunals and court

Particularly at the ICC, excessive use is made of the assistance of the UN and NGOs.
The ICC Prosecution appears to rely on such bodies more than their own
investigations. 778 Off-the-record, members of NGOs even complain about this. Their
reports were never meant to replace the Prosecutor’s own investigations, but rather to
invite him to investigate certain crimes identified by the UN or NGOs. 779

This was one of the factors that led the Pre-Trial Chamber not to confirm the case
against Mbarushimana. In this case, for many of the alleged attacks, the Prosecution
solely relied on a single UN Report or a single Human Rights Watch Report. The
sources contained in these reports were anonymous. 780 Some of the attacks were only
incidentally referred to without any reference to the circumstances in which they
would have occurred. 781 In light of “(i) the paucity of the information provided in
these UN reports, (ii) the identified inconsistencies between the information provided
in these UN reports, (ii) the identified inconsistencies between the information
776
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provided and the Prosecution's allegations, and (iii) the lack of any corroborating
evidence”, the Pre-Trial Chamber found that the evidence submitted by the
Prosecution “is not sufficient to establish substantial grounds to believe that the
alleged attacks occurred in Ruvundi, Mutakato, or Kahole”. 782

The Kenyan investigations have so far been primarily focused on the WAKA and
HRW report. 783 In the press release of Ocampo on 24 January 2012 following the
confirmation of the charges of four out of six Kenyan suspects, he explicitly specified
that, until now, they had no witness in Kenya and that their investigations were
mainly carried out outside Kenya. He indicated that, now the charges were confirmed,
the Prosecution would need to move into Kenya to investigate the crime base and
engage with the victims. 784 Similarly, no investigative mission had been carried out in
Libya before the beginning of November 2011, long after charging three Libyan
suspects. 785

Similarly, the ICC Prosecution seemingly has not conducted any onsite investigations
in Sudan. The Prosecution appears not to have conducted any onsite investigations
even before the arrest warrants against al-Bashir, Haroun and Kushayb were issued
and Sudan closed its borders for anyone connected with the ICC. Instead, in its factual
analysis, the Prosecution has relied on information gathered by intermediaries as well
as UN reports. The Prosecution maintained that it was important to keep a low profile
in Sudan because, otherwise, it would have put its potential witnesses and informants
in serious danger. However, both the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights,
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Louise Arbour, and the Chairman of the UN Commission of Inquiry on Darfur,
Cassese, strongly recommended that the Prosecution enter Sudan and conduct onsite
investigations. Arbour argued that the ICC presence in Sudan could be effective and
have a positive impact on the human rights situation. Based on her own experience in
investigating human rights violations in Sudan, she maintained that it should be
possible for the Prosecutor to conduct investigations in Sudan without increasing the
risk for witnesses. Arbour acknowledged that “[r]isks can never be eliminated
absolutely” but added that security threats were caused more by the ongoing conflict
in Sudan than by their interaction with human rights investigators, which would be
the same for the ICC. 786 She added that, in any event, “security challenges particular
to investigation of international crimes while an armed conflict is ongoing should not
per se prevent the Court from acting in pursuance of its international mandate towards
timely and effective individual criminal accountability.” 787 Cassese warned that
valuable testimonial evidence, as well as documents, such as minutes of security
meetings, flight records and orders issued by the military authorities in Khartoum to
the military authorities in Darfur would perish if investigations were not carried out
immediately. 788 However the Prosecution chose not to follow this advice.

A comparable approach was adopted in the Lubanga and Katanga & Ngudjolo cases.
In these cases, the ICC Prosecution so far has barely investigated in the local
territories. In the Katanga & Ngudjolo case, only one investigative mission was made
to the village of Bogoro before issuing an arrest warrant against Katanga for crimes
committed in Bogoro. 789

After that first mission to Bogoro, which took place in February or March 2007, it
took the Prosecution two years to return. Meanwhile, the defence had visited Bogoro
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on multiple occasions. 790 The Prosecution never visited any other village of import.
Until the judicial site visit which took place between 16 and 20 January 2012 after the
presentation of all evidence, 791 nobody from the Prosecutor’s office ever visited
Aveba and Zumbe. 792 These locations are of particular importance to the case as they
were the home fronts of the two accused in the period relevant to the charges.
Allegedly, they prepared the crimes charged from these localities. Presumably
therefore, many villagers in Aveba and Zumbe were witnesses to the events and could
have provided information to the Prosecutor. The Prosecutor may thus have lost good
opportunities to obtain both incriminating and exonerating evidence.

The purported reason for keeping onsite investigations to an absolute minimum is
security of the Prosecution’s personnel and safety of anyone assisting the Court. The
chief of investigations in Ituri explained to the Court that, in conducting onsite
investigations, the Prosecution faces security risks and health risks, including cholera,
Ebola and Malaria. These risks had delayed the investigations. 793 The same risks,
however, did not delay defence missions. 794

It is further alleged that it is too dangerous to travel around the Eastern Congo
because there are still active militia groups around. The defence, however, managed
to reach all relevant villages on numerous occasions without great difficulties. 795 If
need be, the UN is prepared to offer security items, such as radios, protective outfits,
tanks and escorts. This may, however, have an impact on the willingness of
prospective witnesses to cooperate. Even without the assistance of the UN, most of
the time, it is possible to travel safely between different locations. 796
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On 10 July 2009, the chief Prosecutor succeeded in visiting Zumbe without any
difficulty. He was transported by a UN helicopter. The purpose of his visit was to
listen to the views and sufferings of the Zumbe local communities. 797 The local
authorities were content that he had made the effort to arrive at Zumbe. 798 On 18
January 2012, in the course of the first judicial site visit of the Court, representatives
of the defence, victims, prosecution and the judges all visited Zumbe, Aveba and
Bogoro. 799 It is thus surprising that the Prosecution never attempted to visit any place
other than Bogoro, and even then on significantly fewer occasions than the defence
and victim representatives.

Mention has already been made of the fact that witnesses are often interviewed in safe
and comfortable locations. It is impossible to hide when conducting investigations in
small villages. The international personnel of the Court clearly stand out in such an
environment. Everyone knows immediately when an international investigator of the
Court has passed through. This can put the safety of prospective witnesses and their
family members at risk. In light of prevailing insecurity in most of the ICC situations
and the lack of a police force necessary to protect witnesses, the Prosecution
considered it safer for the witnesses to interview them elsewhere. 800 The ICC has not
employed local investigators in any of their situations. Instead, they rely on
intermediaries to identify and contact potential witnesses, as well as to collect security
information regarding the region. 801 The Prosecution considers this the “best practice”
during investigations. 802 Reliance of intermediaries has, however, been the source of
many problems, which will be addressed below. 803
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Forensic Evidence

In the ICC, little forensic evidence has been introduced in the trials thus far. In
Katanga & Ngudjolo, the Prosecutor conducted a number of forensic examinations of
the ‘Institut de Bogoro’ where allegedly a significant number of people were killed.
However, this exercise was undertaken several months after the deadline for
disclosure of all Prosecution incriminating and exonerating evidence. In addition, it
added very little value because “the expert was unable to provide even a rough
estimation of the date when the bullets were fired or match them to a particular
weapon; nor does it, as the Prosecution admits, bring to light previously unknown
facts which have a significant bearing upon the case”. 804 The four expert reports were
not admitted because the defence had not been involved in the process. 805 Thus, the
forensic examinations were conducted too late to be meaningful. No forensic
examination had been conducted on the bodies. Thus, the Prosecutor’s determination
of the number of victims, the manner in which they were killed, as well as their status
as civilians belonging the targeted ethnic group was made solely on the basis of eyewitness testimony. 806

At the ICTY and ICTR, Prosecution investigators similarly faced issues of safety.
Nonetheless, they managed to conduct onsite investigations. UN and NGO reports are
relied on for context only. For the assessment of who is responsible for what, the
ICTY and ICTR Prosecution have largely relied on their own investigations. At the
ICTR, they were perhaps not as efficient as would be expected, but at least local and
international investigators were actively involved in searching for witnesses and
documents. Often, there is little to no forensic evidence. In few cases, some forensic
evidence was introduced, demonstrating that large-scale massacres had occurred and
that many of the victims were Tutsi. 807 Yet, to the dismay of Alison DesForges and
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Timothy Longman, no serious effort was made to collect documentary or forensic
evidence to link identified suspects to particular crimes. 808

The ICTY investigations have been most efficient. ICTY investigators have managed
to gather forensic evidence in almost every case. 809 They have also interviewed many
prospective witnesses and have gathered volumes of documentary and tangible
material. They often use methods such as telephone taps to obtain direct evidence of
conversations. 810 The ICTY has some advantages over the ICTR. First, the war was
still going on as the bulk of the investigations were carried out. Second, the armies in
the former Yugoslavia were much more organised than the Rwandan army and
militia. Consequently, more orders were issued in writing. 811 Third, the numbers of
victims in the Yugoslav conflict were significantly lower than those in Rwanda. This
facilitated the ICTY investigators in obtaining forensic evidence.

Nonetheless, even if investigators are conducting onsite investigations, they may
encounter numerous difficulties, which are discussed below.

Uncooperative Witnesses

As a result of witness intimidation
The environment in which the parties must conduct their investigations is often
hostile. This is equally a problem for the prosecution as for the defence. Most of the
times, there is a highly politicised climate in a post-war society. Many on the side of
those being prosecuted are adverse to the tribunal or court and, therefore, unwilling to
808
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cooperate with the Prosecution. They may be more welcoming to the defence,
particularly where the defence represents a local hero. In such a situation, they may
give all their assistance to the defence and none to the prosecution. 812 When, on the
other hand, the defence represents someone who is hugely unpopular in the region
where investigations take place, it will be very difficult for the defence to conduct any
investigations. 813

ICTR
Potential witnesses may also fear retaliation if they cooperate with either party. It
often occurs that, initially, potential witnesses are open and ready to talk, but on a
subsequent occasion, they have either amended their story or they are no longer
willing to cooperate. This could be due to the fact that they may have been interfered
with in the meantime. This is particularly a problem in Rwanda where many potential
witnesses refuse to cooperate with the defence for fear of retaliation from the
government. 814 This seriously frustrates the work of defence, particularly in the
context of the ICTR.

Many ICTR defence witnesses allege that they have been harassed as a result of their
cooperation with the defence. 815 A number of them appear to have been arrested or rearrested after testifying for the defence. 816 Others were never freed from prison
812
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despite being acquitted. Some of them suspect that there is a correlation with the fact
that they gave testimony for one of the defendants at the ICTR. 817 Many of them live
in constant fear of being accused by the Gacaca Courts. 818 Threats also come from
the population or civil society groups. In particular ‘IBUKA’ has a reputation for
putting pressure on Rwandans not to testify for defendants before the ICTR. 819

As a result, a large number of potential defence witnesses are reluctant to speak to the
defence or to testify. 820 The refusal to cooperate for reasons of fear has now also
extended to Rwandan potential witnesses living in other countries including European
countries. 821

Numerous defence teams have addressed their Trial Chamber in relation to the
problem of alleged threats or intimidation of their witnesses by State authorities.
Chambers have acknowledged that, if proven, such conduct would be a serious
violation of Rwanda’s duty to cooperate with the ICTR. 822 In Simba, the Chamber
found that it was improper for a State official to warn a prospective witness that he
will be viewed as opposing the government if he testifies in ongoing criminal
proceedings, particularly if the witness is detained and dependent on the State for his
welfare. 823

In the view of the Appeals Chamber, a fair trial may not be possible if crucial
witnesses refuse to testify for the defence as a result of State interference. It is,
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however, incumbent on the defence to (1) demonstrate that such interference has
taken place; and (2) exhaust all available means to secure taking the witness’
testimony. 824 Trial Chambers usually find that the defence has failed to establish on
the balance of probabilities that such intimidation or interference with its witnesses
occurred. 825 In cases where the defence succeeds in so establishing, it must then
request for a stay of proceedings if the evidence was essential to a fair trial. Failure to
do so cannot be remedied on appeal. 826 Thus, in reality, little has been done about
such allegations.

ICTY
In the ICTY, the defence rarely encounters similar problems. 827 The Prosecution, on
the other hand, often alleges witness interference on the part of the accused, people
related to the accused, members of the defence team or others in the local
communities. 828 This appears to be particularly a problem in Kosovo where many
prospective witnesses refuse to cooperate with the Prosecution. The Prosecution
claims that this refusal is the result of threats and intimidation. The defence, on the
other hand, claims that these allegations are exaggerated and serve merely to put the
defendants in a bad light. 829

Three Kosovar Albanians have been charged with contempt of court on the basis of
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allegations of witness interference. 830 One was found guilty for having interfered with
a witness in the first Kosovo Liberation Army case of Limaj et al 831 by requesting him
to repudiate his earlier statements. 832 The two others were jointly charged with the
interference of a witness. The Minister of Culture of Kosovo, Astrit Haraqija, was
found to have instructed his co-defendant Morina to travel to a third country to
dissuade a witness from testifying against Ramush Haradinaj. They were both found
guilty of contempt. 833 However, Haraqija was acquitted on appeal because the totality
of the evidence against him stemmed from his co-defendant. 834

The issue of witness interference was key in the case of the former Prime Minister of
Kosovo, Ramush Haradinaj, and two co-defendants, Idriz Balaj and Lahi Brahimaj. 835
Haradinaj and Balaj were acquitted, and Brahimaj received a low sentence. The
Prosecution blamed this result on witness intimidation, which had frustrated the
Prosecution’s investigations. 836 The refusal of two witnesses to cooperate with the
Prosecution has led to the re-trial of the three of them. The Prosecutor had
unsuccessfully tried to persuade a key witness to testify. He refused even after being
subpoenaed. 837 The Prosecutor had asked the Chamber for additional time to attempt
a final time to secure his testimony. The Chamber refused the request because the
Prosecutor had exceeded the hours allotted to him and his case was deemed closed.838
The judges also refused to hear two additional witnesses, who could have testified to
the same events as the unwilling witness. Their principal grounds for refusal were the
“orderly and timely case management” and “the proximity of the close of the
Prosecution’s case”. 839
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The Appeals Chamber criticised the Trial Chamber for these interventions saying it
had “manifestly prioritised logistical considerations and the specific number of hours
assigned to the Prosecution case over the much more significant consideration of
securing the testimony of a potentially important witness who was finally available to
testify.” 840 Accordingly, by majority, the Appeals Chamber quashed the Trial
Chamber’s acquittal of the three accused in respect of specific counts and ordered a
re-trial on these counts. The re-trial is still pending. However, whilst the Prosecution
has been allowed to call additional witnesses, the two witnesses whose refusal to
testify had led to the re-trial still refuse to testify. The trial is adjourned until February
to offer a final opportunity to the Prosecution to secure their testimonies. 841

These alleged problems of witness intimidation eventually led to the introduction of
new rule 92quinquies. This rule allows the admission of testimonial evidence by
written statement in lieu of oral testimony if the maker of the statement was scheduled
to testify but failed to attend as a result of improper interference through threats,
intimidation, injury, bribes or coercion. 842

ICC
In the ICC, witness intimidation is alleged in every case. 843 It has, however, not yet
been established whether these allegations are sound. No findings have yet been made
in this regard.

Insider Witnesses

In addition, insider witnesses are usually reluctant to cooperate unless they receive
840
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something in return, for instance, a guarantee that they will not be prosecuted. Where
they are willing to cooperate, their credibility is often in doubt given that they may be
seeking to cover up or diminish their own involvement and shift the blame onto the
accused. This is so particularly where they are charged with similar crimes as the
accused in whose case they are testifying. 844 Nonetheless, international justice heavily
relies on the testimonies of insiders. Only insider witnesses can establish the link
between the crime and the accused who is often charged under an indirect, rather than
a direct mode of liability.

Subpoena

At the ICTY and ICTR, unwilling insiders, as well as other unwilling witnesses can
be compelled to participate in a pre-trial interview, 845 or subpoenaed to testify at
trial. 846 There is, however, a general risk that they then turn hostile to the party that
called them. 847 A Chamber may issue a subpoena when it is necessary for the
purposes of an investigation or for the preparation or conduct of the trial. 848 Subpoena
is, however, the last resort. It should not be issued lightly for it involves the use of
coercive powers and may lead to the imposition of a criminal sanction. 849 If the
necessary information in the possession of the prospective witness is obtainable by
other means, a Chamber will not order a subpoena. 850
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Unlike the tribunals, the ICC has no explicit power to subpoena witnesses. This
indicates that it has no means to compel witnesses to testify. As a result, many
important witnesses may not be brought to the court if they do not wish to appear
voluntarily. In addition, the ICC cannot issue other binding orders on States.
According to Kress and Prost, this absence of direct enforcement power “constitutes a
serious weakness” of the ICC. 851

Even with powers of subpoena, it has proved difficult to ensure the appearance of
witnesses. Witnesses may prefer to spend time in prison for their refusal to testify
than to testify. 852

Factors affecting the credibility of witnesses
Different cultural norms
The assessment of the truthfulness of a witness can be difficult, given that one is
dealing with an unfamiliar culture and its own customs. International investigators are
often not acquainted with the local customs. 853 Even if both parties are genuinely
looking for truthful witnesses, they may mistakenly take a convincing liar for a
truthful witness. 854 To fully comprehend the answers of a witness during an interview,
851

C. Kress & K. Prost, Article 93, in O. Triffterer (Ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the
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knowledge of the cultural barriers and the cultural codes is essential. For instance, in
the context of Rwanda, it is often alleged that witnesses speak about events as if they
have witnessed them personally. In reality, they may have only heard about them
through others. Awareness of such culturally accepted manners of speaking would
help in distinguishing that which the witness personally observed, from that which he
heard from others. 855

In her research, Combs points out a number of cultural obstacles. She has observed
that many of the witnesses appearing before the ICTR are uneducated and cannot
write and read. 856 They are often unable to read maps, and estimate distance, dates or
duration. 857 She gives ample examples of witnesses’ estimations of time or distance
that are very far from reality, or inconsistent to what they stated previously. 858 Yet
they may be truthful witnesses. Whilst agreeing that these are serious and genuine
concerns, it is suggested that these are not insurmountable problems. To some extent,
domestic jurisdictions are also regularly confronted with witnesses from a very
different cultural and educational background than the assessors. It is important to be
aware of such differences and of the fact that people in sub-societies or different
societies may not share the same basic assumptions and general knowledge. The
questions posed to witnesses should be adjusted accordingly. Similarly, investigative
techniques must be amendable to ensure that the interviewer and interviewee clearly
understand each other.

Many years after the events, precise dates are difficult to remember for anyone
irrespective of a witness’s cultural or educational background. Thus, it may be useful
to provide a witness with a time frame based on well-known dates of memorable
that a witness is lying but they have to use neutral language because they have to exercise neutrality.
During a personal interview on 8 October 2004 with James Stewart, former chief of the ICTR appeals
section of the prosecution, Stewart said that the prosecution needs to be convinced of the credibility of
a witness for such a witness to be called. It would be unethical to call a witness despite serious doubts
about his credibility. To assess the credibility, the prosecution looks at inherent inconsistency. Once,
properly investigated, it assumes someone is telling the truth. The prosecution may, however, be
mistaken, given that it relies heavily on investigators who took statements from witnesses years before
they are called to testify.
855
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events. A witness can then estimate dates by referring to events rather than precise
dates. Distances can be estimated by identifying locations well known to a witness.
Rather than calculating the distance in (kilo)metres a witness can calculate it by
reference to a distance between point a and b. Accordingly, there are many
possibilities to overcome difficulties caused by diversity in understanding issues. To
use such possibilities, it is however important that investigators are aware of this
diversity. Otherwise, it will be difficult to assess the reliability of the witnesses’
answers.

Suggestive Questions
The manner in which questions are being asked of a potential witness is of crucial
importance. 859 Consciously or subconsciously, prospective witnesses may provide the
answers they think the interviewer would like to hear. In order to get information
based on the witnesses’ own recollection of events, interviewers should therefore
avoid expressing any hint of what they expect to find. Questions must be valueneutral and open so that the witness is free to answer in the manner he is most
comfortable with. Suggestive questions must be avoided. This accords with the advice
of Anthony Forde who conducts trainings in investigation techniques. 860

If no audio or video record exists of pre-trial interviews conducted with prospective
witnesses, it is difficult to establish how answers came about. At the ICTR, the
defence is rarely provided with a full transcript including the questions and answers
provided in such interviews. Mostly, the Prosecution merely discloses a statement
from the witness without including the questions asked. As Combs’ research clearly
confirms, at the ICTR, there are usually significant differences between prior
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statements of witnesses and their testimonies in court. 861 Various factors could
explain such differences. One of them is that, during pre-trial interviews, witnesses
were prompted to answer in conformity with the Prosecution’s theory of the case.

In the ICTY, the defence is usually provided with a full transcript of pre-trial
interviews, as well as an audio and video record thereof. This offers a much better
opportunity both to the defence and the Chamber to verify the reliability of the
answers given. In some situations, this has led the defence to suggest that the
Prosecution leads the witnesses in answering one way or another. 862 This debate then
becomes part of the public record and the Chamber is made aware of it. In the ICC,
the Prosecution tends to provide a full transcript and audio or video tape of prior
recorded testimony, which is one of the conditions for its admission under Rule 68.
This is a significant improvement for the establishment of the truth as it makes the
investigative methods more transparent to the judges. It helps judges verify whether
inconsistencies between prior statements and viva voce testimonies of witnesses can
be explained by misunderstandings by the investigators. 863

The Prosecution states that its investigators refrain from asking leading questions and
are open to any answers, incriminating or exonerating alike. They seek to duly report
the witness’s account as he has experienced the events and take good care not to
manipulate the answers. Investigators have no pre-conceived notion as to what they
want, or expect to hear. 864

This, however, does not always correspond with the reality. In Mbarushimana, the
Pre-Trial Chamber raised concern about the Prosecution’s investigation technique of
putting leading questions to witnesses during interviews and being impatient with
their answers if incompatible with their theory of the case. The Pre-Trial Chamber
qualified this technique as “utterly inappropriate” and contrary to the Prosecution’s
duty under Article 54(1) to establish the truth by investigating incriminating and
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exonerating evidence equally. In the Mbarushimana confirmation decision numerous
examples are cited of the Prosecuting investigators “showing resentment, impatience
or disappointment whenever the witness replies in terms which are not entirely in line
with his or her expectations.” 865

The Pre-Trial Chamber referred specifically to suggestions made by the Prosecution
investigators that the witness may not be “really remembering exactly what was said”;
that he does not “really understand what is important” to the investigators of the case;
or that he may be “trying to cover” for the suspect. 866

By majority, the Pre-Trial Chamber observed that “none of the FDLR insider
witnesses directly and spontaneously confirm the existence of an order emanating
from the FDLR leadership” to launch attacks against the civilian population and to
create a “humanitarian catastrophe” in the manner alleged by the Prosecution. 867
Some witnesses deny having heard of such an order. Others state the opposite, that is
that there were specific instructions to protect the civilians from the consequences of
the fighting. 868 Many of those who remember that such an order was issued by the
FDLR leadership remember it only after the investigator persistently spelt out the
existence of the order, its timing and specific content. 869

Being repeatedly left with the impression that the Prosecution investigators are so
attached to their theory that they lost their impartiality in questioning witnesses, the
Pre-Trial Chamber assigned significantly less weight to any answers prompted in such
a manner. 870

Language Barriers
Language barriers may increase the difficulties in interviewing witnesses. If the
investigator is unfamiliar with the language of the interviewee, he must rely on an
interpreter and thus receives the information through the interpretation of a third
865
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party. Interpretation is difficult because it is not only a question of interpreting words,
but also of particular cultural understandings of such words. 871 For instance, in the
Eastern part of DRC, people often use the term “les enfants” to refer to persons of a
lesser status. They do not necessarily mean to say “children” in the sense this term is
understood in the West. When they speak of the militiamen still active today in Ituri,
they use the term “les enfants” notwithstanding that they are all adults. This is
significant, given that the three Congolese accused are charged with the recruitment
of child soldiers. It is then important to be sure that when witnesses refer to “les
enfants”, they refer to young people under the age of 15. 872 There is also an issue with
the word “makubwa” in Swahili, which refers to someone significant. Depending on
the context, this word is used simultaneously for the chief and for someone who is
respected. The distinction is important if one seeks to establish the position of a
person charged with international crimes. 873

It is particularly difficult to speak with witnesses about sexual crimes. Such matters
can be extremely sensitive and are dealt with differently in different cultures. In some
cultures, it is completely taboo to speak about any sexual experiences. In other
cultures the word rape does not even exist. This is, for instance, the case in local
eastern Congolese languages, such as Lendu and Ngiti. 874 In Kinyarwanda, the same
word is used for sexual violence as for marriage. 875 It is essential to understand the
871
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specific cultural codes relating to sexual crimes when approaching alleged victims of
such crimes. This is important not only as a matter of respect for the interviewee, but
also to be able to assess whether the person is credible.

Trauma
Witnesses may further be reluctant to speak because of severe trauma. An interview
may re-traumatise them. 876 Those witnesses who decided to testify despite their fear
to relive their trauma are often confused. 877 They may need counselling in the course
of an interview, a service the Prosecution can offer but not the defence. 878 According
to Professor Wagenaar, time lapse between testimony and events combined with
trauma significantly undermine the reliability of the testimony. 879

Fabrication of Evidence

Documents
Given the often highly politicised climate in the country of investigations, there is
also more risk that documents are fabricated or witnesses unreliable. In a post-conflict
society, there tends to be more fabrication of documents for the purposes of
propaganda or for shifting blame onto the other side. 880 The extent to which
documents are fabricated is more difficult to assess due to unfamiliarity with the
culture. For instance, if one is familiar with the culture, one can better assess whether
a particular stamp on a document gives the document more authenticity or whether it
is easy to get an official certificate providing incorrect information. In corrupt
systems, officials may be prepared to forge official documents as long as the receiver
is willing to pay a sufficient amount of money for it.
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For instance, in DRC, anyone who is willing to pay money can at any time obtain an
identity card. The personal information of the person requesting a card is rarely
verified. Some people appear to have multiple identity cards each with a different date
of birth. The date of birth that appears on the identity card also frequently differs from
the date indicated on other official papers, such as school bulletins or birth
certificates. Accordingly, whilst such documents are not forged, the contents may be
based on erroneous or false information. Many people in DRC are not certain of their
date of birth. Others have ulterior motives to lie about their age.

This has become a real issue both in the Lubanga and in the Katanga & Ngudjolo
cases. Numerous alleged child soldiers appeared to have lied about their age to make
themselves younger than they were in order to qualify as child soldiers. At least, their
age differed drastically from document to document. The ultimate findings in both
cases are still pending, but both Chambers have expressed concern about this and
allowed the defence significant time to explore the issue of genuine ages. 881

False Testimony ICTY
Witnesses may fabricate evidence for solidarity or financial reasons. In the context of
the former Yugoslavia, ethnic loyalties can go very deep and override any sense of
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duty to tell the truth to a foreign court in a foreign country. 882 However, this has never
become an overwhelming issue, as in the ICTR.

False Testimony ICTR
In the context of Rwanda, it has been suggested that lying is a common phenomenon
acceptable in the culture. 883 Numerous Rwandans, sometimes rather proudly, agree
with this thesis. 884 According to Professor Ndengejeho who testified as a defence
expert in the Semanza trial, lying is a sign of intelligence, and is therefore not only
accepted but also encouraged in the Rwandan culture. 885 Combs cites a number of
scholars who reached similar conclusions about the Rwandan culture. 886

James Stewart, former head of the Prosecution’s Appeal section at the ICTR, does not
believe in the theories that Rwandans have a tendency to lie. According to him, there
are other issues, which explain the misunderstanding of the Rwandan witnesses, such
as the regimented functional placement of people in their society, mechanisms to
survive and behaviour in a social context. 887

Whether such theories are sound or not, there is a real suspicion that false witness
testimonies are frequently being manufactured for use in the trials. Witnesses have
testified to that extent. In particular at the ICTR, there are allegations of concoction
not of the evidence of one witness only, but of several in one trial, on the instigation
of public authorities. 888 Other witnesses claim that civil society groups instigated
them to give false testimony and threatened them when they refused to do so. 889
882

Prosecutor v. Limaj et al, T. 2104 – T. 3164.
See J. De Lange, Rwandan Realities – 10 Years After the Genocide, GTI Conference 29-30 October
2004. Professor Reyntjens did not use those words but has pointed out the dangers of evidence
concoction. He also pointed out the fact that the oath does not have the same meaning for Rwandan
witnesses as it has for European and American witnesses. See personal interview with F. Reyntjens,
conducted in Antwerp, Belgium, 20 December 2004.
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This is confirmed by interviews with Rwandan defendants before the ICTR, as well as their family
members and Rwandans living in The Netherlands.
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Prosecutor v. Semanza, ICTR-97-20-T, T. 31 January 2002, page 116; Prosecutor v. Semanza,
ICTR-97-20-T, Trial Judgement, 15 May 2003, para. 572.
886
Combs, Fact-Finding Without Facts, supra note 6, pages 131-135.
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Personal interview conducted in Arusha, Tanzania, 8 October 2004.
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In Prosector v Akayesu ICTR-96-4-A, 16 May 2001 Arret (Requete Aux Fins de Renvoi De
L’affaire Devant La Chambre de Premiere Instance I), the Defence was unsuccessful in reopening the
trial, or having fresh evidence admitted on appeal, from a Tutsi witness, BBB, who came forward after
trial to provide a detailed, notarized statement to the effect that evidence against Akayesu was
systematically manufactured with the intervention of government agents.
In Prosecutor v
Ntakirutimana, ICTR No-96-10, ICTR-96-17-T, defence witnesses provided similar testimony
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In particular prisoners appear to be under the assumption that they will be rewarded if
they testify against one of the ICTR defendants. 890 In light of Tertsakian’s research in
Rwandan prisons, it is not surprising that the prisoners are rather desperate to get out
of their situation. Some of them have been imprisoned for many years without ever
having seen a case file. 891 They have very limited liberties or time with their families.
Apparently, there was a strong encouragement from the authorities for prisoners to
confess and incriminate others. 892 Thus, it is not necessary to come from a society
where lying is regarded as acceptable behaviour. Many people would be inclined to
concoct stories if they found themselves in an equally desperate situation.

It cannot be said with certainty that these allegations are true, but they are so serious
that they should not be rejected out of hand. There are so many allegations of this
kind that, prima facie, they appear to have at least some foundation. If it is true that
witnesses are manipulated into making up stories, particularly if this is done in a
structured and systematic way under auspices of the government, the tribunal may
have to re-open most of its cases. It would have to doubt the credibility of many, if
not all, of the witnesses who have appeared before it. 893

(Witness 9 and Witness 31). The same thing happened in Prosecutor v Rutaganda ICTR-96-3 (Witness
DD), (see False Witnesses Testified to Genocide Court” inews@habari.co.tz, March 17, 1999) and in
the “Media Trial,” Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza and Ngeze ICTR-99-52-T, (Witness RM 14)
(see “Genocide Survivors Coerced me to Lie, Says Defence Witness,” Foundation Hirondelle Hirondelle Press Agency in Arusha International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 16 January 2003.) In
Prosecutor v Kajelijeli ICTR-98-44-T, a death row inmate testified that he and his family were
threatened by a Rwandan prosecutor if he testified in the defence of the former Rwandan mayor. He
claimed that he was promised his death sentence would be commuted if he did not testify (see “State
Prosecutor Threatened Me Against Testifying, Says Defence Witnesses,” Foundation Hirondelle Hirondelle Press Agency in Arusha International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 21 November 2002.
889
See, for instance, Prosecutor v. Nahimana et al, ICTR-99-52-T, 13 March 2003, page 61;
Prosecutor v. Niyitegeka, TR-96-14-T, 16 May 2003, Judgment, para. 222; Prosecutor v.
Nyiramasuhuko, ICTR-98-42-T, Judgement and Sentence, 24 June 2011, paras. 334-338.
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For instance, Prosecutor v. Seromba, ICTR-2001-66- I, 13 December 2006 , Judgement, para. 73.
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Ibid, para. 73.
891
C. Tertsakian, Le Château, The Lives of Prisoners in Rwanda (Arves Books, 2008).
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Ibid.
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It is indeed the view of many defence counsel that all cases must be reviewed. See views expressed
at two conferences organised by ICTR defence counsel in The Hague and Brussels in November 2009
and May 2010 respectively; The ICTR, Law and International Politics: A Defence Perspective, held in
The Hague, Netherlands, 14-16 November 2009; The ICTR Legacy from the Defence Perspective,
Conference held in Brussels, Belgium, 24 May 2010; See
http://www.ictrlegacydefenseperspective.org/Hague_14_16_November_2009/ICTR-LawPolitics_Hague_conference_14_16_ November_2009.pdf;
http://www.ictrlegacydefenseperspective.org/En.html).
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Until now, most of the claims of fabrication at the ICTR have not been properly
investigated. 894 Some judges appear to have a preconceived view that such claims
themselves are fabricated. 895 Cases where a prosecution witness has been
demonstrated to be lying extensively on significant issues have gone without sanction
or disapproval. 896 In this regard, it is interesting to note that the only prosecution that
has taken place of a witness who allegedly gave false testimony under oath was one
who recanted in favour of the accused. 897 This led to the arrest and conviction of a
defence investigator who allegedly incited the witness in question to give false
evidence before the tribunal which was favourable to the accused. 898

False Testimony ICC
894

For a critical note, see A. Zahar, The Problem of False Testimony at the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda, in A. Klip and G. Sluiter, (Eds.), Annotated Leading Cases of International
Criminal Tribunals, Vol. 25: International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 2006-2007 (Intersentia,
2010). At the Geneva Conference, supra note 173, ICTR judge Arrey justified the non-action in this
regard because she feared it would discourage witnesses from testifying.
895
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DWAN-9) testified that they had received offers of payment from one of the Prosecution witnesses. In
response, one of the judges routinely suggested that the witnesses were not honest. For instance, he
said: “Please, be honest, be frank, and and be concise in your answers to my questions. And so, please,
do not beat about the bush. Please, Witness.” See: T. 22 August 2011, pages 3-15.
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In one case, however, a Trial Chamber ordered the prosecution of a prosecution witness for perjury.
Prosecution witness GFA testified in multiple trials and then recanted while saying that many other
witnesses had equally lied. Having been informed by the witness that he had lied under oath about
Bicamumpaka’s liability in the presence of a Prosecution representative (Exhibit 2D118 (Kampala
Interview of Witness GFA, 8 February 2008), the defence for Bicamumpaka asked to call him back.
This request was granted. Meanwhile, in the Karemera et al trial, he confirmed under oath that he had
lied under oath when he incriminated several accused (The Prosecutor v. Édouard Karemera et al.,
Case No ICTR-98-44-T, T. 10 April 2008 pp. 47-48, pp. 50-51). However, in the course of his
testimony in the Bicamumpaka proceedings, Witness GFA indicated that he was not prepared to testify
and subsequently absconded (Prosecutor v. Bizimungu et al, T. 5 May 2008, pages 52-53, 58; T. 6 May
2008, pages 35, 37-40). The Chamber in Bizimungu et al then issued a subpoena compelling his
attendance (T. 21 May 2008, pages 28-30). Both the Chambers in Karemera et al and Bizimungu et al
ordered that an amicus curiae be appointed to investigate whether reasonable grounds existed to
prosecute Witness GFA for perjury. The investigator found that he had knowingly and wilfully given
false testimony “during all or at least some of the occasions on which he had testified before the
Tribunal”. Nonetheless, the Chamber in Bizimungu et al declined to order his prosecution as he had
only appeared once before it and the amicus curiae was unable to establish if he lied while testifying in
the Bizimungu et al. proceeding, or only during the Karemera et al. trial or both. The Karemera et al.
Trial Chamber, on the other hand, has ordered that the witness be prosecuted for false testimony (The
Prosecutor v. Édouard Karemera et al., Case No. ICTR-98-44-T, Decision on Motion to Prosecute
BTH for Providing False Testimony (TC), 10 September 2009, paras. 1, 6). The Appeals Chamber,
however, overturned this decision based on an erroneous application of the law (Édouard Karemera et
al. v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-98-44-T, Decision on Joseph Nzirorera’s and Prosecutor’s
Appeals of Decision Not to Prosecute Witness BTH for False Testimony (AC), 16 February 2010,
paras. 19, 21; The Prosecutor v. Édouard Karemera et al., Case No. ICTR-98-44-T, Decision on
Remand Following Appeal Chamber’s Decision of 16 February 2010, 18 May 2010, paras. 5-6, p. 7
(order)).
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Prosecutor v. Leonidas Nshogoza, ICTR-2007-91-T, 7 July 2009, Judgement.
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In places like DRC, where people live in extreme poverty, money can be a
stimulant. 899 In the first ICC trial of Lubanga, the issue of false testimony has been
the key subject of several filings. The reliability and credibility of the intermediary
was contested. The defense argued that four intermediaries gave instructions to
witnesses and even provided them with false letters and other documents to support
their stories. Two witnesses followed their instructions and lied about their age and
experience as child soldiers. 900 One of them testified that he was a child soldier in the
UPC. Yet, he did not know the name of his brigade, commander, or even what ‘UPC’
stood for. 901

During cross-examination, some of them declared that they had received money or
that they had been trained for days by those intermediaries in order to build their story
as a child soldier. 902 The Chamber considered that those accusations were grounded
and made several orders for the Prosecution to recall those witnesses and
intermediaries. 903 When the Prosecution refused to disclose the identity of one of the
intermediaries concerned to the defence, 904 the Chamber even stayed the procedure,
stating that it could not offer a fair trial if the Prosecutor failed to follow court
orders. 905 The Appeals Chamber, however, overturned this decision. While severely
criticizing the Prosecutor for failing to abide by the Chamber’s order to disclose, the
Appeals Chamber held that alternative, less drastic measures were open to the
Chamber. Instead of staying the procedure, the Chamber could have imposed
sanctions on the Prosecution. 906
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See Combs who drew similar conclusions on Sierra Leone and Rwanda: Combs, Fact-Finding
Without Facts, supra note 6, pages 138-142.
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ICC-01/04-01/06-2690-Red2 08-03-2011, Redacted Decision on the "Defence Application Seeking
a Permanent Stay of the Proceedings"; pages 13-14.
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ICC-01/04-01/06-2690-Red2 08-03-2011, Redacted Decision on the "Defence Application Seeking
a Permanent Stay of the Proceedings", page 24, citing: ICC-01/04-01/06-2657-Conf-tENG, paragraphs
82 – 85.
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Redacted Decision on Intermediaries, ICC-01/04-01/06-2434-Red2 31-05-2010.
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witnesses. The defence in that case repeatedly requested for the disclosure of the identity of the same
intermediary 143. Ironically, both defence teams had learned his identity while conducting
investigations.
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Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Public Redacted Decision on the Prosecution's Urgent Request for
Variation of the Time-Limit to Disclose the Identity of Intermediary 143 or Alternatively to Stay
Proceedings Pending Further Consultations with the VWU, ICC-01/04-01/06-2517-Red, issued on 8
July 2010, para. 31.
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ICC-01/04-01/06-2582 08-10-2010, Judgment on the appeal of the Prosecutor against the decision
of Trial Chamber I of 8 July 2010 entitled "Decision on the Prosecution's Urgent Request for Variation
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Eventually, the defence asked for a permanent stay on the ground that the evidence
was so unreliable that a fair trial could no longer be guaranteed. 907 The Chamber
dismissed the request, but not the arguments underlying it. The Chamber did not
consider it necessary to stay the procedure because it would be able, despite those
abuses, to reach a final conclusion on the alleged impact of the involvement of the
intermediaries on the evidence in this case, as well as on the alleged prosecutorial
misconduct or negligence. 908 The judgement is still pending.

Similar issues arose in the Katanga & Ngudjolo trial. As said earlier, some witnesses
appeared to be older than they had initially claimed they were. 909 One witness had
of the Time-Limit to Disclose the Identity of Intermediary 143 or Alternatively to Stay Proceedings
Pending Further Consultations with the VWU", paras. 45-61.
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See ICC-01/04-01/06-2657-tENG-Red 12-08-2011, Defence Application Seeking a Permanent Stay
of the Proceedings (Public Redacted Version – with confidential annexes). See also: ICC-01/04-01/062678-Red 29-03-2011, Prosecution’s Response to the Defence’s « Requête de la Défense aux fins
d’arrêt définitif des procédures ».
908
ICC-01/04-01/06-2690-Red2 08-03-2011, Redacted Decision on the "Defence Application Seeking
a Permanent Stay of the Proceedings", pages 74-92.
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See, for instance, Witness P-0279 ICC-01/04-01/07-T-151-Red-ENG WT 08-06-2010, pages 2225: “Q. So which date is your correct date of birth, do you say? Is it the date you gave the investigators,
a date in 1991; or is it the date you gave in your evidence, at the beginning of your evidence, a date in
1990; or neither of those dates? What do you say? Is it 1990? 1991? 1984, as shown on the card? Or
another date? Don't give us the full date, just the year.
A. It's in 1990.
Q. And just remind us how old you are today. How old are you today? Have you forgotten again? How
old are you today?
A. With regard to my age, given the date that I gave you, in that case I would be 20 years old.
Q. No, I think you're 19, actually. But I accept it's probably difficult to remember in your situation.
You, I suggest, were born in 1984. That's right, isn't it? Let me ask you this: Tell us how you got this
card and tell us why the date on it is August -- sorry, is 1984. Why is the date on this card 1984?”
See also page 24-25: “Q. But according to you, at that time you were only 15. What advantage was it
to you to say you were 20?
A. I didn't fully understand your question.
Q. According to you and your correct date of birth, you were just 15. So what advantage was it to you
to show a card to soldiers that stated you were 20, that you were older than you were? How does that or
would that help your safety?
A. (No verbal response)
Q. Well, again that's a long pause. Do you have an answer to it, to the question?
A. I do not have any answer to that question.
Q. Now, when you went along to the Electoral Commission to get a card that clearly was regarded as
very important by everybody, what document did you produce to show that you were born on the year
that appears on that card?
A. I didn't have any other documents. What I showed them there --well, it was my big brother who had
written something on a bit of paper, it was written by my older brother, and that is what I presented
where you had to register.
Q. And you went along yourself, did you?
A. Yes.
Q. As a 14-year-old and you said, "I'm 20"; is that right?”
See also Witness DRC‐OTP‐P‐0028, ICC-01/04-01/07-T-220-Red-ENG WT 22-11-2010, pages 25-28;
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invented an entire detailed story about being kidnapped with four other boys by 36
militiamen and forced to join the militia. He claimed he had done so on instructions of
his intermediary. During trial, this witness stated: 910
“I have already said that this is a statement which does not reflect the truth. I say this
because at that time I was never attending school in Aveba. May I add that I have
never attended school in Aveba. And even during that period, I did not know the
Walendu‐Bindi collectivity well. Well, to answer your question, therefore, I will tell
you the following: That is an untruth. Someone asked me to say that, and the person
who asked me to say that is still alive.”

The testimony of one witness who alleged to have been kidnapped and joined the
militia by force was so contradictory that one of the defence teams requested the
Chamber to order the Prosecution to initiate proceedings for perjury against this
witness. 911 This request was rejected. 912 However, recently, the Chamber asked the
Prosecution whether it intended to initiate proceedings against a victim witness who
had pretended to be at Bogoro when it was attacked, while in fact, he was in Bunia. 913
Upon discovery of this lie after completion of his testimony, the Prosecution had
sought and received permission to withdraw this witness as a witness of truth. 914

Absence of Documentary and Tangible Evidence

Witness P-0280, ICC-01/04-01/07-T-160-Red-ENG CT WT 23-06-2010, see pages 74-75.
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Witness DRC‐OTP‐P‐0028, ICC-01/04-01/07-T-220-Red-ENG WT 22-11-2010, pages 55-59.
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ICC-01/04-01/07-2243-Red 22-09-2010 “Requête de la Défense de Mathieu Ngudjolo aux fins
de solliciter le déclenchement des poursuites judiciaires à charge du Témoin P‐279 de
l’Accusation pour atteintes à l’administration de la justice ‐ Article 70 (1) (a) (b) du Statut de
Rome ».
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ICC-01/04-01/07-T-190-Red-ENG WT 22-09-2010.
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ICC-01/04-01/07-3223 13-01-2012, Order to the Prosecutor regarding the alleged false testimony
of witness P-159, see para 4: “considering that more than a year has passed since the Prosecution
informed the Chamber of its renunciation of the testimony of witness P-159, the Chamber is of the
view that the Prosecution has had sufficient time to determine its position in relation to this issue. As
perjury is a very serious matter, the Chamber hopes that the Prosecution has meanwhile taken the
necessary steps to investigate the issue and has decided on the appropriate course of action.” In its
response, the Prosecution however claimed good faith on the part of the victim: ICC-01/04-01/07-3225
31-01-2012, Prosecution’s response regarding its investigations into the alleged false testimony of
witness P-159, see para. 4: “It bears reminding that the Prosecution withdrew witness P-159’s evidence
because, after the witness had already testified, it received contrary information that raised credibility
questions.4 In that circumstance, the remedy the Prosecution undertook, notifying the parties and
Chamber of its intent to not rely on witness P-159’s in-court testimony, immediately and completely
protected the rights of the accused. The Prosecution’s Notice ensured that the evidence of witness P159, the credibility of which was called into question by other information that the Prosecution deemed
to have been given in good faith, would not have the potential to mislead the Chamber in its finding of
guilt or innocence.”
914
"Prosecution's Notice that it will not rely on the testimony of Prosecution Witness P-159 to prove its
case", 14 December 2010, ICC-01/04-01/07-2631-Conf; Public Decision on the Prosecution's
renunciation of the testimony of witness P-159, ICC-01/04-01/07-2731, 24-02-2011.
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Thus, there are serious obstacles in finding credible witness who are willing to testify.
This is particularly problematic because the main reliance is on eyewitness testimony.
Unlike the Nazis who left a trail of documentary evidence behind, 915 as well as the
Yugoslav perpetrators, who left behind significant volumes of written orders, video
and other tangible evidence, the Congolese and other African perpetrators left behind
very little on paper. 916 There was no structural organisation in any of those countries.
If orders were given, they were usually given orally. Most of the defendants were
high up in the hierarchy and were therefore acting behind the scenes, if at all. This
makes it more difficult to find eyewitnesses who are in a position to confirm that
these defendants gave orders to commit crimes under the jurisdiction of the
international criminal court or tribunal or facilitated the commission of these crimes
in any other way.

However, the non-existence of documentary and other tangible evidence is often
exaggerated. Rwanda, for instance, has a well-deserved reputation of being an
organised society. There is ample documentation. There are diaries, media broadcasts,
speeches of politicians, army and intelligence documents. Unfortunately, the best use
has not always been made out of these documents. For instance, although not strictly
necessary for the admissibility of such documents, their weight would be increased if
introduced through a witness who could make useful comments on them. This is often
not done.

Even in DRC, documents such as school bulletins and birth certificates have proven
essential to establish the correct age of certain witnesses. It was the defence, rather
than the Prosecution, that obtained these documents. Presumably, there are volumes
of intelligence documents in the possession of the Government. So far, it has refused
to allow the parties access to these documents, relying on the protection of State
security. The Prosecution has never made a serious effort to persuade it to disclose at
least some of these documents. The defence sought to receive such documents from
the DRC government. When the government was non-responsive, it requested the
915

In many ways, the circumstances in which the Nuremberg Tribunal was operating were ideal. The
war had finished, the Germans had surrendered completely with the result that Germany was freely
accessible to conduct any kind of investigations. In addition, the archives were available to the court.
This is an ideal situation but a-typical. It is more common that it is a struggle to get access to any
material. See further M. Garapon, at the Geneva Conference, supra note 173.
916
Combs, Fact-Finding Without Facts, supra note 6, at 6-7.
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Chamber’s intervention in obtaining them. However, the Chamber rejected this
request since the actual existence of these documents was based on speculation. 917

In Kenya, it should not be too difficult to obtain tangible and documentary evidence.
“Kenya is not Somalia” as counsel for Ruto, one of the Kenyan suspects, affirmed
during the confirmation hearing. 918 Kenya is a well-structured society with lots of
traceable paperwork. Among the six Kenyan suspects were very senior politicians,
including two (Ruto and Kenyatta) who intend to run for the presidential elections in
2012. Their paths were permanently followed by the active Kenyan media.
Contemporaneous videos, press clips, radio broadcasts and newspaper articles exist
which can show a pattern of their conduct and the public statements they made.919
Contemporaneous documents may also demonstrate that the suspects were occupied
elsewhere at specific dates that witnesses allege they were at meetings. 920

The Prosecution left most of such materials untouched although they are in the public
domain and thus easily obtainable. In addition, when the Prosecution alleged that the
suspects purchased weapons, it relied solely on anonymous witnesses. It had not made
any efforts to obtain purchase receipts, bank transfers or other tangible evidence. In a
society like Kenya, if it exists, it should have been possible for the Prosecution to
obtain it. 921

One witness told the Prosecution that Citizen TV had recorded a rally at which Ruto
allegedly addressed a crowd of youths and told them to prepare to barricade roads,
destroy property and kill the Kikuyus. 922 Another witness stated that he had read in
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See ICC-01/04-01/07-2019-Conf-Exp-Red 23-04-2010, Order on the 'Urgent Defence Motion for
Cooperation of the DRC’, and ICC-01/04-01/07- 2619-Red 17-08-2011, Décision relative à la seconde
requête de la Défense de Germain Katanga visant à obtenir la coopération de la République
démocratique du Congo.
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ICC-01/09-01/11-T-6-Red-ENG WT 02-09-2011, p. 116.
919
This point was made by the Ruto defence: ICC-01/09-01/11-T-5-ENG ET WT 01-09-2011, 91.
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The Ruto defence argued that evidence of Ruto’s absence at alleged meetings because he was
elsewhere, was readily available. See: Ruto Defence Brief, ICC-01/09-01/11-355 24-10-2011, para. 7;
ICC-01/09-01/11-T-6-Red-ENG WT 02-09-2011, 62-72.
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This was one of the arguments of the defence – failure to investigate properly. See, for instance,
ICC-01/09-01/11-T-12-ENG, 8 September 2011, pages 41-45. See also: Muthaura Confirmation Brief,
ICC-01/09-02/11-374-Red, 2 December 2011, paras 71-72. The defence relied on the following
examples: EVD-PT-D12-00063 at para. 2; EVD-PT-D12-00062 at para. 13; EVD-PT-D12-00088 at
para. 2; EVD-PT-D12-00054 at para. 6; EVD-PT-D12-00053 at para. 5.
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Ruto Defence Brief, ICC-01/09-01/11-355 24-10-2011, para. 22.
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the newspaper that grenades were found at the house of Ruto’s accomplice
Cherambos. 923 The Prosecution failed to search for these recordings and newspaper
article and thus missed an opportunity to verify the accuracy of the stories of
witnesses it relied on as witnesses of truth.

More significantly, the Prosecution should have been able to obtain the broadcasts of
the radio station KASS FM, broadcasted from Nairobi. Its radio operator, Sang, was
one of the Kenyan suspects before the ICC. The Prosecution relied on anonymous
witnesses to establish that he incited people to attack the Kikuyu civilian population,
and that he allowed other people to use his radio program to organise the attacks. The
Prosecution produced abstracts from KASS FM broadcasts, published by BBC. It
never sought to obtain the full transcripts of KASS FM broadcasts even though they
are readily available in Nairobi. The BBC abstracts did not include a single inciting
broadcast. Rather, they called for peace. 924 The defence produced broadcasts of the
relevant time period which all referred to peace rather than war. These broadcasts
were ultimately rejected because they were not translated into an official language of
the Court. 925 The Pre-Trial Chamber, Judge Kaul dissenting, nonetheless found that
there were substantial grounds to believe that Sang had contributed to a network
which had as its purpose the attacking of Kikuyu civilians. 926
Difficulties in finding credible and willing witness can also be exaggerated. ICTR
defence teams have generally managed to present to the Court both Hutu and Tutsi
Rwandan witnesses living in Rwanda including survivors of the genocide. Thus, a
923

Ruto Defence Brief, ICC-01/09-01/11-355 24-10-2011, para. 23.
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Pre-Trial Chamber in Abu Garda, see: ICC-02/05-02/09-243-Red 08-02-2010, para.48: “As the
Chamber has already made clear, at this stage of the proceedings, the Defence's objections to the
manner in which the investigations were conducted can only be viewed in the context of the purpose of
the confirmation hearing, and should thus be regarded as a means of seeking a decision declining to
confirm the charges. It follows, therefore, that the Defence's objection raised, in this instance cannot in
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sufficient number of witnesses continue to be willing to testify despite the serious
pressure put on them. Also, whilst cultural differences between investigators and
potential witnesses makes the investigations significantly more challenging, it does
not make them impossible.

It is important to be aware of such differences in order to distinguish lying witnesses
from honest witnesses who have difficulty expressing themselves in a, for the
investigators, comprehensible manner. It may not be advisable to call honest but
forgetful, or entirely incomprehensible witnesses. Such witnesses risk having their
credibility destroyed in cross-examination. To that extent, Combs is right. It is
difficult to conduct a trial with witnesses who are completely disconnected from the
world, culture and language in which the trial is conducted. However, in most
situations, a means of communication can be found. It simply takes more time and
effort.

Moreover, if investigations are conducted thoroughly, ample credible and
comprehensible witnesses can be found. In light of the high number of victims in
most international cases, there are also many potential witnesses. Sufficient time and
effort must be devoted to finding them, communicating with them, testing their
consistency and verifying their stories with other potential witnesses. The ICTY
investigators have done a diligent job and found a great deal of the evidence there was
to be found. 927 However, both at the ICTR and ICC, much more effort could and
should be made in order to ensure that the judges are presented with the fullest and
most reliable picture of events.

ICTR prosecutors rely heavily on witness statements taken by investigators several
years before the witnesses are brought. There are many discrepancies between these
statements and the in-court testimonies. This could be avoided by keeping in closer
contact with the witnesses by interviewing them more regularly. 928
927

See, for instance, Prosecutor v. Gotovina, Cermak and Markac, IT-05-87/1-T, Trial Judgement of
15 April 2011, where a total of 145 factual and expert witnesses were called and 4825 exhibits
including exhumation reports, orders, photographs, and maps. See paras. 10-59. The findings of fact
were to a large extent based on orders, presidential decrees and military documents (paras. 70-94).
928
In an interview in Arusha on 8 October 2004, J. Stewart, former chief of prosecutions at the ICTR,
conceded that a serious concern is that there is insufficient collaboration between the Prosecution
counsel and the investigators and that years pass by without being in contact with the witnesses. The
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Furthermore, when a witness testifies, for instance, about a meeting which was
attended by various other people, investigators should try to find these other
attendants and verify whether the meeting took place and what was discussed. Also
personal information about a witness relating to his age or family members who were
allegedly killed, can easily be verified. The necessity of doing so has become apparent
in many trials where the defence dug up the relevant information and used in its crossexamination. 929 Regularly, the defence calls as defence witnesses, persons mentioned
in statements and testimony from prosecution witnesses. Such witnesses often
contradict the prosecution witnesses accounts. 930

Regrettably, the ICTR and ICC investigators do not tend to verify any of the
information given by witnesses. Rather, they take the veracity of the information for
granted. 931 It of course does not help that the ICC investigators hardly visit the
locations but rely on intermediaries instead. It is rather surprising that the Prosecution
does not find it necessary to recruit local investigators. Most defence teams, on the
other hand, consider the recruitment of a reliable local investigator of the utmost
importance. 932 The Lubanga situation where witness credibility has become a pivotal
issue could have been avoided if the Prosecution had taken this basic measure.

Protective Measures
Protection of persons – non-disclosure of identity

first contact between the witness and Prosecution counsel is often in Arusha upon the witness’s arrival
for testimony.
929
This was for instance the case in the Lubanga and Katanga trials where the defence presented the
Chamber with birth certificates and school bulletins to demonstrate that some witnesses lied about their
age. In the ICTR, the defence often produces criminal dossiers from witnesses prosecuted in Rwanda to
demonstrate contradictions. See also, for instance, Prosecutor v. Nsengiyumva and Bagosora, T. 12
October 2004, pp. 11-12, 48-49; Kabiligi Defence Exhibit 85 (Judgment of 16 August 2001, Military
Court Rwanda) p. 201. See also: Judgement and Sentence 18 December 2008, ICTR-98-41-T, paras.
1558-1567.
930
For instance, Prosecutor v. Nsengiyumva and Bagosora, Judgement and Sentence 18 December
2008, ICTR-98-41-T, paras. 275, 290, 298, 299, 1558-1567
931
Contrary to what the Prosecutor alleges: ICC-01/04-01/07-T-81-Red-ENG WT 25-11-2009, pages
37-38.
932
David Hooper Q.C. (Interview in The Hague, 3 June 2010), and Peter Robinson (Interview in The
Hague, 21 November 2009). Defence teams before the ICC have all recruited local investigators
instead of the more expensive well-trained international investigators. Local investigators are essential
to open doors in the field.
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In order to ensure cooperation from witnesses without putting them at risk,
international courts and tribunals can take protective measures. The main protective
measure is confidentiality. The identities of victims, witnesses, members of their
families or other persons who assist the court or tribunal can be withheld from the
public and defence. The identities of many prosecution witnesses in international
criminal justice systems are disclosed to the defence shortly before the proceedings
begin, and sometimes even later. At the confirmation stage of the ICC, the identities
of prosecution witnesses are rarely disclosed either to the defence or to the public.933
The defence has, however, the right to know their identities a significant period prior
to their testimonies at trial. This is similar in the ICTY and ICTR. It only happened
once in the ICTY Tadic case that the identities of witnesses were not disclosed at all
to the defence. Sources, however, can be protected for longer, and in some situations
permanently. 934

In each of the three international tribunals and court, non-disclosure to the defence of
identifying details of sources and witnesses is a measure of last resort and must be
balanced with the rights of the defendant. The “overriding principle is that full
disclosure should be made”. 935 The ability to investigate can be seriously infringed if
the identities of important information providers are redacted. Indeed, an efficient
investigation commences with enquiries about such persons, which cannot be done
unless their identities are known. 936

933

The Statute explicitly authorises the prosecution to rely on summaries of anonymous witnesses
(articles 61(5) ICC and 68(5) ICC Statute). However, the weight is significantly less. See, for instance,
Public Redacted Version of the URGENT Decision on Evidentiary Scope of the Confirmation Hearing,
Preventive Relocation and Disclosure under Article 67(2) of the Statute and Rule 77 of the Rules, ICC01/04-01/07-428, 21-04-2008, para. 14; citing confidential filing: ICC-OI/04-01/07-374-Conf-Exp,
para. 18; ICC-01/04-01/06-517. pp. 4 and 6; Prosecutor v. Abu Garda, Public Redacted Version of the
Decision on Confirmation of Charges, ICC-02/05-02/09-243-Red, 8 February 2010, paras.173 and 177;
Prosecutor v. Muthaura, Ali and Kenyatta, ICC-01/09-02/11-382-Red 23-01-2012, paras. 89-90.
934
See, for instance, ICC-01/04-01/07-1395-Corr-tENG 13-01-2010, para. 27.
935
Judgment on the appeal of the Prosecutor against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I entitled “First
Decision on the Prosecution Request for Authorisation to Redact Witness Statements”, ICC-01/0401/07-475, 13 May 2008, para. 63.
936
This is the case for prospective witnesses, or other informants. See Judgment on the appeal of the
Prosecutor against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I entitled “First Decision on the Prosecution
Request for Authorisation to Redact Witness Statements”, ICC-01/04-01/07-475, 13 May 2008, para.
62: “The Appeals Chamber agrees with the appellant that, in principle, the Defence is entitled to
contact persons who the Prosecutor either has interviewed or is about to interview prior to their
becoming prosecution witnesses and recognises that such persons may have information which is
potentially relevant to the Defence. In such circumstances, the assessment carried out by the Pre-Trial
Chamber in deciding whether or not to authorise any particular redaction will necessary take this factor
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Non-disclosure of the identities of their family members can also affect the rights of
the defence, most notably the right to have adequate time and facilities to prepare a
defence. To verify the veracity of the testimony of witnesses, speaking to members of
their families or persons in their close proximity has proved essential. It is particularly
through such persons that the discovery can be made that certain parts of the
testimony are not truthful. 937 As addressed above, it frequently occurs that the
Prosecution does not make these necessary enquiries. It is then even more important
that the defence be offered an opportunity to do so. On the ground, defence
investigators can usually find the identities of family members of witnesses through
their own sources. However, this requires time and efforts that the defence could have
used for other purposes. Moreover, the fact that such information can be found by the
defence itself demonstrates that there is no legitimate reason to withhold it from the
defence.

Judges are aware that non-disclosure of relevant information may impinge on the
defence’s ability to adequately investigate and prepare a defence. At the same time, in
some situations, judges consider that such measures are the only way to properly
protect persons who assist the court or tribunal. As one ICTY Chamber put it: 938

If witnesses will not come forward or if witnesses refuse or are otherwise unwilling to
testify, there is little evidence to present. Threats, harassment, violence, bribery and
other intimidation, interference and obstruction of justice are serious problems, for
both the individual witnesses and the Tribunal’s ability to accomplish its mission.

into account”. See also: Prosecutor v. Lubanga, “Decision on Third Defence Motion for Leave to
Appeal”, ICC-01/04-01/06-514, 4 October 2006.
937
ICC-01/04-01/07-3223 13-01-2012, Order to the Prosecutor regarding the alleged false testimony
of witness P-159. Many family members have been called by the defence to testify. See, for instance,
D147 testimony from 17 to 19 may 2011; ICC-01/04-01/07-T-263-Red-ENG CT WT 19-05-2011,
page 52 (D147 = D03-P026); D146 D03-P340, 20-24 May 2011; D145, D03-P0100, see ICC-01/0401/07-T-310-Red-ENG CT WT 13-09-2011, pages 56, 67-68.
938
Prosecutor v. Brdjanin and Talic, Decision on Motion by Prosecution for Protective Measures, 3
July 2010, para. 29. See also: See also Waters, [Redacted]: Writing and Reconciling in the Shadow of
Secrecy, supra note 169, PART IV.
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Nonetheless, the rights of the accused remain “the first consideration”. 939
Accordingly, such protective measures can be granted, but only on an exceptional
basis, after exhausting the possibility of employing less extreme measures (principle
of necessity). Protective measures must also be strictly limited to the exigencies of the
situation (principle of proportionality), and not infringe the right of the defence. 940
More concretely, the Chamber must determine on a case-to-case basis whether the
disclosure of the person’s identity generates an objectively justified security risk;
whether less restrictive protective measures are reasonably available; and whether
non-disclosure gravely prejudices the defence. 941 General security problems in the
region alone do not justify redactions from the defence. 942 For this, it must be shown
that such security problems are prompted by the defendant. 943

In practice, however, this exceptional measure is routinely applied. Particularly the
ICC has gone far in allowing redactions from the public and defence, not infrequently
939

Prosecutor v. Brdjanin and Talic, Decision on Motion by Prosecution for Protective Measures, 3
July 2010, para. 30: “Whilst the Tribunal must make it clear to prospective victims and witnesses in
other cases that it will exercise its powers to protect them from, inter alia, interference or intimidation
where it is possible to do so, the rights of the accused in the case in which the order is sought remain
the first consideration. It is not easy to see how those rights can properly be reduced to any significant
extent because of a fear that the prosecution may have difficulties in finding witnesses who are willing
to testify in other cases”.
940
ICC-01/04-01/06-108, Decision Establishing General Principles Governing Applications to Restrict
Disclosure pursuant to Rule 81(2) and (4) of the Statute, 19 May 2006; ICC-01/04-01/06-102, Decision
on the final system of disclosure and the establishment of a time table, 15 May 2006.
941
Judgment on the appeal of the Prosecutor against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I entitled “First
Decision on the Prosecution Request for Authorisation to Redact Witness Statements”, ICC-01/0401/07-475, 13 May 2008, paras. 59, 60, 71-72; ICC-01/04-01/07-3122 22-08-2011, page 9. See also:
Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-568, 13 October 2006, “Judgment on the Prosecutor’s appeal
against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I entitled “Decision Establishing General Principles
Governing Applications to Restrict Disclosure pursuant to Rule 81(2) and (4) of the Rules of Procedure
and Evidence”, paras. 36-37; Prosecutor v Lukic & Lukic, Order on Milan Lukic’s Request for
Protective Measures, 23 July, 2008, pp. 3-4; Prosecutor v Simba, Decision on Defence Request for
Protection of Witnesses, 25 August, 2004, para. 5; Prosecutor v Nzirorera, Decision on the
Prosecutor’s Motion for Protective Measures for Witnesses, July 12, 2000, para. 9; Prosecutor v
Bizimungu et al, Decision on Justin Mugenzi’s Confidential Motion for Protection of Defence
Witnesses, June 27, 2005, para. 9.
942
Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Judgement on the appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against the
decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I entitled First Decision on the Prosecution Requests and Amended
Requests for Redactions under Rule 81, 14 December 2006, para. 21; Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Decision
of Trial Chamber I on the applications of the prosecutor dated 24 June and 30 August 1996 in respect
of the protection of witnesses’ 2 October 1996; Prosecutor v. Brdjanin and Talic, Decision on motion
by prosecution for protective measures, 3 July 2000, para. 11.
943
Judgment on the appeal of the Prosecutor against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I entitled “First
Decision on the Prosecution Request for Authorisation to Redact Witness Statements”, ICC-01/0401/07-475, 13 May 2008, para. 71; Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Decision on Prosecution Motion for
Provisional Protective Measures Pursuant to Rule 69, 19 February 2003, para. 29; Prosecutor v.
Brdjanin and Talic, Decision on Third Motion By Prosecution for Protective Measures, 8 November
2002, paras. 14-18.
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on a permanent basis. 944 Such redactions can include sources, as well as the names of
persons and organisations who act as intermediaries between the Court and potential
witnesses. 945 The names of staff members of the Prosecution, NGOs or other
intermediaries are regularly redacted at least until the start of the trial. 946

Arguably, the protection of NGOs and Prosecution personnel is excessive. Given the
nature of their work, they should be prepared to take more risks than ordinary
citizens. 947 The fact that several NGOs cooperate with the ICC is not in itself a
confidential matter, and can easily be ascertained from the respective internet sites of
these NGOs. As well, in an amicus brief, submitted in the DRC situation, the
Womens’ Institute for Gender Justice broadcasted to the entire world the fact that it
had conducted interviews in the DRC, and transmitted its findings to the ICC
Prosecutor. 948

In the ICTY and ICTR, with the exception of the International Committee for Red
Cross (“ICRC”), these types of redactions have generally been rejected. The defence
is usually entitled to receive the identities of anyone involved in taking witness
information, be it investigators, interpreters, Prosecution staff members and/or NGO

944

See, for instance, ICC-01/04-01/07-1395-Corr-tENG 13-01-2010, para. 27; ICC-01/04-01/07-1096tENG 18-11-2009, paras.26-27; ICC-01/04-01/07-1097-tENG 18-11-2009, para. 21. See also ICC01/04-01/07-3122 22-08-2011, page 9 where the permanent redaction of a defence source was
authorized for the first time in international justice. The Appeals Chamber nonetheless held that “nondisclosure must be kept under review and altered should changed circumstances make that appropriate”
(Judgment on the appeal of the Prosecutor against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I entitled “First
Decision on the Prosecution Request for Authorisation to Redact Witness Statements”, ICC-01/0401/07-475, 13 May 2008, para. 63). Chambers have followed this instruction. Examples of Decisions
which rejected permanent redactions sought and only allowed temporary ones, are: ICC-01/04-01/071098-tENG 30-12-2009, para.13-18, and ICC-01/04-01/07-1101-tENG 21-06-2010, para.19-28, and
ICC-01/04-01/07-1096-tENG 18-11-2009, paras. 27-31.
945
ICC-01/04-01/07-1101-tENG 21-06-2010, see para 25-26.
946
See also ICC-01/04-01/07-1034-tENG 18-11-2009, see paras. 50-51. The supervisor of
investigations in Ituri testified under pseudonym: ICC-01/04-01/07-T-81-Red-ENG WT 25-11-2009.
By contrast, particularly the ICTY has been strict on disclosure of the identities of sources: Prosecutor
v. Haradinaj, Decision on Motions on Behalf of Idriz Balaj and Lahi Brahimaj to Receive Ten
Unredacted Witness Statements, 3 May 2006; Prosecutor v. Kordic, Order on Motion to Compel
Compliance by the Prosecutor with Rules 66(A) and 68, 26 February 1999; Prosecutor v. Brdjanin and
Talic, Decision on Fifth Motion by Prosecution for Protective Measures, 15 November 2000;
Prosecutor v. Brdjanin and Talic, Decision on Prosecution’s Request for Variation of Third Protective
Measures Decision, 29 November 2000, para. 14.
947
On similar grounds, the European Court of Human Rights has held that the protection of the
identities of police officers was excessive. See Kostovski v. The Netherlands, Judgment of 20
November 1989, 1989 ECHR (Ser. A.) 166.
948
See: ICC-01/04-373, 20 August 2007.
229

members. 949 If not, the defence would be deprived of an opportunity to contest the
methodology of the collection of witness statements. 950 Given how often witnesses
allege that interpreters or investigators have misunderstood them in cases of
inconsistencies with their viva voce testimonies, it is imperative for the defence to
receive disclosure of their names.

If the redactions pertain to the name of an organisation or a person who has
transmitted a document to the Prosecution, or referred a victim or witness to
Prosecution investigators, then their identity is crucial to the ability of the defence to
analyse and challenge chain of custody issues, possible collusion, undue influence, as
well as the existence of prior statements.

Accordingly, the defence is genuinely prejudiced by excessive redactions. Often, such
redactions are not even necessary. For instance, it has been suggested that the need for
protection in the ICTR is exaggerated. Indeed, many of the protected witnesses have
testified publicly before Gacaca courts in Rwanda. 951 Similarly, in the DRC, very few
people feel genuinely threatened. 952 This is confirmed by the fact that a person who
testified in the case of Katanga & Ngudjolo returned to his community after being
relocated for security concerns. He has not faced any difficulties since he is back
although it is generally known in the community that he testified as a witness for the
Prosecution. 953
949

That this applies equally to humanitarian organisations is clear from: Prosecutor v. Milutinovic et al,
Decision on Ojdanic Motion for Disclosure of Witness Statements and for Finding of Violation of Rule
66(A)(ii), para. 14; and Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Decision on Prosecution Motion for Protective
Measures (Concerning a Humanitarian Organisation).
950
Prosecutor v. Pauline Nyiramasuhuko et al, ICTR-97-21-T, ‘Décision relative à la Requête de la
Défense en extreme urgence tenant au respect, par le Procureur, de la “Décision relative à la Requête
de la Défense en Communication de preuves” rendue le 1er novembre 2000”, 8 June 2001; Prosecutor
v. Nyiramasuhuko et al, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Motion for, inter alia, Modification of the
Decision of 8 June 2001, 25 September 2001, para. 19; Prosecutor v. Nzirorera Decision on the
Defence Motion for Disclosure of Exculpatory Evidence, Rule 68 of the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence, 7 October 2003, para. 20 (the name of a prosecution investigator can be exculpatory
information).
951
See the intervention of D. Webster, one of the prosecutors at the ICTR, at the Geneva Conference,
supra note 173, where he agreed that there is no reason to protect witnesses before the ICTR who can
testify without protection in Rwanda.
952
Personal interviews with local Congolese in the period of February 2011, the author has been
informed that one witness who has been relocated is still frequently in the region for business purposes
and has been boosting about his new house paid by the ICC Prosecution. He then obviously shows little
fear for repercussions.
953
Public Version publique expurgée de la Décision relative à la requête du Bureau du Procureur aux
fins de communiquer avec le témoin P-250 (ICC-01/04-01/07-2711-Conf, 18 février 2011), ICC-01/04230

Accordingly, claims of security concerns should not be accepted on face value. Many
allegations of threats from the defendant or an associate turn out to be false. 954
Caution is particularly appropriate when defendants have lost their stronghold, as in
Rwanda. Allegations of security issues can simply be made to put the defendant in a
bad light, or render him eligible for relocation. It often seems that confidentiality is
invoked not genuinely to protect the safety of a witness, but for strategic reasons. 955
Protection may also be an incentive to give false testimony because there will be no
consequences. 956 Witnesses can comfortably invent anything they like without being
subjected to public scrutiny.

Even where the fear is genuine, threats often do not come from the defendant, but
from society members. They frequently act on their own initiatives rather than on
instructions from the defendant. In such a situation, non-disclosure to the defendant
will not increase the safety of the witness concerned. The main fear is that the
defendant will inform others within his community of the identities of witnesses. It
should however be noted that, very often, they are already known in the communities
before the accused is even aware of their identity. It may be the witness himself who
speaks about his involvement with the tribunal or court, or his family. It may also be
an officer of the court or tribunal who accidentally provides such information to
people on the ground. 957

Thus, in reality, the identities of potential witnesses are not hidden locally for very
long. Witnesses often come from very small communities where everyone knows
everything about everyone else. If investigators arrive at a village to speak to
someone, everyone will immediately know that the person in question is cooperating
with the tribunal or court. If a witness fears retaliation from the government, it is even
01/07-2711-Red, 10 mars 2011. In conducting fieldwork the author has observed that most people were
aware of the identities of most, if not all, Prosecution witnesses in the Katanga & Ngudjolo case.
954
For instance, in Kenya I, the victim representative claimed that some of her clients were threatened
by Ruto or his associates. She did so in her closing arguments, thereby depriving Ruto of an
opportunity to respond. See further ICC-01/09-01/11-T-12-ENG ET WT 08-09-2011, 15-34.
955
See also Waters, [Redacted]: Writing and Reconciling in the Shadow of Secrecy, supra note 169,
PART V.
956
See the intervention of Mr. Haguma, lawyer based in Kigali, at Geneva Conference, supra note 173.
957
For instance, the Katanga defence team had discovered the identity of intermediary W-143 in the
field long before the name was officially disclosed to it.
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more difficult to keep his identity confidential. The authorities need to grant witnesses
visas and passports. Thus, at least some public officials will know that a witness
intends to travel.

In the ICTR, the protected witness identifying information is provided to the
Rwandan Prosecutor-General, the Minister of Justice, the Department of Immigration
and copied to the Rwandan Special Representative to the ICTR based in Arusha. The
reason proffered for providing all this confidential information to the most senior
government officials is to obtain travel documents. 958 This defence has alleged that
this practice puts defence witnesses unnecessarily at risk, and that there is a way of
obtaining travel documents without informing the highest authorities. 959 This
arguments were, however, rejected. 960 In the case of Nshogoza, witnesses had not
been informed that their information would be submitted to the highest Rwandan
officials. Upon hearing this, a significant number of defence witnesses decided to
testify publicly. While on the stand, one such witness testified that the ICTR witness
protection programme was “a total farce”. 961

958

In the Prosecutor v. Nshogoza, T. 9 March 2009, pages 4-6 (E), the Registry explained this as
follows: “[...] I would like to -- furthermore, with regard to the procedure that has been used regarding
the movement of witnesses, either those who are free in Rwanda or who are already in
custody -- under our custody, as you know, Your Honour, we cannot issue a travel document without
notifying the country of residence, notifying them of their identity. So you cannot issue this document
using a pseudonym. And so the country's authorities have to be aware of the identity for the issuance
of travel documents. The procedure in Rwanda, and which has been simplified through an agreement
with -- between the Tribunal and the Rwandan authorities, consists in officially notifying the
prosecutor's office in Kigali regarding the movement of all witnesses from Kigali, whether they are in
detention or not. So an official letter is sent to them via the registrar of the Tribunal, including all the
detail -- the particulars of the witness. It is the prosecutor's office in Kigali which cross-checks the
availability of these witnesses and to see if they are ready to come and testify or not. Once this phase
has been passed, then the document is forwarded to the minister of justice, which then does what it has
to do with the file. And when the minister -- minister of justice approves it, then the file is forwarded
to the department of immigration for the issuance of travel documents.”
959
The motion argued that interference by the Rwandan Deputy Prosecutor-General rendered it
impossible for Mr Nshogoza to obtain the attendance of witnesses on his behalf under the same
conditions as those of the witnesses who testified against him in violation of Article 20(4)(e).
Prosecutor v. Nshogoza, Urgent Motion for Stay of Proceedings Due to Interference with Defence
Witnesses, 4 March 2009.
960
Prosecutor v. Nshogoza, Decision on Defence Motion to Make Public the Confidential Decision on
Defence Motion for Stay of Proceedings; and Annexure Comprising Redacted Version of Said
Decision for Public Consumption, 26 June 2009: “[T]he Defence failed to demonstrate how the contact
between the Rwandan Prosecutor General’s office and the witnesses adversely impacted the Accused’s
right under Article 20(4)(e) to obtain attendant of and examination of witnesses on his behalf, under the
same conditions as those who have testified against him”.
961
See, e.g., witness Straton Nyarwaya, T. 20 March 2009, p. 5 “[F]or me, all this issue of a protected
witness is a farce.”). The other three witnesses were Augustin Nyagatare, Fulgence Seminega, and
Cyprien Hakizimana.
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Arguably, hiding the identities of the potential witnesses from the defence and public
increases, rather than decreases security issues. If it is not public information that the
person is a potential witness for the tribunal or court, it is much easier to make
someone disappear, take revenge or put pressure on the witness in other ways.
Someone may die from natural causes. If, on the other hand, it is known publicly that
the person is a potential witness for the tribunals or court, there is public scrutiny
concerning his fate.

Disclosure of the identity of a witness to the local communities in itself may serve as
a protection because it is easier to keep control over the situation. Given the lack of
police or another independent force, the international tribunals and court have no way
of protecting a witness if he stays in his community. Thus, in offering protection, they
make a promise that cannot, in reality, be fulfilled. The tribunals and court must rely
on the community for his protection. If the community is excluded from knowing who
is a potential witness and, accordingly, who is in danger, the witness is rather
defenceless. 962

In light of this reality, the protective scheme should be applied as intended, that is, as
an exception to the rule that the proceedings are public and all relevant information is
disclosed to the defence. It should stop being applied as the rule, as it currently is in
the ICC. 963 Many witnesses ask for protection even if not strictly required. Testifying
publicly means that everyone in the world can follow the testimony. In addition, the
public gallery can fill up with unfamiliar and familiar faces to the witness. That can
be frightening for anyone. However, the test is not, nor should it be, whether the
witness is comfortable testifying publicly. Rather, he must have an objectively
justifiable fear for his security.

962

A counter-argument, as ICTR judge Arrey pointed out, is that witnesses may refuse to testify unless
they are protected. See Geneva Conference, supra note 173.
963
The Prosecution is of the view that the ICC protection program does not go far enough. In its view,
“the starting point for protective measures should be the elimination of all foreseeable risks … because
any lower standard of risk would not permit the Court, or the Prosecution, to discharge its obligations
to protect victims and witnesses as mandated by article 68(1) of the Statute” (Public Redacted Version
of the URGENT Decision on Evidentiary Scope of the Confirmation Hearing, Preventive Relocation
and Disclosure under Article 67(2) of the Statute and Rule 77 of the Rules, ICC-01/04-01/07-428, 2104-2008, para. 14; citing confidential filing: ICC-OI/04-01/07-374-Conf-Exp, para. 13, citing the
confidential filing: ICC-01/04-01/07-374-Conf-Exp, p 10).
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Even the disclosure of his identity to the defence only may involve a level of risk of
which he should be made aware. The situation should be adequately discussed with
the witness. As the Katanga & Ngudjolo Pre-Trial Chamber held: 964
(i) The first and foremost protective measure is to give the witnesses a clear idea of
what they can expect from the Court in terms of protection, which requires that it be
explained to the witness upfront and in detail the type of operational and procedural
measures that may be available to them, as well as the basic features of the
procedure for the granting of such measures;

Accordingly, the witness should not be under the false impression that he has the final
say in whether his identity is to be disclosed to the defence. His consent for the use of
his statement is valid only after he is made to understand that his identity might have
to be disclosed to the defence. The Prosecution cannot give any witness a guarantee of
anonymity. 965 It should also be explained to him that it is not his preference for public
or private testimony that counts.

In these proposed conditions, there is a risk that the Prosecution loses witnesses, but
at least it will be a more honest approach. As long as the situation is clear to the
witnesses, they may still be willing to cooperate. In the ICTY, where protection
measures have been kept to a minimum, the Prosecution succeeded in obtaining the
cooperation from most witnesses it relied on. The only real exception has been
Kosovo. Between 1996 and 2001, less than a quarter of the total number of witnesses
had some type of protective measure. Less than 20 % had a pseudonym and most
witnesses testified in public sessions. This stands in stark contrast with the ICC where
almost all Prosecution witnesses have a pseudonym and large parts of their
testimonies are listened to in closed or private sessions. 966 Yet, this lower level of
protection at the ICTY has not prevented witnesses from testifying.

Relocation
The only way in which the tribunals and court can effectively protect someone is by
relocating him to another area. It is, however, very expensive for the tribunals and
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court to relocate a person. If a witness is relocated for his safety, everything is being
paid for, e.g. his house, education and living expenses. For these reasons it is intended
to be used only as an absolute last resort. However, given that it is the only way to
protect witnesses properly, this resort is used much more often than perhaps desired
by the tribunals and court.

In the ICC, the Victims and Witness Unit (“VWU”) decides on requests from both
parties for relocation of their witnesses. In the ICTR and ICTY, the defence does not
have any option of requesting for relocation of its witnesses. The Prosecution, on the
other hand, can decide to relocate its witnesses. The ICTR Prosecution has, for
instance, done so with regard to a number of insider witnesses with their entire
families. The Prosecution has conceded that the costs for doing so are excessive.
Relocation is therefore applied only in highly exceptional circumstances. 967 In the
ICTY, “[l]ess than a fraction of one per cent of witnesses have been granted long-term
protection such as relocation to third countries”. 968

In the ICC, a high percentage of Prosecution witnesses have been relocated. In Kenya,
it appears from the Prosecutor’s observations that all of the witnesses have been
relocated to a third country. 969 Also in the Katanga & Ngudjolo case, many of the
Prosecution witnesses have been relocated. The number of applications for relocation
of Prosecution witnesses in this case was “unprecedented”. 970 In a number of
situations, the Prosecution preventively relocated its witnesses while waiting for a
decision of the VWU, or where the VWU had denied its request for relocation. The
measure of ‘preventive relocation’ is a provisional measure. It means that witnesses
are temporarily relocated by the Prosecution, pending the provision of protection by
the VWU. 971 The Prosecution had sought no prior authorisation from the Chamber to
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implement this measure; nor any statutory mandate to do so. 972 Accordingly, this
practice of unilateral preventive relocation was severely criticised and disallowed by
the Pre-Trial Chamber and Appeals Chamber. 973 In cases of disagreement between
the assessment of the VWU and the Prosecutor, “the ultimate arbiter of whether the
serious measure of relocation be undertaken is the Chamber”. 974

Preventive relocation forces the issue of relocation and thus effectively shifts the
power to decide whether relocation is necessary from a neutral organ of the Registry
to the Prosecution. Indeed, as was held by the Pre-Trial Chamber, “once a witness is
taken to a new location (alone or with members of his or her family) where he or she
remains for a certain period of time in this new environment, returning the witness to
their former place of residence as a result of the Registrar’s decision not to include the
witness in the ICCPP would be disruptive for the witness and his or her family and
would also most likely put them at risk”. 975 The Prosecution also relocated witnesses
whose request for relocation was rejected. The Pre-Trial Chamber called this
“reactive relocation”, rather than “preventive relocation” and criticised it for
infringing the decision of the competent organ of the Court to decide upon the
relocation of a witness. 976

The excessive use of relocation is both regrettable and unnecessary. Apart from the
expenses, relocation has many other undesired effects. The consequence of relocation
is that witnesses are cut off from their communities for an indefinite period of time.
They cannot easily return to their community, at least not for a significant period of
time. This can cause significant problems for the witness, his friends, family and other
members of the community. 977 It has already occurred that a witness felt too lonely
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and decided to return to his community. 978 He has not had any security issues since
his return, which suggests that his relocation was not necessary from the outset.

Relocation can equally be upsetting for the family that is left behind. Three fathers of
Prosecution witnesses appeared on behalf of the defence. They were all extremely
upset that their children were taken away from them and asked the Court to return
them. As D-147 put it:

Without lying to you, the departure of Pierre who left the family and who is at the
root of the tension between the members of the family is a problem, and the fact that
the ‐‐ and also the fact that Pierre doesn’t do what he’s supposed to do and the fact
that Pierre lied. All of this is not worthy of the family. …. Pierre should be left
alone. I would like to know where he is and I would like to have Pierre returned to
me and I would like to be able to go (Expunged) with Pierre. Everything that has
been said here stems from lies.979

Another problem with relocation is that it is an incentive for anyone to come and
testify irrespective of whether a person was, in reality, a witness to events. Relocation,
especially to a western country, in many people’s minds equals a better life with more
economic opportunities. This is particularly true in societies where the standard of
living is significantly lower than in western countries. Some of these people are
keenly looking to flee their poor economic situation. There is a shared perception that
cooperating with the court may lead to certain benefits. Whilst it is unethical for either
party to offer money to a witness, paying for someone’s food and transport may
already be an incentive for someone to cooperate. In DRC for instance, the reality is
that many of the potential witnesses have a salary at the most of 30 USD per month.
Many of them are waiting for payment for three months on average. The best way to
benefit from testifying is relocation. When relocated, health care, insurance and
education for the entire family are paid for. This may have an adverse impact on the
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credibility of such witnesses. 980

For example, in the ICTY case of Martic, witness MM-079 testified that after his
lawyer had suggested that he contact the Tribunal to seek assistance with his asylum,
he was interviewed by the Prosecution on this issue. The witness was subsequently
informed that the Prosecution had written a letter to the authorities of the State where
he currently lives to ask that he be allowed to stay there until he finishes testifying at
the Tribunal”. The Prosecution “acknowledged that the evidence of Witness MM-079
should be “scrutinised with care” since “he said that he hoped to receive the
assistance of the OTP to remain in the country where he is relocated.”” The Chamber
ultimately concluded that in light of the assistance provided to witness MM-079 and
another Prosecution witness, “there is significant doubt as to the credibility of both
witnesses”. The Chamber therefore gave “weight only to the parts of their respective
evidence which are corroborated by other evidence”. 981

However, as was rightly pointed out by the Trial Chamber in the ICTY case of
Naletilic & Martinovic, the fact that a witness has ulterior motives for testifying does
not necessary mean he is not telling the truth. 982

A final issue of concern is that relocation undermines the equality of arms between
the parties. Defence witnesses have never been relocated. At the ICTY and ICTR this
option does not exist for the defence. In particular at the ICTR, the lack of the
relocation option for the defence has led to the refusal of numerous crucial witnesses
from Rwanda to testify. In certain situations, relocation can be the only way to
persuade witnesses to testify. It is thus unfair that this tool is available to the
980
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Prosecution only. This is better organised at the ICC, where in principle defence
witnesses have an equal chance to be relocated as Prosecution witnesses. This was
emphasised by the Single Judge of Pre-Trial Chamber I: 983
The Single Judge would like to highlight that the Defence should also benefit, on
the same conditions, from the above-mentioned system to be set up by the Registrar.
Furthermore, in the view of Single Judge, the Court can only adequately address
these types of exceptional situations if the Prosecution and the Defence do not abuse
the system and only resort to it when exceptional circumstances make it absolutely
necessary.

It remains to be seen whether, in reality, a defence application would be treated
equally to a Prosecution application. In the author’s knowledge, no defence team has
yet requested for relocation of any of its witnesses. However, the Registry’s reaction
to the request of four detained defence witnesses to seek asylum in The Netherlands,
is concerning. Through the lawyer assigned to them, the witnesses addressed the
Court in respect to their security concerns in the event that they would be sent back to
the DRC where they had been held in prison in Kinshasa since early 2005 without
charge. They had implicated members of the DRC government in crimes committed
in Ituri for which Katanga and Ngudjolo were charged. As a result, they feared
repercussion back in the Kinshasa central prison. 984

The Registry vehemently opposed any possibility for any witness to seek asylum in
The Netherlands. It insisted that the witnesses remained within the power of the DRC
authorities even when on Dutch soil and in the ICC premises. 985 It stressed that, if the
witnesses were not returned to the DRC, the DRC authorities might discontinue their
cooperation with the Court. In addition, it would prevent governments in the future
from cooperating. 986 It also stated that the witnesses’ claim that their security would
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be at risk was baseless, as their allegations against the government were not new. The
witnesses had raised similar arguments when they were still in prison and underwent
no repercussions. 987 The Netherlands was equally opposed to opening the asylum
route to any ICC witness or accused. The Netherlands suggested that the Court deal
with the request as a request for protective measures. 988 Notwithstanding these
arguments, the Chamber held that the witnesses should have a right to seek asylum. 989
Recently, a Dutch Court confirmed that they were entitled to go through each step of
the asylum procedure. 990 This issue was unprecedented.

In light of the number of relocated Prosecution witnesses, one of whom returned to
his community, the Registry’s position towards these defence witnesses appears
inconsistent. Prisoners who have been imprisoned for almost seven years without a
charge are by nature in a vulnerable position. Their future fate in DRC is very
uncertain. They, therefore, appear to have reasons to be genuinely concerned for their
safety. No other protective measures are available, given that they could not hide from
the authorities that they would be testifying before the ICC. The Chamber took it
seriously enough to allow them to seek asylum. The Registry clearly did not.

Organisations
Many entities and States that provide information to the Prosecution at international
tribunals make confidentiality a condition of their cooperation. NGOs, TRCs or the
UN may be concerned about the safety of their sources and may have promised these
parties. But once again, the Court did not call for the submissions which were put to it; it has to answer
them with all the consequences that that might have.”
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sources that their identity will not be disclosed to the defence or the public at large.
States often invoke State security. Such demands are often granted because,
otherwise, States may stop cooperating and refuse to open their archives whenever
their interests are at stake. 991

Rules 70(B) of the ICTR and ICTY Rules, and article 54(3)(e) of the ICC Statute
permit the Prosecution to enter into agreements with NGOs, the UN, States or other
entities, thereby promising confidentiality of any document or information unless the
provider of the information consents to disclosure. Such agreements are limited to
documents or information which has been obtained “solely for the purpose of
generating new evidence”.

Whilst pragmatically such agreements may be the only way to obtain information, it
can be problematic when this power is used excessively. This is particularly so where
the information includes exculpatory information. The Prosecutor is under an
obligation to disclose to the defence any exculpatory information. Thus, there may be
a conflict between the Prosecutor’s right to enter into confidentiality agreements and
his simultaneous obligation to disclose exonerating evidence.

The excessive use by the ICC Prosecutor of his power to enter into confidentiality
agreements has led to a stay in the Lubanga case and severe criticism in the Katanga
and Ngudjolo case. 992 In Lubanga the Prosecutor identified several hundreds of
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documents received mainly from the UN and some NGOs pursuant to article 54(3)(e)
as potentially exculpatory material. The UN refused to permit the defence or even the
Chamber to receive any of the information given to the Prosecutor. Plainly this refusal
prevented the Chamber from exercising its ultimate duty to assess whether the trial
could still be fair if this material was not disclosed to the defence and whether
alternative measures were available to compensate the unfairness to the defence
caused by the non-disclosure. Following refusal by the Prosecution to comply with a
court order that the material be provided to the Chamber, a conditional stay of the
proceedings was ordered. 993

The Appeals Chamber agreed with the Trial Chamber that reliance on Article 54(3)(e)
of the Statute should be “exceptional” and not excessive as it had been in the instant
case. 994 It therefore found that the Trial Chamber rightly came to the conclusion that
“in the circumstances of the case, where a large number of potentially exculpatory
information or information material to the preparation of the defence had neither been
disclosed to the accused person nor to the Chamber, there was no prospect of a fair

stage of the proceedings (paras. 65-66, 77-85, 93-94, 108). The use of summaries was, however,
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trial”. Accordingly, it correctly conditionally stayed the proceedings. 995

The Appeals Chamber held that the Prosecutor needed to concentrate its
investigations on generating evidence which could be given in court rather than
amassing material with which it could do nothing because of confidentiality
agreements. The Appeals Chamber held that “[it]t follows from article 54 (1) of the
Statute that the investigatory activities of the Prosecutor must be directed towards the
identification of evidence that can eventually be presented in open court. This is in
order to establish the truth and to assess whether there is criminal responsibility under
the Statute”. 996

The Appeals Chamber also underscored that “whenever the Prosecutor relies on
article 54 (3) (e) of the Statute he must bear in mind his obligations under the Statute.
He must apply that provision in a manner that will allow the Court to resolve the
potential tension between the confidentiality to which the Prosecutor has agreed and
the requirements of a fair trial”. 997 It was particularly the Prosecutor’s failure to do so
which raised the Appeals Chamber’s concern. In accepting large amounts of UN
material under a confidentiality agreement which prevented even the judges seeing it,
“the Prosecutor effectively prevented the Chambers from assessing whether a fair trial
could be held in spite of the non-disclosure to the defence of certain documents, a role
that the Chamber has to fulfil pursuant to the last sentence of article 67 (2) of the
Statute”. 998

The stay of proceedings in Lubanga was lifted after the UN agreed that the
information could be disclosed to the Chamber. It could then make a determination on
the exonerating nature of the document and the potential need for its disclosure to the
defence. The Appeals Chamber also contemplated the position should the Trial
Chamber determine that the defence were entitled to see material which was the
subject of a confidentiality agreement. It ruled that the Trial Chamber “while
prohibited from ordering the disclosure of the material to the defence, will then have
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to determine whether and, if so, which counter-balancing measures can be taken to
ensure that the rights of the accused are protected and that the trial is fair, in spite of
the non-disclosure of the information”. 999 After the Lubanga and Katanga fiascos the
number of documents obtained under article 54(3)(e) has significantly reduced.

Exonerating Evidence
ICTY and ICTR
In light of the foregoing, it is clear that the equality of arms is undermined in
international justice. The parties start off unequally, which is also the case in domestic
adversarial systems. The principle of equality of arms is further affected by the
imbalance of means to tackle the problems unique to international justice. For
instance, it has been mentioned that the Prosecution has the assistance of NGOs, and
the UN. It has more abilities to enforce State cooperation and gain access to State
archives. The Prosecution further regularly applies protective measures, which affects
the defence ability to investigate.

The duty on the Prosecution in the ICTY and ICTR to disclose all exonerating
evidence within its possession in a timely fashion is intended to partly compensate the
imbalance between the parties. This duty has been referred to as equally important as
the duty to prosecute. 1000 Indeed, it has been emphasised that the Prosecutor is like a
minister of justice “whose object is not simply to secure a conviction but to present
the case for the Prosecution, which includes not only inculpatory, but also exculpatory
evidence in order to assist the Chamber to discover the truth in a judicial setting”. 1001
Particularly at the ICTR, the defence frequently complains that the Prosecutor failed
to disclose exculpatory evidence. Unless defence requests for disclosure of
exculpatory evidence are specific, they are often rejected as amounting to a “fishing
999
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expedition”. 1002 There is an assumption of good faith on the part of the
Prosecution. 1003 It is thus for the defence to establish good cause to believe that the
Prosecution has failed to abide by its obligation to disclose exculpatory
information. 1004 This is not always straightforward. However, recently, failure to
disclose exculpatory evidence in a timely manner led to the acquittal of the Rwandan
minister of foreign affairs and cooperation. 1005

ICC
The ICC Statute goes a step further. Not only does it require that the Prosecution
disclose all exculpatory evidence within its possession, it also mandates the
Prosecution to search incriminating and exonerating circumstances equally. This
obligation is set out in article 54(1)(a) of the Rome Statute, which ascribes the role of
independent and neutral truth-finder to the Prosecutor. 1006

Civil law practitioners regarded the adoption of article 54(1)(a) as an improvement on
the situation at the ad hoc tribunals. There, the Prosecutor was under the sole duty to
disclose exonerating evidence if it happened to come into his possession, and the
burden of collecting exonerating evidence was otherwise left to the Defence. The
drafting of Article 54(1)(a), in fact, is based on a German proposal that was widely
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supported by civil law jurisdictions. 1007 It can thus be said to reflect the influence of
civil law criminal proceedings where a Prosecutor has a similar obligation. 1008

According to Antonio Cassese, “[t]he Prosecutor is not simply, or not only, an
instrument of executive justice, a party to the proceedings whose exclusive interest is
to present the facts and evidence as seen by him or her in order to accuse and to
secure the indictee’s conviction. The Prosecutor is rather conceived of as both a party
to the proceedings and also an impartial truth-seeker or organ of justice”. 1009 Article
54(1)(a) attempts to strike the balance between common law and civil law traditions,
and “build a bridge between the adversarial common law approach to the role of the
Prosecutor and the role of the investigating judge in certain civil law systems”. 1010

Given the difficulties that the defence faces in seeking to obtain evidence, in theory,
this is a significant improvement to the position at the ICTY and ICTR. The
Prosecutor with easier access to relevant information must obtain evidence on behalf
of the defence. This remedies, at least in part, the deficiencies in the defence
investigations and the inequality of arms. In reality, however, it is highly doubtful that
the Prosecutor fulfils this role. In light of the aforementioned inadequacies in the
Prosecutor’s investigations of incriminating circumstances, it does perhaps not come
as a surprise that his investigations for exonerating circumstances are thus far wholly
unsatisfactory.

In every case before the ICC, the defence has raised the concern that the Prosecutor
failed to genuinely investigate even the most basic exonerating circumstances.
Prosecutorial violations of article 54(1)(a) of the ICC Statute were pleaded.

Mention has already been made of the fact that the Prosecutor never visited the
localities of the accused Katanga and Ngudjolo. This is a significant omission in
searching for exonerating evidence. The starting point of such a search is the locality
1007
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of the accused where the Prosecutor can discover what the accused did or did not do.
He should further reach out to the family and friends of the accused, if nothing else, to
obtain mitigating evidence relating to his good character. The Prosecutor has taken no
such initiatives. Until today, in no case did he interview anyone close to the accused
other than insider witnesses. In interviewing these insiders, the Prosecutor does not
always appear neutral as has become clear in the line of questioning adopted in the
Mbarushimana case. 1011

In addition, the Prosecution never follows up any leaks presented to it that could
potentially lead to exonerating evidence. For instance, in Abu Garda, the defence
complained that, contrary to its investigative duties under article 54, the Prosecution
never requested the exonerating evidence mentioned by one Prosecution witness
despite his expressed willingness to provide it. 1012 Similar complaints were made in
Kenya I, where the Prosecution failed to follow up the issue of “coaching witnesses,
being paid 60,000 and being … rented mansions” mentioned by one of its witnesses.
During his interview, Prosecution investigators told this witness that, for now, all it
was interested in is the facts, and they would come back to this issue on another
occasion. They, however, never followed it up. 1013

Also in Kenya I, the Prosecution disclosed a handful of newspaper articles and video
clips of two persons, who say there were coached and induced to implicate Ruto and
recruited others to do the same. 1014 They were allegedly asked to co-operate and
change their statements, so they could be systematic and consistent, in exchange for
upkeep, paid apartments, and relocation outside of Africa. 1015 These persons worked
for organisations whose reports the Prosecution relied on. Yet, it had not investigated
the allegations of impropriety, which was a particularly serious omission because at
least one Prosecution witness for the confirmation hearing appeared to be among
those recruited by these persons. 1016 The Prosecution did not even ask the witness in
question or any other witness, about these inducements. 1017
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In Kenya II, similar complaints were made. The defence for Muthaura submitted that
the Prosecution did not even make an attempt to conduct “the necessary and most
basic investigations” and never interviewed anyone from the inner circles of the
suspect. 1018 General Ali’s defence complained that the Prosecution had completely
failed to exploit Ali’s efforts to combat the Mungiki because these efforts undermined
the Prosecution’s “theory of “inaction” designed to create a “free zone” for
violence”. 1019 The defence also claimed that the Prosecution “consistently downplays
evidence that many Kenya Police officers regularly received actionable intelligence
from General Ali”. 1020 The defence referred to the police raid on the Stem Hotel in
Nakuru on 10 January 2008 to illustrate that General Ali had conveyed vital
intelligence to his officers, which made this raid possible. 1021 According to the
defence, police orders were issued and patrols intensified in the affected areas in an
attempt to get the security situation under control. Notwithstanding that this
information is well documented and known to the Prosecution, it failed to incorporate
it in the story it presented to the Pre-Trial Chamber. 1022
The Pre-Trial Chambers in Abu Garda, and Kenya I and II have taken the position
that the alleged Prosecution failure to comply with its article 54 obligations “does not
fall within the scope of the Chamber's determination pursuant to article 61(7) of the
Statute”. 1023 Accordingly, defence arguments to this effect “can only be viewed in the
context of the purpose of the confirmation hearing, and should thus be regarded as a
means of seeking a decision declining to confirm the charges. It follows, therefore,
that the Defence's objection raised, in this instance cannot in itself cause the Chamber
to decline to confirm the charges on the basis of an alleged investigative failure on the
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part of the Prosecution. Rather, this objection may have an impact on the Chamber's
assessment of whether the Prosecutor's evidence as a whole has met the "substantial
grounds to believe" threshold.” 1024

Thus, the Prosecutor’s duty to search for incriminating and exonerating evidence
equally was not looked at as a distinct issue at the confirmation stage. In Kenya I and
II, dissenting Judge Kaul expressed his disagreement with the majority ruling that this
issue does not fall within the scope of the confirmation hearing. He pointed out article
54 required of the Prosecution investigations to cover all incriminating and
exonerating facts and evidence. In his view, these requirements are fundamental and
must be respected at the confirmation stage. The dissenting judge acknowledged that
the Appeals Chamber authorized the Prosecution to continue its investigations after
confirmation. However, he pointed out that this is only permitted “in certain
circumstances”, and in particular "in situations where the ongoing nature of the
conflict results in more compelling evidence becoming available for the first time
after the confirmation hearing[...]". 1025 Thus, the bulk of the investigations must be
carried out in advance of the confirmation hearing. Given this situation, Judge Kaul
stated the following: 1026
I underline once again the absolute necessity for the Prosecutor to exhaust all ways
and means to make the investigation ab initio as comprehensive, expeditious and
thus as effective as possible, as required by article 54(1) of the Statute. I hold that it
is not only desirable, but necessary that the investigation is complete, if at all
possible, at the time of the Hearing, unless the Prosecutor justifies further
investigations after confirmation with compelling reasons, such as those mentioned
above in paragraph 50. In case a Pre-Trial Chamber is not convinced that the
investigation is complete, it may use its powers under articles 61(7)(c) and 69(3) of
the Statute in order to compel the Prosecutor to complete his investigation before
considering committing any suspect to trial. I consider this issue to be of utmost
importance for the success of this Court.”

Accordingly, in the opinion of Judge Kaul, “the Chamber cannot satisfy itself solely
with the evidence, which the Prosecutor claims to be relevant and reliable, in order to
1024
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effectively and genuinely exercise its filtering function. Such a general approach
would have, in my view, the untenable consequence that Prosecution evidence would
be considered as credible almost by default through the formal act of its presentation.
Likewise, it would have the equally untenable consequence that the role and rights of
the Defence would be dramatically and unfairly curtailed.” 1027

Arguably, the dissenting Judge is correct on this point. The Prosecution has a duty to
investigate incriminating and exonerating circumstances equally from the outset of its
investigations, the major part of which must be conducted prior to the confirmation. If
the full picture is not presented to the Pre-Trial Chamber, the latter risks confirming
charges that should not have been confirmed. It is precisely the task of the Pre-Trial
Chamber to ensure that only those cases are confirmed that should proceed to trial.

Nonetheless, the Prosecutor’s investigative failures were seemingly important factors
in finding that the Prosecutor failed to prove to the requisite “sufficient grounds to
believe” confirmation standard that Abu Garda, as well as four out of the six Kenyan
suspects were guilty as charged.

Article 54 Obligations: Overly idealistic or realistic?

It is debatable whether the notion of a truly independent Prosecutor searching for
evidence that undermines his own case is a workable concept in international criminal
justice systems. Practitioners often come from common law backgrounds where the
notion of prosecutors doing the work of the defence is foreign. Most prosecutors in
international justice are not trained as magistrates or the like. In addition, the
proceedings bear the mark of the typical adversarial model. It is not a joint search for
the truth, duly reported in a dossier, in which the defence is an active participant and
engages with the Prosecution to suggest certain investigative steps. Rather, it is a
party-based gathering exercise.

In this context, it is perhaps not realistic to expect from the Prosecutor to search too
enthusiastically for information that may destroy the credibility of his cases.
1027
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Understandably, the Prosecutor, typically persuaded of the guilt of the accused whose
case he has brought before an international criminal justice system, seeks to secure his
conviction. This is especially true, given the difficulty of bringing cases before
international criminal courts and tribunals, the small percentage of cases that are
brought before an international jurisdiction and the high pressure from NGOs, victim
groups and other observers to succeed. The perceived success of an international
criminal court or tribunal largely depends on the Prosecutor’s conviction figures. 1028
The pressure is enormous and this is likely to impact upon the enthusiasm with which
he Prosecutor will provide the defence with tools to challenge aspects of his case.

Common law practitioners before the ICC are sceptical about the compatibility of
neutrality and the task of prosecuting in an adversarial procedure. 1029 One of the
senior ICC Prosecutors even mentioned in passing and off the record that the
Prosecution’s office does not consider the active search for exonerating evidence as
part of its mandate. Instead, its objective is to disclose all exonerating evidence within
its possession in a timely manner. 1030 This is similar to the viewpoint expressed in the
Prosecution’s Confirmation Brief in Kenya I. 1031 This suggestion is also fully in line
with the Prosecution’s practice until today.

Suggested Solutions

Thus, to comply fully with its obligations under article 54(1)(a) of the ICC Statute,
the Prosecution must drastically change its attitude with regard to the collection of all
evidence rather than only that evidence which supports its theory of the case. Until
now, the Prosecution failed to demonstrate a sufficient level of neutrality in its search
for evidence.
1028
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The Prosecutor’s failure to abide by its investigative obligations renders problematic
the fact that State Parties rely on Article 54 to limit the already tight investigation
budgets of defence teams. If the Prosecutor truly searched for exonerating and
incriminating evidence equally, it may be legitimate to reduce funds for independent
defence investigations. This is, however, not done in reality.

It is perhaps better that the obligation to search for exonerating evidence be left in the
hands of a neutral body not subject to these pressures. The adoption of a neutral
investigative body for the ICC might also prevent political considerations from
prevailing over legal considerations in selecting and charging defendants. As a result
of the dependence of the Prosecutor on the cooperation of States and other entities,
there is a risk that these States or other entities dictate to him who should be
charged. 1032

A neutral investigative body for the ICC may further ensure equality of arms between
the parties. It may not experience similar difficulties as the defence in obtaining the
cooperation of States, NGOs or the UN. 1033 Such a body could then more easily
ensure that all relevant information obtained is presented to the Chamber. Also, if the
parties are in charge of selecting the evidence that is presented to the judges, they may
both present only those portions which support their case. In reality, many documents
simultaneously support and undermine the case of a party and may therefore be
suppressed by both, to the detriment of the truth-ascertaining function of the court.
Neutral and independent investigators may ensure that all relevant evidence in respect
of the charges would reach the triers of fact and, therefore, enhance the truthascertaining function of the court. 1034 This is particularly appropriate where a court is
charged with the determination of historical facts and where allowing the evidence to
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be confined to the evidence presented by the parties may present a partial view of
historical interpretations.

Leaving the investigations in the hands of experienced and neutral investigators who
look for evidence for both sides may result in a perception of greater fairness and
objectivity. 1035 Given their perceived neutrality, witnesses may be more inclined to
co-operate, as they would not feel they were making any declaration of partisanship.

There may also be a cost benefit in employing independent investigators. Independent
investigators can ensure that the limited resources are spent carefully and for relevant
purposes and that the investigations come to an end within a reasonable time.1036
Given the importance of conducting thorough investigations, it is, however,
questionable whether economic considerations should trump all others. What is vital
is that the evidence presented by the Prosecutor is capable of being properly verified
and contextualised. The role of the defence and accused in establishing an unbiased
and complete truth are of the utmost importance. Budgetary and time restraints must
be considered secondary to this.

As has already been indicated there is a price to pay for giving the defence a full
participatory role and voice in the proceedings. Sometimes judges have to listen to
irrelevant, lengthy political arguments. The difficulty is that, hidden within such
diatribes may lie factual nuggets of considerable importance. The careful
consideration of the position of the defence is essential in order to achieve the
objectives of international criminal justice and to ensure that the proceedings cannot
be dismissed as show trials. 1037

One of the perceived advantages of a neutral investigative body is that the accused is
less dependent on the quality of his counsel. On the other hand, he is then fully
dependent on the quality and diligence of the neutral investigators to be employed. In
1035
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either system, the quality of justice will depend on the quality and diligence of the
personnel concerned and the resources afforded to them.

In Part I, it has been suggested that assessors of facts should engage with the
information and information providers while keeping an appropriate distance from
them. It would be an asset if independent investigators, were they to be employed, had
knowledge of, and experience with the culture in which they carry out their
investigations. Too much familiarity with the culture may lead to a loss of objectivity
and choosing sides. On the other hand a lack of familiarity with the situation in
question can lead to uninformed decisions. Interpreters from the region, who may
deliberately or unintentionally distort information, must still be employed.

It would be vital for independent investigators to keep an open mind about the guilt or
innocence of the suspect. The risk that, otherwise, they become additional prosecutors
is particularly great where investigative judges play a significant role in charging
individuals, as they do in certain civil law countries. 1038 This is one of the reasons
why common law jurists are wary of employing investigative judges. They prefer a
system where both the prosecutor and defence have sufficient means to conduct their
own investigations. 1039

If investigative judges do not keep a sufficient distance to the incriminating
information they are receiving, the fear is that, once they have identified a certain
individual as potentially criminally liable for certain identified crimes, they may lose
sight of evidentiary traces that would put his liability in question. They may draw
certain conclusions too fast, particularly when they truly believe in the merits of their
case. Victim witnesses may be believed without further inquiry and sight can be lost
of the necessity to verify the background and identifying details of all witnesses,
including seemingly credible witnesses. This is particularly important in light of the
high risk of manipulation, fabrication and unreliability of the evidence collected in
politicised post-conflict environments. 1040
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Thus, it comes down to the quality of individual investigative judges whether their
recruitment would enhance the ascertainment of the truth. However, even if the fairest
and most competent investigative judges are employed, it is still debatable whether
they are in the best position to collect the available exonerating evidence. An
adequate defence inquiry requires significant time, patience and effort. Often,
exonerating material is not found overnight. It is necessary for a defence investigator
to familiarise himself with the communities concerned and gain their trust. It is only
after some time that people begin to open up and provide information. Relevant
information usually comes from unexpected sources and may require the travelling to
remote locations. It may be necessary to open doors that appear firmly closed.

In addition, while neutral investigators may be more effective to deal with reluctant
States and other international entities, the community, family and allies of the accused
would in most circumstances not open up as easily to a neutral investigator than the
defence counsel for the person they side with. In many occasions, the perceived lack
of neutrality on the part of the defence is an asset in gaining trust of those on the side
of the person he represents.

Thus, in order to conduct such investigations thoroughly and efficiently, it is best to
leave it to investigators who are exclusively concerned with the interests of the
accused, rather than investigators who must be perceived as neutral at all times and
divide their time, focus and resources among serving the often conflicting interests of
the community at large, the victims and the accused. Alternatively, both can play a
role in investigations. Independent investigators could focus on the context and the
defence on the exonerating circumstances surrounding the defendant. The problem
with this proposition is that it will increase rather than reduce costs. There may then
be a tendency to further reduce the defence investigation budget.

In light of these considerations, instead of changing the structural elements of
international justice, a solution should better be found within the existing structure. It
is suggested that the best solution would be to follow Judge Kaul’s proposition and
create a real incentive to the Prosecutor to do his job properly, failure of which would
result in him losing his cases.
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Role of Victims and Witnesses in International Trials

Expert Evidence
To explain the context in which the alleged crimes were committed, it is necessary to
establish an historical record of events. International courts and tribunals often rely on
historians, social scientists, anthropologists or human rights activists as expert
witnesses. 1041 Such experts have not personally observed the events but analyse
information received from sources in the field. Whether they produce reliable
opinions on the events in question depends on the quality of the researchers involved.
This directly relates to their neutrality and expertise, the quality and quantity of the
information available to them and the quality of the methodology applied in terms of
its transparency and reliability. Low quality in any of those areas may lead to
exclusion of the evidence although more often it simply undermines the weight given
to the evidence at the end of the day. 1042

Particularly at the ICTR, many historians and human rights researchers have been
allowed to testify in respect to contextual matters. This includes the socio-economic
and political situation leading up to the 1994 massacres. In addition, it includes the
reasons for the genocide and human rights abuses in 1994, the role of the media in
Rwandan society, the role of the military in 1994 Rwanda and the civil defence
structure. 1043
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Their job does not vary significantly from the job of the adjudicators in court. This is
due to the fact that they equally assess the reliability and credibility of the information
they have collected and draw certain conclusions on the basis of that evidence. Expert
testimony is admissible only if it assists the adjudicators in that it enlightens them “on
specific issues of a technical nature, requiring special knowledge in a specific
field”, 1044 and it is relevant and useful for the Chamber’s deliberation. 1045 If the
evidence relates to legal issues, rather than issues of a technical nature, it will not be
admitted unless such legal issues fall outside the knowledge and expertise of
professional judges. An example is where they fall under domestic law. 1046 In any
other situations legal expertise does not assist the professional judges who are highly
capable of drawing their own conclusions on legal matters. 1047

In collecting evidence, expert witnesses suffer from similar problems as the parties in
an international criminal trial. The international criminal courts and tribunals deal
with cases of particular complexity. The crimes under their jurisdiction such as war
crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide must be committed on a large scale.
1044
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Inevitably, these crimes involve public authorities, rebel groups or other entities
capable of perpetrating crimes in a systematic or widespread manner. Such entities are
often involved in destroying evidence and concealing the identities of the
perpetrators. In addition, documentation of crimes perpetrated during an armed
conflict is difficult because of the circumstances in which they have occurred. It is
much easier to establish globally the nature and level of violence that occurred during
a conflict in a particular region than to establish “who committed what, where, when,
why and how ». 1048

Professor Sunga acknowledges that facts do not speak for themselves but are open to
an indefinite number of interpretations concerning their actual meaning. Therefore,
“great care must be taken to ensure that the particular facts actually represent the real
situation as a whole. Accurate reporting of ‘facts’ might be highly misleading, even
prejudicial, if presented out of context. Even more fundamental, preconceptions about
what one is looking for, conditions one’s view even about what counts as ‘a fact’, and
what does not. People, including investigators, tend to recognize as ‘fact’,
representations about reality that support rather than contradict their own background
views, suppositions, presumptions and prejudices.” 1049

Human rights reporters must be cautious of this. They often share certain objectives
of international criminal justice, such as the fight against impunity for serious
violations of international human rights and humanitarian law. With a view to prevent
such violations from continuing, human rights reporters seek to uncover them and
focus the world’s attention on them. In this process, they often call for accountability
of the perpetrators of serious human rights abuses and welcome the efforts made by
international criminal courts and tribunals in this respect. Whilst human rights
reporters do not all have similar mandates, some of them – for instance, those
working for the NGO Human Rights Watch (‘HRW’) – have a tendency to call for
prosecutions of certain individuals and identify alleged perpetrators.
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Whilst HRW and similar NGOs pride themselves in being objective and providing
accurate information, 1050 their mandate is to report on human rights abuses.
Accordingly, their natural tendency is to associate themselves with the victims of such
abuses and to identify with their side of the story. In siding with the party of the
conflict which suffered the most, they may unintentionally and perhaps even
unconsciously lose their neutrality. They do not always seek to discover the views of
those they have identified as the perpetrators. 1051 Nor are they looking for nuance in
the story of the conflict. On the contrary, it is usually part of their mandate to reveal in
detail to the public at large all crimes they have uncovered. This emphasises the
serious nature of those crimes in an attempt to encourage States, the UN, NATO or
any other decisive political entity to act. 1052

Accordingly, there is a risk that the official story they record is one-sided and does
not reflect the other side of the story. In the context of Rwanda, human rights activists
face the additional difficulty that the story of events is heavily influenced, directly or
indirectly, by the government of Rwanda. 1053 Any expert who criticises the
government may be refused entrance or be thrown in prison. This would seriously
obstruct the work of a researcher on Rwanda. 1054 In addition, the vast majority of
people in Rwanda are scared to openly criticise the government. Doing so may lead to
their arrest as ‘genocidaire’ or ‘genocide negationist’. 1055 Researchers must, therefore,
be vigilant in ensuring that their sources are speaking freely and do not present a
narrative dictated by the Rwandan regime.

Experts are also dependent on factual witnesses. As aforementioned, it is not an easy
task to find reliable factual witnesses. The sources used by expert witnesses
1050
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frequently condition their cooperation on the non-disclosure of their identities. These
sources may be persons who personally witnessed the events that are subject to the
research conducted by the experts. They may also be persons who have information
about the events in question without having personal and direct knowledge. The
research upon which historians, social scientists, anthropologists or human rights
activists draw their conclusion is often based on anonymous hearsay evidence. They
prefer to rely on direct witnesses whose identity can be disclosed to the wider public,
but often such evidence is not available. Unlike courts, they do not have to reach any
conclusion based on the minimum standard of proof. Provided that they explain
adequately the methodology they have used in their analysis, human rights reporters
do not need to follow strict rules in collecting and analysing evidence. As
acknowledged by Professor Sunga, “human rights fact-finding is usually more general
and less rigorous than fact-finding required for criminal prosecutions.” 1056 Thus, they
can and often have no choice but to rely on multiple hearsay which is anonymous, and
other dubious material. 1057

Scholars have raised concerns about the use of social scientists, historians or human
rights researchers as experts in criminal trials. This is due to the impossibility of
forming certain opinions in this field, that are required and expected from an expert
witness. 1058 Some expert witnesses themselves are uncomfortable with their role as
expert in criminal proceedings and share at least some of the criticism expressed. For
instance, Henry Rousso, Director of the Institute for Contemporary History, who
testified as an expert in the French case against Papon, one of the famous WWII
cases, stated: “In my soul and conscience, I believe that an historian cannot serve as a
“witness” and that his expertise is poorly suited to the rules and objectives of a
judicial proceedings. … The discourse and argumentation of the trial … are certainly
not of the same nature as those of the university.” 1059
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In addition, the testimony of social scientists, historians or human rights researchers,
which is not of a technical nature, frequently touches upon issues that are closely
intertwined with the ultimate issues for the judges to determine. 1060 Their opinions are
generally formulated upon the narratives of others. Often, they are based on “second,
third, and even fourth hand testimony of victims and witnesses.” 1061 This may be
acceptable within the context of research into human rights abuses. However, in a
court of law, this raises difficulties given that the credibility of the witnesses whose
stories are being told cannot be tested in cross-examination. 1062

Objections have been raised in relation to non-disclosure of the identity of persons or
sources that form the basis of the expert opinion. In one such case, the Trial Chamber
stated that there was no danger of a deprivation of the right to know the expert’s
sources, as the defence teams had ample opportunity to ask questions relating to the
sources during cross-examination. 1063 Yet, the use of anonymous sources may lead to
unfairness against the accused. This is particularly true given that in their reports
experts often reproduce hearsay evidence from other sources. This means that they
themselves have not even tested these sources. It is true that the defence can ask
expert witnesses how they selected their sources and in what manner they assessed the
truthfulness of their sources, as well as other questions on their methodology. The
defence and the Chamber are nonetheless deprived of an opportunity to assess the
demeanour and credibility of the sources and the reliability of their stories. In
addition, given that the identities of the sources are unknown, the defence is also
hampered in conducting investigations into their credibility. The effectiveness of the
cross-examination of the expert is, therefore, clearly undermined. 1064
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For these reasons non-disclosure of the sources of the information on which the expert
opinion is based may affect the reliability of the expert report or testimony. However,
as long as the expert opinion is not exclusively based on unidentified sources, this is a
matter of weight, not of admissibility. 1065 Indeed, notwithstanding these issues of
reliability, the testimony or a report of a proposed expert, provided he will testify to
the contents of his report, is rarely excluded.

Rights of Victims to Truth and Justice
As addressed in Part I, a core objective of international justice is to do justice to the
victims. It has been suggested that the victims have the right to truth and justice.
These rights have been explicitly recognised by one of the ICC Pre-Trial
Chambers. 1066 They also provide the basis for the right of victims to participate in
trials before the ICC. The ICTY and ICTR have not incorporated victim participation.
Notwithstanding this, the ICTY and ICTR equally appear to have a high regard for
victims. Employees of the ICTY and ICTR, most notably Carla Del Ponte, former
chief Prosecutor of both, has affirmed that she sees her role as doing justice for
victims. 1067

However, the ICC clearly goes a step further. The Chief Prosecutor at Nuremberg,
Justice Robert Jackson acted on behalf of Civilization. 1068 ICTR Prosecutor PierreRichard Prosper and ICTY Chief Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte acted on behalf of the
international community. 1069 In the ICC, Chief Prosecutor Ocampo made a switch to
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the victims and emphasised that he had a “mandate to pay particular attention to the
suffering of the victims”. 1070

It is obvious that international justice must pay significant attention to the interests of
victims. International criminal courts and tribunals were established in the name of
the victims. Without victims, there would be no need for international justice.
International justice does not, however, solely concern the victims. Rather, as was
acknowledged by the prosecutors at Nuremberg, ICTY and ICTR, it concerns the
international community as a whole. Given that the international community
encompasses the victims, arguably there is no need to circle out the victims as a
specific group international justice is to focus on.

It is difficult to identify the victims in a conflict. Victims are often contrasted with
perpetrators, but the line between these two categories is not always clear. Some
persons qualify as both or neither. 1071
On this issue, May and Hoskins state as follows: 1072
When one can recognize, in contexts of conflict and strife, a clear victim and a clear
victimizer, one can then insist on protection of the victim as a universal value.
Although this may appear to be taking sides (politically or otherwise), taking the side
of the victim is a universal stance, a clear expression of justice, global or otherwise.
Also, spotlighting the victim is an aid – both practically and theoretically – for the
issue of identity: Who are we, and for whom do we stand up? The victim – even if he
belongs to the enemy.

Even if victims can be identified clearly, it is still debatable whether international
justice should grant them a right to truth and justice. This is an ambiguous phrase. A
violation of a right warrants a remedy. Does it then follow that a victim is entitled to a
remedy if his right to truth and justice has been violated in a particular case? For
instance, a guilty accused may be acquitted due to insufficient evidence or
irregularities of the procedure. It is also possible that an alleged perpetrator is not
1070
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brought to justice because he is untraceable or the Prosecutor did not select him to be
brought. Such situations surely do not, nor should they, lead to a remedy for the
victims.

The right to truth and justice was first introduced in the particular context of human
rights abuses in central and South America. In the brutal civil wars in places like
Guatemala, Peru, Colombia, Honduras, Argentina and Chile, many people
disappeared and never returned. Family members had no idea where they were, what
happened to them, whether they were dead or alive and would ever return. Their
bodies were never found. In this situation, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
held that the families of the disappeared persons had a right to know the truth of what
had happened to their beloved ones. 1073 The European Court of Human Rights
adopted similar terminology. 1074 It was increasingly acknowledged as a general right
of victims in the context of seeking remedies from the State. This cannot, however, be
simply transformed into a general right of victims to truth and justice in the context of
international criminal trials. Different concepts of truth and justice exist in different
contexts. 1075 As well, international criminal trials should primarily focus on
determining the guilt or innocence of the accused, rather than on granting victims a
right to truth and justice.

It can also not be assumed that all victims want truth and justice. Victims are often
spoken about as if they were one homogeneous group of people with the same
1073
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emotions, needs, and urge for justice. In reality, however, victims are like any other
human beings and differ significantly from each other. The only thing that binds them
universally is that they have suffered from an internationally recognised crime. They
do not speak with one voice, but multiple voices with different expectations from
justice. 1076 Many NGOs speak for victims, but it is questionable whether they truly
represent each single one, or even a high percentage of them. Victims are often
spoken of in a patronising way and represented as passive creatures. It is not
necessarily their own choice to be called ‘victims’. Many of them prefer to be called
‘survivors’ or ‘freedom fighters’. 1077

The empirical research conducted by various researchers and institutes suggests that
most victims want truth and justice, but may have a different perception of how this
should be achieved. Many of them want punishment, but some prefer forgiveness, a
combination of the two, or simply to move on and forget about it. 1078 Truth can reopen old wounds, which is not desired by all victims. 1079 Even if victims generally
desire truth and justice, they may be disappointed with the process put in place to
achieve this, as it will not always bring the desired result. It may also not necessarily
bring relief or emotional repair. 1080

Doak suggests that energy should be invested “in acquiring a greater degree of
understanding of the diverse needs and experiences in order to provide clearer
answers to the problems that confront them.” 1081 This may indeed be the only way to
evaluate what significance international justice can have for victims. 1082
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The rights of victims must further bend when in conflict with the rights of the
accused. 1083 First and foremost, the accused has a right to truth and justice. He is the
one standing trial and facing a long prison sentence, if found guilty. If his guilt is not
established, he must be acquitted irrespective of whether a not-guilty verdict
corresponds with the actual truth. Thus, the rights of the victim to truth and justice are
not always easily reconcilable with the rights of the accused. 1084 International
criminal tribunals and courts are sometimes reluctant to acknowledge that the rights
of the accused have first priority. They regularly state that a fair balance must be
struck between the rights of the accused and the rights of the victims. 1085

Some observers even suggest that, in case of a conflict, the rights of the victim to
truth and justice should prevail. 1086 Other observers have criticised the balancing
exercise. They firmly state that the rights of the accused should prevail over the rights
of the victims. 1087 Given that it puts human beings on trial, international justice first
has a retributive nature. Its primary purpose is to investigate and prosecute individuals
for internationally recognised crimes in fair and efficient proceedings. 1088 The
restorative objectives come second. It is, therefore, indeed inappropriate to give the
accused and victims equal status.

Accordingly, it is suggested that truth and justice should be viewed as aspirations
rather than rights of the victims. Truth and justice are not solely the victims’
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prerogatives, but are of interest to everyone including the affected communities,
victims, accused and society at large. 1089

Victim Participation
At the ICC, whenever the interests of victims are concerned and with leave of the
Court, victims may make written or oral submissions. In giving victims a voice, the
ICC has prioritised their rights and needs and explicitly acknowledged the right of
victims to the truth and justice. This has an impact on the entire process.

This is a novelty in international criminal justice. It is generally viewed as a positive
development. 1090 If testifying does not have a therapeutic effect, then at least victim
participation can have such an effect. 1091 Indeed, it is suggested that victim
participation contributes to the healing process and, thus, defeats secondary
victimisation, if any, caused by testifying. 1092 Therefore, many scholars consider
victim participation as a victory of international justice. 1093

As one victim representative said, “the participation of victims in a judicial process is
wholly relevant. Before all else, the aim is to allow those who are at the very centre,
who are the people who have suffered from the crime to participate in the judicial
process to establish the truth about the crimes.” 1094 Other victim representatives have
made similar submissions emphasizing the right of victims to truth and justice. 1095
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Reservations about this development have also been expressed. 1096 This is an area of
law where one has to be particularly careful not to transplant “wholeheartedly” the
domestic system of victim participation and its underlying rationale. 1097 For instance,
a significant difference between victim participation in domestic jurisdictions and that
in international jurisdictions is the large number of victims who participate in each
trial. In part, this is the result of the wide definition of a victim that has been
applied. 1098 In larger part, this has to do with the fact that the international court
barely deals with crimes other than massive crimes committed on large scale. Unless
a charge is confined to, for instance, torture of a handful of prisoners of war as a war
crime, the number of victims caused by the crimes charged can be extremely high.
Currently, 127 victims participate in the Lubanga trial; 366 in the Katanga trial; and
1889 in the Bemba trial. 1099 Approximately 1500 more victims are in the process of
applying to participate in the Bemba trial, notwithstanding that the Prosecutor only
alleges the existence of about 200 victims of the crimes charged. 1100 In domestic
jurisdictions, there are usually only a number, or just one.
1096
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2003, para. 201, and ICTR, The Prosecutor v Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-40-T, Judgment, 2
September 1998, para. 282: Pursuant to a question from the Chamber as to the killing of teachers,
witness K stated she was unsure how many were killed, but that she knew the names of some of them;
ICTR, The Prosecutor v Kamuhanda, Case No. ICTR-95-54A-T, "Judgment", 22 January 2004, para.
345: "Prosecution Witness GEA testified that he could not say how many people had died at that
location, because "that day there were very many." (...)"; ICTR, The Prosecutor v Ntakirutimana, Case
No. ICTR-96-10 & TCTR-96-17-T, "Judgment and Sentence", 21 February 2003, para. 631: the
witness specified that "many people were killed as a result of this attack".
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Having to deal with such high numbers of victim participants has significant adverse
consequences both for the fairness of the proceedings and for the ascertainment of the
truth. In addition, the hopes of victims may have been raised too highly. This could
then also undermine the healing and therapeutic effects, which are considered to be
the principle objectives of victim participation. These points will be discussed more
thoroughly while analysing how the victim participatory system operates in reality.

Victim Participants: Who Are They?
Victims who wish to participate must put in an application at each stage of the
proceedings. 1101 They can apply to be a participant in a situation, or in a case. Victims
who want to be eligible for reparations must be acknowledged as victims in a
particular case. For each application, the Chamber has to consider whether there are
grounds to believe that the victim is who he claims to be; and that he suffered direct
or indirect harm from the commission of one or more crimes within the jurisdiction of
the Court. 1102 An institution or organisation can also apply for victim status. This will
be granted if it can show that the property it owned suffered direct harm from a crime
committed within the jurisdiction of the Court. This property must further have been
dedicated to religion, education, art or science or other charitable purpose. 1103 To
participate in a specific case, it must be established that the applicant is a victim of
one or more of the crimes charged. 1104

Until now, the ICC has received almost ten thousand applications, one third of which
have been granted. 1105 The parties have a right to respond before the Chamber rules
on the veracity of these applications. This is an incredibly burdensome exercise both
for the parties and for the Chamber. One Judge in the Katanga case reported that
easily one third of their supporting staff was working on victim applications for
several months. 1106 On the side of the defence, the Office of Public Counsel for
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Rule 89 ICC Rules.
Rule 85 ICC Rules; Situation in DRC, ICC-01/04-177-tENG, 31 July 2006; Situation in DRC,
ICC-01/04-101-tEN-Corr, 17 Jan 2006, paras 66 and 79.
1103
Situation in DRC, ICC-01/04-423-Corr-tENG, 31 January 2008, paras 139-143.
1104
Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-601-tEN, 20 October 2006, page 9; Prosecutor v.
Katanga and Ngudjolo, ICC-01/04-01/07-357, 2 April 2008, page 8.
1105
C. Van Der Wijngaert, lecture on victim participation, supra note 539, 6.
1106
C. Van Der Wijngaert, lecture on victim participation, supra note 539, 14-15, Judge Van Der
Wijngaert particularly stresses the difficulties in respect of an individual application procedure that
1102
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Defence (“OPCD”) deals with applications submitted in the situations. A large
percentage of their staff work on these applications on a nearly full-time basis. 1107
Defence teams deal with victim applications in their specific case, which easily
amount to hundreds. In light of the many other tasks they need to focus on, this is a
heavy burden on their shoulders. Presumably, this is the same on the Prosecutor’s
side. Accordingly, dealing with victim applications is a serious strain on the system. It
can take a very long time. 1108

In addition, from their seven-page application form, it is difficult to determine
whether they are genuine victims. The identity of the applicants, as well as any
information that could potentially lead to their identification, is redacted in most of
the applications. Often, the identity of the person who assisted them is also
redacted. 1109 As a protective measure in respect to the victim applicants, the defence
is not entitled to review the redacted information. To give due consideration to the

needs to be applied at each stage of the proceedings. Under the current prevailing interpretation, the
assessment of personal interest in the proceedings must be made anew each time a victim applies to
participate at a different procedural stage. For example, the Appeals Chamber has held that if a victim
wants to intervene in an interlocutory appeal, that victim must demonstrate how his interests are
affected by the appeal, even if this person already has victim status in the proceedings that gave rise to
the appeal. Such applications are made by written submission, on which the parties have the possibility
to comment. This process inevitably delays the appeals proceedings. Some Chambers have also taken
the approach that even within the same procedural phase, e.g. a confirmation hearing or trial hearing,
victims must justify each intervention they want to make, by explaining how the intervention relates to
their interests. For example, under Rule 91(3) if a victim wishes to question a particular witness, the
legal representative must submit a written request, explaining which questions they want to a request,
explaining which questions they want to ask and how these questions further their interests. This was in
part meant to rein in questioning by victims sense of article 68.3 of the Statute. The side effect,
however, is a steady stream Prosecution and the Defence have the right to make observations on each
such request, and the Chamber must rule on them separately. This individualised approach to victim
participation may work in a national proceeding, where there are only a few victims in each case. At
the ICC, however, the number of victims is becoming overwhelming. The judges had to go through this
entire process for each of the nearly 10.000 applications received, and more applications continue to
arrive, now that the Court is investigating the Libya and Ivory Coast situations. The Court may soon
reach the point where this individual case by case approach becomes unsustainable. It may well have to
consider replacing individual applications with collective applications. This would, of course, require
amendments to the applicable texts. (page 6).
1107
Personal Interview with an OPCD member, 11 November 2011. They are currently also dealing
with the 1500 new applications in the Bemba trial.
1108
B. McGonigle Leyh, Procedural Justice? Victim Participation in International Criminal
Proceedings (Intersentia, 2011), pages 243-257.
1109
The requests of the victims to participate at the proceedings are disclosed ex parte only to the
defense, Prosecution, legal representatives, the Registry, and Chambers. The name of the
intermediaries who helped the applicant to fill the form are redacted for the defence, and also probably
for the prosecution, but not for the Chamber and for legal representatives of the victims (these latter
have only access to those of the victims they represent). See ICC-01/04-01/07-1347 31-07-2009,
Dispositif de la décision relative aux 345 demandes de participation de victimes à la procédure; ICC01/04-01/07-1491-Red-tENG 10-03-2010, paras. 42-43.
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principle of equality of arms, the redacted information is equally withheld from the
Prosecution. 1110

Apart from one or two paragraphs containing the victim’s allegations of harm
suffered, practically all information is blackened out. As a result, the parties are
prevented from conducting any investigations into the veracity of the allegations, or
the identity of the victims. The judges do not have any investigative function. 1111 In
addition, given the voluminous applications, the judges do not have the capacity to
thoroughly scrutinise each application. In this regard, it does not help that they are
geographically and culturally far removed from the victims. Reasonable grounds that
applicants qualify as victims do not need to be established. 1112

Consequently, it is impossible to be sure that all victim participants are in fact genuine
victims. It is, of course, hoped that the lawyers and NGOs who assist victims in filling
out the forms and putting in their application to the Court carefully verify whether the
victims are who they say they are – and scrutinise the story. The close resemblance of
different applications does not inspire confidence. They are clearly written with the
same pen, and it is highly questionable whether these are the words of the applicant or
the reporter.

When the issue of close resemblance was raised in the case of Katanga & Ngudjolo,
the Chamber held that “the fact that one statement is similar to others is not in itself
sufficient to affect its credibility, but means that the statement needs to be scrutinized
in light of the other information contained in the application for participation.” 1113 To
give due weight to the defence observations, the Chamber called on the Registry “to
remind intermediaries that their role is restricted to explaining to applicants any terms
which they may not understand and assisting them in drafting their application. They
should not, however, exert any influence whatsoever on the actual content of
statements, in particular in respect of anything relating to the nature of the alleged

1110

B. McGonigle Leyh, Procedural Justice? Victim Participation in International Criminal
Proceedings (Intersentia, 2011), 253-255.
1111
Apart from unique investigative opportunities. See further Part II.
1112
Situation in DRC, ICC-01/04-101-tEN-Corr, 17 January 2006, paras. 99-100.
1113
ICC-01/04-01/07-1347 31-07-2009, Dispositif de la décision relative aux 345 demandes de
participation de victimes à la procédure; ICC-01/04-01/07-1491-Red-tENG 10-03-2010, para. 42.
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crimes or the harm suffered.” 1114

In Lubanga, the judges were much less careful. They held that the similarities in
applications were unsurprising given the “broad context of the systematic
conscription of children under the age of 15 into the military forces of the UPC”.1115
This observation raises question marks about the presumption of innocence. It also
undermines the principle that “a decision to grant an applicant a procedural status in
the proceedings in no way predetermines any factual findings that could be made by a
Chamber in any judgment on the merits”. 1116

That the presumption of innocence is affected by victim participation is a general
concern. Judges frequently feel the urge to apologise to the victims if they do not
decide in their favour. This is an indicator of how important the rights of the victims
are considered. For instance, dissenting Judge Kaul, who found that the post election
violence in Kenya did not amount to crimes against humanity, started off with an
apology to the victims: 1117
“I wish to confess that I have taken this position with a heavy heart. I am profoundly
aware of the crimes and atrocities described in the Application for summonses to
appear for the three suspects William Ruto, Henry Kosgey and Joshua Sang
pursuant to article 58(7) of the Statute. I understand and sympathise with the hopes
and expectations of the victims of the crimes committed in different locations,
including Turbo town, the greater Eldoret area (Huruma, Kyambaa, Kimumu,
Langas and Yamumbi), Kapsabet town and Nandi Hills town in the Uasin Gishu
and Nandi Districts. I am aware of the victims' expectation that those responsible for
these crimes should be brought to justice. I am also painfully aware that there are
currently many citizens in the Republic of Kenya who hope for and support the
intervention of the Court in this country because they do not have confidence in
their own criminal justice system.”

This orientation on victim participants is all the more troublesome in light of the fact
that it is very unclear whether they are genuine. Yet, their allegations are taken for
granted. It cannot be assumed that all victim applicants are honest. The assumed
financial interest in participating should not be underestimated. Persons who were
victim of an attack not subject to investigations may feel legitimate in pretending they
were victims of the attack under investigation. It has already happened that, in the
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Ibid, para. 43.
Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-2509, 29 June 2010.
1116
Situation in DRC, ICC-01/04-505, 3 July 2008, para. 30.
1117
ICC-01/09-01/11-2 15-03-2011, para. 3.
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course of the proceedings against Katanga and Ngudjolo, it became apparent that
participating victims were not present at Bogoro, the crime base. Rather, they were
victims of an attack on Kasenyi, not subject to any investigations. 1118

It is difficult for the Court to establish whether the victim applicants are who they
claim they are. Searching for someone’s identity is in reality a difficult exercise. The
correctness as stated in their identity cards cannot be assumed. Often, there are no
official papers. A large number of the birth certificates and registration cards have
been destroyed in the war. Victims and witnesses have given different birthdates at
different times. For instance, in Bogoro, it is difficult to be sure who was in Bogoro
on 24 February 2003. No register of Bogoro inhabitants of that time exists.

If granted victim status, they are represented by counsel. One victim representative
can easily represent hundreds of victims. In Kenya, for instance, one victim
representative has been assigned for 327 victims. In Katanga, two representatives
represent a total of 388 victims. Many of them keep their anonymity throughout the
proceedings. This diminishes their right to review confidential material and their right
to present and challenge evidence. 1119 The extent to which their identities are
disclosed to the defence varies from case to case. They rarely are disclosed to the
public.

Even if the names are known to the defence, they are always referred to by their
numbers. There are so many of them that one tends to forget that they have names and
individual stories. Their legal representatives barely know the names of their clients.
In light of the geographical distance, their contact with their clients is sporadic. Most
1118

See: Notification du retrait de la victime a/0363/09 de la liste des temoins du representant legal,
ICC-01/04-01/07-2695, 16 August 2011, Pursuant to Trial Chamber II’s Decision ICC-01/04-01/073064, 7 July 2011; Confidential Urgent Décision relative à la Notification du retrait de la victime
a/0363/09 de la liste des témoins du représentant légal ICC-01/04-01/07-2699, 16-08-2011, Pursuant to
Trial Chamber II's Decision ICC-01/04-01/07-3064, dated 7 July 2011, this document is reclassified as
"Public"; Public document Decision on the notification of the removal of Victim a/0381/09 from the
Legal Representative’s list of witnesses, ICC-01/04-01/07-2674-tENG 08-08-2011; Confidentiel
Rapport du représentant légal conformément à la décision ICC-01/04-01/07-2699- Conf et demande
depouvoir mettre fin à son mandat concernant deux victimes (article 18 du Code de conduite
professionnel), ICC-01/04-01/07-2782-Conf 18-03-2011, ICC-01/04-01/07-2782 16-08-2011 Pursuant
to Trial Chamber II's Decision ICC-01/04-01/07-3064, dated 7 July 2011, this document is reclassified
as "Public".
1119
B. McGonigle Leyh, Procedural Justice? Victim Participation in International Criminal
Proceedings (Intersentia, 2011), 253-255.
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of them do not have a mobile phone. The legal representatives visit their clients from
time to time. However, when in the field, they must divide their attention between
their multiple clients. They may not even find their clients at home when they arrive.
One legal representative confirmed how difficult it is to keep in regular contact with
the victims and give them information on the proceedings in which they participate.
Months pass by without any contact. 1120 Thus, victim participation is rather fictitious.
It does not bring the victims any closer to the courtroom. It only brings additional
lawyers into the courtroom. 1121

Victim Participation in Practice

Investigations
During investigations, the participation of victims is limited. If the Prosecutor seeks to
open an investigation proprio motu, he needs the authorisation of the Pre-Trial
Chamber. In such a situation, pursuant to Article 15(3) of the Statute, the victims have
a right to present their views and concerns to the Pre-Trial Chamber. Also, if the
Prosecutor decides in the interests of justice not to initiate an investigation which was
referred to him by a State or the Security Council, he needs the Pre-Trial Chamber’s
authorisation for that decision. In reviewing the Prosecutor’s decision not to
investigate, the Pre-Trial Chamber must take the concerns of the victims into
consideration. 1122 However, victims cannot initiate investigations.

Until now, all attempts to broaden the investigations in respect to particular
individuals have been rejected. For instance, in the cases of Lubanga and Bemba,
various attempts have been made by victims and NGOs to be heard on the scope of
the charges. In the case of Lubanga, their purpose was that investigations be
broadened to include sexual offences. In Bemba, it was to include crimes committed
in DRC. These requests were initially rejected because the Prosecutor’s investigations
were still ongoing. 1123 In Bemba, no further attempts have been made in this regard.
1120

Personal interview with Gillisen, legal representative in Katanga trial who confessed that he was
unsure who he was still representing as many had disappeared (interview in Bunia in the course of
judicial site visit, 19 January 2012).
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This was also pointed out by Judge Van Der Wijngaert: C. Van Der Wijngaert, lecture on victim
participation, supra note 539.
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Article 53(3)(b) of the ICC Statute.
1123
Decision on the Request submitted pursuant to rule 103(1) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence,
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In Lubanga, once the case was confined to the allegation of enlistment, conscription
and active use of child soldiers, any request to add additional allegations was
considered to have no link with the case itself. 1124

Towards the end of the prosecution’s case, victim representatives made another
attempt to add charges on the basis of the evidence that had been presented. They
submitted a request to the judges to consider a legal re-characterisation of the facts as
sexual slavery, and inhuman and / or cruel treatment involving rape, 1125 which, had it
been accepted, would have significantly altered and broadened the scope of the
charges against him.

The initial decision was favourable. In the particular context of the case at hand, the
majority of the Trial Chamber was persuaded by the submissions of the victim
representatives and the evidence heard so far during the course of the trial that the
evidence presented may allow for a modification of the legal characterization and put
the parties on notice that the legal characterisation of facts may be subject to
change. 1126 There was a strong dissent, given that the proposed modifications would
involve additional, and arguably more serious, offences, which in the dissenting view
is in violation of the Rome Statute and the Regulation it was based on. 1127 Meanwhile,
ICC-01/04-373, 20-08-2007; Public Decision on the Requests of the Legal Representative for Victims
VPRS 1 to VPRS 6 regarding "Prosecutor's Information on further Investigation", ICC-01/04-399 2609-2007; Public Decision on the request of the legal representative of victims VPRS 3 and
VPRS 6 to review an alleged decision of the Prosecutor not to proceed, ICC-01/04-582 26-102010.
1124
Public Decision on Request pursuant to Rule 103 (1) of the Statute, ICC-01/04-01/06-480, 26-092006; Décision sur les demandes de participation à la procédure présentées par les Demandeurs VPRS
1 à VPRS 6 dans l'affaire Le Procureur c. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo ICC-01/04-01/06-172, 29-06-2006.
1125
Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Demande conjointe des représentants légaux des victimes aux fins de mise
en œuvre de la procédure en vertu de la norme 55 du Règlement de la Cour, 22 May 2009, ICC-01/0401/06-1891.
1126
Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Public - Urgent Decision giving notice to the parties and participants that
the legal characterisation of the facts may be subject to change in accordance with Regulation 55(2) of
the Regulations of the Court, 14 July 2009, ICC-01/04-01/06-2049, paras. 27-30, 33-35. The majority
came to that conclusion by separating Regulation 55(1) limiting any modification to the legal
characterization to those not exceeding the facts and circumstances described in the charges, from
Regulation 55(2) which does not include any limitation save for those set out in Regulation 55(3)
(allowing the Defence adequate time and prepare a defence against the modified charges and to bring
back witnesses previously heard and/or call additional witnesses and/or present other additional
evidence).
1127
Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Public Minority opinion on the "Decision giving notice to the parties and
participants that the legal characterisation of facts may be subject to change in accordance with
Regulation 55(2) of the Regulations of the Court", 17 July 2009, ICC-01/04-01/06-2054, para. 44. The
minority of the judges submits the view that Regulations 55(2) and (3) cannot be relied upon to
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the decision has been overturned on appeal. 1128 Thus, Mr. Lubanga is left with the
charge of child soldiers.

The role of the victims during investigations is still evolving. However, until now, it
has been severely restricted. In light of earlier observations on the Prosecutor’s
politicised selection of suspects, it would have served the ascertainment of the truth in
a wider sense had the victims been given an opportunity to challenge the Prosecutor’s
choices. In addition, victims are principally affected by the Prosecutor’s choices of
suspects and charges. Indeed, they can only participate and seek reparation if the
Prosecutor decides to charge the particular crimes of which they are victims.

Trial
At trial, victim participants may, with leave of the Court, ask questions of witnesses to
ascertain the truth and where the personal interests of the victims are concerned. 1129
The right to ask questions to witnesses is not limited to reparation issues but extends
to questions pertaining to the guilt or innocence of the accused. 1130 In addition, they
may call their own witnesses.

circumvent the stricter requirements under Regulation 55(1) limiting re-characterisation of facts to
those not exceeding the charges. Pursuant to Article 61(9) of the Rome Statute, the charges can no
longer be amended once the trial has begun to provide an accused ‘with a high degree of certainty as to
charges that he or she will face once the trial has commenced’, and Regulation 55 has to be read in that
light (paras. 15-17). If it were allowed for modifications to exceed the facts and circumstances
described in the charges, such modifications would amount to amendments of the charges in violation
of Article 61(9) and, in the view of the minority, “would markedly undermine the rights of the accused
under Article 67(1)(a) "[t]o be informed promptly and in detail of the nature, cause and content of the
charge [...]", set against the general restrictions on changes to the charges as reflected in governing
provision, Article 61(9)”. The facts of a criminal case frequently - in reality, invariably - change and
develop as the trial unfolds, and under the approach preferred by the majority, the accused could be
confronted, at any stage, with a re-characterization based on the new facts and circumstances that have
emerged during the trial. Even allowing for the safeguards under sub-regulations 2 and 3, this would be
inimical to the statutory provisions just set out, which strongly tend towards finality and certainty as
regards the charges, rather than to flexibility, particularly if this leads to a significant change” (para.
28).
1128
Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Judgment on the appeals of Mr Lubanga Dyilo and the Prosecutor against
the Decision of Trial Chamber I of 14 July 2009 entitled "Decision giving notice to the parties and
participants that the legal characterisation of the facts may be subject to change in accordance with
Regulation 55(2) of the Regulations of the Court", 8 December 2009, ICC-01/04-01/06-2205.
1129
Lubanga Decision on Victim’s Participation (n 1036 above), paras. 108-109.
1130
Ibid, paras. 119-120; see also: Lubanga Appeals Chamber Decision on Victim’s Participation (n
1036 above), para. 102. Appeals Chamber Judges Pikis and Kirsch submitted strong dissenting
opinions to this ruling. See further H. Friman, The International Criminal Court and Participation of
Victims: A Third Party to the Proceedings? 22 Leiden Journal of International Law 485 (2009), 493.
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Thus victim participants have a potentially powerful role as a third party in
conducting investigations and presenting evidence to the Court. The Appeals
Chamber has addressed the distinction between parties and participants in ICC
proceedings, emphasising that victims have the latter status with much more limited
rights and obligations. However, as Friman has pointed out, “[t]he determination that
victims may lead and challenge evidence pertaining to guilt or innocence at trial
pushes the role of the ‘participant’ very far, indeed so far that it is difficult to avoid
the notion of their in fact being ‘parties’. 1131

The active participation of independent victims may assist the truth-ascertaining
process. They may present evidence to the Court that the parties do not have in their
possession or prefer to ignore for tactical reasons. In the case against Ngudjolo and
Katanga a victim representative informed the Court of his intention to demonstrate
that the responsibility which the Prosecution attributed solely to the two defendants
extended to many others, including the political leaders of their own and neighbouring
States. 1132

If the trend is for victims to seek to depict the fuller picture surrounding the crimes
charged, going beyond the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused, but
not interfering with that determination then the ICC can be truly said to be a Court
where the ascertainment of the truth is being given its proper significance. However,
if the victim participants effectively act as additional prosecutors, whose primary
interest lies in securing a conviction skewed in their own interest then the fairness,
and efficiency of the proceedings will have been severely impaired for little gain.

It is to be expected that, in most cases, the victims will be hostile to the accused. It
will be in their direct interest to act like semi-prosecutors and produce evidence or ask
questions demonstrating that guilt. A particular difficulty will arise where it is the
case that the accused is an alleged indirect rather than direct perpetrator. The victims
1131
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Chronique d’Amnesty International Mai 2010, Premier check-up pour la Cour pénale international,
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may not even know who is responsible for their suffering, but will have been told by
others that it was the accused. Their submissions and questions, inevitably hostile to
the interests of the accused, will be unlikely to bear upon the real issues to be decided
by the bench and may simply muddle and lengthen proceedings. In addition, their
submissions prolong the proceedings and place a heavy additional workload on the
Chamber and the defence. If the defence is not allocated sufficient additional funds to
deal with this workload, the equality of arms will be further distorted. 1133

The first cases before the ICC are instructive as to the roles played by victim
representatives, who may often represent hundreds of victims, with the difficulties
that this brings with it. They have tended to ask questions seeking to implicate the
accused, and to take the side of the Prosecutor in each legal argument. In the case of
Katanga and Ngudjolo, a victim representative suggested to a witness who had not
yet implicated the group allegedly led by one of the accused in the abduction of
women and children that that group had in fact been involved. In response to an
objection from the defence, the victim representative said: “I do understand that this is
rather embarrassing for the Defence. I can put myself in their shoes, but I think truth
is worth the price, regardless of how embarrassing it may be.” 1134

The interventions of the victim representatives in Katanga & Ngudjolo have still been
rather limited. Frequently the Chamber has reminded them of their neutral role and
that they are not Prosecutors bis. 1135 On the other hand, the Chambers in the Lubanga,
Bemba and Kenya cases allowed far reaching interventions going directly to the guilt
of the defendant. In Lubanga, for instance, victim representatives were allowed to ask
questions about Lubanga’s link to the financial support to the UPC in order to help
establish his role in the UPC leadership structure. 1136 In Kenya, the legal
1133
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representative was allowed to read out personal emails she received from her clients
alleging threats and intimidation from the suspects. This was part of her closing
submission at the confirmation. Thus, the defence did not even have an opportunity to
respond to these new allegations based on anonymous hearsay. The defence objected
a number of times until the judge firmly stated: ‘Interruption will not be granted.’ 1137

These examples demonstrate that victim participants are not neutral. They have a
direct monetary interest in establishing that the accused has committed crimes
charged of which the victim participants are directly or indirectly a victim. The court,
while making appropriate acknowledgment of the severe suffering endured by some
of the victim participants and many other victims, must not place undue emphasis on
it when deciding whether it is sure that the accused is guilty as charged.

Another problem for the accused is that victim participants do not have the same
disclosure obligations as the Prosecutor. The Appeals Chamber has held that ‘[i]f the
Trial Chamber decides that the evidence [from victims] should be presented then it
could rule on the modalities for the proper disclosure of such evidence before
allowing it to be adduced . . . .’ 1138 Thus, it is for the Chamber to determine on an ad
hoc basis the extent of disclosure obligations on victim participants.

Unlike the Prosecutor, victim representatives do not need to disclose the evidence
before the start of the trial, but at a later point to be determined on a case-to-case basis
by the Chamber. This will put the accused under time pressure in terms of seeking
cross-examination material and rebuttal evidence. Victim representatives have no
obligation to disclose exonerating evidence, 1139 and may fail to do so for dubious
tactical reasons, potentially depriving the Chamber of relevant information and the
accused of a fair trial. 1140

facts are allowed. They can include direct allegations against the accused (Bemba ICC-01/05-01/08807-Corr, 12 July 2010, paras 38-40).
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What can Victims Expect at the End of the Day?
Victim participation may raise unrealistic hopes both as to the righting of individual
wrongs and as to the issue of compensation since no price is high enough to remedy
the injuries suffered. It is also unclear how victim participants will be remedied.
Given their increasing number, whatever they will receive in compensation will
probably be below expectations. This may then result in “tertiary victimisation” as
Judge Van Der Wijngaert calls it. 1141
Whatever may be its merits in principle, victim participation is one of the greatest
challenges for the ICC and potentially delays and complicates already lengthy and
complex trials. The ICC is still in the process of sorting out the modalities of victim
participation in a manner consistent with its truth-ascertaining mandate and principles
of due process.
The proposed budget for 2012 for victim-related issues exceeds seven million
Euros. 1142 This stands in stark contrast to the envisaged budget reductions for defence
related issues. While the budget for victims and witnesses increases each year, the
defence budget decreases this year by 15 percent. Drastic measures are being
proposed including significant cuts of salaries and investigation budget. Thus, victim
participation clearly undermines the position of the defence. On balance, it is
debatable whether this sharp focus on victims is worth the price.

Victims as Witnesses
Victims can play a role as witnesses in the trials held in international courts and
tribunals. This is a very crucial role. Trials cannot be held without victim witnesses
who give testimony about their victimisation. However, empirical researchers suggest
that many victims at the ICTY were disappointed with the experience of testifying.
They found the court testimony stressful and felt let down and humiliated by defence
had informed the legal representative that, contrary to his claim in court, he was not at Bogoro when it
was attacked. The representative gave this information to the Prosecutor who subsequently investigated
it. This eventually led to the withdrawal of one Prosecution witness who was simultaneously a victim.
See: Public Decision on the Prosecution's renunciation of the testimony of witness P-159, ICC-01/0401/07-2731, 24-02-2011.
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C. Van Der Wijngaert, lecture on victim participation, supra note 539, 14-15.
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Ibid, pages 4, 14-15.
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counsel. They also complained because they received no information about the case
after their testimony. Accordingly, Stover concludes that testimony invokes “intrusive
post-traumatic symptoms in victims of war crimes”. 1143 ICTR victim witnesses have
made similar complaints. 1144

If victim witnesses perceive the experience of testifying as a traumatising event, other
victim witnesses may be put off from testifying. This would have a consequent
negative impact on the availability of evidence and on the ascertainment of the truth.
This may also be unfortunate for the purpose of reconciliation, which some observers
consider to be served by giving victims an opportunity to tell their story about what
happened to them. 1145

The veracity and causes of these complaints, as well as potential improvements, will
be addressed below.

Treatment of Witnesses Outside the Courtroom
Victim witnesses are treated similarly to other witnesses. Sometimes, witnesses who
are not qualified as victims equally express dissatisfaction with the experience of
testifying. Witnesses have to come from far to an unfamiliar court whose language
they barely speak or not at all. Many of them have never in their entire life left their
region or been on a plane. They are also unsure what is to be expected from them. It is
thus not surprising that witnesses feel uncomfortable about testifying. 1146

A Victim and Witness Unit (“VWU”) is in charge of organising the visas, journey,
accommodation and food. 1147 If requested, the VWU sends an escort to accompany
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the witness. They arrange for pocket money, accommodation and food. In the ICC,
the witnesses are also provided with a suit to wear in court, as well as comfortable
winter clothes, if required. Urgent medical or dental problems can also be sorted out
while witnesses are present at the seat of the Court. The VWU can further
accommodate additional individual demands, provided they are reasonable and
connected with the witnesses’ testimonies. 1148 Dependent on their availability, VWU
staff members regularly take witnesses out for day-tours to cities or the beach during
weekends or other breaks during their testimonies.

Women with babies can come accompanied by an accompanying person who will
look after the babies during the course of the women’s testimonies. Vulnerable
witnesses can also be accompanied. Alternatively, a contact person from the VWU
will pay particular attention to such witnesses and be available at any time they are in
need. Psychological assistance is also available. 1149

Upon request, witnesses who face a potential risk of self-incrimination may receive a
guarantee that they will not be prosecuted for what they say in court, apart from
perjury. The protection against self-incrimination offered at the ICC is more elaborate
than at the ICTY and ICTR. 1150 The ICC legal provisions explicitly allow witnesses to
give incriminating parts of their testimony in closed session. In addition, they are
entitled to counsel. 1151
The period of absence can be long. Many witnesses spend several weeks at the seat of
the Court even if the testimony itself is shorter. The period is particularly long at the
ICC. The VWU at the ICC has created a lengthy familiarisation program to prepare
witnesses for their testimony. This program starts a few days prior to the witness’s
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testimony, and ends a number of days after his testimony. In the course of his
familiarisation program, the parties and participants have an opportunity to greet the
witness. The witness is further shown the courtroom and explained who sits where
and the order in which the parties and participants will ask him questions. 1152

The length of absence often causes difficulties to witnesses with jobs. Employers do
not always act reasonably when a witness requests for leave of absence for a month or
longer. This is particularly problematic if the employer is not informed of the real
reason for the witness’s departure, which is the case when a witness testifies
anonymously. The VWU can act as an intermediary and, for instance, write a letter to
the employer, or assist the witness in inventing a credible story to explain his absence.
The VWU reimburses witnesses for any lost income. 1153 In addition, if a witness is a
student when he is called to testify, the VWU is prepared to assist him financially in
re-taking any missed courses.

There is no specific program to inform each individual witness of the continuation
and outcome of the case in which they testified. There is, however, a very extensive
outreach program at the ICTY, ICTR and ICC. The purpose of this program is to
reach out to the affected communities and keep them informed about the
developments at the international tribunals and court. Thus, witnesses are not
forgotten after the completion of their testimony. They are clearly more than mere
instruments of the international tribunals and court, as Judge Jorda put it. 1154

Accordingly, witnesses for the Prosecution, defence and victim representatives are
treated very well. This is particularly the case at the ICC, which is characterised by its
“victim-friendliness”. 1155 However, even at the ICTY and ICTR, the VWU is
extremely helpful and generous to witnesses. In general, witnesses are satisfied with

1152

Personal experience in the ICC Katanga trial.
The VWU has assisted a number of defence witnesses in their interactions with their employers.
Where necessary, the VWU wrote official invitations stressing the importance of their testimonies.
Consequently, employers authorised the witnesses leave of absence without great difficulty.
1154
C. Jorda & J. de Hemptinne, The Status and Role of the Victim, in the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court: A Commentary, in Cassese et al (2002), 1387, 1388.
1155
C. Van Der Wijngaert, lecture on victim participation, supra note 539.
1153

283

their treatment at the tribunals and court. 1156 This undermines the viewpoint that the
ICTY and ICTR are not sufficiently victim-centred. 1157

However, despite the best efforts on the part of the VWU, some witnesses still
complain. Sometimes, the logistical arrangements are not implemented as smoothly as
intended. 1158 On other occasions, witnesses demand more money for lost income or
other issues. Witnesses from poor countries with very sparse resources do not always
realise that the international courts and tribunals have budgetary limits. They can be
under the erroneous belief that testifying is a financially profitable business. These
witnesses undoubtedly find themselves disappointed. 1159

There is also a genuine belief shared by many defence witnesses in the DRC that they
are not treated equally to prosecution witnesses. This belief is based mainly on the
fact that many prosecution witnesses are relocated and funded for housing and
education. Relocated witnesses, however, fall in a different category from other
witnesses. There is no reason to believe that defence witnesses receive a differential
treatment from non-relocated prosecution or victim witnesses. All witnesses are in the
very gentle and capable hands of the VWU.

However, such a system comes at an extremely high price at the expense of other
important issues, such as the investigation budget of the parties. The financial side of
the witness program will be discussed below.

Prohibition of Contact with the Parties
The prohibition of contact at the ICC and its adverse impact on the defence ability to
adequately investigate has already been discussed. This prohibition also has
consequences for the well being of witnesses while in The Hague. Witnesses
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generally build up a relationship of confidence with members of the party they have
been in contact with in their home country. Such relationships cannot easily be
replaced by the VWU. In light of the cultural differences, it can take some time for
witnesses to confide in a person. It can therefore be discomforting for witnesses to
have no contact at all with the person they trust while in a foreign country. Often they
do not know anyone there.

Many of them have never left their area and have never been on a plane before. This
can be either exciting, or frightening, or both at the same time. In the ICTY and
ICTR, a party can welcome its witnesses at the airport or meet them at their hotels. It
can have both casual and professional contact with them before and after their
testimony, which generally reassures witnesses to the extent necessary. In the ICC, on
the other hand, they are exclusively under charge of the VWU. The parties only have
the right to greet them during a courtesy meeting lasting ten minutes when they arrive
and five minutes after their testimony to say thank you.
Some witnesses find this really difficult, even if the VWU treats them very well. 1160
The prohibition of contact extends to the presentation of all evidence in the case. 1161
Thus, even after their departure from The Hague, the parties cannot be in contact with
the witnesses until the very end of the trial. This can be particularly unnatural for
local investigators who live in the same area and who are used to having frequent
contact with the witnesses up until their departure. 1162

To avoid that parties willingly or unwillingly influence the witnesses’ testimonies, it
may be considered necessary to disallow contact between them prior to these
testimonies. Elsewhere, it has, however, been argued that appropriate and succinct
contact should be allowed prior to the familiarisation program, and where necessary,
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to take an additional statement from the witness. 1163 Not everyone agrees with that
proposition. 1164 Nevertheless, there are no compelling reasons to prohibit contact after
the completion of the witnesses’ testimonies. It would be too late for a witness to
change his testimony even in the event that a party makes it apparent that parts of the
testimony were not helpful. If the concern is that the party passes on a message for
another witness, the party can simply contact the other witness directly. In theory, a
witness can be recalled to clarify an issue that came up after his testimony. However,
in practice this rarely happens. 1165 This is, therefore, arguably an insufficient ground
to prohibit all contact. In a party-system, the judges have no choice but to trust that
the parties conduct themselves ethically. Indeed, unless proven otherwise, the good
faith of the parties is assumed. 1166

The prohibition of contact also extends to the accused. In the ICTY and ICTR,
witnesses have the right to visit the accused in prison after the completion of their
testimonies. The defence in Katanga & Ngudjolo asked that all defence witnesses be
permitted to meet with the accused in prison after their testimony. 1167 The Prosecution
and victim representatives objected on the ground that the Chamber had already ruled
that contact between the parties and the witnesses was prohibited until the end of the
presentation of all evidence. Such contact was allowed on an exceptional basis
only. 1168 The Prosecution submitted that, were the Chamber to allow such meetings to
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take place, it should be brief and in the presence of someone from the Registry.
Discussing the testimony or using unknown languages should not be permitted. 1169

The Registry also submitted observations holding that such meetings should not be
allowed. It held that this could be a motive for witnesses to testify, as frequently
occurred in the ICTY and ICTR. It also said it would delay the witnesses’ departure
back to their home country and that the visit to prison could have a traumatising effect
on the witnesses as they would have to go through the prison security. Instead, it
suggested allowing the accused to greet the witnesses briefly in the Court
immediately after their testimony. 1170

Arguably, these are unconvincing grounds not to allow meetings between an accused
and his witnesses. The defence cannot call an unlimited number of witnesses. It has to
demonstrate their relevance; otherwise the Chamber may not authorise their
appearance. Thus, it is extremely unlikely that anyone would be called on the sole
basis that they can visit the accused. The traumatising effect of the prison security
would surely be outweighed by the trauma of travelling thousands of miles to testify
and not be able to meet with the accused. Since the accused is facing a potentially
lengthy prison sentence, it could be the last opportunity to see him for a long time, or
even for good. Some of them have close links with the accused. In the specific case of
Katanga, the accused had not seen his family and friends since January 2005, when he
left the eastern part of Congo for Kinshasa, thousands of miles away. Shortly after, he
was arrested and remained in the Kinshasa central prison until his transfer to The
Hague in October 2007. 1171 Nobody from his home area, including his family, could
afford coming to visit him in Kinshasa or The Hague. Like any other prisoner, Mr.
Katanga is entitled to receive visitors. To then not allow him to receive visits from the
witnesses who he has not seen for years and have come all the way to testify in his
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defence, is rather inhuman. Such visits can be subject to monitoring and do therefore
not raise difficulties for the Court.

The Chamber nonetheless rejected the request and reiterated that it would authorise
contact on an exceptional basis only. It authorised a monitored meeting between the
accused and his brother for half an hour immediately after his testimony. 1172 All other
witnesses were allowed a five-minute monitored meeting in a little cell behind the
courtroom. Further requests for longer meetings with close allies were rejected. 1173

The prohibition of contact has become a serious problem when three detained
witnesses sought asylum and were thus not sent back to DRC immediately after their
testimony as anticipated. 1174 They were detained in the same prison as the accused,
but were not allowed to speak to him until all evidence had been presented. This has
led to great logistical difficulties. They could not simultaneously take fresh air,
participate in sport activities or use the common facilities such as the kitchen and
dining room. If the witnesses were outside of their cell, the accused had to stay in his
cell, and vice versa. As a result, both the witnesses and the accused were locked up in
their cell for a significantly longer period than prisoners normally are. This situation
lasted for over five months. It was particularly difficult in the summer break when the
accused did not leave the prison to attend trial. For five consecutive weeks, both
accused were locked up for twenty hours a day. 1175
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Counsel for the detained witnesses, as well as the defence for Katanga have made
multiple requests to the Chamber that the witnesses and accused be allowed contact in
this exceptional situation; or that an alternative solution be found. 1176

The Prosecution and victim representatives objected because they said there was a
possibility that the witnesses would be called back. 1177 They had given lengthy
testimonies, so there was no apparent reason for them to be called back. Indeed, in
reality, there were not called back. The Chamber declined to review its decision that
contact was prohibited. Instead, it ordered the Registry to make all efforts to allow the
witnesses and accused sufficient time out of their cell, even if it required the
employment of more security guards. 1178 The Registry, however, informed the
Chamber that the logistical arrangements in the prison did not allow for a more
humane solution. 1179
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Thus, the prohibition of contact has done more damage than good and should
arguably be reviewed. It has contributed to the discomfort of witnesses and has served
little purpose.

In addition, there is no good reason to treat victims differently from other witnesses.
If the well being of victims is important to international justice, then the well being of
non-victim witnesses should be considered equally important. Testifying can be
traumatising for all witnesses, including victims, insider witnesses and any other
defence or prosecution witnesses. Doak rightly observed that international courts and
tribunals “can only function with the full assistance of victims”. 1180 However, they
equally need the full assistance of insider and other witnesses. Therefore, Doak’s
suggestion that this need for victim witnesses creates obligations towards them should
be extended to all witnesses. 1181 The needs of each witness should be looked at
individually, rather than categorically. This has been the approach of the VWU at the
ICTY, ICTR and ICC and has generally worked well.

Testimony
It is the testimony itself, more than the treatment outside the courtroom that causes
witnesses to complain. Both educated and uneducated witnesses find testifying a
difficult and exhausting exercise. 1182 The bulk of testimonies last at least a few days
each counting four to five hours. Some may even take a few weeks. The testimony is
frequently interrupted by objections from the parties. Most of the objections pertain to
the suggestive nature or irrelevance of a question posed. Procedural discussions can
take days sometimes. 1183
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Witnesses have to answer questions from both parties as well as the judges. In the
ICC, they also have to answer questions from the victim representatives. These
questions tend to be challenging, as they seek to undermine the credibility of the
witnesses. The witnesses are well aware that their credibility is not taken for granted
and often feel trapped by questions from the other side. This can be unpleasant and
stressful. 1184

It can also be frustrating for witnesses that they cannot tell their story uninterruptedly
in their own style. The lawyers, rather than the witnesses are the storytellers. Lawyers
lead them through the evidence and elicit only those elements helpful to their case.
Witnesses have to give succinct answers to precise questions asked. Consequently,
their accounts are often suppressed, distorted or taken out of context. 1185 According to
Doak, this manner of presenting the evidence leads victims to feel let down. It also
has anti-therapeutic effects. 1186

Accordingly, scholars have suggested that testimony in an adversarial setting leads to
second victimisation. In their view, subjecting victims to cross-examination at all
dehumanises them and makes them re-live their trauma. 1187 An adversarial system is
confrontational and hostile to the witness even if efforts are made to control the
questioning. 1188

Some observers opine that this is even more the case in international trials than in
common law adversarial trials. Particularly victims of rape are said to suffer from a
second victimisation in the courtroom. Doak, for instance, states that rape victims
often have to answer questions from defence counsel that are extremely aggressive
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Witness: War Crimes and the Promise of Justice in The Hague (University of Pennsylvania Press,
2005) (above).
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Doak, The Therapeutic Dimension of Transitional Justice, supra note 59, 273-274.
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M. Dembour & E. Haslam, Silencing Hearings? Victim-Witnesses at War Crimes Trials, 15
European Journal of International Law 151 (2004); R. Dixon, Rape as a Crime in International
Humanitarian Law: Where to from Here, 13 European Journal of International Law 697 (2002).
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DeLaet, Gender Justice, supra note 59, at 165.
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and humiliating in an attempt to destroy their credibility. 1189 In reaching this
conclusion, he relies on empirical researchers including Amanda Beltz who have
personally observed some of the international trials. Beltz witnessed a trial where a
woman testified that she was not selected to be raped, while other women with her
were. Defence counsel then asked her whether she was jealous of the women who
were chosen to be raped. 1190
On the basis of this example, Doak concludes: 1191
Although this type of questioning is now widely frowned upon and is restricted in
many common law jurisdictions, victims of rape can still expect a raw deal in the type
of questioning they might experience at international courts. Rules prohibiting use of
previous sexual history evidence have been bypassed on occasions at both the ICTY
and SCSL severely damaging any prospect of emotional repair. We can only hope
that the ICC adopts a more robust approach to the exclusion of such evidence.

It is questionable how Doak reaches this conclusion on the basis of such limited
empirical research conducted by others than himself. The given example indisputably
constitutes an unacceptable and irrelevant question. Such a question does not serve
any purpose other than humiliating the witness. For a competent counsel, it should not
be necessary to humiliate a witness to such an extent in order to undermine her
credibility. Strategically, this is very unwise. By humiliating a traumatised victim, the
defence looses the sympathy of the judges and audience, and the victim’s credibility
is boosted rather than undermined. 1192 Thus, defence counsel rarely choose such a
strategy. In many cases, the defence does not even challenge the victimhood of a
witness. 1193
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Doak, The Therapeutic Dimension of Transitional Justice, supra note 59, 283-284. See also M.
Dembour & E. Haslam, Silencing Hearings? Victim-Witnesses at War Crimes Trials, 15 European
Journal of International Law 151 (2004); R. Dixon, Rape as a Crime in International Humanitarian
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A. Beltz, Persecuting rape in international criminal tribunals: the need to balance victims’ rights
with the due process rights of the accused, 23 St. John’s Journal of Legal Commentary 167 (2008),
cited by Doak, Doak, The Therapeutic Dimension of Transitional Justice, supra note 59, 284.
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Doak, The Therapeutic Dimension of Transitional Justice, supra note 59, 284.
1192
Personal experience of the author; interviews with defence counsel: Ben Gumpert (August 2006);
David Hooper Q.C. (Interview in The Hague, 3 June 2010), Peter Robinson (Interview in The Hague,
21 November 2009).
1193
See for instance, Defence Counsel for Katanga in respect of Witness P-0132, ICC-01/04-01/07-T139-Red-ENG WT 11-05-2010, page 14:
“A. Some of them raped me.
Q. Before we continue on this aspect, I know that it is extremely difficult for you to talk about this to
us today, but for us to be clear, when you say that you were raped -292

Most of the accused at the ICTY and ICTR are not charged with direct participation in
any of the alleged atrocities, but rather with indirect forms of liability such as
ordering, instigating, planning, aiding and abetting, participating in a joint criminal
enterprise or commanding. The link of the accused to any of the alleged crimes is
more often in dispute than the actual commission of the crimes. 1194 It is then not
necessary to challenge crime-base evidence. It can even be more advantageous for an
accused to accept the credibility of a victim witness and use him or her to confirm
contested elements favourable to the accused. 1195 Therefore, unless victims
incriminate the accused directly, 1196 they generally have a much easier time in crossexamination than insider witnesses whose evidence is mostly more vigorously
contested. 1197

It can be trickier when a victim is questioned by the accused himself. The advantage,
however, is that the accused and accusers have an opportunity to confront each other
directly. By some, a direct confrontation is preferred over a confrontation through
lawyers. 1198 For instance, one witness who was cross-examined by Slobodan
Milosevic himself, seemed to appreciate the opportunity to direct his anger to the man
MR. HOOPER: (Previous translation continues) ... for my part, I'm sure for my colleagues as well,
when this witness asserts "rape," we understand it to mean penile penetration per vagina, and that's not
disputed.
THE WITNESS: (Interpretation) Yes, that is how it happened.
PRESIDING JUDGE COTTE: (Interpretation) Madam Witness, take some time to rest.
MR. GARCIA: (Interpretation) Mr. President, I think it would be necessary to suspend, given the state
of the witness.
PRESIDING JUDGE COTTE: (Interpretation) Madam Witness, we are going to break for 15 minutes.
We will resume at 10.00 a.m. This should give you time to recover.
1194
See, for instance, the opening observations of counsel for Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-T-80-ENG
ET WT 24-11-2009, page 51: “And all Ituri, all its inhabitants became victims. Nobody was left
untouched. In this trial, we hear the voices mainly of Hema victims. And I don't detract from their
miseries one iota, but it is, we must remember, a selective voice. And we will not hear from the mass of
Ngiti victims, of which there were a great number. »
See also the opening observations of Mr. Musau, counsel for Ruto in Kenya I: ICC-01/09-01/11-T-5ENG ET WT 01-09-2011, p. 87: “The violence that broke out in Kenya had never been witnessed
before. We think the devil must have made a short journey to the republic but not at the invitation of
William Ruto.”
1195
See for instance, cross-examination of Witness DRC‐OTP‐P‐0166, where the defence sought to
have the witness confirm elements favourable to the accused: ICC-01/04-01/07-T-225-Red-ENG CT
WT 30-11-2010, ICC-01/04-01/07-T-226-Red-ENG WT 01-12-2010 and ICC-01/04-01/07-T-227Red-ENG WT 02-12-2010.
1196
For instance: Witness DRC‐V19‐P‐0002, ICC-01/04-01/07-T-231-Red-ENG WT 21-02-2011, p.
57; DRC‐V19‐P‐0004, ICC-01/04-01/07-T-234-Red-ENG CT WT 24-02-2011, page 26.
1197
See for instance, ICC-01/04-01/07-T-221-Red-ENG WT 23-11-2010 WT 24-11-2010, Witness
DRC‐OTP‐P‐0028, page 6.
1198
Doak, The Therapeutic Dimension of Transitional Justice, supra note 59.
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he held responsible for his victimisation.1199 Witnesses who were cross-examined by
Karadzic spoke to him on equal foot and generally did not appear intimidated. This is
apparent from the following dialogue between Karadzic and prosecution witness
Fatima Zaimovic, who was the chief of the nursery department in a hospital in
Sarajevo during the war: 1200
Q. All right. We'll come to that. But you didn't know, you say,that all the
offensives that were launched in Sarajevo were launched by the BH Army. Is that
what you said?
A. Yes, that's right. I didn't know.
Q. How is that possible when it was on television, the information was broadcast
over television? The people were told what positions they had taken control of and
where they broke through, and so on.
A. Mr. Karadzic, I was at the clinic. There was no electricity or water. The
children were wounded. We didn't know where to turn first, we had so much work to
do. We worked from morning to night. And when I went home, I was so tired and I
didn't even have any food to cook for the children. My life during the war was very
difficult, and I don't know about anything of the things you're asking me about, and
I'm not interested in them. I have to be quite sincere there. You're asking me about
military matters, something that you should ask military experts and not me. I have
come here to testify about the difficulties that the children were facing, children who
were wounded and who were killed, whose parents were crying, whose lives were
disrupted and were targeted like pigeons in town. Of that's what I want to say. Do
you have any conscience? Do you have a conscience, because you destroyed the
Muslim children and the Croatian children and the Serbian children. That's what you
did. You destroyed them all. That's what I've come here to talk about and not to
speak about military strategy that I know nothing whatsoever about.
Q. Thank you, madam, but as soon as you say that somebody shot, you provide the
basis for me to ask you why and how. As soon as you're saying that Breka was
shelled, I had to put it to you that your son was a member of the 105th Brigade which
numbered 6.000 men and that the whole place was teeming with soldiers, that there
were more soldiers than the inhabitants of Breka.
A. Leave my son alone. That's not true and leave my son alone. I'm not talking
about your children. I don't want us to talk about our children. We're discussing
1199

See the testimony of a survivor from Glogova in the ICTY case of Milosevic, T. 15 April 2003
B1701:
3 Q (Milosevic). Let us just try and clear up one thing. You say that those people
4 had socks over their heads.
5 A. Yes, socks.
6 Q. And you can't recognise them. And do you know that the JNA did
7 not wear socks on their heads?
8 A. They didn't, but I -- we lived as brothers in the old days when we
9 used to say, "Comrade Milosevic." Everything changed when you came to
10 power. You knew about everything. And don't ask me too many questions.
See also the cross-examination of protected witness VS 033, a former subordinate of Seselj, conducted
by
Seselj
himself,
T.
2
April
2008,
(ICTY
case
of
Seselj)
at:
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/seselj/trans/en/080402ED.htm.
1200
T. 5 May 2010, page 1865 at: http://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/trans/en/100505ED.htm. See
also Karadzic’s cross-examination of a witness to whom he put it that he did not believe his story. The
witness answered as follows: “Karadzic, when you are saying that as if that is the truth, may you look
at your own children dead. When you see them dead, the way mothers did when their children were
killed, and this is going to be confirmed to you by a witness who found clothing by the grave” (T. 22
April 2010, page 1449 at: http://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/trans/en/100422ED.htm).
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something quite different here.
Q. Madam, I have every respect for your husband who was a friend of mine and
your child, and it was his duty to -JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic. Mr. Karadzic.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes.
JUDGE KWON: Come to your questions. You haven't cross-examined yet the
evidence which was given by this witness. Let's move on to your real topic, please.

In cases where an accused or his counsel go too far in asking embarrassing questions,
judges will almost certainly intervene. Typically in international courts, the
examination of witnesses is subject to greater control by the judges than in domestic
common law proceedings. Questions that are considered to humiliate or embarrass the
victim are generally not permitted. 1201 Judges barely tolerate suggestions being put to
witnesses that they are lying. 1202

Indeed, in the course of twelve years as participant in, and observer of international
trials in the ICTY, ICTR, SCSL and ICC, this author has not observed a single line of
questioning of a similar nature as the above example. On the contrary, judges are
generally very courteous to witnesses and try to make them feel comfortable. They
frequently ask witnesses on the stand about their well-being and willingness to
proceed. 1203
1201

Personal observation from the author. See also ICTR Judge Khan’s submissions at the Geneva
Conference, supra note 173, explaining how much care her Chamber takes to make a witness feel
comfortable. See also: ICC-01/04-01/07-T-270-Red-ENG CT WT 27-05-2011, female defence witness
DRC‐D02‐P‐0161 questioned by the Prosecution, page 23 : “JUDGE DIARRA: (Interpretation) Your
Honour, I don’t understand this. He asked were you demobilized. She said yes. He said you weren’t a
soldier. She said yes. And now she’s asked if she was lying. Does she have to insult herself to continue
this?”
1202
Ibid. See further, for instance, Judge Mose in Military I who routinely repeated to the parties that
“people do not lie in this courtroom”. See, for instance, T. 15 June 2004 pages 87-89. Although judges
have the ability to prosecute witnesses who have lied under oath but are reluctant to do so, even if there
is ample evidence to show this to be the case. For a critical comment on this reality, see A. Zahar, The
Problem of False Testimony at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, supra note 890.
1203
See,
for
instance,
Judge
Schomburg
in:
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/dragan_nikolic/trans/en/031103ED.htm, page 227: “Should you have any
problems, please tell the Bench immediately that we can take the necessary measures”, also page 258:
“Please take into account the state of the witness, and I -- I ask you on purpose: Do you have
inevitable, mandatory, additional questions?”; See also Judge Cotte in the Katanga & Ngudjolo case,
Witness DRC‐OTP‐P‐0353, ICC-01/04-01/07-T-213-Red-ENG WT 04-11-2010, page 63: “Q. Did they
do anything else other than sing? A. What I saw was that they would sing. One day they brought a
young man, and they slit his throat. That disgusted me.
MS. DARQUES‐LANE: (Interpretation) Your Honour, perhaps we could suspend for a few moments.
PRESIDING JUDGE COTTE: (Interpretation) Madam Witness, we will stop for a few moments so
you can regain your composure. Please take some time. Witness, do you think you can go on?
THE WITNESS: (Interpretation) Yes.
PRESIDING JUDGE COTTE: (Interpretation) We will go on, madam, but you must realize that it is
entirely legitimate to cry. If you need to cry from time to time because you cast your mind back to
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Judges further tend to protect victim witnesses, particularly victims of rape. A
provision has been adopted which deals specifically with the evidence of victims of
sexual assault. Pursuant to Rule 96 of the ICTY and ICTR Rules and Rules 70 to 72
ICC Rules, evidence relating to prior sexual conduct is not admissible; and relating to
consent only upon a Chamber’s predetermination of its credibility and relevance. 1204
Protective measures, as well as special measures to comfort a witness are also
available. Special measures may include the allowance of the presence in the
courtroom of a counsel, legal representative, psychologist or family member during
the testimony of the victim or witness. 1205 In addition, Chambers are under an
obligation to be “vigilant in controlling the manner of questioning a witness or victim
so as to avoid any harassment or intimidation, paying particular attention to attacks on
victims of crimes of sexual violence.” 1206

The extent to which these principles have been applied in practice varies from
Chamber to Chamber. However, contrary to the suggestion of Doak and other
observers, these rules have been applied with rigor by almost all ICTY, ICTR and
ICC Chambers. Beltz’s example is really the exception rather than the rule. The
author’s experience in this respect concords with Judge Van Der Wijngaert’s
experience at the ICTY. During a lecture, she informed her audience that she saw
“many courageous victims who were very keen to come and testify and tell their
stories, and the cross-examination process, although difficult at times, was practiced
with restraint and caution by counsel appearing before the tribunal and, if necessary,
was controlled by presiding judges.” 1207

This does not take away the fact that some witnesses are not happy witnesses. Both in
the ICTY, ICTR and ICC, judges intervene frequently to calm down a witness.
Emotions can be very heated and tears are often shed. This is particularly the case

things that are difficult for you, the Court and everyone here certainly understands that. So if it happens
again, we will stop for a moment so that you can take some time and then feel better.”
1204
ICTY/ICTR Rule 96(ii) and (iii) respectively; Rules 70-72 ICC Rules. Rule 72(2) refers to
relevance and admissibility, rather than credibility as under the ICTY/ICTR Rules.
1205
Rule 88 ICC Rules; ICTY/ICTR Rules 34 and 75(B)(iii).
1206
Rule 88(5) ICC Rules. See also ICTY/ICTR Rule 75(D) pursuant to which “A Chamber shall
control the manner of questioning to avoid any harassment or intimidation.”
1207
C. Van Der Wijngaert, lecture on victim participation, supra note 539.
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when victim witnesses testify to traumatising events. 1208 However, also insider
witnesses regularly burst out in tears. 1209 Most of these strong reactions from
witnesses are, however, not caused by improper questioning from the parties. Being
reminded of unpleasant memories mixed with stress can stir up such emotions.
Frequently, witnesses react in a very rude and angry manner to normal and
appropriate questions, so much so that judges must intervene and insist that they
answer the question. 1210 One accused had a very strong and tearful reaction to a
completely neutral question from the judge. 1211

1208

See, for instance, Witness P-0132, ICC-01/04-01/07-T-138-Red-ENG WT 10-05-2010, page 76:
“PRESIDING JUDGE COTTE: (Interpretation) Please stop for a moment, ma'am.
(Trial Chamber confers)
PRESIDING JUDGE COTTE: (Interpretation) Ma'am, it is very painful for you to tell us what you
experienced at that time, and at the same time, Witness, it is very important, it is very important for the
Court, it is very important for all those who are taking part in this trial and who are here to shed light
on matters for the Court, the Defence teams, the Legal Representatives, and it's important for you as
well even though it is very difficult to talk about all that. And it is also very important for all the people
who died, and you -- people who died and you're telling us how they died before an International
Criminal Court, and these people deserve to have their stories told before an International Criminal
Court. So it is very difficult but very important.”
See also Witness DRC‐OTP‐P‐0353, ICC-01/04-01/07-T-213-Red-ENG WT 04-11-2010, page 63.
1209
See for instance DRC‐OTP‐P‐0028, ICC-01/04-01/07-T-216-Red-ENG WT 15-11-2010, page 5253.
1210
See Witness DRC‐OTP‐P‐0028, ICC-01/04-01/07-T-220-Red-ENG WT 22-11-2010, page 25-26:
“Q. So what it comes down to, Mr. Witness, is this: In order to give or provide some proof of your date
of birth being as it appears on these documents, you produced forged documents. That’s right, isn’t it?
A. Your Honour, I am ashamed. I am really ashamed, Mr. Presiding Judge. I wanted to ask you the
following question: What is the ICC’s work? What is the aim of this court? What motivates the court?
Because I do not know what the objective of the ICC is. The only thing that I do know is that the
International Criminal Court does exist, but I don’t know what the objective of it is. I don’t know what
its aims are. If you could please tell me, your Honour, what the ICC does.
PRESIDING JUDGE COTTE: (Interpretation) Witness, in the very first hearing, I think I recalled that
it’s normally not up to the witness to ask questions, but the witness, rather, has questions put to him or
her. Having said this, I shall now answer some of your questions. I am now going to answer the
question you are asking now. We are here, and you know, to try two accused persons who have been
accused of a certain number of crimes. And as I told you some time ago, that is important, and I think
you understood me. But let me remind you. These two accused persons have a right to a legal defence.
That is the situation in which all accused persons should be before all criminal courts in the world
when we are in a democratic country, and within the framework of the legal defence of an accused
person, the counsel for that accused person can ask a certain number of questions. Those questions1 are
asked not to persecute the witness, but, rather, to ensure that a certain number of statements made by
the witness in the course of his interviews before the OTP are correct. What Counsel Hooper is trying
to do now is ‐‐ he’s trying to understand why different dates of birth appear in documents which
purport to be your documents. He’s trying to clarify this, because he feels that this is important for the
defence of his client. He has just asked you whether or not you falsified certain identity documents, and
apparently you are shocked by these questions, because you probably feel that you are being accused of
committing an offence. The only thing that is requested of you, Mr. Witness, is to answer. If you feel
that falsification did not take place, say so. You should simply tell us what you deem to be the truth.
However, this counsel or the counsel from the other Defence team do not intend to deliberately put you
in difficulty. They are doing their job, and you have to understand that. They are doing their job, and
you should answer the questions spontaneously, and you should say things to the best of your
knowledge. We have already gone over this territory, but I have to repeat these things to you, because I
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Thus, it is apparent that testifying may be the cause of frustration, anger and tears.
This is the case for all witnesses, not only for victim witnesses. Regrettably, scholars
have mainly focused on the experience of victim witnesses despite the fact that many
other witnesses testifying for either side are also vulnerable and traumatised. 1212 In
light of their incredible experiences, it is not surprising that witnesses react
emotionally. Testifying cannot remove their initial victimisation.1213

However, accepting that testifying can be a painful process does not justify the
conclusion that such witnesses experience a second victimisation. The expression of
emotions is not necessarily evidence of a feeling of victimisation. On the contrary, it
see that you are shocked. You should answer. You should tell the truth. That’s what you promised to
do. You should speak the truth. That’s the only thing we request of you.”
See also Witness DRC‐OTP‐P‐0028, ICC-01/04-01/07-T-221-Red-ENG WT 23-11-2010, page 8-9:
“Q. Wait for a moment. Please wait for a moment. Just look at the document that’s coming now with
the underlined ‐‐ there it is.
A. We’re not joking around here. We’re not joking around. I ‐‐ I can stand up if you want. I could stand
up and answer you, if you want. We’re not joking around here.
PRESIDING JUDGE COTTE: (Interpretation) Witness. Witness. It is not easy, as Mr. Hooper pointed
out, to work on the basis of rather full documents with a lot of information. The Court Usher will stay
with you for a moment, if you will, so that we will be sure that you’re looking at the correct line, which
is the line upon which Mr. Hooper is basing his questions. So, Court Usher, please make sure that you
are on the page 0319 with the reference 832/01, and from thereon, on that very line, Mr. Hooper will be
basing his questions.
THE WITNESS: (Interpretation) Yes.
JUDGE DIARRA: (Interpretation) Mr. Witness.
THE WITNESS: (Interpretation) This is completely separate. It has got nothing to do with me.
JUDGE DIARRA: (Interpretation) You do not have to stand up to answer this question. Everybody is
sitting around this room, and we are here to hear you. If you were to stand up, it would be looked upon
badly. Getting angry solves nothing. Please, I beg you, remain calm and answer the question for respect
for the Chamber. I beseech you, do not go thinking that standing up would be a good idea. This would
be seen very negatively.
THE WITNESS: (Interpretation) He’s making a mockery of me.
JUDGE DIARRA: (Interpretation) He’s doing his job. This is the way that it goes. Please do not stand
up.
PRESIDING JUDGE COTTE: (Interpretation) Mr. Witness, we shall now continue calmly, as Judge
Diarra has just said. Counsel Hooper is going to ask his questions. Perhaps it will not always be
obvious to you why he’s asking those questions, but he has a strategy in his head that is his strategy,
and your job is just to answer to the best of your knowledge.”
1211
See the testimony of Mr. Ngudjolo (Witness DRC‐D03‐P‐0707, ICC-01/04-01/07-T-331-RedENG ET 09-11-2011), page 63; ICC-01/04-01/07-T-332-Red-ENG ET 10-11-2011, page 1-2:
“Q.(Interpretation) Good morning, Mr. Ngudjolo.
1212
See, for instance, Protected Witness K 41, who testified that, every night, he dreamt about a child
who was hit by three bullets in the massacre in which he participated. He indicated that he had come to
tell the truth in the hope that it would feel easier in his soul. See: examination by the Prosecution, 6
September 2002, available at:
<http://www.icty.org/x/cases/slobodan_milosevic/trans/en/020906ED.htm>; It is noteworthy that many
Tutsi genocide survivors have testified for the defence before the ICTR.
1213
This is acknowledged by Doak, The Therapeutic Dimension of Transitional Justice, supra note 59,
297.
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may have a therapeutic effect. 1214 Showing anger, frustration and tears may well be
the best way of getting rid of them. 1215

There are many other witnesses before the ICTY, ICTR and ICC who, with or without
showing emotions, have found the experience of testifying rewarding. They
appreciated the opportunity to tell their story to a wider audience and to be listened
to. 1216 For some witnesses, testifying can even help the healing process. For instance,
a victim witness in the case of Dragan Nikolic was really desperate to find out what
had happened to her sons who appeared to have been murdered. It was the accused
himself, who informed her in open court where and when her sons had been
liquidated, and where the bodies could very likely be found. He told the Court that he
had wanted to meet her before to inform her about the fate of her sons, knowing how
anxious she was to find out. 1217 As difficult as it must have been for this witness to
hear about the tragic fate of her sons, it was rewarding to find out what happened to
them and have hope of retaining their bodies. At the end of her testimony, President
Judge Schomburg thanked her and said: 1218

I know it was a very difficult period of time for you. We're very grateful that you
came to The Hague and gave this important testimony. I hope that you will know
better in the future about the fate and the whereabouts of the remainders of your
beloved ones. Thank you for your testimony.

Also witnesses who were on the side of the perpetrators may have experienced
testifying as contributing to their healing process. For instance, in the ICTY case of
Milosevic, one witness confessed to having participated in massacres of civilians in
Kosovo. He gave details of an “unbelievably loud” screaming baby being shot with

1214

Even Doak accepts that procedural justice, even if the outcome is below expectations, may have a
healing effect on victims; and that storytelling, even if painful, can help restore a sense of esteem and
self-worth. See Doak, ibid, 279-280.
1215
This was confirmed by a Tutsi genocide survivor who informed the author of her experience as a
witness before the ICTR.
1216
E. Stover The Witness: War Crimes and the Promise of Justice in The Hague (University of
Pennsylvania Press, 2005), 76 – 87; Rebecca Horn, Simon Charters and Saleem Vahidy: ‘Testifying in
an International War Crimes Tribunal: ‘The Experience of Witnesses in the Special Court for Sierra
Leone’, 3 International Journal of Transitional Justice (2009) 135-149: 80 percent of witnesses had a
positive experience and would testify again. This is also confirmed by the author’s own encounters
with witnesses after their testimony.
1217
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/dragan_nikolic/trans/en/031103ED.htm 256-258.
1218
Ibid, 258.
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three bullets. He informed the Court that the reason he had come forward to give his
evidence was: 1219
I wanted in this way to express everything that is troubling me, that has been
troubling me for the past three years since the time I completed my service in the
army. The thing that I find most troubling is that never a night goes by without my
dreaming of that child who was hit by that bullet and who was crying. And I thought
that if I come forward and tell the truth that I will feel easier in my soul. And that is
the only reason why I am here.

Some witnesses clearly take pleasure out of the challenge of cross-examination.1220
For some, this may be a terrifying experience; for others a confrontational line of
questioning can be extremely satisfying. This largely depends on the personality of a
witness, more than his status as a victim or non-victim. It can thus not be assumed
that all victims prefer a safer, less confrontational environment where they can tell
their story without being interrupted.

Even if this assumption can be proven, it should still not be implemented. TRC
procedures can allow witnesses to tell their stories without interruption or subjecting
them to cross-examination. Unlike TRCs, however, international criminal procedures
focus on determining the guilt or innocence of an accused who potentially faces a
long prison sentence. The fact that cross-examination may be an unpleasant
experience for the witnesses should not prevent an accused from having the
opportunity to challenge the allegations made against him by his accusers. It is also an
acknowledged right of the accused to confront his accusers. 1221

A trial cannot, nor should it simultaneously serve as a therapeutic centre for
victims. 1222 In the Stakic Judgment, the Chamber acknowledged that it is impossible
1219

Protected Witness K 41, examination by the examination by the Prosecution, 6 September 2002,
available at:
<http://www.icty.org/x/cases/slobodan_milosevic/trans/en/020906ED.htm>
1220
See for instance, Ndjabu Ngabu, Witness DRC‐D02‐P-0236, ICC-01/04-01/07-T-244-ENG CT 0604-2011 - ICC-01/04-01/07-T-248-ENG ET WT 15-04-2011; Pitchu Iribi: Witness DRC‐D02‐P‐0228,
ICC-01/04-01/07-T-249-Red-ENG CT WT 18-04-2011 - ICC-01/04-01/07-T-253-ENG ET WT 02-052011, Jean Logo: Witness DRC‐D02‐P‐0258 ICC-01/04-01/07-T-286-Red-ENG CT WT 06-07-2011 ICC-01/04-01/07-T-290-Red-ENG WT 12-07-2011, Germain Katanga : Witness DRC‐D02‐P‐0300,
ICC-01/04-01/07-T-314-ENG CT WT 27-09-2011 - ICC-01/04-01/07-T-325-ENG CT WT 19-102011.
1221
1950 European Convention on Human Rights, Art. 6(d); 1966 International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, 999 UNTS 171 Art. 14(3)(e).
1222
Doak, The Therapeutic Dimension of Transitional Justice, supra note 59, 288.
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for a trial to do justice to each individual story of each victim. Victims are by
necessity treated as statistics, but in reality, each of them is a human being with his
own personality and story. The Chamber in that case restricted itself to elaborating on
three individual victim accounts. 1223 Victims and witnesses can be disappointed if
their expectations are too high. 1224 It is, therefore, important that they are properly
informed of the procedure in advance. This is a shared responsibility of the parties
themselves and the VWU.

Testing the Evidence: in Control of the Judges or Parties?
Thus, the primary purpose of a trial is to test the evidence, rather than offer a forum to
individual victims to tell their stories. To determine the guilt of the accused
adequately, the evidence must pass a rigorous test.

The examination of witnesses can be subject to the control of judges or parties. As
addressed earlier, in civil law jurisdictions, judges take the lead in examining the
witnesses. They tend to be less confrontational than the parties. Nonetheless, they
may confront witnesses with contradictions and ask them to explain them. They can
do so because they have access to the entire case file. In common law jurisdictions
solely the parties are in charge of examining the witnesses. This feature is linked with
the fact that trials are run by juries who have no information about the witnesses.

In common law jurisdictions, cross-examination is regarded as the most effective tool
of testing the credibility of a witness. The efficiency of this tool is also acknowledged
by the judges in international courts and tribunals. 1225 The scholars who criticise
cross-examination in international trials do so on the basis of human aspects but rarely
suggest that it undermines the ascertainment of the truth. DeLaet, for instance, opines
that putting witnesses to a rigorous test of cross-examination enhances the
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Stakic Judgment, 31 July 2003, Stakic Judgment, IT-97-24-T, 31 July 2003, para.18.
B. Hamber, Transforming Societies after Political Violence: Truth, Reconciliation and Mental
Health (Springer, 2009), 66.
1225
See, for instance, Prosecutor v. Martic, Decision on Defence Motion to Exclude the Testimony of
Milan Babic, Together with Associated Exhibits from Evidence, 9 June 2006; Decision on Appeal
Against the Trial Chamber Decision on the Evidence of Witness Milan Babic, 14 September 2000.
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ascertainment of the truth. It may either enhance or diminish a witness’s credibility
before the Chamber. 1226

This is, however, not always true in reality. An honest and reliable witness can appear
unreliable after going through a vigorous cross-examination. In his book “Hints on the
Trial of a Law Suit”, Longenecker sets out how “a skilful advocate by a rapid crossexamination may ruin the testimony of such a witness”. 1227 He refers to a truthful,
honest, over-cautious witness. The trial tactics described in this book may be
beneficial to the party’s case, but they may not assist the triers of fact in accurately
reconstructing the facts. A witness may be so intimidated in cross-examination that,
due to his high level of stress as a result thereof, he loses the ability to give answers in
a logical manner and, consequently, his answers may not represent his actual
knowledge on the subject. As Wigmore pointed out, “questions which in form or
subject cause embarrassment, shame or anger in the witness may unfairly lead him to
such demeanor or utterances that the impression produced by his statements does not
do justice to its real testimonial value”. 1228
A competent trial lawyer will do his utmost to present his case in the best manner he
can even if that means that the truth be distorted. According to Frank, “the lawyer
aims at victory, at winning in the fight, not at aiding the court to discover the facts. He
does not want the trial court to reach a sound educated guess, if it is likely to be
contrary to his client’s interests. Our present trial method is thus the equivalent of
throwing pepper in the eyes of a surgeon when he is performing an operation.” 1229
It is therefore not a foregone conclusion that cross-examination is the most efficient
tool to test the credibility of witnesses. This is particularly questionable when the
witnesses are uneducated, cannot read maps, do not speak the same language as the
lawyers and judges, and are from an entirely different culture. International tribunals
and courts often deal with such witnesses. It is very easy to confuse them and make
them look incredible even if, in reality, they are truthful and solid witnesses.
1226

DeLaet, Gender Justice, supra note 59, at 165. See also Doak, The Therapeutic Dimension of
Transitional Justice, supra note 59, 277.
1227
Frank, Courts on Trial, supra note 38, 81. Frank cites many more examples of guidebooks of how
to conduct a cross-examination recommending how to make a witness look more hostile than he is.
This is, however, much more common in US than in UK.
1228
Quoted by J. Frank, ibid, 82.
1229
Frank, Courts on Trial, supra note 38, 85.
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Combs is of the view that, for honest but confused witnesses, it would be better if
they were examined primarily by the judges. If judges are in control of their
examination, witness can tell their story in more relaxing, narrative way without being
interrupted excessively. Psychological research suggests that it is easier to recall and
relay information accurately and effectively if the observer is comfortable than under
stress. 1230 In addition, the narrative option could also “enrich communication and
enhance understanding”. 1231 Combs also notes that “judges are more apt than lawyers
to elicit accurate and complete testimony from international witnesses because it is
the function of the judge, when questioning, to seek accurate and complete
testimony.” 1232

When dealing with lying witnesses, however, Combs considers cross-examination the
most efficient tool to test their credibility. 1233 Combs points out that many of the
witnesses who appear before international tribunals lie. She cites different reasons for
this phenomenon, and suggests that it could be cultural feature. 1234 This author’s
observations correspond with Combs’ observations. However, it is suggested that this
is not an African problem. People, wherever they are have a potential to lie if there is
a reason to do so. In the ICTY, people lie mainly for reasons of solidarity to their own
ethnic group. Insider witnesses may seek to exempt themselves from any culpability
and blame it all on the accused. Victims can also lie or exaggerate. They may need
someone to blame. This has become particularly evident in the ICTR, where some
victims have been demonstrated to incriminate different accused for the same
deed. 1235

The acknowledgment that witnesses in each category potentially lie leads to the
conclusion that international justice depends on an effective examination and crossexamination. Indeed, Combs’ research demonstrates very clearly that the honesty of
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witnesses cannot be assumed. In general, it is easier to detect lies through a
confrontational line of questioning.

In addition, in international trials, it would be difficult for judges to lead the
examination of witnesses effectively. Almost all witnesses are called by the parties.
Judges have a right to call additional witnesses but rarely do in reality. On the rare
occasions that judges do, the witnesses have mostly been identified by one of the
parties. For instance, where a party withdraws a witness it initially intended to call,
the judges may call this witness if they are of the view that his testimony may assist
them in ascertaining “the truth in respect of the crimes of which the Accused has been
charged’. 1236

Thus, the judicial power to call witnesses overrides the right of parties to withdraw
one or more of their witnesses. Once witnesses are on their list, the parties cannot
withdraw witnesses without leave of the Chamber, which it will grant only if in the
interests of justice. Witnesses are not viewed as witnesses of the parties, but rather as
witnesses of the court, witnesses of justice or witnesses of truth. 1237

When the judges call a witness, it may be more appropriate and logical for them to
examine the witness first. If, however, a witness is called by one of the parties, judges
are not the best placed to take the lead in his examination. They do not have access to
the entire case file and do not have anyone in the field to conduct investigations and
verify the stories and personal details of witnesses. In such a system, judges have
insufficient information to take charge. Instead, they must rely on the two parties to
present them with all relevant information pertaining to the credibility of the
witnesses.

International justice potentially offers a suitable compromise between the two
systems. Whilst cross-examination is allowed, judges control the manner in which this
1236

Prosecutor v. Blaskic (Decision of Trial Chamber I in Respect of the Appearance of General Enver
Hadzihasanovic) IT-95-14 (25 March 1999), second consideration. See also Prosecutor v. Kupreskic
(Transcript) IT-95-16 (30 September 1998) 3407.
1237
Prosecutor v. Jelisić (Decision on Communication between Parties and Witnesses) IT-95-10-T (11
December 1998), para. 2; Prosecutor v. Kupreškić (Decision on Communication between the Parties
and their Witnesses) IT-95-16-T (21 September 1998), para. 3; ICC-01/04-01/06-1049, para. 34; 01/0401/06-679, para 26; ICC-01/04-01/07-428 21-04-2008, para. 30.
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is done. In addition, they can ask additional questions to witnesses. In so doing,
judges can potentially restore the credibility of witnesses if their credibility was
destroyed unfairly and allow them to complete their story. Relevant information that
was not elicited by the parties can then still come out. Arguably, such a system is the
most efficient system to test the evidence in a fair manner. Judges, particularly those
of a civil law background, are of the firm belief that this enhances the truthascertaining process. 1238

Whether this is the most efficient truth-ascertaining method in reality depends on two
factors: whether judges exercise their control over the examination of witnesses by
the parties in appropriate fashion; and whether their own interventions are proper.

Control by the judges
Time Management
In line with the completion strategy, ICTY and ICTR Chambers have sought to shorten the trials. To
this end, Chambers have restricted the time allowed for the presentation of the Prosecution and defence
cases, as well as for cross-examination of the witnesses presented by the opposite party. It is well
within the Chamber’s discretion to do so. However, it must be reasonable and flexible in allocating
time. The allocated time must also be proportional and more or less equal to one another. 1239 Both
parties have complained that the Chamber’s time restrictions have been too drastic. 1240 Particularly at
the ICTY, these restrictions have been excessive for both parties. 1241

1238

See, for instance, the observations of ICC Judge Cotte, Presiding Judge in the Katanga &
Ngudjolo case, hearing of 8 February 2010, ICC-01/04/01/07-T 97, pages 66-67. See also W.
Schomburg, Truth-Finding in the International Courtroom: The ad-hoc Tribunals for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR), Lecture Outline, Utrecht 29 March 2008.
1239
Prosecutor v. Karemera et al, Scheduling Order, 21 August, 2007, para. 4; Prosecutor v. Oric,
Interlocuory Decision on Length of Defence Case, 20 July, 2005, paras. 8-10; Prosecutor v. Prlic,
Decision on Joint Defence Interlocutory Appeal Against the Trial Chamber’s Oral Decision of 8 May
2006 Relating to Cross Examination by Defence and Association of Defence Counsel’s Request for
Leave to File an Amicus Curiae Brief, 4 July, 2006; Prosecutor v. Prlic et al, Decision on
Prosecution Appeal following Trial Chamber’s decision on remand and further certification, 11 May
2007; Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal by the Amici Curiae Against the Trial
Chamber Order Concerning the Presentation and Preparation of the Defence Case, 20 January, 2004.
1240
Ibid; Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Reasons for refusal of leave to appeal from decision to impose time
limit, 16 May, 2002, paras.10-13; Prosecutor v. Prlic et al, Decision on Prosecution appeal concerning
the Trial Chamber’s ruling reducing time for the Prosecution case, 6 February 2007, para. 14.
1241
See in particular: Prosecutor v. Oric, Interlocuory Decision on Length of Defence Case, 20 July,
2005; Prosecutor v. Prlic et al, Decision on adoption of new measures to bring the trial to an end
within a reasonable time, 13 November, 2006; Prosecutor v. Prlic et al, Decision on Prosecution
appeal concerning the Trial Chamber’s ruling reducing time for the Prosecution case, 6 February 2007.
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With regard to cross-examination, ICTY Chambers tend to give the parties a particular percentage of
the time used in examination-in-chief. In a multi-defendant case, the defence is not given equal time in
cross-examination as in examination-in-chief. Their cross-examination time usually amounts to
approximately 60% of the examination-in-chief. The defence has regularly complained that this time is
insufficient to do an adequate job, particularly because each defendant has his own strategy sometimes
even opposing each other. 1242 Such complaints are more frequent in the ICTY than in the ICTR. This
is not surprising because generally ICTR Chambers allow the parties more time than at the ICTY.
However, ICTR trials are excessively long and could easily be shortened without being unfair to the
parties. Time must then be shortened in an equal and fair manner to both parties. This does not always
appear to be the case. In recent accelerated ICTR cases, the defence sometimes complains that its
cross-examination time is reduced unfairly and unequally to the Prosecution. 1243

ICC Chambers similarly tend to allocate a specific time to the parties. Oddly, the Chamber in Katanga
& Ngudjolo allocated 60% to the defence and 100% to the Prosecution for cross-examination. The
logic behind this unequal treatment was that the Prosecution had the burden of proof beyond
reasonable doubt. 1244 It is unclear why this burden should give the Prosecution a right to crossexamine each witness of both defendants for significantly longer than the defence had to cross-examine
the Prosecution witnesses. An additional unfairness on paper is reflected in the fact that the second
defendant was not entitled to re-visit issues already addressed by the first attendant. 1245 However, in
reality the defence was not prejudiced by these modalities, as the Chamber was flexible enough to
allow both parties to cross-examine for longer than scheduled, provided the questions were relevant.

It is suggested that this latter approach is the correct one. It is not disputed that judges should intervene
where necessary to ensure that no valuable court time is wasted in asking irrelevant questions.
However, relevance cannot be measured in a percentage. Thus, rather than setting strict time limits, it is
best if the Chamber intervenes only to the extent that questions are irrelevant. If relevant, the parties
should be able to explore any issue that will assist the Chamber in assessing the credibility of the
witnesses. If Chambers wish to set a time line, then at least a level of flexibility in applying it is
warranted. There is a great disparity between Chambers in how well, equally and fairly they manage
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See, for instance, Prosecutor v. Prlic et al, oral ruling, 15 May, 2007, T. 18304-05, 18527-29; 16
May, 2007, T. 18528-29).
1243
For instance, in Prosecutor v. Augustin Ngirabatware, ICTR-99-54-T, the bench refused to give
the defence additional time to make up for the witness’s refusal to answer its questions and the endless
interventions from the Prosecution and the bench. See, for instance, T 8 Feb 2010, pages 26-35, 53-58,
94-95.
1244
See ICC-01/04-01/07-1665-Corr 01-12-2009, Directions for the conduct of the proceedings and
testimony in accordance with rule 140, para.10.
T. 14 June 2004 pp. 12-13, 17-20, 26-27; T. 15 June 2004 pages 2, 84-85, 87-89
1245
ICC-01/04-01/07-1665-Corr 01-12-2009, Directions for the conduct of the proceedings and
testimony in accordance with rule 140.
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time. The rushed attitude of some Chambers have not accelerated them. 1246 Yet, in general, the parties
have been granted sufficient time to explore the relevant issues adequately.

Control over Types of Questions

As aforementioned, judges at the ICTY, ICTR and ICC tend to be very protective in
respect of victim witnesses. Many observers approve of such protective attitude and
even suggest that judges are not protective enough. 1247 However, they ignore that this
has consequences for the fairness of the proceedings. Victim or not, it is vital for the
defence to be able to examine vigorously all incriminating witnesses. There is no
witness whose credibility and reliability can be taken for granted. Victims are equally
likely to lie or suffer from a faulty memory as anyone else. If anything, their stories
should be considered with more caution given that the trauma they have experienced
may have affected their memory. 1248 Therefore, the triers of fact must be vigilant to
assess victim witnesses with the same vigour as any other witness notwithstanding the
compassion and indignation their testimony may arouse. 1249

There is a thin line between expressing sympathy to the victim, and showing bias in
favour of him or her. The extent to which sympathy translates into excessive control
over the questioning by the parties varies significantly from Chamber to Chamber
across the tribunals and courts. 1250
1246

For instance the ICTY judgement in the case of Prlic et al is still outstanding. The trial itself lasted
until the end of 2010. In fairness to the judges, however, this case involved six accused each of whom
was entitled to participate directly alongside their counsel. In addition, although the bench was
extremely controlling in an attempt to move the case forward, it was reasonably fair in allocating
additional time if used for relevant matters. For instance, Mr. Prlic and his counsel were both granted
additional time in cross-examination (14 and 15 May 2007, page 18527). See also: Prosecutor v. Prlic
et al, Decision Allocating Additional Time for Completion of Case-in-Chief, 22 August 2007, granting
additional time to the Prosecution.
1247
See above ‘victims as witnesses’.
1248
G. Wolters, Herinneringen door getuigen, in: P.J. van Koppen a.o. (Eds.), Het recht van binnen.
Psychologie van het recht, (Kluwer 2002), 397-415; E. Loftus, Eyewitness Testimony (Harvard
University Press 1979), 397-415; W. Wagenaar & J. Groeneweg, The Memory of Concentration Camp
Survivors, 4 Applied Cognitive Psychology 77 (1990); W.A. Wagenaar: Identifying Ivan: A Case Study
in Legal Psychology (Harvard University Press, 1988); H. Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem, A Report on
the Banality of Evil (Penguin Books, 1994) (first published in the US by the Viking Press 1963), 220233.
1249
P. Levi, Les naufragés et les rescapés, cited in S. Maupas, Juges, bourreaux, victimes, voyage dans
les pretoires de la Justice internationale (edition Autrement, 2009): « Il est naturel et évident que le
matériau le plus substantiel pour la reconstruction de la vérité sur les camps soit constitué par les
souvenirs des survivants. Au-delà de la pitié et de l’indignation qu’ils provoquent, il faut les lire d’un
œil critique ».
1250
For instance, the Chamber in Katanga & Ngudjolo appears not to be influenced by the
overwhelming suffering of the victims. This is clear in the conduct of the judges vis-à-vis the parties.
They made it clear that it was not for them to handle issues relating to the well-being of the victims.
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Judges Interventions
In each international tribunal and court many examples can be found of interventions
of judges that have truly assisted the ascertainment of the truth. This has, for instance,
been the case where relevant questions were not asked by either party. In the ICC case
of Katanga & Ngudjolo, Presiding Judge Cotte usually asked more coherent, clear
and relevant questions than the parties and frequently managed to get an answer out
of a witness where the parties had failed to do so. 1251

This is rather the task of the VWU. See: T. 11 June 2010, pages 27-30. By contrast, other Chambers
regularly put the victims’ interests first. See, for instance, the Bemba case.
1251
Own observation, shared by many colleagues in the Katanga & Ngudjolo case. See for example for
Witness DRC‐D02‐P‐0236, ICC-01/04-01/07-T-246-Red-ENG WT 13-04-2011, pages 19-20:
PRESIDING JUDGE COTTE: (Interpretation) As far as he knows, is that what you have just said, Mr.
Floribert Ndjabu? As far as you know were there within the UPC delegation members who were not of
the Hema ethnic group who had in a certain sense become members to protect themselves or their
families? Answer the question if you know about this; if not, say so. Is this a reasonable possibility?
This seems to be the question that the Prosecution is putting to you, and Mr. Hooper is concerned that
you might fail to understand this question. If you have an answer you will tell us; if not, that doesn’t
matter”. See also, pages 15, 22, 45.
See also: Witness DRC‐D02‐P‐0300, ICC-01/04-01/07-T-320-ENG CT WT 11-10-2011, page 65-66:
“PRESIDING JUDGE COTTE: (Interpretation) Before going to Aveba, I would like to put a question
to Mr Katanga. Now, you gave us a hierarchy of the persons who were present at the meeting and in
answering the Prosecutor you mentioned Kakado, Kasaki, Pastor Saradu and so on and so forth. Now,
on page 77 of the transcript, line 19, you mentioned that Move, Bebi and others may also have been
there. Now, can you remind us, in relation to the date of 3 March 2003, what the specific status and
position of Move and Bebi were? You did not mention them in the hierarchy at the beginning, but I
would like to know from you what their status and their positions were at that time. Maybe you have
already mentioned this, but please provide us with that clarification.
THE WITNESS: (Interpretation) To that date, Mr President, Move and Bebi were under the control of
the APC. They were acting under the orders of the APC. Move on his side was in Nyabiri, whereas 1
Bebi was in Bukiringi as commander of a platoon or company or what have you, and that is how things
were.
PRESIDING JUDGE COTTE: (Interpretation) And you do remember that there were platoon or
company commanders? Do you remember? These are not the same positions. Do you know ‐‐ do you
remember what their ranks were and the positions they had within the sections, platoons and
companies? You understand this military terminology very well.
THE WITNESS: (Interpretation) When Bebi left Aveba for Bukiringi, he was still a platoon
commander. That, I do remember. Now, when he became a company commander, I must say that I am
not able to tell you whether it was before 3 March or after, so I expressed some reservations on that
point, but as for Move, while he was in Nyabiri he was a company commander.
PRESIDING JUDGE COTTE: (Interpretation) Thank you, Mr Katanga. Mr Prosecutor, I return the
floor to you.” See also ICC-01/04-01/07-T-320-ENG CT WT 11-10-2011, pages 70-71;
DRC‐D02‐P‐0300, ICC-01/04-01/07-T-321-ENG ET WT 12-10-2011, page 36-37; DRC‐D02‐P‐0300,
ICC-01/04-01/07-T-322-ENG ET WT 13-10-2011, Page 20:
“PRESIDING JUDGE COTTE: (Interpretation) Just so that we fully understand, because we have been
dealing with the same issue for a long time, you said that you did not take part in the meetings, but you
have said that you had the opportunity to meet with the participants in that meeting, either in the
morning to have a coffee, or in the evening to have a beer, or perhaps at other times during the day. I
can see that you are nodding. You have also told us that it was not possible for you to take the initiative
to have a discussion with Chief Manu, for example, but that on the other hand it could have been
possible for you to discuss with Chief Manu if he wanted to speak with you. Did he ever want to
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However, if the judges are not open minded to both sides and engage genuinely with
all relevant information, their interventions may positively distort the truth. Indeed, if
judges appear biased against a witness, being already nervous, the witness may get
even more nervous which may undermine the certainty and thus credibility of his
answers. As well, if the judges’ questions disclose in any way a preference or
expectation for one answer over another, the given answer may be unreliable. The
answer may be that which the witness assumes the judges want to hear rather than an
attempt at the truth. 1252 Leading questions are not allowed either by the judges or the
parties. Asking leading questions is particularly inappropriate if in connection with
matters in dispute, as this could imply that the Chamber is actively seeking to
discuss with you? Did he ever initiate a discussion with you? That is what we want to understand so
that we can make some progress, because we are beating about the bush here. Please answer the
question.
THE WITNESS: (Interpretation) Mr President, Chief Manu did not request any discussion with me. He
did not ask me to speak to him.” See also, pages 34-35, 43, 51-52; DRC‐D02‐P‐0300, ICC-01/0401/07-T-323-ENG ET WT 14-10-2011, page 13: “PRESIDING JUDGE COTTE: (Interpretation) Mr
Prosecutor, I’m going to have to interrupt. Now, Mr Katanga, you said that there’s a distinction to be
made between a brief absence and going away to go to the front. Now, is this the distinction that
explains why you were able to leave Aveba despite the risk of Kisoro the day that you went to Tchey
on the 3rd? Because you said you weren’t in Bogoro, there were too many threats, but on 3 March you
were in Tchey. So that trip to Tchey, how long was that; this celebration, the ceremony in Tchey?”
See also: Witness DRC-D02-P-0236: ICC-01/04-01/07-T-245-Red-ENG CT WT 08-04-2011, page 5354; 61: “PRESIDING JUDGE COTTE: (Interpretation) I’m not quite sure that you are quite on the
same wavelength with the witness, Prosecutor. So perhaps one last time you would like to rephrase
your question, but if you don’t want to do that, let’s go on to something else. The reference to the fact
that Mr. Augustin Lobbo as being a friend is something that the witness has responded to twice, saying
that it was not because he was a friend that he was appointed commissioner for external affairs. Mr.
Witness, actually the Prosecutor simply wants to know whether or not Mr. Augustin Lobbo was a
friend of yours, which he is entitled to do. But he doesn’t want to infer from that that you appointed
him as commissioner simply because he was a friend. I hope now that you are onthe same wavelength.
We need to avoid that because it would take up too much time.
THE WITNESS: (Interpretation) Your Honour, I think you have understood everything quite clearly.
PRESIDING JUDGE COTTE: (Interpretation) So Mr. Lobbo was a friend of yours, but you did not
appoint him because he was a friend but because of his abilities; is that right?
THE WITNESS: (Interpretation) Yes, your Honour, that’s precisely what I meant.
PRESIDING JUDGE COTTE: (Interpretation) Well, in that case, Prosecutor, we can proceed.”
See also: Witness DRC-D02-P-0228, ICC-01/04-01/07-T-251-ENG CT WT 20-04-2011, pages 28, 3435; Witness DRC-D02-P-0258, ICC-01/04-01/07-T-290-Red-ENG, pages 61-62: “PRESIDING
JUDGE COTTE: (Interpretation) Very well. Mr. Prosecutor, from the beginning of the
cross‐examination, or should I say from the beginning of today’s hearing, you have put the question at
least three times to the witness, whether Germain Katanga suggested any names of witnesses for him to
meet. And on all occasions, the witness briefly from the beginning told you that this was true ‐‐
absolutely untrue and then he went on to explain. So please move on ‐‐ move on with the
cross‐examination under conditions which I insist should not lead us to repeat ‐‐ a constant repetition.
Mr. Prosecutor, you have the floor.”
1252
Prosecutor v. Prlic, ‘Decision on Prosecution Motion Concerning Use of Leading Questions, the
Attribution of Time to the Defence Cases, the Time Allowed for Cross-Examination by the
Prosecution, and Associated Notice Requirements, 4 July 2008, para 18; Prosecutor v. Oric, Transcript
11 April 2005, pages 7031-7033, at: http://www.un.org/icty/transe68/050411IT.htm.
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establish a particular response, or to impugn the credibility of the witness in question.
Rather than leading questions, the Chamber should ask open questions instead. 1253

The questions of the judges should further be led by the principle of impartiality and
their truth-ascertaining objective. As the jurisprudence has established, "Judge[s]
should [. . .] be subjectively free from bias, [and . . .] there should be nothing in the
surrounding circumstance which objectively gives rise to an appearance of bias; that
impartiality must be assessed with regard to the perception of a hypothetical fairminded observer with sufficient knowledge of the actual circumstance to make a
reasonable judgement; that this hypothetical fair-minded observer is in a position
different to that of the parties". 1254

There have, however, been many allegations of judges posing biased or leading
questions to witnesses, particularly at the ICTR. In various ICTR cases, the defence
has the impression of dealing with judges who have preconceived views on the guilt
of the accused. In their perception, there also appears to be a tendency to have more
patience with Prosecution witnesses than with defence witnesses. 1255

In the ICTR case of Ngirabatware, one judge routinely suggested to defence
witnesses that they were not honest in answering his questions even if there was no
apparent contradiction in the witnesses’ answers. When, for instance, a witness
explained how he had come to confess, the judge asked the following question:
“So you were in prison and ICTR investigators came and questioned you, if I
understood you correctly. You were in a group in prison and the investigators were
questioning you, not individually, but collectively, the questions were put to the
group. So my question is as follows: So when a question was put, you all answered in
a chorus collectively?”
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To which the witness answered:
I explained to you that the investigators asked the group and asked what
Ngirabatware did in our region. And in answer, we said that he did good things and
did nothing bad.

The judge did not like the answer and said: “Please do not try to avoid my question. It
is direct and it is as follows: They asked one, two, three questions to the group, and
my question is as follows: So the group answered in chorus all at the same time in the
same breadth?”1256
In the same case, the defence was not allowed to ask questions to the accused about
the allegations made against the accused. When defence counsel asked the accused
Ngirabatware to comment on the accusations made against him, she was interrupted.
The presiding judge said: 1257
“You are not going to take the evidence of a witness and discuss the evidence of the
witness, you know directly in that way. Raise the issue that arise from the whatever
either from the testimony of the witness but it will be a question and answer answer
session, as it were, with the witness, not situation whereby the witness be invited to
comment or otherwise give his views on any other evidence has been given.
That is not his function. That’s the function for the for the Trial Chamber. And any
formulations any position taken will be taken by his by his counsel on both sides. So
raise the issue that are relevant to a particular aspect that you want to address in the
normal way and the proper way.
…

When defence counsel sought to suggest that the accused has a fundamental right to
answer the allegations made against him, the Presiding Judge stated: “No. No. No. It
can’t go that way.” This is extremely absurd and unprecedented. It is indisputable that
the accused has a right to answer the allegations made against him. One would
normally assume that the judges would want to hear what the accused has to say
before rendering judgment. That is the advantage for a bench if an accused chooses to
testify.
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Indeed, the Appeals Chamber in Nahimana et al confirmed that “the concept of a fair
trial includes equal opportunity to present one’s case and the fundamental right that
criminal proceedings should be adversarial in nature, with both prosecution and
accused having the opportunity to have knowledge of and comment on the
observations filed or evidence adduced by either party”. 1258

In the ICTR case of Nizeyimana, the presiding judge had a tendency to ask very
leading questions. He regularly put a proposition to the witness and asked him if that
was correct. This is a typical way of questioning a witness in cross-examination. Yet,
as aforementioned, it is not proper for a judge to adopt such a style, particularly when
issues are contentious. 1259

At the ICTY, the issue of bias has not been raised as often. Yet, some judges have
used language that suggests a lack of impartiality. For instance, one judge told one of
the accused on the stand to “[s]pare us your fantasy”. The accused, Kovacic, reacted
as follows: 1260
I can only say that I understand the statement in the following way. It actually
expresses a certain position and a certain conviction on the part of the Judge, the
position or the conviction that was a put forward during a trial. This might be an
indicator of prejudice in terms of the conclusions being made. Any sensible person
could have read it this way. We don't need to talk. I have arrived at my conclusion,
everything else is fantasy. I will give it some serious thought, whether I can perhaps
ask the Judge to step down from the Chamber. I do believe that a Judge who is part
of the Chamber should not be allowed to address the accused in this way before the
OTP's cross has even begun. Perhaps this was a piece of awkward phrasing by the
Judge. Maybe it was too emotional. I'm not going into that. Perhaps the Judge can
explain. Nevertheless, the way it looks now on the transcript really seems like
someone is jumping to conclusions there and as if the Judge already had his own
solution made up in his head.

On another occasion, that same judge asked the following questions to another
accused while on the stand: 1261

Judge: “I'm sorry. Mr. Bozic, we must assume that you as a lawyer, have a certain
1258
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intelligence, and if that is so, then you should be aware when you're just repeating
yourself instead of answering a question. Now, you have told us that the document
could have – everyone could have heard about it. That was not the question at all. It
is obvious that if there is a press release, everybody could have heard about it. The
question was: Did you personally take -- have knowledge of this? This is the
question that you are repeatedly being asked, and you have to answer by yes or no
finally. ...
I want this answer. There has been so much time spent just for such a simple answer.
…
Mr. Bozic, yes or no?
Witness: All I want to say is this, that in the -- in translation, a document means
something official, something that comes from a certain -- one organ to another
organ, whereas a press release I see as something quite different. I knew or, rather,
heard about this press release, and I take cognizance of it.
Judge: You are really trying our patience. We do not need lectures about what is a
document or not, and you are not here to lecture the Chamber. You are here, and I
quote myself, I said to tell us whether you have taken cognizance of this. I did not
use the word "document."
…
WITNESS: [Interpretation] First of all, Your Honour, I want to say that it is not my
intention to avoid answering the question; far from it. And I said that as far as this
press release is concerned, I heard about it from the media, not from any official
sources, and I went on to explain this precisely in response to the question by Judge
Antonetti.”

Defence counsel intervened and requested that the judge refrain from cross-examining
the accused and impatiently asking strident and accusatory questions. Counsel
stressed the importance of the process being fair, detached and objective. He added
that it would be unfortunate if an independent and impartial judge “would
inadvertently, no doubt, give the appearance of being other than independent and
impartial”. 1262

The judge conceded that he “may have been a little bit emotional” and agreed with the
defence in principle. 1263 However, in light of the non-responses to questioning in a
row, he considered it understandable that one loses patience. The Presiding Judge
added that it had nothing to do with partiality; rather, that it was part of the search for
the truth that judges enter into the arena of litigation and ask questions to
witnesses. 1264 Defence counsel clarified that he did not question the right of the bench
to ask questions: “I accept on many occasions it’s most illuminatory, and it sheds an
awful lot of light for the Prosecution and for the Defence on questions that are opaque
or not clarified”. However, he underlined that “[t]he truth can be arrived at
1262
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particularly by the Bench by non-leading, neutral, and rather balanced questions. But
when one talks about the intelligence of a witness, as the Judge did, and when one
talks about the Bench losing patience, it is perhaps unnecessary and lends more heat
to the debate than light”. 1265

The language used in these examples indeed gives the impression that some judges
have preconceived views. However, it is very difficult to demonstrate bias. There is a
strong presumption that the judges take their decisions in full independence, and it is
for the accused to rebut this presumption. 1266 The author is only aware of one recuisal
case based on the appearance of bias; 1267 but not of any other granting of a complaint
of bias.

Thus, in conclusion, there clearly is a great disparity between different benches when
it concerns appropriate interventions and trial management. The difference is not
explained so much by the common law or civil law background of judges; but rather
whether the judges have significant court experience or not. Professor Bohlander has
made the correct observation that the degree of control exercised by judges depends
largely on their individual attitude. 1268 The appropriateness of their interventions
varies depending to a large extent on the level of training and experience judges have.
Many of the appointed judges in international criminal courts and tribunals have no
court experience. It is obviously difficult to run a court properly and to make
appropriate interventions, if and when necessary, without any case management
experience. Particularly the job of the presiding judge is as much a management job
as it is a job of judging. It is no easy task to run an international trial lasting for years
with a significant number of witnesses speaking different languages and from an
unfamiliar culture. This is challenging for any judge, let alone one without proper
criminal trial experience.

To manage a case of such magnitude properly, it would greatly assist the judges to
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have “the experience of many years of learning to deal with victims and witnesses,
assessing credibility, sifting through evidence, distinguishing relevant facts from
irrelevant ones, balancing the interests of prosecution and defense against each other,
acquiring case management skills, cooperating and deliberating on a collegiate panel
as well as honing the craft of judgment writing to a fine art”. 1269
Public Trials?
As stated earlier, protective measures can be taken if necessary to guarantee the safety
of witnesses. These protective measures can apply throughout the investigations as
well as trial. They must be balanced carefully with the rights of the accused. Thus,
disclosure of at least the identity of all witnesses must be disclosed to the defence
adequate time before they commence their testimonies. However, the public at large
has no acknowledged right to full disclosure. Consequently, the identities of the
witnesses, as well as any information that could potentially identify them remains
confidential to the public at large.

This means that it can be very difficult for the public to follow the trials. Many of the
trials are conducted out of the public view through the excessive use of closed and
private sessions. 1270 Prosecution witnesses testify in private session for large chunks
of time and documents are usually redacted. The extent of closed and private sessions
has meant that interested third parties seeking to follow the proceedings are
confronted with a disrupted and disjointed record. Attempts to monitor the
proceedings remotely and in the public gallery are significantly hampered by the
frequent movement into or out of closed sessions.

This is particularly a problem with regard to ICC proceedings. Most of the time, for
individuals following remotely via the ICC’s web-link, the message appearing on the
screen indicates “closed or private session”, or “no broadcast”. The ICTY has sought
to keep closed sessions to a minimum. Less than 10% of the hearings are conducted in
closed session. The remainder of the trial sessions are public. In the ICTR, on the
1269
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other hand, confidential hearings are very frequent, but still not as frequent as at the
ICC. In the ICC, it varies from trial to trial. The Katanga & Ngudjolo proceedings
have been significantly more accessible to the public than Lubanga or Bemba, which
are in closed or private session virtually all the time.

The International Bar Association (‘IBA’) expressed concern about this excessive use
of closed and private sessions. 1271 The IBA held that “to many observers, aspects of
the [case] appear to be shrouded in secrecy.” 1272 The IBA further noted with regard to
many of the closed and private sessions that it was clear from the reclassified
transcript that there had in fact been no need to resort to closed session.

The Chamber in the case against Katanga and Ngudjolo acknowledged the
“superfluous” recourse to private or closed session. 1273 On several occasions, the
presiding judges in the Katanga and Lubanga cases emphasized the importance of a
public hearing. 1274

The Prosecution, however, routinely asks for confidential or private sessions even if
the risk of identification is negligible. For instance, in Katanga & Ngudjolo the
Prosecution requested for a closed session each time an NGO or a person who had
cooperated with the Court was mentioned. Most of the time, the mere mentioning of
such a person or NGO does not disclose the fact that the organisation or the person
had provided assistance to the Court. Their mentioning in public does then not put
them at any risk. The Chamber agreed that such information can be discussed
publicly. 1275

Recourse to closed or private session where not strictly necessary, undermines the
fundamental right of the defence to a public hearing and thus to a fair trial pursuant to
1271
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Article 21 ICTY Statute, Article 20 ICTR Statute and Article 67(1) of the ICC
Statute. Indeed, irrespective of whether confidentiality is justified in a particular
situation or not, they “deny access to knowledge and indicate its undeniable existence.
This ‘undeniable denial’ is consequential, as courts sit in judgment and mete out
penalties according to evidence that cannot be viewed by any but themselves.” 1276

A real advantage of public testimony is that there is a greater possibility that persons
involved in the event in question will be in a position to identify false testimony. In
addition, they may be able to offer to testify as a defence witness. This will not
happen if the public is unable to access key information pertaining to the testimony of
the witness. 1277

In this regard, the ECtHR has held that the public character of proceedings “protects
litigants against the administration of justice in secret with no public scrutiny; it is
also one of the means whereby confidence in the courts can be maintained. By
rendering the administration of justice transparent, publicity contributes to the
achievement of the aim of article 6(1), namely a fair trial.” 1278 Thus public trials are
important, not only to protect the fairness of the proceedings, but also to allow the
public to follow what is going on. The public nature of criminal proceedings “offers
protection against arbitrary decisions and builds confidence by allowing the public to
see justice administered”. 1279

Former Vice-President and ICTY Appeals Judge Florence Mumba has underscored
the point that while there may be a need for limited exception to the right of a public
trial, public hearings “serve an important educational purpose, by helping people
understand how the law is applied to facts that constitute crimes, acting as a check on
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‘framed’ trials, and giving the public a chance to suggest changes to the law or justice
system.” 1280

Oral testimony aside, almost all documents at the ICC are submitted confidentially.
This means that only the parties, participants and the Chamber are allowed to review
their contents. Whilst a redacted version of most confidential filings and transcripts is
produced at a later stage, considerable quantities of database material remain
unavailable to the public. 1281 Consequently, the trials and evidence on which the
judgements rely are barely accessible to the communities who were affected by the
war under investigation of the various international criminal courts and tribunals.

There is a clear conflict between different interests that need to be balanced carefully
by the international criminal courts and tribunals. On the one hand, confidentiality
may encourage witnesses to come forward and States and other entities to disclose
their documentation. In that way, this may assist the truth-ascertaining exercise of the
international criminal courts and tribunals. On the other hand confidentiality of the
proceedings may affect the fairness of the proceedings as well as many of the
secondary objectives upheld by international criminal courts and tribunals. This most
notably includes the right of victims to the truth, reconciliation and the creation of an
accurate and authoritative historical record.

The lack of access to important material and testimony on which the international
criminal justice systems rely deprives victims of their right to know the truth. It is
insufficient that the judgements are public because the victims and their communities
should be able to verify the evidentiary foundation underlying the judgements and
assess for themselves whether they agree with the conclusions drawn. People are not
1280
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inclined “to believe by a text they cannot see”. 1282

Reconciliation is also clearly compromised by the excessive use of confidentiality.
According to Waters, confidentiality “inhibits the reception of the court’s judgments
and documents as a legitimate source that might displace alternatives; and second, the
strategic aspects of redaction create incentives to harness arguments about history to
agendas of prosecution and power that are unresponsive to local sensibilities.”
Accordingly, confidentiality undermines the court’s ability “to craft authoritative
reconciliatory narratives”. 1283 It is usually presumed that “it is the authoritative truthrecord established by international trials that makes denial impossible and paves the
way for reconciliation – but essential to that process is undeniable truth.” 1284 A nontransparent truth cannot be undeniable as long as most of the evidence relied on to
reach that truth, to the exclusion of other truths, is unknown to the public and cannot
be tested adequately by those affected by the truth that is being established.

In addition, confidentiality undermines the contribution the court could potentially
make to the creation of a historical record of the conflict which is shared by the
different communities involved because “[p]rojects of shared understanding require a
shared body of reference.” 1285 If based largely on confidential material and testimony,
the narrative created by the international court or tribunal cannot be reflective of “the
perspectives of those parties most affected and most concerned with generating a
history”. 1286 This prevents them from making any contribution to the creation of an
authoritative historical narrative of their own conflict situation. The historical
narrative created by an international court or tribunal may, therefore, be distorted and
rejected as authoritative by the communities most concerned.

Thus, more efforts should be made to retain the public nature of international
proceedings. It is conceded that international courts and tribunals operate in a delicate
position. They fully rely on cooperation of States and other entities and they cannot
1282
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offer adequate protection to victims and witnesses. In exceptional situations,
confidentiality seems therefore to be a condition for the effective operation of
international criminal courts and tribunals. However, with due respect for fairness and
in the light of the ambitious objectives set for international courts and tribunals, any
decision to withhold information from the public for reasons of confidentiality must
be exceptional and well reasoned, rather than routine.
Admissibility of Evidence

International criminal justice systems commonly operate an inclusionary policy
towards evidence, whereby material presented to the Chamber will be admitted in
evidence unless there is a particular problem with it. In order to be admissible, there
must only be indicia of reliability, indicia of relevance and indicia of probative value.
In addition, the probative value must outweigh the prejudicial effect of any evidence.
Further, where evidence is unlawfully obtained such evidence will be excluded. 1287

The approaches towards the admissibility of evidence vary significantly from
Chamber to Chamber. 1288 For instance, the ICC Chamber in the Katanga & Ngudjolo
made a case-by-case determination of the relevance, significance, probative value and
prejudice of a document. On that basis, it excluded reports from independent
observers where the author’s identity and the sources of the information were not
revealed with sufficient detail or it relied heavily on hearsay information. Reports of
NGOs and third States were excluded where insufficient guarantees of nonpartisanship and impartiality were provided. They were also held inadmissible where
insufficient information was given on the sources and methodology used, or where the
contents largely relied on hearsay evidence. 1289
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This is in stark contrast to the approach taken by the Bemba Trial Chamber. Without
predetermining their ultimate weight, it made a prima facie determination of
admissibility as evidence of all of the materials included by the Prosecution in its list
of evidence. 1290 The Chamber justified this decision by referring to its right under the
Statute to admit non-oral evidence, and held the wholesale admission of evidence
would save time and serve the search for the truth. 1291 The Appeals Chamber,
however, overturned the decision. It considered that, in admitting all Prosecution
documents without a cautious item-by-item evaluation and giving reasons, the
Chamber acted outside the legal framework of the Court and inconsistent with the
principle of orality under article 69(2) of the Statute. 1292
Thus, some limits to admissibility have been imposed. However, aside from the
obligation to assess documents on their individual indicia, there are few additional
requirements. There is, for instance, no ban on hearsay or other dubious evidence.
Documents of contested authenticity because they are unsigned and undated copies or
excerpts of exhibits, may still be admitted. 1293 Even a written statement made by a
suspect or accused, incriminating his co-accused, without a requirement for him to
take the stand and be subject to cross-examination by this co-accused, can be admitted
in this fashion. 1294 Given that the co-accused has not had an opportunity to crossexamine his accuser, such a statement can, however, only be relied upon for a finding
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of guilt if sufficiently corroborated. 1295

Thus, while there are certain thresholds for admissibility of evidence, many categories
of evidence that would be excluded or tightly controlled in common law criminal
justice systems, such as hearsay, are admissible in international criminal justice
systems. Documents do further not need to be introduced through a witness, but can
be introduced through the bar. 1296 As a result, a large quantity of evidence is admitted
without any explanation from anyone who is familiar with the document and without
significant discussion in court.

The reason for this approach to admissibility is that the evidence is not reviewed by a
jury who might be distracted or improperly affected by certain evidence, but by a
bench of professional judges who seek to establish the truth. Truth is not dependent
on the parties. 1297

As previously discussed, the fundamental norm that witnesses be heard orally in court
has been undermined, particularly at the ICTY, by the introduction of new rules, e.g.
rule 92ter, rule 92quater and rule 92quinquies allowing the admission of written
witness declarations in lieu of oral testimony in specific circumstances. Under these
rules, directly incriminating statements can be introduced without the judges having
had an opportunity to assess the demeanour of the witness and without the defence
having had an opportunity to question the witness.

These provisions were introduced not to advance the ascertainment of the truth, but
rather for reasons of efficiency. As aforementioned, they were based on a
misinterpretation of civil law principles of evidence. Whenever civil law proceedings
are looked at as a better model for international criminal justice, it is because such
1295
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proceedings, without the ‘technicalities’ of common law procedures, are viewed as
being likely to provide a quicker and easier determination of guilt, if appropriate,
rather than to enhance truth-finding.

However, the measures adopted go further than the principles of evidence adhered to
in civil law systems. This is so, particularly in respect of rules 92quater and
92quinquies allowing the judges to rely on a witness statement directly going to the
acts and conduct of the accused without having had an opportunity to assess the
demeanour of the witness and without the defence having been given an opportunity
to cross-examine. In most civil law systems, particularly under influence of the
ECHR, this is no longer acceptable. Most witnesses the judges tend to rely on without
having seen them have previously been questioned by an investigative judge in the
presence of the parties who were also given an opportunity to ask questions. 1298

This difference between civil law proceedings and international criminal proceedings
was pointed out by former ICTY Judge Hunt. He pointed out that this new approach
went further than either common law or civil law proceedings. He emphasised that the
civil law dossier was prepared by a judicial officer whose mandate it is to look for
exonerating and incriminating evidence equally and who is expected to be neutral.1299
International criminal tribunals do not employ an independent judicial officer to take
statements, but rely on the parties for doing so. The result is that international
criminal tribunals, whilst readily accepting the use of out-of-court evidence, have not
incorporated the safeguards inherent in domestic systems which have a tendency to
rely on paper evidence. 1300

Other practices, such as the admission of an incriminating statement made by one
accused against his co-accused even where the maker of the statement has not given
oral evidence would not be permitted at common law nor in some civil law
jurisdictions. 1301
1298

See above, Part II ‘methodologies’.
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In approving the admissibility of statements from a co-accused the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY
concluded that the practice was inconsistent with common law principles while, with regard to civil
law “no discernable general principle may be inferred from domestic practice in this area”. 1302 Once
again the reason for approving the admission of such statements was the fact that international trials are
conducted by professional judges, as opposed to a lay jury. According to the Appeals Chamber,
“professional judges are better able to weigh evidence and consider it in its proper context than
members of a jury. Furthermore, as opposed to a jury’s verdict, professional judges have to write a
reasoned decision, which is subject to appeal.” 1303

The ease with which evidence is admitted before the tribunals has been subject to
criticism. Scholars have suggested that such a lenient admission policy removes any
kind of quality test. 1304

The tendency to admit rather than exclude most of the proposed evidence is arguably
more problematic in the circumstances in which the tribunals operate. Given the
complexity of the cases, thousands of documents tend to be admitted per case without
any explanation by a witness who is familiar with the documents. 1305 The quantity is
so great that it would be useful, simply on pragmatic grounds, to introduce stricter
admissibility criteria. As Murphy has pointed out, “far from furthering the search for
truth through free proof, they actually frustrate their objective by making trials longer,
more complex, and less efficient, and by tending to bury the truly important evidence
in the midst of an enormous accumulation of evidential debris.” 1306 An additional
reason to introduce a more vigorous admissibility test is the high risk of document
fabrication in ethnically divided war areas. 1307
Prlić Decision on Appeals against Decision Admitting Transcript of Jadranko Prlić’s Questioning
into Evidence, para 50.
1303
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See Julian Nicholls, ‘Evidence: Hearsay and Anonymous Witnesses’, Ch VII in Haveman,
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The admission of dubious evidence does not necessarily lead to less accurate findings.
The real issue is whether the oft recited mantra (that the professional judges in
international criminal proceedings are capable of winnowing out such material in a
way that juries would not be) is to be relied upon. The question whether the
judgments handed down over the last fifteen years do indeed show that the judges
have been able to set aside evidence that is irrelevant, unfairly prejudicial or
unreliable will be looked at in the next chapter.
Assessment of the Evidence

The evaluation system
The reliability of the outcome depends on two components, the degree of access to the
information related to the underlying charges and secondly the efficacy of the
evaluation of this information. The actual evaluation equates to the cognitive
component of a search for the truth. It is much more difficult to regulate the cognitive,
than the procedural component, as was addressed above, because that is essentially a
subjective process of the uncertain human mind.

In the ICTY, ICTR and ICC, the evidence is evaluated by a Trial Chamber consisting
of three professional judges, a majority of whom must be in agreement with the
outcome. The Chamber’s verdict is final unless one or both parties lodge an appeal
against the verdict. In such a case, the enforcement of the judgment is stayed until the
Appeals Chamber has ruled on it.1308 An acquitted person is released immediately
upon the pronouncement of the judgment unless the Chamber uses its discretion to
issue an order for his continued detention. This may occur pending the determination
of the appeal if the Prosecutor has advised it at the time the judgment is pronounced
and in open court of his intention to file an appeal. 1309 Any appeal against an acquittal
or conviction is allowed provided it is based on an error of law invalidating the
decision, or an error of fact which has occasioned a miscarriage of justice. 1310 The
1308
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Appeals Chamber may affirm, reverse or revise the Trial Chamber’s judgment. 1311

The ICC includes an extra layer of review of the factual allegations. There is already a
full assessment of the evidence at the confirmation hearing by a Pre-Trial Chamber.
The Pre-Trial Chamber’s findings do not, however, constitute findings on the guilt or
innocence of the defendant. The purpose of the confirmation hearing is to ensure that
“no case goes to trial unless there is sufficient evidence to establish substantial
grounds to believe that the person committed the crime with which he or she has been
charged.” 1312 The evidence is tested marginally and few witnesses, if any, will be
called to testify viva voce. 1313 The Prosecution is explicitly allowed to rely on
anonymous witnesses and summaries, although the weight will be reduced. 1314 The
confirmation hearing has a limited scope and “by no means can it be seen as an end in
itself, but it must be seen as a means to distinguish those cases that should go to trial
from those that should not go to trial.” 1315

Despite its limited scope, so far four out of fourteen cases have not been confirmed.
These cases were not confirmed because of insufficient evidence, or inherent
contradictions and inconsistencies between the witness statements. 1316 In the case of
Mbarushimana, the majority of the Pre-Trial Chamber even held that the evidence
failed to demonstrate that the suspect made any contribution to the commission of
crimes under the ICC Statute, let alone a “significant” one, as is required for criminal
1311
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Decision on the Confirmation of Charges ICC-01/04-01/10-465-Red, 16 December 2011, paras.39-41;
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges,
ICC-01/04-01/06-803-tEN, 29 January 2007, paras 37-39; Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Pre-Trial
Chamber I, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, ICC-01/04-01/07-717, 1 October 2008, paras 6164; Prosecutor v. Bahar Idriss Abu Garda, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on the Confirmation of
Charges, ICC- 02/05-02/09-243-Red, 8 February 2010, paras 35-40; Prosecutor v. Abdallah Banda
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liability under the Statute. 1317

This amounts to 29% of the totality of the cases, a number of which were not even
challenged at the confirmation level. 1318 In light of the significantly lower standard of
proof, this is a high percentage. Unfortunately, it demonstrates that the Prosecutor
failed significantly in producing sufficient evidence in support of the cases he himself
brought before the Court. On a more positive note, it also demonstrates that there is a
real test at the ICC and that judges are independent of the Prosecutor’s Office. Until
now, the judges have rigorously applied the requisite confirmation standard and did
not confirm the cases that should not have been confirmed. 1319

General Principles
As aforementioned, the burden is on the Prosecutor to prove the case beyond
reasonable doubt and the only question the judges should focus on is whether the
Prosecutor met this burden. This is perceived as the principal safeguard against
wrongful convictions of defendants before international criminal courts and tribunals.
As Coleen Rohan, defence counsel before the ICTY, has stated: 1320
The requirement that the Prosecution must prove cases brought in international
forums beyond a reasonable doubt […] is a critical means of attempting to assure that
verdicts returned on the international stage, involving, as they do, previous heads of
state, military, government and political leaders, are as reliable as they can be, given
the flaws of human nature and the flaws inherent in any system of law. Application of
this standard of proof assures that all Prosecution evidence will be properly subjected
to rigorous, thoughtful scrutiny including a thorough examination of its strengths and
weaknesses. It also obviates, to a significant extent, the concern that verdicts can or
will be based on rumor, innuendo, assumptions, suspicion, political or ethnic bias or
1317
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ill-informed, though nonetheless popular pre-conceptions as to who must be held
liable for individual war crimes and who must not.

If the Prosecutor fails to produce sufficient evidence, the judges can do very little
other than acquit the accused even if they believe that the accused is guilty as
charged. His guilt must be firmly demonstrated by evidence produced during the
course of trial. Surprisingly, in one case, the judges considered themselves competent
to rely on documents “not specifically tendered in evidence”. 1321 This case has,
however, not established a rule or practice. In general, judges rely solely on the
evidence produced in the proceedings. Such evidence can, however, be produced on
the Chamber’s order. If the judges believe there is relevant and reliable evidence
available which is not produced by the parties, they may request that this additional
evidence be produced. Such additional evidence may complete or shed doubt on the
Prosecutor’s case. In one case, additional evidence produced on the Chamber’s order
has led to the acquittal of the accused. 1322

If at the end of the case two out of these three judges are satisfied that the defendant’s
guilt has been established beyond reasonable doubt, he risks being sentenced to life
imprisonment or at least a significant number of years. This is because of the serious
nature of the crimes most defendants are charged with before international criminal
tribunals and courts. Given the impact of their decision on the defendant’s life, the
judges carry a heavy responsibility. This is particularly true in light of the mandates of
the international criminal justice systems, e.g. the maintenance of international peace
and security, reconciliation and the manifestation. NGOs, civil society groups, victims
and other interested persons or organisations also have a keen interest in the outcome.
Some observers consider it appropriate for the judges to take into account the interests
of victims and other groups and individuals concerned when determining the
appropriate sentence to be imposed on the defendant if found guilty. 1323

However, in determining whether the defendant is guilty as charged, such interests
1321
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should not play any role. Instead, the judges are expected to engage with the
information but keep their distance, and determine the guilt or innocence only on the
basis of the evidence presented. It is this very rationale which explains why the rules
of admissibility of evidence are so flexible as opposed to jurisdictions with lay jurymembers. Professionally trained judges are assumed to be able to render emotionless
decisions. Indeed, as one ICTR Trial Chamber put it, “[i]n spite of the irrefutable
atrocities of the crimes committed in Rwanda, the judges must examine the facts
adduced in a most dispassionate manner, bearing in mind that the accused is
presumed innocent. Moreover, the seriousness of the charges brought against the
accused makes it all the more necessary to examine scrupulously and meticulously all
the inculpatory and exonerating evidence, in the context of a fair trial and in full
respect of all the rights of the Accused.” 1324

Extra-judicial Considerations
In reality, this may be difficult even for professionally trained judges. The judges may
subconsciously have pre-determined views concerning the guilt of the accused. Such
risk is heightened in light of the participation of victims before the ICC and their
acknowledged right to the truth, as well as the active role of the media and human
rights activists in investigating the crimes under the jurisdiction of international
criminal justice systems, and publicly identifying those who are allegedly responsible.
In domestic jurisdictions, identified perpetrators in high profile cases causing public
outrage are usually at a higher risk to be wrongly condemned. 1325 International
criminal courts and tribunals exclusively deal with high profile cases. Any human is
prone to be influenced by extra-legal considerations. A professional judge does not
stop being a human being. 1326
As Frank put it: 1327
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Now the trial judge is a man, with a susceptibility to such unconscious prejudiced
“identifications” originating in his infant experiences. Sitting at a trial, long before he
has come to the point where he must decide what is right or wrong, just or unjust, with
reference to the facts of the case as a whole, he has been engaged in making numerous
judgments or inferences, as the testimony dribbles in. His impressions, colored by his
unconscious biases with respect to the witnesses, as to what they said, and with what
truthfulness and accuracy they said it, will determine what he believes to be the “facts
of the case”. His innumerable hidden traits and predispositions often get in their work
in shaping his decision in the very process by which he becomes convinced what those
facts are. The judge’s belief about the facts results from the impact of numerous stimuli
– including the words, gestures, postures and grimaces of the witnesses – on his
distinctive “personality”; that personality, in turn, is a product of numerous factors,
including his parents, his schooling, his teachers and companions, the persons he has
met, the woman he married (or did not marry), his children, the books and articles he
has read.”

The most problematic aspect of the ascertainment of the guilt or innocence of the
accused is that the mind of the triers of fact cannot be controlled or known. A
standard of proof can be set. However, it is impossible to know, let alone regulate,
how the triers of fact determine when the requisite standard is met and what level of
certainty is required for meeting this standard. One can control the type of evidence
the triers of fact are allowed to consider in evaluating the question of guilt or
innocence. One can also impose legal conditions for the standard to be met. The
international judges are for instance obligated to justify in writing if, and on what
basis the standard of proof was met. This constitutes a safeguard against erroneous
convictions, as it renders the findings and reasoning transparent. Accordingly, the
judgement can be put to the test of scrutiny by the public as well as the Appeals
Chamber. This also guarantees consistency in approach from Chamber to Chamber as
well as greater certainty before the law.

The obligation upon the judges to justify their findings also ensures that the society at
large and the people from the affected communities including the victims have access
to the full truth established in international trials. Thus, the delivery of public detailed
judgements may also contribute to the secondary mandates, most notably
reconciliation, peace and security, and the creation of a historical record.

It is therefore a positive phenomenon that international tribunals have incorporated
the civil law requirement of producing reasoned written decisions. It nonetheless
remains difficult to assess whether a given decision is fair. Whilst the judges tend to
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produce very lengthy written findings, 1328 it is often impossible to verify which
factors have led them to decide one way or the other. The reliability and credibility of
witness testimony is determined on a case-by-case basis. 1329 Judges are not required
to provide reasoning for each step they took in the process of weighing and assessing
the evidence. 1330 Reviewing the judgements, particularly those at the ICTR, one
cannot help to wonder whether it is a chess game or a search for the truth. The
judgements contain lengthy analyses on witness credibility. They discuss each factor
that could potentially undermine or enhance the credibility and reliability of the
evidence. However, on the basis of such factors, the ultimate determination on the
witness credibility can easily go either way: credible or not credible. It seems rather
arbitrary.

The judgements further do not address any extra-legal considerations that may have
played a determinative role in the subjective decision-making process of the
judges. 1331 They do not address the personal process the trier of facts has gone
through to make up their mind about the ultimate issue of guilt or innocence. 1332 Nor
do they disclose the real motives and reasons underlying their findings. If judges are
even aware of their real motives for deciding as they did, such motives will rarely be
included in the decision, in particular where the decision was essentially based on
prejudice. 1333 At least, one cannot be sure that the reasons given for the judges’
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findings match what, in truth, they think. 1334
It is difficult, if not impossible, to explore the mind of any human being, but particularly that of a trier
of fact. A witness can be cross-examined, which may expose his thoughts to some degree, but no one is
permitted to cross-examine a judge or to use other methods applicable to witnesses. How, then, can one
“investigate his secret thoughts …? He is the master of them, and what he says must be conclusive, as
there is nothing to contradict or explain it.” 1335

Cultural and Linguistic Difficulties
In addition, judges in international criminal courts and tribunals suffer from the same
deficits as investigators in assessing an unknown situation usually not covered by
their training or expertise. It is questionable how much their professional training
assists judges in assessing what happened during conflicts in unfamiliar cultures.1336
It does not help that the deliberation takes place far from the war zone in a quiet office
in The Hague or Arusha. Many judges have not even visited the crime base and may,
therefore, have no affinity with the culture under investigation.

It is, for instance, not uncommon for international judges dealing with African
conflicts to be presented with command structures based on magic. For instance, in
his ICC trial, Katanga has alleged that the true war chiefs in his culture were the
‘féticheurs’, spiritual leaders with magical powers. Katanga testified that it was the
spiritual leader or ‘sage’ who decided when and where an attack should be launched.
Such decisions were based on the messages the sages of war received. Prior to an
attack, the sages would gather the militiamen together and organise a ceremony and
provide them with ‘fétiche’. The ‘fétiche’ consisted of a mix of herbs and animal
bones and made the militiamen bullet proof, provided they abided by the rules.1337
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This has been confirmed by other witnesses. 1338 Throughout the trial, the judges have
expressed genuine interest in this aspect of the story. 1339 It will be interesting to see
whether the judges will treat this evidence, if believed, as mitigating or exempting
liability. In many African villages, there is a strong belief in mythical powers. It is
thus difficult for anyone to refuse to abide by the orders of a war sage. 1340

In each individual case in international justice, it is difficult, if not impossible, to
determine what type of conduct is internationally condemnable in the extraordinary
circumstances of a conflict. Unlike in domestic systems, the conduct of an accused in
a war situation is often conformist rather than deviant. 1341 Is that a factor that should
mitigate the sentence? No expert presumably has the expertise to give an authoritative
answer on this, particularly because every conflict is unique. There is often simply no
precedent for “reasonable” behaviour.

To the extent that expert witnesses can give some guidance, the reader is reminded
that there are numerous problems with expert testimony. Expert witnesses are not
always impartial and dispassionate even if they try. Moreover, they have not
personally witnessed any of the events they describe but often rely on anonymous
sources to reconstruct them. Their sources were not always eyewitnesses to the events
but may narrate the accounts of others. Such factors are taken into consideration in
weighing the reliability and credibility of expert testimony. 1342 Thus, a finding of guilt
cannot be made exclusively on expert testimony. 1343 Expert evidence may be useful to
complement eyewitness testimony, but can never replace it. Expert evidence is
therefore of limited assistance only.
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It can also be challenging to assess the demeanour of witnesses from a culture with
very different customs. A witness’s evasiveness in answering questions can be the
result of lying, a misunderstanding or a cultural reason the assessor cannot quite
comprehend. Combs has highlighted many such difficulties. She also pointed out that
a witness’s lack of education can cause a credible witness to look incredible. On the
other hand, witnesses can also hide behind cultural differences when, in fact, they are
stuck in their own lies. 1344

An additional difficulty is caused by multiple translations and interpretations.
International tribunals have more than one official language. The more languages are
involved, the more likely mistakes occur in simultaneous translation. The ICC is
faced with a particular complexity as it deals with a large number of different
languages spoken by the accused and witnesses, including non-written local or tribal
languages, for instance Zaghawa spoken by a particular tribe in Sudan. Languages are
often translated into different languages first before being translated into a language
which the judges understand, thus widening the gap between them and the witness.

There are already serious discrepancies between the English and French versions of
the transcript. 1345 In light of the recognised potential impact of translation errors on
the outcome of the case, such discrepancies have led the Chamber in Katanga &
Ngudjolo to order a full review of the English and French translations of Katanga’s
and Ngudjolo’s testimonies. 1346

Such translation errors can lead to significant misinterpretations of what the witness
has said. Inconsistencies between a witness’s testimony in court with his previous
statement, or between different parts of his testimony could be the result of translation
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errors. Witnesses often blame it on interpretation. 1347 It could, however, also simply
be the result of perjury or confusion. Additional difficulties are caused by the
interpretation of words. As previously discussed, divergent meanings can be given to
the same terms. Translation therefore renders the task of judging very challenging.

Quality of Judges
In these circumstances, the quality of judges is of the utmost importance. It has
already been noted that this quality varies significantly between excellent and poor.
Defendants tried by properly trained and experienced judges generally have a greater
chance of receiving a fair trial. According to Professor Bohlander, the recruitment of
judges does not measure up and is not always in conformity with the recruitment
criteria set out in the Statutes. 1348

Paciocco has pointed out that politics have plagued the judicial appointments process,
with the result that the decision-makers who have been chosen are not always the best
qualified. 1349 Paciocco finds this distressing, “particularly given that international
criminal law is in its infancy, and that these judges are the ones developing the
jurisprudence that may well frame the law for generations. It is also distressing
because the rules adopted tend to invite broad judicial discretion; it takes a better
lawyer to handle that latitude, than to apply a technical jurisprudence, because the
wise use of discretion requires intimate familiarity with principles, and the purposes
underlying the rules.” 1350 Paciocco rightly observes that good quality decision-makers
are essential for a satisfying development of international jurisprudence. 1351
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Paciocco expresses alarm at the sight of judges of the Tribunal becoming immersed in
political issues, such as advocating for victim compensation. 1352 Indeed, the
independence and objectivity of a court are questionable if the judges are too much
focused on victims.

It is particularly problematic that judges at international courts and tribunals are not
necessarily professionally trained as judges in criminal matters. Among them are
academics and diplomats with no court experience at all. Bohlander, who has
experience both as an academic and a judge, has no hesitation in saying that, in his
experience, “judges usually do a better job at academic work than academics at
judging.” 1353 In any judicial system, judges receive some training. In civil law
jurisdictions this training tends to be longer than in common law systems. However,
for instance in the UK, judges have been practicing barristers for a significant period
of time before being appointed. 1354 International criminal justice systems are about
the only courts at least in the western world where persons can become judges
without judicial training or experience. 1355 They do not even receive any training
upon arrival in the international arena, but must immediately participate in rendering
judgment on as serious an issue as genocide, war crimes or crimes against humanity.
In Bohlander’s view, “diplomats, government officials, academics are ill-suited for
such an important and complex judicial office, absent substantial judicial
experience.” 1356
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The International Crisis Group in a report in 2001 proposed to revisit the selection of
the judges in order to ensure that only judges with a real professional experience in
criminal law would be employed. 1357

These are valid criticisms. Some academic judges have, however, been among the
better judges. 1358 This shows that training and experience does not always guarantee
better quality. For trial management purposes, it is essential that the presiding judge is
properly trained and experienced in judging. Academic judges could serve as appeal
judges, or be part of a trial bench jointly with professional judges. Experience and
training certainly assist in assessing the credibility and reliability of the evidence.

Principles of Ascertaining the Facts Applied in ICTY and ICTR
The ICC has not rendered any final judgement yet. It is currently waiting for the
Chamber in Lubanga to reach a verdict, but it has not yet been announced. Thus, the
analysis below is focused on the ICTY and ICTR only.

The ICTY and ICTR have adopted a liberal system of proof, which means that legal
provisions do not set out minimum requirements for a conviction, or directives to be
followed in deliberating on the issue of guilt. In principle, the judges are entirely free
to determine what weight, if any, to attach to the evidence admitted in each case. The
only two exceptions are embodied in Rule 90(B) of the ICTY Rules and Rule 90(C)
of the ICTR Rules, requiring corroboration of witnesses who did not take the oath,
and in Rule 96 ICTY, ICTR Rules, imposing that no corroboration shall be required
in cases of sexual violence.

The requirements of corroboration at the ICTY and ICTR in specific circumstances
have strengthened over the years. For instance, untested evidence directly implicating
the accused must be corroborated. 1359 As was held by the Appeals Chamber,
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“evidence which has not been cross-examined and goes to the acts and conduct of the
accused or is pivotal to the Prosecution’s case will require corroboration if used to
establish a conviction.” 1360

Statements admitted under Rule 92quater or Rule 92quinquies of the ICTY Rules can
only be relied upon if sufficiently corroborated. In the case of Haraqija and Morina
the Chamber held that
[i]n order for a piece of evidence to be able to corroborate untested evidence, it must not
only induce a strong belief of truthfulness of the latter, i.e. enhance its probative value,
but must also be obtained in an independent manner. Rejecting a technical approach to
this issue, the Trial Chamber holds that corroborating evidence may include pieces of
evidence that, although originating from the same source, arose under different
circumstances, at different times and for different purposes. Such evidence would
indeed meet the requirement of “sufficient corroboration”, which is aimed at preventing
an encroachment on the rights of the accused.1361

The Appeals Chamber affirmed that a conviction cannot rest decisively on untested
evidence. It found that “[w]hether untested evidence is sufficiently corroborated is
necessarily a fact specific inquiry and varies from case to case”. 1362 In this particular
case, the Appeals Chamber was not satisfied that the untested evidence from the coaccused was sufficiently corroborated, given that all other available evidence was also
untested, consisting of double or triple hearsay. The Appeals Chamber, therefore,
overturned the conviction of one of the accused. 1363
Another category of evidence that is usually expected to be corroborated is evidence
given by a co-perpetrator or others with a motive to incriminate the accused. 1364 Coperpetrators are frequently considered to be of diminished credibility, given that their
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answers are not trustworthy because they may seek to put the blame on the accused to
avoid self-incrimination. Their evidence should, therefore, be treated with suspicion
even where the co-perpetrator came to testify as a viva voce witness in the case and,
as such, was subjected to the test of cross-examination. In most cases, although not a
strict requirement, such evidence is only relied upon if corroborated. 1365
The inherent reliability is particularly undermined where evidence is given in an
interview with the prosecution by a co-perpetrator who is jointly tried with the
accused but does not himself testify. Due to the lack of oath and the test of crossexamination and demeanour such evidence must be treated with caution and, at a
minimum, be corroborated. 1366

In any other situation - although it is usually preferred that evidence is
corroborated 1367 - the judges are perfectly allowed to rely on non-corroborated
evidence for the finding of guilt. Provided it is relevant and credible, the Chamber can
rely on a single testimony. 1368

This is no different when it constitutes uncorroborated hearsay or circumstantial
evidence which can be relied upon for the finding of guilt, provided it is credible and
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reliable. 1369 However, caution is warranted in such circumstances. 1370 Indeed, hearsay
evidence “may be affected by a potential compounding of errors of perception and
memory”. 1371 Its reliability is usually affected by the fact that the source of the
information is not tested in cross-examination and often has not taken the oath.1372
Double hearsay raises greater concerns of reliability because the truthfulness of that
information depends not only on the credibility of the witness and the accuracy of his
observation, but also on the credibility and reliability of the declarant. 1373

In Muvunyi, the Appeals Chamber found that the Trial Chamber had not acted
reasonably and with the requisite degree of caution when it relied on hearsay evidence
from two witnesses to establish the systematic killing of Tutsi lecturers and students,
notwithstanding their lack of detail in respect of those killings. 1374

Accordingly, most Chambers are reluctant to rely on uncorroborated hearsay evidence
even if it is otherwise reliable and credible. Although it is a case-to-case
determination depending on ”the content of the evidence and the circumstances under
which it arose”, 1375 as well as its voluntariness, truthfulness and trustworthiness,1376
Chambers rarely rely on hearsay evidence standing alone. 1377
1369

Muvunyi Appeal Judgement (29 Aug 2008), para 70; Haraqija & Morina Appeal Judgment, para

62.
1370

Rutaganda Trial Judgment, para 18; Sesay Trial Judgement, para. 495. Milosevic Decision on
Admissibility of Prosecution Investigator’s Evidence (30 Sep 2002), para 18; see also Kordic & Cerkez
Appeal Judgment (17 Dec 2004), para 787; Tadic Separate Opinion of Judge Stephen on the
Prosecutor’s Motion Requesting Protective Measures for Victims and Witnesses (10 Aug 1995) 2–3;
Simba Trial Judgment (13 Dec 2005), para 209; Naletilic Trial Judgement, para 11; Nahimana Trial
Judgment, para 97.
1371
Kamuhanda Decision on Kamuhanda’s Motion to Admit Evidence Pursuant to Rule 89 of the
Rules of Procedure and Evidence (10 Feb 2003), para 10; Simic Trial Judgment, para 23; Naletilic Trial
Judgment, para 11 and Krnojelac Trial Judgment, para 70; Naletilic Appeal Judgement, para 217.
1372
Krnojelac Trial Judgment, para 70.
1373
Ntakirutimana Appeal Judgment, para 211. See also Aleksovski Decision on Prosecutor’s Appeal
on Admission of Evidence (16 Feb 1999), para 15; Blaskic Decision on the Standing Objection of the
Defence to the Admission of Hearsay with no Inquiry as to its Reliability, para 12.
1374
Muvunyi Appeal Judgement, para 70.
1375
Aleksovski Decision on the Prosecutor’s Appeal on Admissibility of Evidence (16 Feb 1999), para
15; Limaj Decision on the Prosecution’s Motion to Admit Prior Statements as Substantive Evidence
(25 April 2005), para 17.
1376
Aleksovski Decision, ibid, para 15; Blagojevic and Jokic Trial Judgment, para 21; Halilovic Trial
Judgement, para 15; Martic Trial Judgment, para 24; Brdjanin Trial Judgement, para 28.
1377
Limaj Oral Ruling of 18 November 2004, at 447–49; Limaj Decision on the Prosecution’s Motions
to Admit Prior Statements as Substantive Evidence (25 April 2005), para 27; Prlic Appeals Judgment,
para 51; also Aleksovski Decision on Prosecutor’s Appeal on Admissibility of Evidence (16 Feb 1999),
para 25; Popović Decision on Appeals Against Decision Admitting Material Related to Borovčanin’s
340

Inconsistencies with Prior Statements
Discrepancies between in-court testimony and earlier accounts or between the
testimonies of different witnesses on the same events in relation to matters peripheral
to the charges in the indictment in general weaken the credibility of the witness in
question. 1378 Discrepancies must, however, be looked at in light of the testimony as a
whole, and the overall credibility of each particular witness, 1379 as well as the
testimony of other witnesses, 1380 and documents. 1381 Significant lapses of time
between the events, written and oral statements, 1382 language and translation problems
may provide an explanation for discrepancies. 1383 Also, different techniques of
questioning a witness may result in different answers. A witness may, for instance,
provide new information or additional details in court which he had not provided
before because he was not specifically asked questions about it. 1384 Thus, a lot
depends on the “conditions under which the prior statement was provided, as well as
on other factors relevant to, or indicia of, the prior statement’s reliability or
credibility, or both”. 1385

In general, great faith is placed on the oath. Sworn testimony, particularly when tested
in cross-examination, is usually given considerably more weight than an unsworn
written statement. 1386 The test of cross-examination is arguably the most effective tool
to test a witness’s credibility, but it is questionable how much extra value the oath
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brings. 1387 It is uncertain whether the oath has the same value in every culture.
Particularly the fact that witnesses must take the oath before a foreign jurisdiction in a
foreign country may undermine the effect of it.

It is often the case that witnesses have an interest in the outcome of the trial, which
may influence their testimony even if given under oath. This may occur
subconsciously, which makes the witnesses still fall in the category of ‘honest’
witnesses, or consciously, which transforms them into ‘dishonest’ witnesses. Over
and over again, history has shown that, notwithstanding the oath, there are ample
witnesses who deliberately attempt to mislead the court for a variety of reasons. It has
been evidenced that this is no different in international trials. 1388

The oath aims to ensure that witnesses will be telling the truth in court. They can,
however, only tell the truth as they perceived it. Perceptions of what happened may
vary from ‘honest’ witness to ‘honest’ witness, depending on a witness’s background
and personal circumstances. They may each give a different account of the same
event while all are telling the truth. As a Cambodian lawyer before the ECCC stated,
the truth is too complex to be monolithic. 1389

There may also be a disparity between what occurred and a witness’s memory of what
occurred. Trauma and time lapse may have a particular impact on the accuracy of a
witness’s testimony. As principal reasons for erroneous identifications, Wagenaar
mentions the time lapse between the events and the identification, the trauma of the
witnesses, the confusion with images published in the media and mistakes made in the
identification process, such as suggestive gestures by the investigator or
distinguishing features between the image of the alleged perpetrator and the images of
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the other persons. 1390 Misidentification even by many honest and convincing
witnesses is a common phenomenon and has led the UK to adopt guidelines directing
juries in eye-witness identification cases. 1391

In this regard, it is troubling that the judges in Gacumbitsi relied on one
uncorroborated witness, whose oral testimony departed significantly from her
previous statement, 1392 to find that the accused had instructed people through a
microphone to rape Tutsi women. She had not seen him, but heard his voice through
the microphone. The Chamber found that she knew him sufficiently well to be able to
identify him by his voice. 1393 The potential unreliability of a voice-identification is
even more apparent than that of a face-to-face identification. 1394

By contrast, Musliu in the ICTY case of Limaj et al had been acquitted
notwithstanding that two witnesses who knew him had identified him by his voice as
he was wearing a mask. 1395

It is also disconcerting that Chambers, in general, have a tendency to believe
traumatised victim witnesses irrespective of discrepancies in their testimony. Indeed,
where it concerns victim witnesses, Chambers hold that minor discrepancies are to be
1390
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expected in light of the time lapse between the events and the witness’s testimony and
the impact of trauma, none of which generally discredit the witness. 1396

Frequently, however, the discrepancies judges excuse on such grounds are not that
minor. For instance, in the Akayesu trial, one witness had previously declared that one
of his three brothers was killed by the accused by gun while the other two brothers
were killed by machetes by associates of the accused as they tried to escape. At trial,
however, this witness testified that the three of them were shot by the accused. His
testimony also differed from his previous statement in that he had previously stated
that he had buried his brothers. Under cross-examination, he declared that he had no
time to bury his brothers and that someone else buried them instead. 1397

These are significant discrepancies which are difficult to explain away because of
trauma or translation errors. If a witness is so traumatised that he can no longer recall
whether he buried his brothers or not, then such a witness should not be relied on in
determining the guilt or innocence of an accused. Nonetheless, the Trial Chamber
found that the witness gave a truthful account of events and that he did so without
exaggeration or hostility. 1398 Accordingly, the Chamber relied substantially on his
testimony for finding Akayesu guilty as charged.

This accords with the Akayesu Chamber’s premise that all the witnesses suffered from
post-traumatic or extreme stress disorders and “[i]nconsistencies or imprecisions in
the testimonies, accordingly, have been assessed in the light of this assumption,
personal background and the atrocities they have experienced or have been subjected
to”. 1399 Moreover, “there is no recognised rule of evidence that traumatic
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circumstances necessarily render a witness’s evidence unreliable. It must be
demonstrated in concreto why “the traumatic context” renders a given witness
unreliable”. 1400

In general, victim witnesses are believed easier than other witnesses, particularly
“insider” witnesses. Judges rarely dare to conclude that a victim witness is dishonest.
However, victim witnesses are human beings like anyone else and equally prone to
dishonesty as anyone else. They may similarly have an incentive to lie, for instance
for reasons of revenge, a sense of duty to the community or solidarity with other
victims. Judges could easily mistake a credible liar for an honest witness, particularly
if the witness in question was a victim of horrific events. Even for professional
judges, it is easy to get carried away by the often shocking nature of the victim’s
narrative. 1401

However, in the ICTR, there has been a change in attitude of the judges. In more
recent cases, many witnesses are looked at with caution and can be relied on only if
corroborated. This is the case even for victim witnesses who depart significantly from
their prior statements. 1402

Adoption of more stringent guiding principles
Apart from these guiding principles, the judges are entirely free in assessing the
evidence. Evidence is to be assessed in the overall circumstances and in its overall
context. The judges should not look at the evidence of each witness separately as if it
existed in a hermetically sealed compartment; it is the accumulation of all the
evidence in the case which must be considered. The evidence of one witness, when
1400

Kunarac Appeal Judgment, paras 12 and 267; Furundzija Appeal Judgment, para 109, holding that
“[t]here is no reason why a person with [post-traumatic stress disorder] cannot be a perfectly reliable
witness”. Some Chambers have, however, been more cautious in relying on traumatised witnesses. For
instance, in the ICTY case of Limaj, in evaluating the reliability of the testimonies given by
traumatised witnesses, the Trial Chamber took into consideration “that any observation they made at
the time may have been affected by stress and fear; this has called for particular scrutiny on the part of
the Chamber.” Limaj Trial Judgment, para 15.
1401
Primo Levi, Les naufragés et les rescapés, cited in book authored by Stephanie Maupas (Juges,
bourreaux, victimes, voyage dans les pretoires de la Justice internationale, edition Autrement, 2009):
« Il est naturel et évident que le matériau le plus substantiel pour la reconstruction de la vérité sur les
camps soit constitué par les souvenirs des survivants. Au-delà de la pitié et de l’indignation qu’ils
provoquent, il faut les lire d’un œil critique ».
1402
See, for instance, Prosecutor v. Bizimungu Casimir et al, Case No. ICTR-99-50-T, Judgement and
Sentence, September 2011, paras. 757-764.
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considered in isolation, may appear at first to be of poor quality, but may gain
strength from other evidence in the case. The converse also holds true. 1403 Witness
testimonies can also be relied on in part, and rejected in other. 1404

Thus, in general, there are no clear criteria that should be followed in assessing the
evidence, which falls within the discretionary domain of the Chamber. On occasions
defendants have complained that the Chambers have not established sufficiently clear
criteria in order to assess the weight of evidence. 1405 In response the Appeals
Chamber pointed out that “it is neither possible nor proper to draw up an exhaustive
list of criteria for the assessment of evidence, given the specific circumstances of each
case and the duty of the judge to rule on each case in an impartial and independent
manner”. 1406 In this regard the ICTY Trial Chamber in Strugar held that:

the general background circumstances to material events, and the actual course of
material events, at times has offered valuable assistance in the task of determining
where the truth lies in a body of conflicting and inconsistent oral and documentary
evidence about a particular issue…. As will be seen, the Chamber has accepted some
evidence notwithstanding the presence of contradicting or inconsistent evidence. At
times, the Chamber rejected evidence despite the presence of other consistent evidence.
At times, the Chamber has been persuaded it should accept only part of the evidence of
a witness, while rejecting other parts. Where this has occurred it has been done in light
of the other evidence on the issue and only after very careful scrutiny indeed of the
witness and the evidence. 1407

It is indeed impossible to establish clear guidelines as to how to assess evidence. One
can regulate the collection, presentation and admissibility of the evidence, but it is
much harder to set criteria for the assessment of evidence. No criterion can properly
assist the triers of fact in the determining the key question “whether, and how far, he
ought to believe what the witnesses say”; and if yes “what inference should be
drawn”. 1408 Evaluating evidence is a personal business that cannot be regulated. Two
reasonable persons can look at information and draw completely different
1403

Tadic Judgment on Allegations of Contempt, para 92.
Prosecutor v. Strugar, Trial Chamber Judgment (31 Jan 2005), para. 7.
1405
See, inter alia, Kayishema and Ruzindana Appeal Judgment, paras 307–11.
1406
Ibid, para 319.
1407
ICTY Prosecutor v Strugar, Trial Chamber Judgment (31 Jan 2005), para 7.
1408
Frank, Courts on Trial, supra note 38, 152. See also John Henry Wigmore, ‘All the artificial rules
of Admissibility might be abolished; yet the principles of Proof would remain, so long as trials remain
as a rational attempt to seek the truth in legal controversies’ (VII Works 599). In: ‘A Treatise on the
Anglo-American System of Evidence in Trials at Common Law’ (cited in Twining: Rethinking
Evidence).
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conclusions. Guidelines or directives can barely prevent a judge from deciding one
way or the other.

With regard to assessing documentary evidence, some objective criteria could be
adopted. For instance, one can argue that a document with an authentic stamp or
signature has more value than one without. More frequently though in the context of
international tribunals, a document’s value may only be apparent upon the full
presentation of the evidence and whether the document actually corroborates or is at
odds with the larger body of evidence. The weight should also be considered
significantly reduced when it is not introduced through a witness. Given the lack of
cultural familiarity of the judges, it will be hard for them to assess whether a
document is authentic unless an explanation is given as to what it is about. In general,
judges have assessed the weight of documents fairly. Apart from contemporaneous
documents, little weight is normally attached to documents.

The primary source of evidence, however, constitutes witness testimony. The
assessment of witness credibility does not lend itself to strict regulations. A person
who, on the face of it, has an incentive to lie may in fact not lie; and a person who has
the appearance to be credible may not be credible. Thus, the assessment of a person is
a case-per-case determination which can be based only on intuition, at times spot on,
at other times not at all.

Only a limited number of factors can objectively and in all circumstances be said to
undermine or strengthen a witness’s credibility. Thus, only broad criteria have been
developed to assess witness testimony. For instance, it has been held that, in order to
determine the credibility of viva voce witnesses the Trial Chamber must consider
“their demeanour, conduct and character”, as well as “the probability, consistency and
other features of their evidence, including the corroboration which may be
forthcoming from other evidence and circumstances of the case”, as well as “the
knowledge of the facts upon which they give evidence, their disinterestedness,
integrity [and] veracity”. 1409 Chambers have further acknowledged that an incentive

1409

Brdjanin Trial Judgment, para 25. See also Akayesu Appeal Judgment, para 128. Blagojevic Trial
Judgement, para 23.
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to lie or a particular bias against or in favour of the accused are factors undermining a
witness’s credibility. 1410

In addition, corroboration or at least significant partial corroboration could and should
be made a requirement for any verdict of guilt or significant factual findings
underpinning the verdict. This would undoubtedly reduce the risk of error. Given the
importance of fact-finding precision particularly in light of the greater risks of
fabrication in international criminal justice, requiring corroboration in all
circumstances may well be advisable. Corroboration should particularly be required
where there are ample potential corroborative witnesses available. For instance, if a
witness testifies to a meeting, which was attended by many people, there is no good
reason to rely on one witness only as evidence that such meeting took place or in the
manner alleged.

Corroboration of such evidence is even more essential where the defence has called
one or more witnesses to testify about the same events but with a completely different
narrative. 1411 Also, in situations where the defence relies on an alibi to support its
assertion that the accused was not present at a particular meeting, his presence at such
meeting should not be accepted on the basis of one witness alone. 1412

1410

Limaj Trial Judgement, para 13.
The Chamber in Prosecutor v. Nsengiyumva and Bagosora, Judgement and Sentence 18 December
2008, ICTR-98-41-T, indeed showed reluctance to do. For instance, Witness AAA, a Hutu local
official in Kigali, testified that, between mid and late April 1994, he attended a meeting of the Kigali
prefecture security council in which Kabiligi participated as a military representative together with
Colonel Luc Marchal and General Gatsinzi and that General Kabiligi promised to deliver weapons,
which was done at the end of April (T. 14 June 2004 pp. 12-13, 17-20, 26-27; T. 15 June 2004 pages 2,
84-85, 87-89). However, this was contradicted by a defence witness who was said to have held the
meeting. This witness claimed not to know witness AAA, and that he met Kabiligi only in June 1994
(T. 23 Feb 2006, p. 4, 61-62, 65-67; T. 24 Feb 2006, pp. 28, 35-37). Even the Prosecution admitted that
witness AAA is not “worthy of being described as a wholly believable witness” but invites the
Chamber to accept certain aspects of his testimony (Prosecution Closing Brief, para. 1471). In these
circumstances, the Chamber did not rely on him (paras. 1548-1557).
1412
Again, in Bagosora et al, the Chamber did not rely on a witness who testified that Kabiligi presided
over a meeting at Ruhengeri Military Camp on 15 February 1994. Kabiligi provided an alibi for this
date. Luc Marchal, the Belgian Colonel in charge of the Belgian UN soldiers in Kigali testified that
Kabiligi was in a meeting with him in Kigali on that day. He even provided the court with his minutes
of that meeting. The witness was uncorroborated and convicted and sentenced to death in Rwanda. His
appeal was pending during his testimony (T. 12 October 2004, pp. 11-12, 48-49), Kabiligi Defence
Exhibit 85 (Judgment of 16 August 2001, Military Court Rwanda) p. 201. Particularly in light of
Kabiligi’s alibi, the Chamber did not rely on this witness. Nonetheless, it was not prepared to discredit
him entirely. See: Prosecutor v. Nsengiyumva and Bagosora, Judgement and Sentence 18 December
2008, ICTR-98-41-T, paras. 275, 290, 298, 299, 1558-1567.
1411
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Corroboration, however, does not offer any guarantee of accuracy. As Wagenaar has
pointed out, even many honest witnesses can mistakenly identify the accused as the
perpetrator, particularly when they are traumatised and a long time has lapsed. 1413 In
addition, evidence concoction can take place on a large scale. 1414 Thus, corroboration
of testimonies, even by many witnesses, “does not establish the credibility of those
testimonies”. 1415 Some witnesses are so inherently unreliable, and found to be so in
each and every case in which they testify that they should not be relied on even if
corroborated. Chambers are very reluctant ever to discredit a witness completely even
if they lied routinely in previous statements or in Rwandan courts. 1416 They treat such
witnesses with caution but may rely on them in part and where corroborated. In light
of the frequent allegations of witness tampering particularly at the ICTR, judges
should be even more cautious than they are today.

In addition, reliance on double or further remote hearsay, or hearsay evidence from
anonymous witnesses should be reconsidered. Either more stringent criteria for the
admissibility of such evidence should be adopted or judges should set aside such
evidence irrespective of the existence of corroborative evidence. Evidence must have
1413

W.A. Wagenaar: Identifying Ivan: A Case Study in Legal Psychology (Cambridge, M.A Harvard
University Press, 1988).
1414
For instance, see: In Prosector v Akayesu ICTR-96-4-A, 16 May 2001 Arret (Requete Aux Fins de
Renvoi De L’affaire Devant La Chambre de Premiere Instance I), the Defence was unsuccessful in
reopening the trial, or having fresh evidence admitted on appeal, from a Tutsi witness, BBB, who came
forward after trial to provide a detailed, notarized statement to the effect that evidence against Akayesu
was systematically manufactured with the intervention of government agents. In Prosecutor v
Ntakirutimana, ICTR No-96-10, ICTR-96-17-T, defence witnesses provided similar testimony
(Witness 9 and Witness 31). The same thing happened in Prosecutor v Rutaganda ICTR-96-3 (Witness
DD), (see False Witnesses Testified to Genocide Court” inews@habari.co.tz, March 17, 1999) and in
the “Media Trial,” Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza and Ngeze ICTR-99-52-T, (Witness RM 14)
(see “Genocide Survivors Coerced me to Lie, Says Defence Witness,” Foundation Hirondelle Hirondelle Press Agency in Arusha International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 16 January 2003.) In
Prosecutor v Kajelijeli ICTR-98-44-T, a death row inmate testified that he and his family were
threatened by a Rwandan prosecutor if he testified in the defence of the former Rwandan mayor. He
claimed that he was promised his death sentence would be commuted if he did not testify (see “State
Prosecutor Threatened Me Against Testifying, Says Defence Witnesses,” Foundation Hirondelle Hirondelle Press Agency in Arusha International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 21 November 2002.
1415
Musema Trial Judgment, para 46; Tadic Judgment on Allegation on Contempt Against Prior
Counsel Milan Vujin, para 92.
1416
For instance, Ruggiu was discredited by the Cyangugu Chamber. In Bagosora et al, the Chamber
did not follow this example but treated him with caution. See Prosecutor v. Nsengiyumva and
Bagosora, Judgement and Sentence 18 December 2008, ICTR-98-41-T, para. 1984. For other examples
where inherently unreliable witnesses, who departed drastically from their prior statements, were
treated with caution, see paras. 251, 252, 258-274, 292-338, 1645, 1715, 1731. The Chamber did not
discredit a single one of them entirely, but required corroboration. Even Serushago, who gave a
different account in each case he testified, was treated with caution and relied on in parts (see also
Nahimana et al Judgment, para. 824).
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a minimum level of inherent quality before it should be considered even if it is relied
on only to demonstrate peripheral matters or is heavily corroborated. If sufficient
other evidence is available, there is no need to rely on such evidence. If insufficient
other evidence is available, the particular element that is sought to be established can
simply not be established. Otherwise, a risk exists that the “beyond reasonable doubt”
standard be lowered to enter a conviction on insufficient credible and reliable
evidence.
Evaluation by the Appeals Chamber
The Appeals Chamber is often compared with the Appeals Chamber in common law
rather than civil law jurisdictions, as it usually stays away from the facts. The
appellate proceedings do not constitute a trial de novo and the witnesses will not be
called back. It is unusual for the Appeals Chamber to hear new witnesses. New
evidence on appeal will only be admitted if relevant and credible, it was not available
at trial and it could have been a decisive factor in reaching the decision at trial. 1417
Thus, unless the Trial Chamber’s factual determination is wholly erroneous, or no
reasonable Chamber could have reached the same finding, the Appeals Chamber’s
usual reasoning is that the Trial Chamber was in a much better position to evaluate the
evidence having been able to assess the demeanour of the witnesses. 1418

The Appeals Chamber rightly refrains from assessing the credibility of witnesses it
has not seen, or the reliability of their testimonies it has not heard. Yet, the Appeals
Chamber routinely overturns verdicts. Mostly, findings are overturned on the basis of
an incorrect application of a legal principle. This is, for instance, the case where
established facts were not pleaded in sufficient detail in the indictement, 1419 or where
the evidentiary standard of an alibi assessment was incorrectly applied. 1420

1417

Rule 115 (B) ICTY/ICTR Rules. See Prosecutor v Semanza (Decision on Additional Evidence)
ICTR-97-20-A (5 April 2005). See Inneke Onsea and Linda Bianchi, ‘Additional Evidence on Appeal,
Review Proceedings and the Remedy of Reconsideration’, Ch 16 in: Khan, Principles of Evidence.
1418
Ibid. See also Prosecutor v. Nsengiyumva and Bagosora, Judgement and Sentence 18 December
2008, ICTR-98-41-T, para. 18; Krstic Appeal Judgment, para. 40; Munyakazi Appeal Judgment, para.
8; Setako Appeal Judgment, para. 10; Muvunyi Appeal Judgment of 1 April 2011, para. 10.
1419
See, for instance, Prosecutor v. Kupreskic et al, Appeals Chamber Judgment of 23 October 2001,
para. 92; Prosecutor v. Muvunyi, Appeals Chamber Judgment, 29 August 2008, para. 18.
1420
Prosecutor v. Zigiranyirazo, ICTR-01-73-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, 16 November 2009,
paras. 36-52.
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In addition, the Appeals Chamber can, and often does, review the level of consistency
and coherency of the Trial Chamber’s own analysis of the facts set out in great detail
in its judgment easily counting 500 or more pages. For instance, in the case of
Bagosora et al, the Chamber relied exclusively on prosecution witness HV for finding
that soldiers participated in the attack at Mudende University in the morning of 8
April 1994. 1421 The Chamber found her identification of at least two soldiers based on
their camouflage uniforms reliable as she was in a position to follow the attack briefly
from close-up, heard gunfire and was personally questioned by a soldier. 1422
The Appeals Chamber was not convinced and reversed this factual finding. 1423 It
relied on the Chamber’s own doubts of the same witness’s identification of soldiers
present at Mudende University in the evening of 7 April 1994, and her identification
in the evening of 8 April 1994 of masked assailants carrying lists as soldiers. 1424 As
the witness no longer recalled whether the soldiers were wearing berets - the main
distinguishing feature in the uniforms of soldiers of different units or gendarmes 1425 in the opinion of the Appeals Chamber, no reasonable Chamber could have concluded
beyond reasonable doubt that these men in uniform were in fact soldiers. 1426 This was
so, particularly in light of the witness’s confusion on the issue of identification in her
written statement of 28 November 1995, 1427 as well as the fact that none of the
Defence witnesses who had witnessed the attack and whom the Trial Chamber found
credible, had identified soldiers among the attackers. 1428 According to the Appeals
Chamber, the fact that gunfire was used did not necessarily imply the presence of
soldiers. 1429

The Appeals Chamber did not make its own assessment of the credibility of the
witness, but relied on the Trial Chamber’s own analysis in finding that the part of
1421

Bagosora Trial Judgment, para. 1248.
Bagosora Trial Judgment, para. 1248.
1423
Bagosora Appeal Judgment, paras 352-362.
1424
Bagosora Appeal Judgment, para. 359, relying on: Trial Judgment, paras. 1246, 1249.
1425
Bagosora Trial Judgment, para. 166.
1426
Bagosora Appeal Judgment, paras 361-362.
1427
Initially, the witness had stated that the soldiers were wearing red caps, but in an addendum to this
statement on 10 September 2003, the witness corrected this and stated that she only recalled the
gendarmes wearing caps. See Bagosora Appeal Judgment, footnote 830.
1428
Bagosora Appeal Judgment, para. 360.
1429
Bagosora Appeal Judgment, para. 358, relying on the Trial Chamber’s finding that civilians were
trained and armed (Bagosora Trial Judgment, paras 489, 1203).
1422
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witness HV’s testimony relating to the identification of soldiers could not serve as the
basis for a finding beyond reasonable doubt.

In the same judgment, the Appeals Chamber held that the Trial Chamber erred in
relying on witness XBG whose reliability it seriously questioned. It expressed clear
concerns about his general credibility and reliability and rejected certain aspects of his
testimony. The Chamber nonetheless relied on him on the issue of the participation of
soldiers in a particular attack because this had been consistent allegation. 1430 The
Appeals Chamber, however, noted that his accounts of the circumstances of the
soldiers’ involvement and role in the killings differed significantly between his prior
statements to the Rwandan judiciary and his testimony in the case. In these
circumstances, the Appeals Chamber considered that “a reasonable trier of fact would
not have relied on Witness XBG’s evidence of soldiers assisting civilians and playing
a supporting role as Tutsis were sought out and killed, even as mere background
evidence”. 1431 For Nsengiyumva, it made no difference because there was an
additional witness testifying to the same event who did not need corrobration. 1432

In addition, in correcting errors of law, which the Appeals Chamber does not hesitate
from doing, the Appeals Chamber often corrects the corresponding factual findings.
For instance, where the Appeals Chamber finds an error of law arising from the
application of an incorrect legal standard, the Appeals Chamber will enunciate the
correct legal standard and review the Chamber’s relevant findings of fact
accordingly. 1433 In doing so, the Appeals Chamber “not only corrects the legal error,
but, when necessary, also applies the correct legal standard to the evidence contained
in the trial record and determines whether it is itself convinced beyond reasonable
doubt as to the factual finding challenged by the appellant before that finding may be
confirmed on appeal.” 1434

In the ICTY, the Appeals Chamber also often finds that the established facts do not
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Bagosora Trial Judgment, paras 1243, 1244, 1254.
Bagosora Appeals Chamber’s Judgment, para. 257.
1432
Bagosora Appeals Chamber’s Judgment, para. 258.
1433
Bagosora Appeals Chamber’s Judgment, para. 17; Munyakazi Appeal Judgment, para. 7; Setako
Appeal Judgment, para. 9; Muvunyi Appeal Judgment of 1 April 2011, para. 9.
1434
Ibid.
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match the legal findings, or that the legal finding is not the only reasonable inference
that can be drawn from the facts. 1435 It has also found that the Chamber erred in not
drawing the only reasonable inference on the facts. 1436 For instance, in the case of
Martić the Appeals Chamber found that the Chamber had erred in establishing a link
between the defendant and the perpetrators of acts of destruction a number of murders
because the evidence did not demonstrate that he controlled or influenced these
perpetrators most of whom were unidentified. 1437 Orić was acquitted on appeal
because only one of his subordinates had been identified as having committed crimes
against Serbian detainees. In addition, the evidence failed to demonstrate that Orić
was even aware of the commission of these crimes, let alone that his one subordinate
took part in them. 1438

Thus, with increasing frequency, the Appeals Chamber reverses the Chambers’
verdicts, both the legal and factual findings. The time that the Chamber’s verdict was
final is clearly over. Common law practitioners find this problematic, particularly
when an acquittal is reversed or the sentence is increased. 1439 It is also not a foregone
conclusion that the Appeals Chamber always gets it right and issues better judgments
than the Trial Chambers. Nonetheless, it means that more eyes have gone over the

See, for instance: Prosecutor v. DRAGOMIR MILOŠEVIĆ, IT-98-29/1-A, Appeals Judgment of 12
November 2009, where the Chamber found that it was unreasonable for the Trial Chamber “to infer
that Milošević ordered the shelling of the BITAS building and the Markale Market on the mere basis
that the incidents in question were similar to the ones that took place in his presence and thus were part
of “the overall plan and general orders of Milošević” (para. 293).
1436
For instance, in the case of Veselin Šljivančanin, the Appeals Chamber entered an additional
conviction for aiding and abetting the murder of 194 prisoners on the basis that “upon learning of the
order to withdraw the JNA troops from Mrkšić at their meeting of the night of 20 November 1991, the
only reasonable inference is that Šljivančanin must have been aware that the TOs and paramilitaries
would likely kill the prisoners of war and that if he failed to act, his omission would assist in the
murder of the prisoners” (Prosecutor v. Veselin Šljivančanin, IT-95-13-A, Appeals Judgment of 5 May
2009 and 8 December 2010 (Case number IT-95-13/l-R.1) para. 63; also paras. 74, 75, 81, 99, 100,
103). The conviction was later vacated when new evidence was presented to a new Appeals Chamber
(Prosecutor v. Veselin Šljivančanin, IT-95-13/I-R.1, Appeals Judgment of 8 December 2010, paras. 23,
30, 32, 36).
1437
Prosecutor v. Martic, IT-95-11-A, Appeals Judgment of 8 October 2008, paras. 192-193, 199-201,
207-208, 210-214.
1438
Prosecutor v. Orić, IT-03-68-A, Appeals Judgment of 3 July 2008, paras. 47-48, 57, 60, 188-189.
1439
The most striking example is the case of Haradinaj, Balaj and Brahimaj, two of whom were
acquitted (Haradinaj and Balaj), and who are now being re-tried on the basis that the Prosecutor was
given insufficient time to seek to arrange for the appearance of two reluctant witnesses (Prosecutor v.
Haradinaj et al, Appeals Chamber Judgment, IT-04-84-A, 19 July 2010, paras. 41-43). These
witnesses, however, still refuse to appear. Meanwhile, the Prosecutor has been allowed to call
additional evidence (Interview with Gregor Guy-Smith in The Hague, 12 April 2011). See further
above, section ‘uncooperative witnesses, ICTY’.
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facts, which increases the chances of fact-ascertaining accuracies. The evaluation of
factual witnesses correctly remains within the Trial Chamber’s domaine.

The scope of the appeal review at the ICC is yet to be determined but appears to be
wider than that at the ICTY and ICTR. The Statute and Rules do not impose any limit
on the production of new evidence and explicitly leave open the possibility for the
Appeals Chamber to call witnesses. 1440 It is, however, highly unlikely that the
appellate proceedings will be the equivalent of a trial de novo. 1441

PART IV
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1440

Article 83(2) ICC Statute.
Since the ICC has not yet completed any of its trials, its jurisprudence cannot form part of the
analysis on the evaluation of the evidence.
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CONCLUSION

In conclusion, I agree with Combs that the ascertainment of the facts in international
tribunals thus far has been highly problematic. This thesis has identified numerous
causes of fact-ascertaining inaccuracies. They will be discussed below.

Can a Mixed System be a Fair and Effective Truth-Ascertaining System?

Mixed Legal Principles
Many observers have expressed concern that blending the civil law and common law
types of procedure can lead to a dysfunctional international court or tribunal. This
thesis, however, suggests otherwise. Whilst a number of difficulties have arisen due to
unfamiliarity of international practitioners with the new procedure, this is not the
main cause of fact-ascertaining impediments. International lawyers had to adjust
themselves to a new way of thinking, which initially did not come naturally but has
improved over time. The initial adjustment problems were principally based on
criticism against the other system, rather than the mixing of systems. Slowly, a new
international vocabulary and philosophy is emerging.
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In law, with some exceptions, international justice has taken the best of both worlds.
It has combined the two-party common law model with the judge-led civil law model
in a manner doing justice to the philosophy behind both models. Whilst the parties
retain their independence in conducting investigations and presenting their cases to
the judges, the judges have discretion to intervene in that independence where
necessary to uphold the fairness and expeditiousness of the proceedings or to
ascertain the truth.

The Statutes and rules give important weight to the rights of the accused, which take
precedence over the rights of the victims and witnesses. Provided the judges are fair,
as they should be according to the Statutes and rules, the defence has a genuine
opportunity to present its case in a fair manner in equality with the Prosecution. The
parties must respect the dignity of the witnesses in testing their credibility. If not, the
judges legitimately have a discretion to intervene. Humiliating witnesses is not
necessary for the ascertainment of their credibility and should indeed be disallowed
by the judges.

The judges are also entitled to fill in the evidentiary gaps left by the parties. They can
ask additional questions and order that further evidence be produced. If done
properly, this discretion can genuinely contribute to the ascertainment of the truth. It
ensures that the parties cannot manipulate the truth and present only partially what a
witness has to say in favour of their case. It equally ensures that the Court can
complement the two one-sided truths presented by the parties if this is in fact the case.

The powers of the judiciary remain, however, limited in conducting investigations. In
the absence of investigative judicial officers, the judges exclusively rely on the parties
to collect the evidence. This thesis has demonstrated that the parties do not have equal
opportunities in conducting investigations. In addition, the means available to the
defence are not always adequate. To remedy this imbalance, the ICC drafters sensibly
included an obligation on the Prosecution to search for incriminating and exculpatory
information equally. If done properly and not at the expense of defence investigations,
this provision strengthens the truth-ascertaining system.
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Thus, overall, there is no problem with mixing the two types of procedure, provided
that the legal principles are truly implemented in practice. They complement each
other and fill each other’s gaps.

In theory, international justice systems also meet the requirements set out in Part I.
The proceedings are transparent, open and fair and potentially offer the judges
sufficient access to relevant and reliable information from all sides. In theory, the
judges are highly experienced and professionally trained. They should thus be able to
engage with the information while keeping an appropriate distance to the information
providers.

Mixed Legal Principles Applied in Practice
The fact-ascertaining impediments are not so much caused by the law, but rather by
the law in action. The implementation of the law depends on the quality of those
implementing it, as well as the conditions in which they must carry out this task.

As regards the conditions unique to international justice, this thesis has focused
particularly on the reliance on State cooperation and cultural diversity.

State Cooperation
This thesis has established that there is a dilemma between the need to cooperate with
States while conducting investigations independently of those States. A particular
problem arises where the State was one of the belligerents in the conflict. Such a State
has a clear interest in who will be charged. If a State does not agree with the
Prosecutor’s focus of his investigations, it may seek to manipulate or even prevent
them. Thus, in order for the Prosecutor to be successful some level of political
compromise may be deemed necessary. However, the ICTR and ICC Prosecutors
have clearly gone too far in this respect, effectively rendering immunity to rebel
groups associated with a number governments. The ICTY has not compromised, but
managed nonetheless to get everyone on its list. The ICTY Prosecutor had the
advantage of being backed by the European Union and NATO. Had the ICTR and
ICC Prosecutors been firmer in their refusal to compromise, they may also have had
the political support of such international organisations.
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Cultural Diversity
This thesis has also raised the problem of cultural and linguistic differences between
the witnesses and their assessors, as well as the problem of perjury. These problems
occur both at the investigative and trial stages. This thesis has also pointed out the
dangers for investigators and judges to be carried away by the horrific victim stories
and to be too victim-driven. This may lead them to believe victim witnesses too easily
without adequately scrutinising their credibility and the reliability of their stories.

Overall, the ICTY has done a much better job at ascertaining the facts than the ICTR.
Investigators got their hands on more reliable evidence than at the ICTR. Contrary to
Combs’ assumption, the principal explanation for this difference between the two
tribunals is not that the cultural differences with African regions are greater than with
the former Yugoslavia. Without underestimating the problems caused by cultural and
linguistic diversity, this thesis has demonstrated that such problems are not
insurmountable, nor the principal cause of the fact-finding impediments described in
Combs research as well as this thesis.

The main problem is the quality of people working in the international criminal courts
and tribunals. This thesis suggests that the quality of those involved in the
international law implementation varies significantly and can be improved.

Standard of Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt
Combs’ research principally focuses on the role of the judges. She concludes that the
judges do not always apply the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. This thesis
has not looked at the correctness of the actual findings. However, it has identified
numerous problem areas. It establishes that Chambers regularly find a fact proven
beyond a reasonable doubt on the basis of a single witness or on two or more
unreliable witnesses. In light of the numerous problems addressed in respect to
witness testimony, particularly the alleged witness interference at the ICTR, it is hard
to imagine any situation where a finding based on a non-corroborated witness can
objectively be seen as proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Similarly, if unreliable
testimony is corroborated by other unreliable testimony, the standard of proof beyond
reasonable doubt is not reached. It may be more likely than not that the accused is
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guilty as charged, but that does not equal the standard of proof beyond reasonable
doubt. To that extent, Combs is correct.

The ICTY has not relied on equally unsafe evidence. It must, however, be
acknowledged that it did not have to. In most cases, there are many documents in
support of witness testimony. There are tapped telephone conversations, videos and
contemporaneous documents including agendas, military documents and written
orders. The ICTY also did not have to deal with the same level of alleged witness
tampering as the ICTR. Thus, as a result, judges were able to apply the standard of
proof beyond reasonable doubt without the unfortunate consequence that most of the
accused are acquitted.

Until now, the ICC has not yet demonstrated whether it rigorously applies the
standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. However, the Pre-Trial Chambers have
shown preparedness not to confirm cases where the “substantial grounds to believe”
standard has not been met. This aspires confidence in the future of the ICC.

The quality of judges varies significantly. Defendants in front of properly trained and
experienced judges generally have a greater chance of receiving a fair trial. The
willingness to acquit has also increased with time. Initially, almost all accused were
found guilty. However, there is a drastic change, particularly at the ICTR. In recent
judgements, high profile accused including ministers have been acquitted. The
Appeals Chamber has also become increasingly rigorous in overturning Chambers’
findings. Thus, there is clearly a change in the attitude of the judges. There is more
awareness of problems with the evidence even where it stems from victims. It is much
more likely for an accused to be acquitted or receive a reduced sentence nowadays
than it was initially.

The best judges are not always recruited. However, there have been excellent judges
among them. In any event, this thesis suggests that the main failure of the
ascertainment of the truth is not caused by the judiciary. Rather, this thesis has
identified the failure of the Prosecution to adequately investigate the charges as the
principal cause of fact-finding impediments.
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Judges must be able to trust the Prosecution in conducting adequate investigations,
particularly given that they have no judicial officers at their disposal who they can
send out for clarifications. Their own experience in the field, if any, is limited to
judicial site visits. Important as they may be, they cannot replace adequate
investigations.

Once the evidence is presented to the judges for their assessment, their capacity to
rectify inadequate investigations is limited. They can call additional witnesses but
even then they rely on the evidence brought to their attention. They cannot make their
own independent inquiries. If the evidence is insufficient, they can only do one thing,
and that is to find that the standard of proof is not met. However, this does not
necessarily suggest that the truth has been found. Some of the accused are acquitted
simply because the Prosecution has failed to produce sufficient reliable evidence
demonstrating their guilt. This is regrettable if good quality evidence is readily
attainable but has not been presented to the Chamber. It is suggested that this is often
the case in international justice.

Victim Participation
Another area of concern is victim participation. What was a good idea in theory may
not work so well in practice. This is, however, not due to the blending of systems, but
rather to the unique circumstances in which international justice systems operate.
Victim participation significantly burdens the system while it remains to be seen
whether it delivers justice to the victims. It does not bring them closer to the
courtroom as their interests are served by lawyers who barely know their names. It
creates expectations for victims that may not be fulfilled. For now, it is unclear what
the system can offer to a continuously increasing number of victim participants.
Unmet expectations can lead to a ‘third victimisation’ as Judge Van Der Wijngaert
called it. 1442

It is difficult to verify the veracity of the stories of the victim participants. Most of
them will never appear before the Court. Accordingly, their stories are not tested
through examination by the judges and, or the parties. Given the potential financial
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gain for victim participants, their applications should be scrutinised more carefully.
Already, there have been cases of victim applicants who were not who they claimed
they were. 1443

In the courtroom, victim representatives act as additional prosecutors even if they are
meant to be neutral. It is perhaps unfair to expect victim representatives who clearly
have an interest in the outcome of the case to be neutral. The reparation of victims
depends on the finding of the guilt of the accused. Thus, the outcome is more
important for them than for the Prosecution. This can create an unfairness to the
accused, depending on how much leeway the judges offer to victim participants.
Different Chambers react differently to victim participants. While the Chamber in
Katanga & Ngudjolo has fairly balanced the rights and interests of the different
parties and participants, the Chambers in Bemba and Kenya favour victim participants
too strongly.

In charging and selecting appropriately the suspects before the ICC, victim
participants could make an effective contribution. Victims have a very direct interest
in who is charged for what crime. Their potential claim for reparation depends on
whether the Prosecutor has selected the crime for which the persons concerned are
victims. Thus, it would only be fair for them to challenge a Prosecutor’s decision not
to prosecute a particular person. However, the role of the victims in this regard is
limited. Victims are not in a position to challenge a non-prosecution and cannot
expand the scope of the charges. Victims can only request that charges be added if
they can be justified on the basis of the evidence brought by the Prosecution.

As this thesis has addressed, the Prosecutor’s selection of suspects does not always
appear to be based on complete independence and impartiality. In light of its
dependence on State cooperation, it is not always evident that the Prosecution can be
fully independent. An independent voice of the victims could therefore ensure that the
selection process is less influenced by political considerations.
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Accordingly, it is suggested that victim participants be given greater powers to
challenge the charges and non-charges against suspects at the preliminary stages.
However, their participation in the proceedings themselves should be reconsidered.
There could be a separate reparation stage once the guilt of an accused is established
in the courtroom. Victim participants can then fully participate and seek to gain
reparations for their sufferings. There is, however, little added value to their
participation in the criminal proceedings.

Victim participation may raise unrealistic hopes both as to the righting of individual
wrongs and as to the issue of compensation since no price is high enough to remedy
the injuries suffered. It is also unclear how victim participants will be remedied.
Given their increasing number, whatever they will receive in compensation will
probably be below expectations. This may then result in a “tertiary victimisation” as
Judge Van Der Wijngaert called it. 1444

Recommendations for Impr ovement

In conclusion, there is ample room for improvement. To address the cultural issues
properly, expert witnesses could be called. Judges can also learn a significant deal by
listening to the factual witnesses. Key is that judges are aware that witnesses do not
all react in the same manner and that their demeanour can sometimes be explained by
their cultural background. Cultural differences can also be exaggerated. To evaluate
this properly, it helps for the judges to have sufficient experience domestically in
dealing with many different types of witnesses.

It is certainly recommended, as suggested by Combs, that judges move to the location
in each and every case. Such a judicial site visit can be fruitful, not only to verify
whether witnesses could have seen what they claim they, but also for the judges to get
a sense for the local culture.

Most importantly, high quality judges must be recruited. As aforementioned, the
quality of judges can and should be increased. Bohlander has suggested a sensible
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way to improve the recruitment procedure of judges. He proposes to create an
international pool of potential candidates consisting of national judges with solid
experience in criminal trials and who are familiar with international criminal justice.
This pool of judges should receive training from internationally qualified trainers at
the national judicial academics. From this pool, a selection is made on the basis of
merit alone. Court experience as a defence or Prosecution trial attorney could be
accredited. However, diplomats and academics without any court experience should
be exempted. 1445

I agree with this proposition. However, I would not entirely exclude academics.
Academic judges can be well-equipped appeal judges. They could also be equipped as
trial judges provided that they are in a bench with a highly experienced presiding
judge.

Standard of Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt
Combs argues that it is not realistic to tackle the fact-finding impediments to such an
extent that accuracy of the outcome can be guaranteed. Yet, she is of the view that
convictions are needed to meet the objectives of international justice. She holds that
acquittals in international justice are more expensive than in domestic justice. She
bases this on the immense suffering of the victims and the need for these courts to
work effectively because of the expenses involved. Essentially, she bases it on the
secondary objectives of the international courts and tribunals. In light of this, she
suggests lowering the standard to a level which is more realistically achievable. 1446

Combs is not alone in this view. May and Hoskins state, “if standards are too high,
then it appears that the legacy of impunity, far from being successfully countered, will
in fact be continued through international criminal trials.” 1447 They suggest that
“careful consideration may need to be given to whether it is possible to ease specific
standards so as to make convictions possible but in a way that avoids the appearance
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or reality of replicating problematic patterns displayed during conflict or by repressive
regimes.” 1448

Also, in the context of the trial of former President of Malawi who was acquitted due
to lack of evidence to prove that he ordered the killings, Kadri, one of the Prosecutors
involved, observed that “for many people the fairness of the proceedings stood in
contrast to the inexplicability of the verdict, a salutary reminder that due process
alone will not deliver justice.” 1449

This thesis, however, suggests that there is no need to lower the standard. The
standard can be met if investigations are conducted more efficiently. Domestic justice
similarly deals with fact-finding impediments and has had to find practical solutions,
over the years. A practical solution is not to lower the standard. This undermines
justice and increases the chances of wrongful convictions. It is not clear on what basis
Combs believes that most people in international tribunals are guilty but that their
guilt cannot be established. This is a dangerous suggestion and not justified in the
absence of sufficient evidence to prove it.

There is no legitimate reason to treat international justice differently from domestic
justice in this regard. In both, one hopes that most defendants who appear are guilty.
If not, it means that the Prosecution has not done its job properly. If someone is not
guilty, ideally the person is filtered out at an earlier stage. However, it happens that
innocent people are being charged. This is precisely why it is so important to have a
careful evaluation on the basis of proof beyond reasonable doubt. The primary
purpose of any trial is to establish whether the accused is guilty as charged. This
should not be conflated with victims’ justice.

Chuter rightly suggests that it is a very dangerous notion that an international tribunal
can only be successful if it achieves a high conviction rate. 1450 On the contrary, it is
healthy for a judicial system to acquit. Acquittals show that a justice system works.
Only then will the Prosecutor be pushed to do a better job in the future. This is very
1448
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clear in the ICTR. For years, Prosecutors got away with inefficient investigations, as
their suspects were routinely found guilty. Recently, however, they do not get away
with such conduct any longer. They are often criticised for failing to disclose
exculpatory evidence. Recently, judges have been more prepared to acquit if the
evidence is too unconvincing. Had this occurred at an earlier stage, the ICTR would
most likely have operated much more efficiently.

Investigations
The option of investigative judges has been discussed. This shifts the burden of
impartiality to the investigative judges rather than the Prosecution. This is an option
that could be explored, provided that the investigative officers do not take over
completely from the defence. They could operate alongside the parties. This may,
however, be a costly option. Instead of changing the structure of international justice,
it is better to improve the system internally. First and foremost, the Prosecution can
and should change its investigation strategy.

Most importantly, the Prosecution should recruit competent investigators with an
open mind. It should have its investigators in the field and conduct onsite
investigations. Rather than rely on intermediaries whose identities are often not
disclosed to the defence, it is suggested that they should employ local investigators.
Being officially employed, local investigators are scrutinised to a much greater extent
than intermediaries. As well, the Prosecution must take responsibility for their
conduct. The best investigative teams are mixed, consisting of at least one local and
one international investigator. The investigative team should receive proper training
in investigative techniques.

The investigators must thoroughly scrutinise the credibility of their witnesses. To be
able to better assess their demeanour, investigators should familiarise themselves with
the local culture. They should also employ an interpreter who they fully trust, and
instruct them not to be overly creative in interpreting but rather to translate exactly
what the witness has stated.

It is not sufficient to interview witnesses at length. Investigators should refrain from
asking leading questions. They should interview the witnesses on numerous occasions
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to evaluate whether they are consistent. Their stories must be verified by speaking to
other sources. To the extent possible, investigators should always look for
corroboration. If a witness testifies to a meeting attended by various other people,
investigators should seek to interview these other people as well and compare their
stories. This proposed method is more time-consuming. However, it is of the utmost
importance for an adequate truth-ascertaining system that the investigations are
conducted thoroughly.

If investigations are efficient, there is no need to charge defendants with membership
of a joint criminal enterprise instead of other modes of liability, unless this is the most
appropriate liability mode on the basis of the evidence. It should not be relied on to
avoid difficulties in proving allegations under another mode of liability, as was
suggested by Combs. 1451

Secondary Objectives

It is difficult to determine in any situation whether the secondary objectives, e.g.
reconciliation, peace and security, and contribution to a historical record have been
achieved. International courts do not operate in a vacuum but are part of numerous
efforts to rebuild a transitional society. They are not “ends in themselves”, and can
only be successful if other measures are simultaneously being taken. 1452 The impact
of an international criminal tribunal can be the work of generations, “changing over
time and in the light of myriad mediating factors”. 1453 Clark suggests that “if impact is
not static but fluctuating, which further compounds the problem of measuring direct
impact, there is arguably a strong case to be made for longitudinal approaches to
impact assessment. Yet, such approaches themselves present considerable challenges,
not least in terms of time and resources.” 1454
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Thus, it is too early to assess properly whether the international tribunals and courts
have achieved their secondary objectives. However, it is not too early to make a
number of preliminary observations. The effectiveness of a truth-ascertaining system
in a wider sense than the legal establishment of guilt depends on the perception of the
affected communities. Only if they accept the outcome as truthful can the secondary
objectives potentially be met. This thesis has established that the truth about a conflict
“is multilayered and complex”, and, thus, there is not one mechanism which “can
capture the truth completely”. 1455 It has also concluded that it is a difficult task to
establish a truth that is “embracing enough to connect profoundly different views”. 1456

Clark’s empirical research conducted in different parts in the former Yugoslavia with
the involvement of different ethnic groups suggests that the ICTY did not bring the
ethnic communities closer together, at least not yet. In Clark’s observation, the three
ethnic groups still believe in their own truth, deny their own crimes, and disregard
some of the findings made by the ICTY. Clark concludes that this widespread denial
on all sides has obstructed the reconciliation process. 1457

Indeed, many Serbs continue to argue that the ICTY is an anti-Serb court, particularly
because the highest acquittal and low sentencing rate is among the Muslim
defendants. Also, many Serbs, including the less radical ones, disagree with the
finding that the massacre at Sebrenica amounted to a genocide. Some go further and
disagree with the number of deaths. The Croats are dissatisfied because their main
hero, Gotovina, has been convicted. The Muslim communities are irritated because
their heroes had to face international justice too. 1458

Overall, however, the ICTY has considerably more legitimacy in the eyes of the
affected communities than the ICTR or the ICC. Many individuals among all ethnic
communities in the former Yugoslavia continue to have faith in the work of the ICTY
and acknowledge its findings as truthful. The radical voices appear to have a limited
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audience only. The legitimacy of their arguments is undermined by the fact that the
crimes of all ethnic groups have been addressed. 1459

An international tribunal cannot achieve more than that. There will always be people
or interested groups who will contest the legitimacy of the tribunal and the accuracy
of the outcome. Reconciliation between the ethnic communities has not been a great
success. The ethnic communities continue to be suspicious of one another and stick to
their version of events. However, reconciliation is a process which does not happen
over night. Tribunals are not the only institutions that seek to assist this process.
Accordingly, their achievements must be considered in light of other peace and
reconciliation initiatives. If nothing else, at least the ICTY judgements opened a
debate about the past atrocities. This is the first step to reconciliation. Seeking to
achieve more is unrealistic and therefore unwise. A modest contribution to peace and
reconciliation would be a great achievement.

The reconciliation of the different views concerning the Rwanda conflict has proved
impossible and remains unresolved. The gap between different views, particularly of
Rwandans, appears to be growing and any possibility of reconciliation between
Rwanda’s ethnic groups (Hutu and Tutsi) seems to be increasingly remote. 1460 The
reason is that the entire focus has been on the genocide committed against the Tutsi
population. The Hutu population is bitter about the fact that their suffering has not
been acknowledged or addressed. 1461 Local communities in the DRC similarly appear
to have little faith in the tribunals. Many of them are of the view that the selection of
suspects by the tribunals are politically motivated. 1462

This apparent lack of faith from the local communities does not mean that attempts to
run international justice courts and tribunals should be dismissed altogether.
However, it is important to be realistic about what international justice can achieve. It
1459

Personal conversations with people in Kosovo (May 2005, July 2007), as well as Serbian attorneys
in The Hague (2004-2005).
1460
Personal conversations with Rwandans of Hutu and Tutsi origin, particularly those living in exile.
Over the years, their views have radicalised. See also Tribunal Penal International Pour le Rwanda:
Modele ou Contre-Modele pour la Justice Internationale? Le Point de Vue des Acteurs, Conference
held in Geneva in May 2009 (‘the Geneva Conference’), where some participants expressed views that
victims and perpetrators cannot be expected to reconcile.
1461
Clark, Transitional Justice, Truth and Reconciliation, supra note 68, 250-251.
1462
Personal conversations with local people in Ituri and North Kivu, February - March 2010.
368

is a stretch from reality to consider international courts and tribunals capable of
establishing the truth about the allegations against an accused on trial while
simultaneously establishing the truth about the conflict, restoring peace and security
and reconciling different communities who were previously at war with each other.
The claim that international criminal justice can achieve all these objectives at the
same time and through the same process equates aspiration with empiricism. Moral
claims are often taken as empirical statements, which is not only scientifically
unsound but also manipulative. 1463

Accordingly, it is strongly suggested that international tribunals and courts should not
focus on the secondary objectives although positive steps in their direction are of
course welcome. Tribunals should keep it simple and focus on establishing the facts
as accurately as possible in the circumstances. If this is done properly, there is a much
greater chance that the secondary objectives will also be served. A realistic and
modest perspective of what can be achieved is appropriate. The ascertainment of the
truth can never lead to absolutely certain results, let alone in the uncertain
circumstances in which international tribunals must operate. International tribunals
are conditioned by their structure and lack of independent modus operandus. Many
obstacles had to be overcome in securing arrests and conducting investigations. The
fact that these courts and tribunals have managed to function at all is an achievement
in and of itself.
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